DONALD R. RETHAMEL, d/b/a DONALD R. RETHAMEL CONSTRUCTION vs. STEPHEN A. HAVEY
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 53 / 04-1830
Filed June 2, 2006
DONALD R. RETHAMEL, d/b/a
DONALD R. RETHAMEL
CONSTRUCTION,
Appellant,
vs.
STEPHEN A. HAVEY,
Appellee.
________________________________________________________________________
On appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Artis I.
Reis, Judge.
Employer appeals from district court judgment under Iowa Code
section 86.42 (2001). JUDGMENT REVERSED; CASE REMANDED.
D. Brian Scieszinski of Bradshaw, Fowler, Proctor & Fairgrave,
P.C., Des Moines, for appellant.
Robert S. Kinsey III and Kim R. Snitker of Brown, Kinsey,
Funkhouser & Lander, P.L.C., Mason City, for appellee.
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STREIT, Justice.
Stephen Havey obtained an award of workers’ compensation
benefits from Donald R. Rethamel based on an injury suffered by Havey
during his temporary employment with Rethamel. After the award was
affirmed on judicial review, the district court allowed Havey to modify the
commissioner’s award through a motion for entry of judgment. Rethamel
appealed; we reversed and remanded back to the district court with
instructions to “enter judgment in conformity with the commissioner’s
award.” On remand, the district court granted Havey’s new motion to
remand the case back to the commissioner for a limited evidentiary
hearing. Because we find this is another improper attempt to modify an
existing award through a motion for entry of judgment, we reverse the
decision of the district court.
I. Facts and Prior Proceedings
Stephen Havey was injured on January 21, 1997, while working
for
Donald
R.
Rethamel
Construction.
Havey
filed
a
workers’
compensation claim, and the commissioner entered the following award:
That defendant shall pay claimant healing period benefits
from January 21, 1997 to May 5, 1997, at the rate of two
hundred sixty-eight and 06/100 dollars ($268.06).
That defendant shall pay claimant fifty (50) weeks of
permanent partial disability benefits at the rate of two
hundred sixty-eight and 06/100 dollars ($268.06) to
commence on May 6, 1997.
That defendant shall pay the reasonable and necessary
medical expenses as outlined in this decision.
That all accrued benefits shall be paid in a lump sum.
That defendant pay interest as provided by Iowa Code
section 85.30.
That defendant pay the costs of this action, pursuant to rule
876 IAC 4.33.
That defendant shall
requested by the agency.
(Emphasis added.)
3
file claim
activity
reports
as
Rethamel appealed the decision, and the district
court and court of appeals affirmed the commissioner’s decision.
After
the
judicial
review
proceedings
ended,
Havey
sought
enforcement of his award through an amended motion for judgment. See
Iowa Code § 86.42 (1997) (authorizing judgment by district court on
award). In this motion, Havey asked the court for three items beyond
enforcement of the commissioner’s decision:
(1) to enter an order
whereby Rethamel would pay the medical expenses directly to Havey; (2)
to award Havey a credit for attorney fees for collection of payments from
third-party medical providers; and (3) payment of interest that was not
included in the original award.
Havey supported this motion with
additional evidence purporting to prove that Havey had already paid part
of the medical bills. After considering new evidence proffered by Havey,
the district court ordered judgment in conformance with Havey’s
requests. Rethamel appealed, requesting that the application for
judgment be dismissed or recalculated to reflect only those awards made
by the commissioner.
On appeal, we interpreted the district court’s role in rendering
judgment on a commissioner’s award determination to be a “ministerial
function.” Rethamel v. Havey, 679 N.W.2d 626, 629 (Iowa 2004). We
held the court had the authority to “construe” the commissioner’s award,
but found the court had no authority to review, reverse, or modify the
award at this point in the proceedings.
Id. at 628-29.
Because the
district court’s order of judgment expanded the workers’ compensation
award, we vacated the judgment and remanded the case back to district
court “to enter a judgment in conformity with the commissioner’s award.”
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Id. at 629. We ended our decision with the statement “[a]ny remaining
issues shall be resolved at the time of execution or by a separate action
outside Iowa Code section 86.42, between the parties.”
Id. (emphasis
added).
On remand, Havey filed a new motion requesting that those issues
upon which the district court previously took evidence be remanded to
the workers’ compensation commissioner for an evidentiary hearing. The
district court agreed and remanded a portion of the case back to the
workers’ compensation commissioner for an evidentiary hearing to
determine whether or not Havey was entitled to reimbursement of the
medical expenses he had already paid.
On appeal, Rethamel claims the district court erred in remanding
this case.
Rethamel argues that by ordering the commissioner to
consider new issues and consider new evidence not previously raised, the
court has once again effectively modified the commissioner’s original
decision.
II. Standard of Review
The standard of appellate review regarding the permissible scope of
a district court judgment is for errors of law. Id. at 627.
III. Merits
Iowa Code section 86.42 provides a summary method for
transforming a workers’ compensation award into an enforceable
judgment:
Any party in interest may present a certified copy of an
order or decision of the [workers’ compensation]
commissioner, . . . and all papers in connection therewith, to
the district court where judicial review of the agency action
may be commenced. The court shall render a decree or
judgment and cause the clerk to notify the parties. The
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decree or judgment . . . has the same effect and in all
proceedings in relation thereto is the same as though
rendered in a suit duly heard and determined by the court.
This section does not expressly provide for enforcement by
execution, but, as noted by the italicized language, it creates a judgment
just like any other.
See also Simonson v. Snap-on Tools Corp., 588
N.W.2d 430, 437 (Iowa 1999) (“a petitioner may seek to enforce an award
pursuant to section 86.42 by obtaining a judgment in district court
based on the commissioner’s award of benefits”). Judgments for money
are enforced by execution. Iowa Code § 626.1. Allowing execution on a
section 86.42 judgment is also consistent with the general rule as stated
in Zeigler v. Fleetguard, Inc., 675 N.W.2d 581, 583 (Iowa 2004) (quoting
101 C.J.S. Workers’ Compensation § 1484, at 318 (2000)):
The court’s award of compensation under the Workers’
Compensation Act is a judgment that may be enforced by
execution. The judgment must be entered before it can be
enforced by execution. After an award has been filed in the
proper court and given the force and effect of a judgment
therein, it is enforceable by execution, and supplementary
proceedings in aid of execution may be resorted to as in
other cases.
Because the rights of the claimant have already been established
by the time the application to enter judgment has been made, the district
court is bound to enter judgment in conformance with the workers’
compensation award. Rethamel, 679 N.W.2d at 628. The court has no
power to change the award, review the award, reverse the award, modify
the award, remand the case to the commissioner, or construe the
workers’ compensation statute.
See id.; St. Louis Pressed Steel Co. v.
Schorr, 135 N.E. 766, 767 (Ill. 1922) (“[O]n application for judgment on
the award the court has no jurisdiction to review the decision, construe
the statute, or determine whether the decision of the board was correct
or not.”).
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The district court’s role at the time of entry of judgment is limited
to “construing” the commissioner’s decision.
Id.
According to Black’s
Law Dictionary, “construe” means “[t]o analyze and explain the meaning
of (a sentence or passage).” Black’s Law Dictionary 333 (8th ed. 2004).
Therefore, the district court’s role in entry of judgment is limited to
analyzing and explaining the meaning of the commissioner’s written
award decision.
In this case, the commissioner’s decision specifically states that
Rethamel shall pay Havey healing period benefits and permanent partial
disability benefits. The decision then states Rethamel is ordered to pay
specific reasonable and necessary medical expenses related to this
injury. The decision does not identify who shall be paid the reasonable
and necessary medical expenses.
Our previous decisions clearly
establish that a workers’ compensation claimant is not entitled to be paid
sums for medical and hospital expense unless there is a specific showing
that the claimant himself paid the medical expenses. See Krohn v. State,
420 N.W.2d 463, 464-65 (Iowa 1988); accord Caylor v. Employers Mut.
Cas. Co., 337 N.W.2d 890, 894 (Iowa Ct. App. 1983) (“Claimant is not
entitled to reimbursement for medical bills unless he shows that he paid
them from his own funds.”).
If a claimant has already paid such
expenses, and anticipates difficulties in recouping those costs, the onus
is on the claimant to present evidence of prior payment to the
commissioner so that the commissioner, in awarding medical benefits,
can order the defendant to pay such medical expenses directly to the
claimant.
By remanding the case back to the commissioner, the district court
implied that it had reviewed the award and was sending the case back so
the commissioner could take additional evidence to reconsider or revise
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its original decision.
This action goes far beyond the court’s power to
construe the commissioner’s decision. 1
An appropriate way to “construe” the award would be to enter
judgment stating “Rethamel is liable for Havey’s medical expenses.”
Such a judgment could be enforced “at the time of execution or by a
separate action” by whoever provided the medical care, or whoever
already paid for the medical expenses. See generally Iowa Code ch. 626
(addressing
writs
of
execution);
Iowa
R.
Civ.
P.
1.1018-1.1020
(addressing execution and duty of officer, endorsement, and levy on
personalty); Stefan A. Riesenfeld, Collection of Money Judgments in
American Law, 42 Iowa L. Rev. 155 (1957) (broadly categorizing collection
remedies into executability, actionability, and lien creation); J.E.
Heiserman, Procedures Available for Implementation of a Judgment in
Iowa, 42 Iowa L. Rev. 265 (1957) (reviewing the procedures for
enforcements of judgments).
IV. Conclusion
The proper avenue to modify a decision by the commissioner is
through procedures before the commissioner or a petition for judicial
review. Havey’s attempt to modify the commissioner’s decision now, at
the time of entry of judgment, is improper.
We vacate the district court’s judgment and remand the case back
to the district court so that it can enter a judgment in conformity with
the commissioner’s award.
JUDGMENT REVERSED; CASE REMANDED.
1This
decision does not abrogate the district court’s ability to remand a case
back to the commissioner at the time of judicial review. We only find it inappropriate
when the court does so in a section 86.42 enforcement proceeding.
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