STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. JOEL ADNA HOLLINGSWORTH, Defendant-Appellant.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 9-969 / 09-0456
Filed December 30, 2009
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
JOEL ADNA HOLLINGSWORTH,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Johnson County, Sylvia A. Lewis,
District Associate Judge.
A defendant appeals his conviction and sentence for indecent exposure,
contending that his guilty plea was unknowing and involuntary. CONVICTION
AND SENTENCE VACATED; CASE REMANDED.
Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Nan Jennisch, Assistant
Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kyle Hanson, Assistant Attorney
General, and Janet M. Lyness, County Attorney.
Considered by Sackett, C.J., and Vaitheswaran and Danilson, JJ.
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VAITHESWARAN, J.
Joel Hollingsworth pleaded guilty to indecent exposure, a serious
misdemeanor. Iowa Code § 709.9 (2007). The district court adjudged him guilty
and sentenced him to a jail term of 180 days, with all but seven days suspended,
as well as supervised probation for two years.
Two months later, the Sixth
Judicial District Department of Correctional Services notified the district court that
it had failed to impose a special sentence mandated by Iowa Code section
903B.2.1 The court convened a second sentencing hearing at which defense
counsel acknowledged Hollingsworth was subject to section 903B.2. The court
―committed [Hollingsworth] to the custody of the director of the Iowa department
of corrections for a period of ten years, with eligibility for parole as provided in
chapter 906.‖ This sentence was to be served upon completion of the originallyimposed sentence.
On appeal, Hollingsworth contends that ―he was not properly informed that
he would be subject to the special sentence provision of section 903B.2,‖
rendering his plea unknowing and involuntary under Iowa Rule of Criminal
Procedure 2.8(2)(b).
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Section 903B.2 states in relevant part:
A person convicted of a misdemeanor or a class ―D‖ felony
offense under chapter 709, section 726.2, or section 728.12 shall
also be sentenced, in addition to any other punishment provided by
law, to a special sentence committing the person into the custody of
the director of the Iowa department of corrections for a period of ten
years, with eligibility for parole as provided in chapter 906. The
special sentence imposed under this section shall commence upon
completion of the sentence imposed under any applicable criminal
sentencing provisions for the underlying criminal offense and the
person shall begin the sentence under supervision as if on parole.
Iowa Code § 903B.2.
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As a preliminary matter, the State argues that Hollingsworth did not
preserve error on this issue.
We disagree.
While a defendant wishing to
challenge the adequacy of a plea proceeding must normally file a motion in arrest
of judgment according to Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.24(3)(a),
this requirement does not apply where a defendant was never
advised during the plea proceedings, as required by rule 2.8(2)(d),
that challenges to the plea must be made in a motion in arrest of
judgment and that the failure to challenge the plea by filing the
motion within the time provided prior to sentencing precludes a right
to assert the challenge on appeal.
State v. Meron, 675 N.W.2d 537, 540 (Iowa 2004).
Hollingsworth was informed of his right to file a motion in arrest of
judgment but was not advised that such a motion was necessary to preserve
error on a challenge to his guilty plea.
For that reason, we conclude
Hollingsworth’s failure to file the motion does not preclude Hollingsworth from
challenging his guilty plea on appeal. See id. at 541.
We turn to the merits. Our review of the guilty plea proceeding is for
correction of errors at law. State v. Tate, 710 N.W.2d 237, 239 (Iowa 2006).
The district court has a duty to ensure that a defendant understands the
direct consequences of a plea. Saadiq v. State, 387 N.W.2d 315, 324–25 (Iowa
1986).
The special sentencing provision of Iowa Code section 903B.2, if
applicable, is a direct consequence of the plea. State v. Hallock, 765 N.W.2d
598, 605 (Iowa Ct. App. 2009) (―We conclude this special sentencing provision is
a part of Hallock’s sentence and is not merely collateral.‖). Therefore, the district
court had an obligation to inform Hollingsworth of this sentence. Iowa R. Crim. P.
2.8(2)(b)(2) (requiring district court to advise a defendant of ―[t]he mandatory
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minimum punishment, if any, and the maximum possible punishment provided by
the statute defining the offense to which the plea is offered‖); Hallock, 765
N.W.2d at 605–06.
The court did not advise Hollingsworth of this special sentence at the time
he pleaded guilty.
Effectively conceding this fact, the State argues that
substantial compliance with Rule 2.8(2)(b) is all that is required. In its view, the
written plea containing defense counsel’s certification that Hollingsworth fully
understood the maximum penalty amounts to substantial compliance. See State
v. Kress, 636 N.W.2d 12, 21 (Iowa 2001) (―Substantial—not strict—compliance
with the rule is all that is required.‖); State v. Kirchoff, 452 N.W.2d 801, 805 (Iowa
1990) (finding that although court did not discuss the mandatory minimum
sentence and constitutional rights in the in-court colloquy, rule 2.8(2)(b) was
substantially complied with because those provisions were covered in the written
plea forms). The problem with this argument is that the written plea document
specifies the original sentence but makes no mention of section 903B.2. While
the State asks us to assume counsel raised section 903B.2 with Hollingsworth,
we cannot do so given the Rule 2.8(2)(b)(2) requirement to advise a defendant of
the ―maximum possible punishment‖ and
given the fact that section 903B.2
increased the time Hollingsworth was under the supervision of the department of
corrections. See Hallock, 765 N.W.2d at 605 (―Application of the section could
subject [the defendant] to additional imprisonment in excess of the maximum
imprisonment to which he was sentenced for the underlying crime.‖).
Because Hollingsworth was not advised of the special sentencing
provision of Iowa Code section 903B.2, we conclude his plea was not voluntary
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and intelligent as required by Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.8(2)(b).
Accordingly, we vacate his conviction and sentence and remand for further
proceedings.
CONVICTION AND SENTENCE VACATED; CASE REMANDED.
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