VAUGHNELLE PENISKA, Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. DAVITA, INC., Defendant-Appellee.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 9-653 / 09-0177
Filed September 17, 2009
VAUGHNELLE PENISKA,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
DAVITA, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Richard G. Blane II,
Judge.
Vaughnelle Peniska appeals from the district court’s order granting
defendant’s motion for summary judgment. AFFIRMED.
Harley C. Erbe of Erbe Law Firm, Des Moines, for appellant.
Heidi A. Guttau-Fox and Scott Moore of Baird, Holm Law Offices, Omaha,
Nebraska, for appellee.
Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Potterfield, J., and Huitink, S.J.*
*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 (2009).
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POTTERFIELD, J.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
Vaughnelle Peniska was employed by DaVita, Inc. from 2003 until she
was involuntarily terminated in 2007. DaVita employees receive paid time off
(PTO) to use for vacation, sick, and personal time.
DaVita employees also
receive extended illness leave (EIL) to use when personal illness or injury
prevents them from working. At the time of her termination, Peniska had accrued
56.18 hours of PTO and 160.42 hours of EIL.
These unused PTO and EIL
benefits were not paid to Peniska following her termination.
DaVita’s policies specify that an employee who is involuntarily terminated
“will automatically forfeit all accrued PTO, except in states where prohibited by
law.”
It is undisputed that Peniska’s termination was involuntary.
DaVita’s
policies also state that “EIL is not paid out in the event of a teammate’s
separation of employment (either voluntary or involuntary).”
On February 29, 2008, Peniska filed a petition seeking payment of her
accrued PTO and EIL time. On November 6, 2008, DaVita filed a motion for
summary judgment asserting that Peniska is not entitled to such payments. On
January 5, 2009, the district court granted DaVita’s motion for summary
judgment.
II. Standard of Review
We review the granting of a summary judgment motion for correction of
errors at law.
In re Estate of Renwanz, 561 N.W.2d 43, 44 (Iowa 1997).
Summary judgment is appropriate when the record demonstrates that there is no
genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
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matter of law. Id. We review the evidence in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party. Id.
III. Summary Judgment
Iowa Code section 91A.4 (2007) provides, “When the employment of an
employee is . . . terminated, the employer shall pay all wages earned . . . .” Iowa
Code section 91A.2(7)(b) defines wages to include “[v]acation, holiday, sick
leave, and severance payments which are due an employee under an agreement
with the employer or under a policy of the employer.” “When a statute is plain
and its meaning is clear, we need not search for its meaning beyond its
expressed language.” Stroup v. Reno, 530 N.W.2d 441, 443 (Iowa 1995). We
agree with the district court that the plain language of the statute means that
vacation and sick time are not wages unless the employer has such a policy or
agreement with its employee. It is undisputed that no such policy or agreement
existed in this case.
Further, the cases cited by Peniska on appeal do not support her
interpretation of the statute. The cases Peniska cited are either cases from other
jurisdictions, which involve different statutory language,1 or cases involving an
agreement or policy.2 We agree with the district court that because DaVita did
1
See Langager v. Crazy Creek Prods., Inc., 954 P.2d 1169 (Mont. 1998); Roseland v.
Strategic Staff Mgmt., Inc., 722 N.W.2d 499 (Neb. 2006).
2
See Vanous v. City of Cedar Rapids, 255 N.W.2d 334, 336 (Iowa 1997) (involving a
policy granting retirement benefits, which included full compensation for all accumulated
sick leave in excess of ninety days); Haesemeyer v. Mosher, 308 N.W.2d 35, 38 (Iowa
1981) (allowing the Iowa merit employment department to limit the amount of unused
vacation time for which employees would be compensated upon termination); Chard v.
IA Mach. & Supply Co., 446 N.W.2d 81, 84 (Iowa Ct. App. 1989) (finding employee was
entitled to unused vacation pay pursuant to an agreement with employer); Willets v. City
of Creston, 433 N.W.2d 58, 63 (Iowa Ct. App. 1988) (finding employees’ accrued sick
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not have an agreement or policy providing that it would compensate employees
for unused PTO or EIL time upon involuntary termination, Peniska has no right to
compensation under the statute, and DaVita is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.
AFFIRMED.
leave benefits provided by a collective bargaining agreement were not due without
sickness, retirement, or termination).
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