CHERYL C. WOODS vs. STEVEN YOUNG, DEAN LERNER, ROBERT GALBRAITH, DEPARTMENT OF INSPECTIONS AND APPEALS, and THE STATE OF IOWA
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 28 / 05-1290
Filed May 11, 2007
CHERYL C. WOODS,
Appellant,
vs.
STEVEN YOUNG, DEAN LERNER,
ROBERT GALBRAITH, DEPARTMENT OF
INSPECTIONS AND APPEALS, and
THE STATE OF IOWA,
Appellees.
________________________________________________________________________
On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Robert J.
Blink, Judge.
Appeal from dismissal of cause of action for retaliatory discharge
from
employment.
DECISION
OF
COURT
OF
APPEALS
AND
JUDGMENT OF DISTRICT COURT AFFIRMED.
Pamela J. Walker of Sherinian & Walker Law Firm, West
Des Moines, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Jeffrey C. Peterzalek and
John R. Lundquist, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellees.
2
CADY, Justice.
This appeal was brought after the district court dismissed the
appellant’s lawsuit for retaliatory discharge. We transferred the case to
the court of appeals.
The court of appeals affirmed the district court
decision without an opinion under Iowa Rule of Appellate Procedure
6.24(1) and (4). We granted further review. Upon our review, we affirm
the district court judgment.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
This lawsuit evolves from two prior lawsuits. In the first lawsuit,
Cheryl Woods brought a small claims action against her employer, the
State of Iowa, after it refused to reimburse her for expenses incurred in
her employment.
She recovered a judgment.
In the second lawsuit,
Woods sued the State for retaliatory discharge from employment. She
alleged the State terminated her from her employment for pursuing the
small claims action, in violation of Iowa’s Wage Collection Act, Iowa Code
chapter 91A (2003), and in violation of public policy derived from the
prohibition under Iowa Code section 91A.10(5) against terminating an
employee for bringing an action against an employer. The second lawsuit
was terminated when the district court granted the State’s motion to
dismiss.
The district court held chapter 91A did not create a private
cause of action for an employee. It also held there was no common law
action for wrongful discharge based on public policy derived from chapter
91A, and in particular section 91A.10(5).
Woods did not appeal the
district court’s order and judgment.
Woods then filed the present action based on the same underlying
facts. However, Woods alleged she was terminated from her employment
contrary to the public policy as derived from a criminal statute, Iowa
3
Code section 720.4, prohibiting tampering with a witness.
Woods
claimed she was terminated due to the testimony and evidence she
presented during the hearing in the small claims action.
The district court dismissed the action, and Woods filed this
appeal.
She claims the doctrine of res judicata does not preclude a
second wrongful termination action after dismissal of the first wrongful
termination action because the first dismissal was not based on the
merits of her prior claim. Instead, she claims the lawsuit was dismissed
because claims concerning discharge from employment under chapter
91A are required to be brought in district court by the labor
commissioner, not by private parties. See Iowa Code § 91A.10(5) (“Any
employee may file a complaint with the commissioner alleging discharge
or discrimination within thirty days after such violation occurs.”).
Consequently, Woods claims the current lawsuit is a different claim than
the first lawsuit because it is based on a private cause of action
independent of chapter 91A, and is outside the doctrine of res judicata.
II. Issue and Standard of Review.
“On further review, we can review any or all of the issues raised on
appeal or limit our review to just those issues brought to our attention by
the application for further review.” Anderson v. State, 692 N.W.2d 360,
363 (Iowa 2005).
The issue brought to our attention by Woods’s
application for further review is the same issue she presented in her
original appeal and to the district court. The issue we must decide is
whether the district court properly applied the doctrine of res judicata in
granting the State’s motion to dismiss.
We review a motion to dismiss for errors at law. Crall v. Davis, 714
N.W.2d 616, 619 (Iowa 2006).
Thus, “we are not . . . bound by the
4
district court’s legal conclusions or application thereof.”
Wilson v.
Ribbens, 678 N.W.2d 417, 418 (Iowa 2004). However, if the district court
made findings of fact in ruling on the motion, we are bound by those
findings “so long as they are supported by substantial evidence.”
Id.
Substantial evidence will generally support the findings if they were
deduced from the pleadings. Id.
III. Discussion.
The doctrine of res judicata requires the dismissal of this action.
Although Woods could have initiated a complaint with the labor
commissioner following her termination from employment, she chose to
assert a right to a cause of action in district court based on the
termination of her employment. Once she made this choice and invoked
the jurisdiction of the district court, she was required to allege all
theories of recovery to support the alleged wrong against her. An action
between the same parties involving the same claim that has been
adjudicated by the court is final as to all issues that could have been
presented to the court. Bennett v. M.C. No. 619, Inc., 586 N.W.2d 512,
516 (Iowa 1998) (“[A] final judgment rendered by a court of competent
jurisdiction on the merits is conclusive as to the rights of the parties and
their privies, and, as to them, constitutes an absolute bar to a
subsequent action involving the same claim, demand or cause of
action.”).
A party is not entitled to bring a second action simply by
alleging a new theory of recovery for the same wrong. Id. Woods was
required to allege her various theories, including her public policy theory
under section 720.4, in the first action.
We conclude the district court properly dismissed Woods’s current
lawsuit. The prior action was an adjudication of the merits. See Iowa R.
5
Civ. P. 1.946 (“All dismissals not governed by rule 1.943 or not for want
of jurisdiction or improper venue, shall operate as adjudications on the
merits unless they specify otherwise.”). Woods chose to pursue her prior
claim independent of her right to file a complaint with the commissioner
of labor, and the district court had subject matter jurisdiction to
determine if Woods could bring the private cause of action she sought.
See Penn v. Iowa State Bd. of Regents, 577 N.W.2d 393, 401 (Iowa 1998)
(noting the doctrine of res judicata does not apply if subject matter
jurisdiction was lacking in the previous action).
The doctrine of res
judicata was properly applied by the district court.
DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS AND JUDGMENT OF
DISTRICT COURT AFFIRMED.
All justices concur except Hecht and Appel, JJ., who take no part.
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