STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. ERIK JOHN RAVE, Defendant-Appellant.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 9-765 / 09-0415
Filed October 21, 2009
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
ERIK JOHN RAVE,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Story County, Thomas R. Hronek,
District Associate Judge.
Defendant appeals his conviction for operating while intoxicated.
AFFIRMED.
Brandon Brown of Parrish, Kruidenier, Dunn, Boles, Gribble, Parrish,
Gentry & Fisher, L.L.P., Des Moines, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Mary E. Tabor, Assistant Attorney
General, Allen Best, Law Clerk, Stephen Holmes, County Attorney, and Jessica
Reynolds, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Vogel, P.J., Potterfield, J., and Huitink, S.J.*
*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 (2009).
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HUITINK, S.J.
I. Background Facts & Proceedings
On August 28, 2008, there was an evening football game at Iowa State
University in Ames, Iowa. Lieutenant Darren Vanryswyk and Officer Sara Jensen
of the Iowa State University Police Division were working on foot patrol in two
parking lots near the football stadium where people had gathered for socializing,
or tailgating. These parking lots had gravel roads for travel and large grassy
areas meant for parking. A fifteen-dollar fee was charged to park in the lots.
There were many people tailgating in these parking lots, with people
walking everywhere. Many of the people had been drinking alcohol. The officers
considered it a high-crime area during a football game due to the use of alcohol.
As the game went on, the level of intoxication increased. Lieutenant Vanryswyk
stated that people in the parking lots after the game started tended to be more
intoxicated than those who attended the game.
At 8:42 p.m., when it was dark and after the football game had started, the
officers noticed a vehicle driving very slowly through one of the parking lots
without its headlights on. The officers flashed their flashlights at the vehicle to
get it to turn on its headlights or stop.1
Officer Jensen testified she was
concerned the vehicle did not have its headlights on due to the number of people
in the area and the condition of the people, namely that some were intoxicated.
1
Portable overhead lights, described as stadium-style lights, had been brought to the
parking lot. These lights were brighter than regular parking lot lights, but while “they light
up the lot a little bit if you’re near them, . . . they don’t light the entire lot.” Officer Jensen
testified the lighting in the area required her to use her flashlight. Lieutenant Vanryswyk
also testified that on the date in question it was dark enough that he needed to use a
flashlight.
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She stated that generally when she saw a vehicle without its headlights on in the
area, she would flag it down and ask the driver to turn on the headlights. She
testified it was not safe to drive in that area without using headlights. Lieutenant
Vanryswyk testified that with the headlights off it was less likely an intoxicated
person would notice the vehicle and such a person could possibly stumble in
front of the vehicle. Also, the driver would be less likely to see a pedestrian. He
stated he was concerned for the safety of pedestrians and other vehicles in the
area. He testified the basis for the stop was a safety concern.
Officer Jensen walked up to the vehicle and tapped on the window. The
driver, Erik Rave, stopped the vehicle and rolled down his window. Both officers
immediately noticed that Rave showed signs of intoxication. Rave failed field
sobriety tests. He refused a breath test at the police station. Rave was arrested
and charged with operating while intoxicated, in violation of Iowa Code section
321J.2 (2007).
Rave filed a motion to suppress, claiming there was no lawful basis to stop
his vehicle. In particular, he pointed out that the statute requiring the use of
headlights from sunrise to sunset, section 321.384, applied only to vehicles upon
a highway. Rave argued that because he was driving in a parking lot that was
not open to the public unless a fee was paid, the statute did not apply. He
claimed officers did not have probable cause to stop his vehicle. See State v.
Aderholt, 545 N.W.2d 559, 563 (Iowa 1996) (finding the violation of a traffic
offense, however minor, provides probable cause to stop a vehicle).
At the suppression hearing, the State conceded there was no traffic
violation because Rave was not driving on a highway. The State’s position was
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that there was a valid investigatory stop under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-22,
88 S. Ct. 1868, 1879-81, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 905-06 (1968). The State asserted
the officers had reasonable suspicion to make the stop based on the time and
location of the stop (among football game tailgaters where many people had
been drinking), the fact Rave did not have his headlights on, he partially drove off
the gravel driveway when making a turn, and there was evidence he did not
immediately stop for the officers.
The court denied the motion to suppress. The court found the State had
established the officers had probable cause to approach the vehicle because
they had a reasonable suspicion he was operating while intoxicated based on the
fact he was driving in the vicinity of numerous pedestrians well after dark but
without his headlights and he drove off the roadway in making a turn. The court
additionally found the officers could legitimately stop the vehicle as part of their
community caretaking function. Defendant was driving in an area well-populated
with intoxicated persons, after dark, without having his headlights on.
Rave filed a motion to reconsider, asserting the State had waived any
reliance on the community caretaking function by not raising it during the
suppression hearing. The court denied the motion to reconsider.
Rave waived his right to a jury trial, and the case proceeded on a trial to
the court. Rave stipulated the matter could be submitted on the minutes of
testimony. The court found Rave guilty of operating while intoxicated. He was
sentenced to serve two days in jail, pay a fine, and obtain a substance abuse
evaluation. Rave appeals the court’s ruling on his motion to suppress.
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II. Standard of Review
We review de novo constitutional claims arising from a motion to
suppress. State v. Feregrino, 756 N.W.2d 700, 703 (Iowa 2008). Our review is
de novo in light of the totality of the circumstances. State v. McConnelee, 690
N.W.2d 27, 30 (Iowa 2004). While we are not bound by the district court’s factual
determinations, we may give deference to the court’s credibility findings. State v.
Lovig, 675 N.W.2d 557, 562 (Iowa 2004).
III. Waiver of Issue
Rave contends the court improperly relied upon the community caretaking
function when that issue was not raised by the parties at the suppression
hearing.
He asserts the State waived this argument by not raising it at the
hearing. Rave claims the court engaged in a partisan role by raising the issue of
the community caretaking function on its own volition.
For evidentiary rulings, there is an exception to the rules of error
preservation.
DeVoss v. State, 648 N.W.2d 56, 62 (Iowa 2002).
“[W]e will
uphold a ruling of the court on the admissibility of evidence on any ground
appearing in the record, whether urged below or not.”
State v. Parker, 747
N.W.2d 196, 208 (Iowa 2008) (quoting State v. McCowen, 297 N.W.2d 226, 227
(Iowa 1980)).
A motion to suppress raises a Fourth Amendment challenge to the
admissibility of evidence seized from a defendant. State v. Merrill, 538 N.W.2d
300, 301 (Iowa 1995). “In ruling on a motion to suppress, the trial court must
determine the facts upon which the admissibility of evidence depends.” State v.
Frake, 450 N.W.2d 817, 818 (Iowa 1990); see also State v. Scott, 405 N.W.2d
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829, 830 (Iowa 1987) (listing the denial of a motion to suppress as one of two
evidentiary rulings being appealed); State v. Campbell, 326 N.W.2d 350, 351
(Iowa 1982) (listing a ruling on a motion to suppress as a pretrial evidentiary
ruling under appellate review).
We conclude the court’s ruling on the motion to suppress was an
evidentiary ruling. For this reason we may affirm on any ground appearing in the
record, whether urged by the parties or not. See Parker, 747 N.W.2d at 208.
Therefore, whether or not the issue of the community caretaking function was
raised by the State, we may affirm if the record supports a denial of the motion to
suppress on this issue.2
IV. Community Caretaking Function
We turn to the issue of whether the record supports a finding that the
officer’s conduct was permissible under the community caretaking function.
Under the Fourth Amendment, a search conducted without a search warrant is
per se unreasonable unless the circumstances come within an exception to the
warrant requirement. State v. Christopher, 757 N.W.2d 247, 249 (Iowa 2008).
The applicability of an exception must be proved by a preponderance of the
evidence by the State. State v. Naujoks, 637 N.W.2d 101, 107 (Iowa 2001). If
2
There is a constitutional right to a neutral and detached judge. State v. Biddle, 652
N.W.2d 191, 198 (Iowa 2002). Because we have determined that on appellate review
we may address an issue not raised by the parties at the suppression hearing, we do not
need to address whether the trial court assumed a partisan rule by ruling on an issue not
raised by the parties. As an aside, however, we note that problems in impartiality arise
when a judge comments on the facts, or directs one of the parties in how to conduct a
case. See State v. Larmond, 244 N.W.2d 233, 236 (Iowa 1976); State v. Glanton, 231
N.W.2d 31, 34 (Iowa 1975). A judge does not exhibit a partisan position by ruling on the
facts presented in a case. See Williams v. State, 967 So. 2d 735, 750 (Fla. 2007) (“With
regard to the determination that [evidence was] admissible on a ground not advanced by
the State, we conclude that the trial court did not depart from a stance of neutrality and
assume the role of prosecutor.”).
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evidence is obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, it is inadmissible.
State v. Lloyd, 701 N.W.2d 678, 680 (Iowa 2005).
An exception to the warrant requirement was enunciated by the United
States Supreme Court in Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441, 93 S. Ct.
2523, 2528, 37 L. Ed. 2d 706, 714-15 (1973), where the Court found police
officers frequently “engage in what, for want of a better term, may be described
as community caretaking functions, totally divorced from the detection,
investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal
statute.” “Where evidence is discovered in the course of performing legitimate
community caretaking or public safety functions, the exclusionary rule is simply
not applicable.” State v. Mitchell, 498 N.W.2d 691, 694 (Iowa 1993).
In determining whether police officers’ conduct comes within the
community caretaking function, we consider a three-step analysis: (1) whether
there was a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment; (2) if so,
whether the police were engaged in bona fide community caretaker activity; and
(3) if the first two factors were met, then whether the public’s needs and interests
outweighed the intrusion upon the person’s privacy.
State v. Crawford, 659
N.W.2d 537, 543 (Iowa 2003).
We address each of these three factors in turn. The first issue is whether
there was a “seizure” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
An
investigatory stop of a vehicle, even though it is temporary and for a limited
purpose, is a seizure for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. State v. Kreps,
650 N.W.2d 636, 641 (Iowa 2002). In this case we will assume, without deciding,
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there was a “seizure” when officers stopped Rave’s vehicle to tell him to turn on
his headlights.
The next factor is whether the officers were engaged in a bona fide
community caretaking activity when they stopped Rave’s vehicle to tell him to
turn on his headlights. There are three types of community caretaking activities:
(1) emergency aid; (2) automobile impoundment/inventory; and (3) acting as a
public servant. Crawford, 659 N.W.2d at 541. An officer may be acting as a
public servant in assisting a motorist with a flat tire, for example. Id. (citation
omitted).
We note that in Mitchell, 498 N.W.2d at 694, the officer was found to be
engaged in a legitimate public safety activity when he stopped the defendant to
inform him of a burned-out taillight. Also, in State v. Fuller, 556 A.2d 224, 224
Me. 1989), an officer properly stopped a vehicle after he noticed the headlights
were blinking on and off, and advised the defendant “to fix the headlights before
getting stranded in the dark.” On the other hand, in State v. Joe, 69 P.3d 251,
254-55 (N.M. Ct. App. 2003), the court found there was not a valid public safety
concern justifying the stop of a vehicle driving without the headlights on when it
was not yet sunset and the officer could see the vehicle at least 500 yards away.
“[A]n officer must have a reasonable and articulable basis for a stop, even
for public safety issues.” Id. at 254. Officer Jensen testified that due to the
number of people in the area and that some were intoxicated she was concerned
the vehicle did not have its headlights on. She testified it was not safe to drive in
that area without the headlights on. Lieutenant Vanryswyk testified that with the
headlights off it was more likely a pedestrian would not see the vehicle and walk
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in front of it, and also the driver would be less likely to see a pedestrian. He
testified the basis for the stop was a safety concern.
We conclude the officers had specific and articulable public safety
concerns which created a sufficient reason for the stop.
The officers were
properly acting as public servants when they stopped Rave, who was driving
after dark with his headlights off in an area full of pedestrians, some of whom
might be intoxicated, to tell him to turn his headlights on.
Having met the first two elements, we turn to the third element, whether
the public’s needs and interests outweighed the intrusion upon Rave’s privacy.
The last element “requires an objective analysis of the circumstances confronting
the police officer.” Crawford, 659 N.W.2d at 542.
Here, the intrusion on Rave’s privacy was minimal. The officers walked up
to Rave’s vehicle as he was driving slowly, tapped on his window, and after he
rolled the window down told him to turn on his headlights. If Rave had not
exhibited obvious signs of intoxication, that would have been the end of the
incident. This intrusion is balanced against the public safety concerns presented
by Rave driving without headlights after dark in an area filled with pedestrians,
many of whom were intoxicated.
As noted above, there were concerns a
pedestrian might not see the vehicle and walk in front of it, and there were also
concerns Rave would be unable to see a pedestrian. We conclude the public’s
needs and interests outweighed the intrusion on Rave’s privacy.
We conclude the court properly denied Rave’s motion to suppress based
on a finding that the officers were legitimately engaged in a community
caretaking function at the time of the stop. Because we have affirmed on this
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ground, we do not need to address the other issues raised by Rave in this
appeal.
We affirm Rave’s conviction for operating while intoxicated.
AFFIRMED.
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