RODERICK N. REIFENSTAHL, Applicant-Appellant, vs. STATE OF IOWA, Respondent-Appellee.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 9-627 / 08-1362
Filed September 17, 2009
RODERICK N. REIFENSTAHL,
Applicant-Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF IOWA,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Eliza J. Ovrom,
Judge.
Applicant appeals the district court’s dismissal of his postconviction action
on the ground the issues had been previously adjudicated. AFFIRMED.
Charles Kenville, Des Moines, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Sharon Hall, Assistant Attorney
General, John P. Sarcone, County Attorney, and Jacki L. Livingston, Assistant
County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Mansfield, J., and Schechtman,
S.J.*
*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 (2009).
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SCHECHTMAN, S.J.
I.
Background Facts & Proceedings
On January 26, 2006, Roderick Reifenstahl was charged by trial
information with two counts of second-degree kidnapping, first-degree burglary,
assault while participating in a felony, and going armed with intent. There were
two alleged female victims to his crimes, one being Wanda Wiegand. On March
20, 2006, Reifenstahl signed a limited waiver of speedy trial to May 1, 2006.1
Trial was scheduled for that date.
On April 24, 2006, the State moved for a continuance to May 22, 2006. It
asserted that Wiegand’s sister had suddenly died the previous day; that Wiegand
was responsible for the funeral arrangements, disposing of the estate, and
arranging for the care of the decedent’s child.
A hearing on the continuance was held on April 26, 2006. Reifenstahl
resisted, contending lack of good cause. At this time, a second-degree theft
charge against Reifenstahl was also pending in Polk County.
His attorney
offered that he was “out on bond” on the theft charge, though in custody on the
subject prosecution. The district court stated, sua sponte, “Well, I believe his
bond was revoked.” The court attendant, after being asked to do a computer
search, confirmed that the bond in the theft charge had been revoked. The court
concluded, “the State has presented good cause for continuance of trial. Trial in
this matter is continued to May 10, 2006.” The case went to trial on May 10.
1
Riefenstahl executed this extension of five days (speedy trial expired on April 26,
2006, pursuant to our ninety-day rule under Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.33(2)(b))
as his attorney had a conflict with a military reserve duty commitment.
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Reifenstahl was convicted of two counts of false imprisonment, second-degree
burglary, and assault while participating in a felony.
He was sentenced to
consecutive terms totaling seventeen years.
In his direct appeal Reifenstahl raised as an issue that the district court
abused its discretion in granting the State’s motion for a continuance, as it
violated his right to a speedy trial. He also claimed ineffective assistance of
counsel for failure to file a motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds.
The
appellate opinion, directly after commenting on the circumstances confronting
Wiegand, stated:
[W]e can understand and respect the difficulty one faces in the
mourning period immediately following the death of a close relative.
We agree with the district court this is an exceptional circumstance
that justified the trial being continued beyond the speedy trial
deadline.
State v. Reifenstahl, No. 06-0962 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 8, 2007). The opinion
further related:
The delay of only ten days was reasonable. Defendant had
asserted his right to a speedy trial but had agreed to a partial
waiver to assure availability of his attorney. There is no showing
that defendant was prejudiced. He was incarcerated on another
charge, so he would not have been released even if this case had
been dismissed on May 2. We affirm on this issue.
Id. We preserved for possible postconviction proceedings the other claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel unrelated to speedy trial.
Id.
The Iowa
Supreme Court denied Reifenstahl’s application for further review.
Reifenstahl filed an application seeking postconviction relief, contending
(1) material facts, not previously presented, requires a vacation of his sentences;
and, (2) he received ineffective assistance because (a) defense counsel did not
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file a motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds; and (b) failed to object to certain
testimony/exhibits and to move for mistrial due to jury misconduct.2
After hearing, the district court denied Reifenstahl’s petition for
postconviction relief, prompting this appeal.
The grounds of appeal were
narrowed to (1) the court’s error in ruling that the doctrine of claim preclusion
barred consideration of the violation of his right to speedy trial, and (2) the court’s
error in denying his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
II.
Standard of Review
Postconviction proceedings are law actions ordinarily reviewed for the
correction of errors at law. Bugley v. State, 596 N.W.2d 893, 895 (Iowa 1999).
Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, however, are reviewed de novo.
State v. Bergmann, 600 N.W.2d 311, 313 (Iowa 1999). To establish a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show (1) the attorney failed
to perform an essential duty, and (2) prejudice resulted to the extent it denied
defendant a fair trial. State v. Carroll, 767 N.W.2d 638, 641 (Iowa 2008).
III.
Speedy Trial
Reifenstahl contends the district court erred in ruling that the doctrine of
claim preclusion barred him from claiming, in this postconviction action, that there
had been a speedy trial violation.
He recognizes that this same issue was
previously considered by the court of appeals in the direct appeal of his criminal
conviction. But Reifenstahl contends “[t]here was never a final adjudication on
the merits in the direct appeal because the true facts regarding the applicant2
These allegations were dropped on appeal after the district court’s dismissal of each
of them.
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appellant’s custody status were never considered.” He suggests it was the trial
court’s duty to re-analyze the speedy trial issue under similar standards as the
appellate court, but with the correct facts that he was not in custody on the theft
charge.
Iowa Code section 822.8 (2007) (in our chapter entitled “Postconviction
Procedure”), with the preface, “Grounds must be all-inclusive,” provides:
Any ground finally adjudicated or not raised, or knowingly,
voluntarily, and intelligently waived in the proceeding that resulted
in the conviction or sentence, or in any other proceeding the
applicant has taken to secure relief, may not be the basis for a
subsequent application, unless the court finds a ground for relief
asserted which for sufficient reason was not asserted or was
inadequately raised in the original, supplemental, or amended
application.
Under section 822.8, “[r]elitigation of previously adjudicated issues is barred.”
State v. Wetzel, 192 N.W.2d 762, 764 (Iowa 1971). Reifenstahl’s claim that the
nine day continuance violated his right to a speedy trial was finally adjudicated by
the court of appeals. State v. Reifenstahl, No. 06-0962 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 8,
2007). His claim would be barred by section 822.8, unless he has “sufficient
reason” for failing to have previously raised the misunderstanding relating to his
custody on the theft charge. His appeal focused on the lack of good cause and
he has urged no sufficient reason for having ignored its alleged potential prior to
this proceeding.
But there are other factors that bear directly upon this issue. One of the
situations for applicants to seek postconviction relief is if “there exists evidence of
material facts, not previously presented and heard, that requires vacation of the
conviction or sentence in the interest of justice.” Iowa Code § 822.2(d). This
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statute is the basis of Reifenstahl’s application to address issue preclusion. The
applicant needs to establish four elements to succeed on this ground of new
material facts: (1) the evidence was discovered after judgment; (2) the evidence
could not have been discovered earlier in the exercise of due diligence; (3) it is
material to the issue, not merely cumulative or impeaching; and (4) it would
probably change the result if a new trial were granted. Summage v. State, 579
N.W.2d 821,822 (Iowa 1998).
Not only was the evidence discovered before judgment, but the
continuance would have been granted notwithstanding. The continuance court
focused on whether “good cause” existed for the delay. See State v. Winters,
690 N.W.2d 903, 908 (Iowa 2005).
The reason for the delay was not that
Reifenstahl was in jail, but because of the travails of the victim witness, who was
in a mourning period for her sister. The applicant has failed to convince the
postconviction court, or this court, that if the court had known the applicant was
not in custody, that would have resulted in a denial of the the ten-day
continuance.
We conclude the district court did not err in concluding Reifenstahl’s
speedy trial claims had been previously adjudicated, and therefore further
relitigation of that issue was barred. See Wetzel, 192 N.W.2d at 764.
IV.
Ineffective Assistance
Reifenstahl asserts he received ineffective assistance because his trial
counsel failed to file a motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds. The opinion in
his direct appeal states:
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He further contends that if error on this issue is not preserved
because his defense counsel failed to file a motion to dismiss
because he was not brought to trial within the speedy trial deadline,
then we should find his defense counsel ineffective. The speedy
trial issue was addressed by the parties in arguing the motion to
continue and the district court’s ruling indicates the court
considered the speedy trial issue. Consequently, we find the issue
adequately preserved.
State v. Reifenstahl, No. 06-0962 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 8, 2007). The opinion
proceeds to aver that the district court had not abused its discretion by granting
the motion for continuance. Id. On this basis, a motion to dismiss on speedy trial
grounds would have been unsuccessful.
Because there has already been a finding that a motion to dismiss on
speedy trial grounds, whenever made, would have been unsuccessful,
Reifenstahl cannot show he received ineffective assistance due to his counsel’s
failure to file a motion to dismiss. We will not find counsel engaged in ineffective
assistance due to a failure to raise a meritless claim. State v. Hildebrand, 405
N.W.2d 839, 841 (Iowa 1987).
We conclude the district court properly denied Reifenstahl’s application for
postconviction relief.
AFFIRMED.
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