IN THE INTEREST OF C.S., Minor Child, T.S., Mother, Appellant.
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 9-997 / 09-1680
Filed December 30, 2009
IN THE INTEREST OF C.S.,
Minor Child,
T.S., Mother,
Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Dallas County, Virginia Cobb,
District Associate Judge.
A mother appeals from the termination of her parental rights. AFFIRMED.
Donna Schauer, Adel, for appellant mother.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kathrine Miller-Todd, Assistant
Attorney General, Wayne Reisetter, County Attorney, and Sean Wieser,
Assistant County Attorney, for appellee State.
Steve Clarke, Des Moines, for minor child.
Considered by Sackett, C.J., and Vaitheswaran and Danilson, JJ.
2
DANILSON, J.
T.S. appeals the termination of her parental rights to C.S., born in
February 2009. We affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
T.S. and her children have been involved with the Iowa Department of
Human Services (DHS) since 2006. Reports in January 2006, May 2006, and
October 2007, were founded based on T.S.’s failure to provide adequate shelter
for her three older children. A fourth report was founded after the older three
children were removed by ex parte order on January 4, 2008.1
The older
children were adjudicated children in need of assistance (CINA) on April 11,
2008, and T.S.’s parental rights were terminated to the children on July 23,
2009.2 This court affirmed the termination of parental rights on October 7, 2009.
In re R.S., No. 09-1186 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 7, 2009).
Throughout T.S.’s pregnancy with C.S., T.S. denied she was pregnant.
T.S. lied to both the caseworker and the juvenile court about her pregnancy
status. At a hearing for her older three children on February 4, 2009, T.S. agreed
to take a pregnancy test, but stated she would have to wait because she was in
her menstrual cycle. C.S. was born less than two weeks later, and a removal
order was issued the following day. C.S. was placed in family foster care, and
has remained there since that time.
1
T.S. had been committed to a hospital with suicidal ideations and left the
children with a seventy-six-year-old man who was unable to care for them due to his
medical conditions. The house in which the family had lived was unsanitary and
uninhabitable. While in the hospital, T.S. agreed to the children’s placement in foster
care.
2
The mother would not reveal the names of the children’s fathers. She said that
one was the result of rape and another was the result of contact with a drug abuser.
3
A case permanency plan was established in January 2008, and T.S. has
been provided parenting classes and numerous other services since that time.
However, T.S. did not begin to utilize services until May 2009. Throughout that
time, the State and DHS continued to express concerns about T.S.’s progress.
T.S. was diagnosed as suffering from attachment disorder, but failed to receive
adequate mental health treatment that was offered to her. When T.S. did attend
parenting classes, she failed to fully participate and did not show progress in her
parenting skills. T.S. continued to be in denial of her inadequacies as a parent
and provider, showed a lack of insight, and made poor decisions.
Most
importantly, T.S. was unwilling to consistently utilize services offered to her to
allow C.S. to be returned to her care.
In August 2009, the State filed a termination petition. After the contested
hearing, the court terminated T.S.’s parental rights to C.S. on October 20, 2009,
pursuant to Iowa Code sections 232.116(1)(d) and (h) (2009). T.S. now appeals.
II. Scope and Standard of Review.
We review termination of parental rights de novo. In re Z.H., 740 N.W.2d
648, 650-51 (Iowa Ct. App. 2007). Grounds for termination must be proved by
clear and convincing evidence. In re J.E., 723 N.W.2d 793, 798 (Iowa 2006).
Our primary concern is the best interests of the child. Id.
III. Merits.
T.S. argues the court erred in terminating her parental rights because
reasonable efforts were not made toward reunification. T.S. alleges DHS’s goal
from day one was to terminate her parental rights to C.S. T.S. contends she
prepared a suitable home for C.S. but DHS did not allow her visits with the child
4
to progress to unsupervised or overnight visits.
T.S. further argues she
adequately complied with parenting classes and therapy, but the State did not
make an honest effort toward reunification.
Iowa Code section 232.102(7) requires DHS to “make every reasonable
effort to return the child to the child’s home as quickly as possible consistent with
the best interests of the child.” In In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 493 (Iowa 2000),
the court explained that “[t]he State must show reasonable efforts as a part of its
ultimate proof the child cannot be safely returned to the care of a parent.” The
focus of reunification is on the health and safety of the child and mandates a
permanent home for a child as early as possible. Id.
The State contends T.S. has failed to preserve error on this issue. While
DHS has an obligation to make reasonable efforts toward reunification, a parent
has an equal obligation to demand other, different, or additional services prior to
a permanency or termination hearing or the issue is considered waived for further
consideration on appeal. In re A.A.G., 708 N.W.2d 85, 91 (Iowa Ct. App. 2005).
If a parent has a complaint regarding services, the parent must make such
challenge at the removal, when the case permanency plan is entered, or at later
review hearings.
In re C.H., 652 N.W.2d 144, 148 (Iowa 2002).
Moreover,
voicing complaints regarding the adequacy of services to a social worker is not
sufficient: a parent must inform the juvenile court of such challenge. Id. In this
case, we are unable to find where T.S.’s requests for additional services were
made a part of the court record. No formal actions were taken by T.S. or her
attorney during court proceedings to challenge or object to services offered by
DHS.
5
Even assuming, arguendo, that T.S. has properly preserved this issue for
our review, we conclude T.S. was provided more than adequate services to
promote her reunification with C.S. However, T.S. failed to make use of all the
opportunities for reunification and did not fully and willingly comply with services
offered to her.
We do not find the decision of DHS to limit visitation to be
unreasonable under the circumstances in this case.
T.S. was resistant to
individual therapy, despite the fact that she suffers from attachment disorder and
was ordered to receive mental health treatment. Further, when T.S. did finally
begin to attend parenting classes, she only minimally participated and showed no
progress in her parenting skills.
As the juvenile court noted:
In the last four months preceding the hearing, it appeared
that T.S. was starting to be willing to cooperate; however, Ms.
Hoffman asserted that although T.S. has had some success in
keeping her visits, has completed her evaluations, and is engaging
in individual therapy, Ms. Hoffman does not see any real insight on
T.S.’s part in understanding parenting. While the individual therapy
T.S. is receiving may help T.S. address her attachment disorder, it
will likely be months or even years before that progress can
positively affect her parenting abilities. C.S. cannot wait for T.S. to
make progress. The court also notes that the home has improved
somewhat, although cleanliness was still an issue, and while T.S.
seemed to be starting to mimic and adopt appropriate parenting
actions, there is a lack of insight or any real internal change in her
capacity to understand parenting. She may learn from observing
others, but has not incorporated any real sense of the nature of
parenting.
The court is still concerned about the risky behavior in which
T.S. engages toward herself and that resulted in this most recent
pregnancy which behavior would have occurred while she was
receiving services. In her testimony she indicated she couldn’t say
who the father was, wouldn’t reveal names, and wasn’t 100% sure
anyways.
6
Upon our review, we find this record supports a finding that the State
made reasonable efforts at reunification consistent with the child’s best interests.
T.S. has demonstrated a history of risky behaviors, lack of insight, poor decision
making, and resistance to services.
Insight for the determination of the child’s long-range best interests
can be gleaned from “evidence of the parent’s past performance for
that performance may be indicative of the quality of the future care
that parent is capable of providing.”
Id. (quoting In re Dameron, 306 N.W.2d 743, 745 (Iowa 1981)). T.S. has failed to
show any significant improvement in her areas of weakness as a parent. Since
the child was removed from T.S.’s care, T.S. has done little to improve the
situation and resume care of the child.
We are convinced that the child’s
interests are best served by terminating T.S.’s parental rights and making her
eligible for continued placement in a safe and stable home.
We conclude T.S. has failed to preserve error on the issue of the
adequacy of services provided to her by DHS, and we further find clear and
convincing evidence supports termination of T.S.’s parental rights under sections
232.116(1)(d) and (h). The record clearly supports T.S.’s inability to provide a
safe environment for the child, and returning the child to her home is not an
option. There is no reason to delay the child the permanency she needs and
deserves. We affirm the termination of T.S.’s parental rights.
AFFIRMED.
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.