FRONTIER NATURAL PRODUCTS COOPERATIVE and UNITED HEARTLAND, Plaintiffs-Appellants, vs. BETTY BUTZ, Defendant-Appellee.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 9-947 / 09-0822
Filed December 17, 2009
FRONTIER NATURAL PRODUCTS
COOPERATIVE and UNITED HEARTLAND,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
vs.
BETTY BUTZ,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Arthur E. Gamble,
Judge.
Appeal from the district court‟s decision on judicial review that affirmed the
agency‟s award of workers‟ compensation benefits. AFFIRMED.
Thomas D. Wolle of Simmons Perrine Moyer Bergman, P.L.C., Cedar
Rapids, for appellants.
Gary Nelson of Rush & Nicholson, P.L.C., Cedar Rapids, for appellee.
Considered by Sackett, C.J., Vaitheswaran and Danilson, JJ.
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SACKETT, C.J.
The employer and insurer appeal from the district court‟s decision on
judicial review that affirmed the agency‟s award of workers‟ compensation
benefits, contending the agency erred in concluding the claimant provided timely
notice of her injury. We affirm.
BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS. The claimant, a former
employee of Frontier Natural Food Products, filed an arbitration petition on
January 24, 2007, seeking workers‟ compensation benefits for a left-knee injury
in 2005. She identified a traumatic injury from a fall in February of 2005 and a
cumulative trauma injury dated in May or June of 2005.1 The employer denied
liability based on the affirmative defense of failure to provide notice within ninety
days of the injury. See Iowa Code § 85.23 (2007) (denying benefits unless the
claimant gives notice or the employer has actual notice within ninety days of
injury).
The agency found the claimant did not prove she suffered a work-related
injury in February of 2005.
It fixed the date of her work-related cumulative
trauma injury as June 1, 2005, the date of her first knee surgery. The agency
then considered the employer‟s affirmative defense of lack of notice.
It
concluded:
The evidence in this case established that while the [employer]
knew that the claimant had been off work for knee surgery and then
retired due to her left knee problem, the employer had no
information that the claimant was alleging that her knee problem
was work related until the petition was filed and served on the
1
Claimant retired on October 3, 2005. In the comments section of the resignation form,
she listed “Health (left knee).”
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employer on January 31, 2007. The claimant conceded that she
did not tell anyone at the employer that her knee problem was work
related, but for her claim that [the shift lead person] knew about the
fall on February 1, 2005.
The claimant‟s obligation to give notice to her employer,
however, does not begin to run until the claimant as a reasonable
person, should recognize the nature, seriousness, and probable
compensable character of the injury. The claimant testified and
[her doctor] concurred, that the first discussion between [him] and
the claimant concerning the role her employment played in her
knee condition was on January 4, 2007. Although the claimant did
know that she had a serious left knee condition and did retire as a
result of that condition, she did not know of the probable
compensable character of that injury until her conversation with [her
doctor] on January 4, 2007. It was on January 4, 2007, that the 90
day period for giving notice began to run. Since the petition was
filed and served on January 31, 2007, the claimant gave timely
notice. The notice defense fails.
On judicial review, the defendants contended the agency misapplied the
standards set forth in Herrera v. IBP, Inc., 633 N.W.2d 284, 288 (Iowa 2001), by
adding an additional element. In its analysis, the court noted:
Frontier correctly points out that when Butz retired on
October 3, 2005, she informed her employer that her reason for
leaving was “health/left knee.” It is undisputed that when Butz left
the company in October of 2005, she knew her left knee was in
such a condition that she would be unable to work in the distribution
area. She felt that she needed light duty. She left because she
could not get light duty. While these facts might support a finding
that Butz knew her injury was serious at the time of her retirement,
this does not compel the conclusion that Butz knew or should have
known her injury was serious enough to have a permanent adverse
impact on her employment at that time.
When Butz left the company, she had already been released
for work by her doctor without restrictions [after her knee surgery].
She was still seeking treatment from [her doctor] for her pain. In
October of 2005, [her doctor] was giving Butz a series of injections
in her left knee. It is reasonable to consider whether permanent
work restrictions or a permanent physical impairment rating had
been given to the employee by her medical provider prior to that
date. She had not been given permanent work restrictions nor had
she been given a permanent physical impairment rating at that
time. Her doctors had not given her an opinion that her work had
aggravated her pre-existing condition of degenerative arthritis. In
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fact, it was not until January 4, 2007, that [her doctor] told Butz that
standing on concrete for 22 years may have aggravated her
degenerative arthritis.
Substantial evidence supports the [agency‟s] finding that
upon her conversation with [her doctor] on January 4, 2007, Butz
knew her injury was serious enough to have a permanent adverse
impact on her employment or employability. Until this visit, there is
no indication in the medical records that Butz was alerted to the
seriousness and therefore probable compensable nature of her
injury. At that point, Butz knew her condition had a permanent
adverse impact on her employment or employability. She was
deemed to know the nature, seriousness, and probable
compensable character of her injury.
The district court concluded the agency applied the correct standard, it did
not add an additional element, and the application of the law to the facts was not
irrational, illogical, or wholly unjustifiable. The district court further concluded the
agency‟s findings of fact were supported by substantial evidence.
SCOPE AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW.
Iowa Code chapter 17A governs the scope of our review in
workers‟ compensation cases.
It is well settled that the
interpretation of workers‟ compensation statutes and related case
law has not been clearly vested by a provision of law in the
discretion of the agency. We therefore do not defer to the
commissioner‟s interpretation of the law.
Factual determinations in workers‟ compensation cases, on
the other hand, are clearly vested by a provision of law in the
discretion of the agency.
Accordingly, we defer to the
commissioner‟s factual determinations if they are based on
substantial evidence in the record before the court when that record
is viewed as a whole. Substantial evidence is the quantity and
quality of evidence that would be deemed sufficient by a neutral,
detached, and reasonable person, to establish the fact at issue
when the consequences resulting from the establishment of that
fact are understood to be serious and of great importance. Thus,
when we review factual questions delegated by the legislature to
the commissioner, the question before us is not whether the
evidence supports different findings than those made by the
commissioner, but whether the evidence supports the findings
actually made.
The application of the law to the facts is also an enterprise
vested in the commissioner. Accordingly, we reverse only if the
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commissioner‟s application was irrational, illogical, or wholly
unjustifiable. This standard requires us to allocate some deference
to the commissioner‟s determinations, but less than we give to the
agency‟s findings of fact.
Larson Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Thorson, 763 N.W.2d 842, 850 (Iowa 2009) (citations
and internal quotations omitted).
MERITS. The appellants state their issue as:
Whether the [agency] erred in holding that claimant, who knew in
October 2005 that she had a serious, work-related knee condition
that led her to retire, provided timely notice of her injury when she
served an arbitration petition on January 31, 2007.
They argue the agency‟s conclusion that Butz did not know of “the probable
compensable character” of her injury until her conversation with her doctor in
January of 2007 is erroneous. They contend Butz “knew that she had a work
related injury that was serious enough to have a permanent adverse impact on
her employment” at least by the time of her retirement in October of 2005.
At the heart of the issue is the agency‟s application of the discovery rule
as set forth in Herrera. The appellants believe the agency misinterpreted the
law.
The supreme court summarized its analysis of the interplay of the
“manifestation” of a cumulative injury and the discovery rule on the statutory
period for giving notice:
The preferred analysis is to first determine the date the injury is
deemed to have occurred under the Tasler[2] test, and then to
examine whether the statutory period commenced on that date or
whether it commenced upon a later date based upon application of
the discovery rule.
To summarize, a cumulative injury is manifested when the
claimant, as a reasonable person, would be plainly aware (1) that
he or she suffers from a condition or injury, and (2) that this
2
Oscar Mayer Foods Corp. v. Tasler, 483 N.W.2d 824, 829 (Iowa 1992).
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condition or injury was caused by the claimant's employment.
Upon the occurrence of these two circumstances, the injury is
deemed to have occurred. Nonetheless, by virtue of the discovery
rule, the statute of limitations will not begin to run until the
employee also knows that the physical condition is serious enough
to have a permanent adverse impact on the claimant’s employment
or employability, i.e., the claimant knows or should know the
“nature, seriousness, and probable compensable character” of his
injury or condition.
Herrera v. IBP, Inc., 633 N.W.2d at 288 (emphasis added) (quoting Orr v. Lewis
Cent. Sch. Dist., 298 N.W.2d 256, 257 (Iowa 1980)).
The appellants contend the agency‟s application of the “probable
compensable character” language from Herrera adds an additional factor to the
“permanent adverse impact” on employment requirement of knowledge sufficient
to satisfy the discovery rule. They argue that “under Herrera, once an employee
knows her injury is serious enough to have a permanent adverse impact on
employment, the employee is also charged with knowledge that the injury is
probably compensable.”
On judicial review, the district court noted that the
agency quoted the language from Herrera, and concluded it did not add another
factor to the analysis.
The supreme court recently considered the application of the discovery
rule to the two-year statute of limitations for filing a petition for benefits in Iowa
Code section 85.26(1). See Larson, 763 N.W.2d at 854-55. Although expressly
addressing a different limitation period than the ninety-day notice period before
us, the analysis clarifies the application of the discovery-rule language quoted
above:
Consistent with this court's prior decisions, Thorson is entitled to
the benefit of the discovery rule, Herrera v. IBP, Inc., 633 N.W.2d
284, 287 (Iowa 2001), and the statute of limitations did not begin to
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run until she recognized, or should have recognized, the “„nature,
seriousness, and probable compensable character‟” of the
disability. Orr v. Lewis Cent. Sch. Dist., 298 N.W.2d 256, 257 (Iowa
1980) (citation omitted); accord Herrera, 633 N.W.2d at 287.
Thorson‟s knowledge of these three triggering factors may be
actual or imputed from the record. Ranney v. Parawax Co., 582
N.W.2d 152, 154-55 (Iowa 1998).
Id. at 854 (emphasis added). The phrase “probable compensable character” is
not synonymous with an employee‟s recognition of the “seriousness” of the injury
as the appellants claim.
The appellants‟ argument that the agency erred in
adding an additional factor to the analysis is without merit. The agency correctly
understood the law to require knowledge of all three “triggering factors.” See id.
Having determined the agency did not misunderstand the law, we
consider, then, whether the agency‟s finding that Butz did not know of the
probable compensable character of her knee condition until her discussion with
her doctor in January of 2007 is supported by substantial evidence.
The
appellants contend, when the record is viewed as a whole, that it is not.
As is often the case when parties dispute the findings made by the
agency, there is evidence in the record when viewed as a whole that does not
support the agency‟s findings. The district court recognized the existence of
contrary evidence in this case, but properly focused its consideration on whether
the evidence supports the decision made, not whether it supports a different
decision.
“[T]he question before us is not whether the evidence supports
different findings than those made by the [agency], but whether the evidence
supports the findings actually made.” Larson Mfg., 763 N.W.2d at 850 (citation
omitted).
We broadly and liberally construe an agency‟s findings to uphold,
rather than defeat the decision. Second Injury Fund v. George, 737 N.W.2d 141,
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154 (Iowa 2007).
“Evidence should not be considered „insubstantial merely
because the court may draw different conclusions from the record.‟” Id. (citation
omitted). “[I]n challenging an agency finding, a party may not succeed merely by
showing that the evidence would support a different conclusion than the one that
the agency reached.” Garcia v. Naylor Concrete Co., 650 N.W.2d 87, 91 (Iowa
2002) (citation omitted). “In order to succeed, it must be demonstrated that, as a
matter of law, the finding that the agency made was not supported by substantial
evidence.” Id.
Claimant had knee surgery for knee problems in June of 2005.
She
returned to work in September without any restrictions and with no impairment
rating as a result of her knee problems. She was unable to continue working in
her position in the warehouse without pain, so she tried to find suitable light-duty
work with her employer. Failing that, she retired, citing “health (left knee).” She
was a sixty-two year old woman with only a high school education who had
worked for the same employer for twenty-two years. None of her doctors had
told her that the kind of work she did, involving walking and standing on concrete
all day, could aggravate her pre-existing, mostly asymptomatic degenerative
arthritis—until she met with her doctor on January 4, 2007. The agency found
she did not know of the probable compensatory character of her knee condition
until that visit to her doctor. The district court, considering the evidence, found
substantial evidence supported the agency‟s finding.
We conclude the
appellants have not demonstrated, as a matter of law, that the agency‟s finding
was not supported by substantial evidence. See id.
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Applying the law to the facts of this case, the agency determined the
defendants had not proved their affirmative defense of lack of timely notice. The
district court determined the agency‟s action was not irrational, illogical, or wholly
unjustifiable. See Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(l), (m); see also Mycogen Seeds v.
Sands, 686 N.W.2d 457, 465 (Iowa 2004). From our review of the record before
us, our conclusions are the same as those of the district court. See Kohlhaas v.
Hog Slat, Inc., ___ N.W.2d ___, ___ (Iowa 2009). Therefore, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.
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