CREIG SHELTON, Applicant-Appellant, vs. STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 9-681 / 08-1370
Filed October 7, 2009
CREIG SHELTON,
Applicant-Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Hancock County, Colleen D.
Weiland, Judge.
Creig Shelton appeals from the district court order denying his application
for postconviction relief. AFFIRMED.
Rachel Antonuccio and Rockne Cole of Cole & Vondra, L.L.P., Iowa City,
for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Richard Bennett, Assistant Attorney
General, and Karen R. Kaufman Salic, County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Sackett, C.J., and Eisenhauer and Doyle, JJ.
2
EISENHAUER, J.
Creig Shelton appeals from the district court order denying his application
for postconviction relief. He contends the application should have been granted
because his appellate counsel was ineffective.
He also contends the State
violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963),
by failing to disclose a deal it made to procure witness testimony.
Shelton was convicted of first-degree murder and first-degree robbery in
2002. On direct appeal, his convictions were affirmed. State v. Shelton, No. 020673 (Iowa Ct. App. Sept. 24, 2003). On December 7, 2006, Shelton filed an
application for postconviction relief, alleging his appellate counsel was ineffective
in failing to raise (1) the prosecutor’s denial of “use immunity” to a potential
witness and (2) admission of the DNA evidence over objection. He also alleged
the State violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d
215 (1963), when it failed to disclose it had granted a “deal” to one of its
witnesses in exchange for testimony.
Following a trial, the district court entered its ruling denying Shelton’s
application for postconviction relief. The court found appellate counsel’s failure
to raise the issues of “use immunity” and the admission of the DNA evidence was
not a breach of an essential duty, but a strategic decision based on sound
reasoning and analysis, having concluded neither issue had any merit. The court
also found Shelton failed to show the existence of any “deal” between the State
and its witness.
3
Shelton appeals. Normally, a trial court’s denial of a postconviction relief
action is reviewed for correction of errors at law. Fenske v. State, 592 N.W.2d
333, 338 (Iowa 1999).
Where, however, the applicant asserts violations of
constitutional safeguards, our review is de novo. Giles v. State, 511 N.W.2d 622,
627 (Iowa 1994).
We first address Shelton’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel,
which we review de novo. Ledezma v. State, 626 N.W.2d 134, 141 (Iowa 2001).
A person claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must show (1) counsel
breached an essential duty and (2) prejudice resulted. Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 690, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2066, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 695 (1984). To
show prejudice, one must demonstrate counsel’s errors were such that they
“undermine the confidence in that outcome.” Id. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068, 80 L.
Ed. 2d at 698.
We conclude appellate counsel was not ineffective in failing to raise the
two issues advanced by Shelton.
Shelton sought an order directing a
codefendant to testify in his trial. The request was denied. In order to succeed
on the claim regarding use immunity,1 Shelton’s appellate counsel would have
had to show the prosecutor denied the witness immunity to intentionally distort
the factfinding process (1) by intimidating or harassing the witness to discourage
his testimony, or (2) by refusing to grant immunity solely to keep exculpatory
evidence from the jury. State v. Simpson, 587 N.W.2d 770, 773 (Iowa 1998).
1
Use immunity may be granted to compel a witness to give self-incriminating testimony
while at the same time prohibiting the use of such testimony in a subsequent prosecution
of the witness. State v. Fox, 491 N.W.2d 527, 533 (Iowa 1992).
4
Shelton is unable to show the requisite prosecutorial misconduct to succeed on
his claim. Therefore, appellate counsel was not required to raise the issue on
direct appeal. State v. Hochmuth, 585 N.W.2d 234, 238 (Iowa 1998) (holding
trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to pursue a meritless issue).
In order to succeed on a claim the district court erred in admitting DNA
evidence because of a flaw in the chain of custody, appellate counsel would have
had to show the trial court abused its discretion because there was a reasonable
probability tampering, substitution or alteration of evidence occurred. State v.
Biddle, 652 N.W.2d 191, 196 (Iowa 2002). The evidence in question was inside
the victim’s home, which had been secured by padlock and locked. When the
evidence (drinking glasses, beer cans, and cigarette butts) was retrieved the
house was still secured. There is no showing the evidence inside the home had
been tampered with or disturbed. Because it had no merit, appellate counsel had
no duty to raise the issue.
Finally, we conclude the district court did not err in denying Shelton’s claim
the State violated Brady by failing to disclose information regarding a “deal” in
exchange for Joline Johnson’s testimony. The court found “Shelton has failed to
show that an agreement or deal between the State and Johnson ever existed.”
The prosecutor denied any such deal was made and the court found Johnson’s
account to be inconsistent. We find no error.
We affirm the district court’s denial of Shelton’s application for
postconviction relief.
AFFIRMED.
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