IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF CHERYL A. ANGIER AND CHRIS E. ANGIER Upon the Petition of CHERYL A. ANGIER, Petitioner-Appellee/Cross-Appellant, And Concerning CHRIS E. ANGIER, Respondent-Appellant/Cross-Appellee.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 9-695 / 08-1919
Filed October 7, 2009
IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF CHERYL A. ANGIER
AND CHRIS E. ANGIER
Upon the Petition of
CHERYL A. ANGIER,
Petitioner-Appellee/Cross-Appellant,
And Concerning
CHRIS E. ANGIER,
Respondent-Appellant/Cross-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, D.J. Stovall, Judge.
Chris Angier appeals the property settlement and alimony provisions of a
decree of dissolution. Cheryl Angier cross-appeals as to alimony. AFFIRMED
AS MODIFIED AND REMANDED.
Sharon Soorholtz Greer of Cartwright, Druker & Ryden, Marshalltown, for
appellant.
Debra Hockett-Clark, West Des Moines, and Andrew Howie of Hudson,
Mallaney & Shindler, P.C., West Des Moines, for appellee.
Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., Mansfield, J., and Schechtman, S.J.*
*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 (2009).
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MANSFIELD, J.
Chris Angier appeals the property settlement and alimony provisions of a
decree dissolving his marriage to Cheryl Angier.
Cheryl cross-appeals the
alimony provisions. We modify both the property settlement and the alimony
award and remand for further proceedings consistent herewith.
I. Facts.
At the time of trial, Cheryl was age fifty, Chris was age fifty-one, and they
had been married to each other for twenty-six years. The parties had three
children, only one of whom was a minor (an eleven-year-old daughter). Cheryl
and Chris were separated at the time of trial, with Cheryl living in the former
marital home in West Des Moines and Chris living in Des Moines.
Cheryl graduated with a bachelor’s degree from the University of Iowa in
1981. However, after the couple’s first child was born in 1982, Cheryl primarily
stayed home to raise the first two children. In the early to mid-1990s, Cheryl
worked outside the home as a nurse’s associate and then as a teaching
associate, but this employment ceased in 1996 after the couple’s third child, their
daughter, was born. The daughter was diagnosed with a serious form of cancer
shortly after birth, and had to undergo multiple surgeries, but the cancer has
been in remission for nine years. In 2007, when the parties separated, Cheryl
began working approximately thirty hours a week doing a variety of tasks for a
nonprofit organization at a rate of ten dollars per hour. Cheryl agrees that she
has marketable skills.
Chris, like Cheryl, has a bachelor’s degree from the University of Iowa.
He has worked in the insurance business for many years and is currently
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employed by GuideOne.
Chris earns approximately $80,000 a year plus a
bonus.
In 2004, three years before Cheryl petitioned for dissolution, Cheryl and
Chris acquired a farm in Marion County. This farm had been in Cheryl’s mother’s
family for several generations. Cheryl’s mother and father lived on it for twentytwo years. When Cheryl’s mother died in 2002, Cheryl’s father, Jack Noah,
inherited it from her.
By June 2003, Jack Noah had remarried and executed a new will. The
will provided that upon his death, his new wife (Lois Noah) would receive a life
estate in the farm, but it would then pass to his daughters Cheryl Angier and
Carol Honary in equal shares.1 The next year, however, Jack and Lois decided
they wanted to move away from the farm to the warmer climes of Arkansas.
Cheryl’s father recognized that he needed some return from the farm. In an April
2004 letter to Cheryl and her sister, Jack proposed several options. The third
option involved “sell[ing] out the farm lock, stock and barrel to both the Angier
family and the Honary family for 150,000 dollars which they could split and use
the property any way they wished.”
Cheryl’s father planned to sell the farm
whether the Angiers and the Honarys bought it or not. In July 2004, after making
plans to dispose of the farm, Jack executed a new will leaving his entire estate to
his new wife Lois unless she predeceased him.
1
In a separate memorandum to the will, Jack deposed of certain items of personal
property. Among other things, he indicated that his son-in-law Chris should receive four
guns from his collection, noting that he “found him to be an honest and responsible
adult.”
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In October 2004, Jack and Lois Noah deeded the farm property to Cheryl
and Chris Angier as joint tenants for the sum of $80,000 cash, which was
substantially less than its actual market value.
Jack and Chris finalized the
transaction directly without Cheryl’s involvement. According to Chris, Jack told
Chris that this was “what he wanted” out of the farm. According to Jack, this was
only a “token price.” He believed it was one-third the actual value of the farm
($240,000). He intended that each of his daughters, Cheryl Angier and Carol
Honary, would receive the benefit of one-half the difference between the
purchase price and the actual value.
Cheryl and Chris obtained the needed $80,000 by taking out a new
mortgage on their marital home. In the first year of owning the farm, Cheryl and
Chris used several thousand dollars of their marital funds to get the property in
good rental condition. Thereafter, all farm expenses (e.g., mortgage, taxes) have
been paid from marital funds, and all rental payments have been treated as
marital income. Cheryl and Chris have both done work on the farm, and had
planned to retire there. Since the first year, the farm has been financially selfsupporting.
Cheryl acknowledged that when the farm previously passed through her
family, no one ever paid anything for it. Thus, the $80,000 transaction was the
first purchase. At trial, Cheryl took the position that the farm actually belonged to
herself and her sister, although she conceded that none of the farm income has
been paid to her sister and her sister has had no involvement with the farm since
2004. Chris agreed that the $80,000 price “had something to do with the fact that
Cheryl is his daughter.” Both of the Honarys testified that they were generally
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aware of Jack’s $80,000 price, and that they had discussions with the Angiers
about putting up half of that amount. According to them, the Angiers went ahead
and paid the full $80,000 although the Honarys were ready, willing, and able to
pay half or even all of the purchase price. The Honarys assumed that Carol’s
interest in the property was being protected.
Cheryl’s father testified by deposition that he wanted to keep the farm in
the family in 2004. As noted, he testified that $80,000 was a “token price.” He
testified that he understood he was signing over the farm to Cheryl and that Chris
“would finance it for Cheryl.” However, he acknowledged that the deed went to
both Cheryl and Chris and there was nothing wrong with it.
According to
appraisal evidence presented at trial, the actual value of the farm in 2004 was
approximately $200,000, and its value had increased by 2008 to $295,000.
Following trial, the district court approved a property settlement that
generally resulted in an equal division of the parties’ considerable investments
and retirement accounts. However, the district court excluded the Marion County
farm from that property settlement, except for a $29,000 increase in equity that it
treated as marital property. (The court arrived at $29,000 by taking the present
value of $295,000, subtracting the 2004 value of $200,000, and subtracting the
remaining mortgage balance of $66,000.) As the district court explained, “It is
obvious that the $80,000 nominal sale price agreed to by Cheryl’s father was
meant to keep the property in the family.” The district court also ordered Chris to
pay Cheryl $400 per month in rehabilitative alimony for sixty months. Chris now
appeals, challenging both the disposition of the Marion County farm and the
provision for alimony.
Cheryl cross-appeals, arguing that the district court’s
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alimony award was insufficient and that she should receive $1100 per month until
she dies or remarries or Chris dies.
II. Standard of Review.
We review dissolution proceedings de novo. Iowa R. App. P. 6.4; In re
Marriage of Becker, 756 N.W.2d 822, 824-25 (Iowa 2008). We give weight to the
factual findings of the district court, especially when considering the credibility of
witnesses, but are not bound by them. Iowa R. App. P. 6.14(6)(g).
III. Analysis.
A. Marion County Farm.
The district court found that the Marion County farm was not a marital
asset subject to full division, notwithstanding the fact that Cheryl and Chris jointly
financed the purchase and jointly took title to it. The district court reasoned that
Cheryl’s father agreed to a steep discount “to keep the property in the family.”
The district court added, “To sell the property at this point pursuant to Chris’s
desires would defeat keeping the farm property in the family.”
Upon our review, under the specific facts of this case, we accept the
district court’s implicit determination that the equity in the farm at the time of the
2004 transfer was a gift to Cheryl. Although the farm was titled in both spouses’
names, we have previously held that this is not determinative.
See In re
Marriage of Fall, 593 N.W.2d 164, 167 (Iowa Ct. App. 1999). In reaching our
conclusion, we note the undisputed evidence that the purchase price was far
below the actual value of the property. Moreover, everyone recognized this at
the time. Also, Jack, Cheryl, Carol, and Carol’s husband all testified that Jack’s
overall plan was for Cheryl and Carol to derive equal benefit from the property;
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there is no evidence that Jack wanted to favor one daughter over the other. In
effect, it appears Jack intended to get back the $80,000 he needed, relinquish
the property to Cheryl, and let Cheryl and Carol work out the details later.
Although Chris mentions Jack’s decision to bequeath four guns to him, this
modest bequest, accompanied by modest praise (Jack says he found Chris to be
“an honest and responsible adult”), does not convince us that Jack would have
intended to give him half of an entire farm.
However, we believe the district court should have allocated more than
$29,000 of the equity in the farm to be divided as marital property. From 2004
until the time of dissolution, the couple used marital assets to improve and
maintain the property, used marital assets to pay down the mortgage, and
treated the rental income as marital property.
The district court specifically
found, and we concur, that Chris subsequently performed “some work to
enhance the value of the farm property.” Thus, it is our view that any increase in
value from 2004 to the time of dissolution should have been treated as a marital
asset.
Accepting the district court’s determinations that the property is now worth
$295,000 and that it was worth $200,000 in 2004, we hold that $109,000 of
equity in the farm should have been subjected to division as marital property.
We arrive at this number as follows:
In 2004, Jack gifted $120,000 (the
difference between the $200,000 value and the $80,000 purchase price) to
Cheryl. Cheryl also is assuming the $66,000 balance on the mortgage. This
results in a total of $186,000. The difference between $295,000 and $186,000 is
the marital share, and it comes to $109,000.
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For the foregoing reasons, we believe the property settlement needs to be
redetermined, with $109,000 of the farm property equity rather than $29,000 to
be included in the division of property pursuant to Iowa Code section 598.21(5)
(2007).
The remaining $186,000 of value, which includes both the original
$120,000 gift to Cheryl and the $66,000 mortgage balance assumed by Cheryl,
would still be treated as Cheryl’s separate property and would not be divided. We
accordingly remand for this purpose. On remand, we anticipate that the district
court would carry out this modification by reducing Cheryl’s assigned assets by
$40,000 (one-half of the difference between $109,000 and $29,000) and
reassigning those same assets to Chris.
B. Alimony.
Chris argues that the district court should not have awarded alimony;
Cheryl, meanwhile, contends the monthly alimony payments should have been
greater and of longer duration. An award of spousal support depends on the
circumstances of a particular case. Becker, 756 N.W.2d at 825. In making a
spousal support award, the district court must consider the statutory factors
enumerated in Iowa Code section 598.21A. These factors include: (1) the length
of the marriage; (2) the age, physical, and emotional health of the parties; (3) the
property division; (4) the educational level of the parties at the time of the
marriage and at the time the dissolution action is commenced; (5) the earning
capacity of the party seeking support; and (6) the feasibility of the party seeking
support becoming self-supporting at a standard of living reasonably comparable
to that enjoyed during the marriage. Id. The court also considers each party’s
earning capacity and each party’s present standard of living and ability to pay
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balanced against the relative needs of the other. In re Marriage of Hitchcock,
309 N.W.2d 432, 436-37 (Iowa 1981).
The district court found, and we agree, that Cheryl is entitled to
rehabilitative spousal support.
However, we find in order to do equity, the
spousal support award must be increased. The parties were married for twentysix years. At the time of the trial, Cheryl was fifty and Chris was fifty-one years
old. While Chris was advancing his career, Cheryl stayed home and raised three
children, one of whom was still at home.
Understandably, this has had an
adverse impact on her current and future earning capacity.
Although Cheryl
does have marketable skills, at the time of trial there was a large disparity
between the parties’ incomes. Cheryl’s annual income was $16,640, compared
with Chris’s annual income of $80,212 plus a bonus. Moreover, the district court
indicated its alimony award was intended, in part, to take into account the fact
that it only considered Chris’s regular salary, not his bonus income, for child
support purposes. Weighing all of these considerations, we find it necessary to
modify the alimony award in order to do equity. See In re Marriage of Clinton,
579 N.W.2d 835, 839 (Iowa Ct. App. 1998) (stating an award of spousal support
is a balancing of the equities). Thus, we award Cheryl alimony for sixty months
in the amount of $900 per month.2
2
We assume Cheryl has been receiving alimony at the lower $400 per month level while
this appeal has been pending. This would mean that her alimony would now be
increased to $900 per month, and when the original five years are over, Cheryl would
still receive alimony at the level of $900 a month until Chris has paid a total of $54,000
($900 per month times sixty months) in spousal support.
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IV. Conclusion.
For the foregoing reasons, we have decided the property settlement
provisions of the dissolution decree should be modified so as to treat $109,000 of
the equity in the Marion County farm as subject to division. Additionally, we
modify the decree’s alimony provisions to award Cheryl five years of alimony in
the amount of $900 per month. We also in our discretion deny Cheryl’s request
for attorney fees on appeal.
Thus, we affirm the decree of dissolution as
modified and remand for further proceedings consistent herewith. Costs of this
appeal are taxed one-half to each party.
AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED AND REMANDED.
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