STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. ARTHUR ALAN POYNER, Defendant-Appellant.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 9-689 / 08-1863
Filed November 12, 2009
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
ARTHUR ALAN POYNER,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Montgomery County, Timothy
O‟Grady, Judge.
Defendant appeals from a district court ruling denying his request to
modify a supplemental restitution order. AFFIRMED.
DeShawne L. Bird-Sell of DeShawne L. Bird-Sell, P.L.C., Glenwood, for
appellant.
Arthur Poyner, Fort Madison, pro se.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Martha E. Trout, Assistant Attorney
General, and Bruce E. Swanson, County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Mansfield, J., and Schechtman,
S.J.*
*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 (2009).
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VAITHESWARAN, P.J.
This is the third appeal stemming from a criminal restitution order entered
in 2002. The defendant, Arthur Poyner, challenges the jurisdiction of the court
that considered the restitution issue and contends the order violates the Ex Post
Facto Clauses of the United States and Iowa Constitutions.
I.
Background Proceedings.
More than three decades ago, the State charged Poyner with first-degree
murder. Although the act giving rise to the charge occurred in Pottawattamie
County, venue was changed to Montgomery County. A jury found Poyner guilty
and the court imposed a sentence, which included an order to pay the “costs of
the action.” Poyner‟s conviction was affirmed in State v. Poyner, 306 N.W.2d
716, 720 (Iowa 1981).
In 2002, the Iowa Department of Corrections sought restitution for court
costs. The district court sitting in Montgomery County granted the request but,
following hearings, reduced the requested amount by more than half, to
$3333.53. On appeal, this court affirmed the district court‟s order. See Poyner v.
Iowa Dist. Ct., No. 02-1349 (Iowa Ct. App. July 10, 2003).
Poyner next filed a motion for correction of sentence, again challenging
his restitution obligation. The district court denied his claims, and this court again
affirmed the district court. See State v. Poyner, No. 06-1100 (Iowa Ct. App. Dec.
12, 2007).
Not deterred, Poyner filed another challenge to the restitution order. He
asserted that the Montgomery County District Court did not have “jurisdiction or
authority to issue the 2002 Supplemental Order ordering [him] to pay restitution
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thus making the judgment void.” He additionally claimed the restitution order
violated the constitutional prohibitions against ex post facto laws because it was
entered pursuant to Iowa Code chapter 910 (2007), which was not in effect when
he was sentenced in 1979. Following a hearing, the district court denied this
challenge. The court concluded:
There is no ex post facto violation of defendant‟s due process rights
by using chapter 910 to collect court costs that were lawfully
assessed. Defendant also misapprehended the meaning of the
rules pertaining to change of venue. Venue was changed from
Pottawattamie County to Montgomery County.
Jurisdiction
remained in the Iowa District Court at all times.
Poyner appealed. Our review is for errors of law. State v. Jose, 636 N.W.2d 38,
43 (Iowa 2001).
II.
Analysis.
A. Jurisdiction.
Poyner claims that “Montgomery County, as the situs of trial as the result
of a change of venue, does not hold subject matter jurisdiction in this case.” He
asserts subject matter jurisdiction instead remained with the district court in
Pottawattamie County where the case originated.
“Subject matter jurisdiction refers to „the authority of a court to hear
and determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings
in question belong,‟” in contrast to the authority of the court to hear
the particular case then occupying the court‟s attention.
In re Marriage of Engler, 532 N.W.2d 747, 749 (Iowa 1995) (citations omitted).
Iowa district courts clearly have subject matter jurisdiction to hear the general
class of cases involving criminal restitution. See generally Iowa Code ch. 910.
Additionally, this jurisdiction is statewide. See id. § 602.6101 (establishing a
unified trial court with exclusive, general, and original jurisdiction over all civil and
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criminal proceedings, except where the legislature has otherwise provided); In re
Marriage of Rathje, 521 N.W.2d 748, 749 (Iowa 1994) (“We read nothing in
[section 602.6101] to indicate that Iowa‟s district courts hold less than statewide
jurisdiction over all appropriate matters.”). Therefore, there is no question that
the district court sitting in Montgomery County had subject matter jurisdiction
over Poyner‟s restitution proceedings.
The question remains whether Montgomery County was the appropriate
venue for the post-trial restitution proceedings.
On this question, the State
concedes that “[a]fter defendant was convicted, the case should have returned to
Pottawattamie County for further proceedings.” The State argues, however, that
Poyner waived this issue by failing to file a motion for change of venue when the
restitution issue was first raised in Montgomery County in 2002. See Iowa R.
Civ. P. 1.808(1) (providing that an action brought in the wrong county may be
prosecuted there unless the defendant moves for a change of venue before
answering). We agree with the State.
“[V]enue is not ordinarily jurisdictional.” Countryman v. Mt. Pleasant Bank
& Trust Co., 357 N.W.2d 599, 604 (Iowa 1984). Therefore, improper venue, if
not challenged, may be waived.
Id. at 603-04 (finding parties acquiesced to
venue in a certain county by filing motions in that county); see also State v.
Mandicino, 509 N.W.2d 481, 483 (Iowa 1993) (holding “an impediment to the
court‟s authority can be obviated by consent, waiver or estoppel”). As there is no
indication that Poyner challenged the court‟s venue in the restitution proceedings,
we conclude this issue was waived.
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B.
Ex Post Facto Clauses.
Poyner next claims the district court “erred in failing to rule on [his]
assertion that Iowa Code chapter 910 was unconstitutionally imposed” under the
Ex Post Facto Clauses of the United States and Iowa Constitutions.1 See U.S.
Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 1; Iowa Const. art. 1, § 21. As noted, the court in fact ruled
on the claim, concluding, “There is no ex post facto violation of defendant‟s due
process rights by using chapter 910 to collect court costs that were lawfully
assessed.” As Poyner does not challenge the merits of that ruling, we need go
no further. See Hyler v. Garner, 548 N.W.2d 864, 870 (Iowa 1996) (“[O]ur review
is confined to those propositions relied upon by the appellant for reversal on
appeal.”).
III.
Conclusion.
We affirm the district court‟s denial of Poyner‟s latest challenge to the
restitution order.
AFFIRMED.
1
Although Poyner‟s brief does not specify the constitutional provisions on which he
relies, the section 910.7 motion he filed in district court referred to the Ex Post Facto
Clauses of both the federal and state constitutions.
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