STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. TYRONE DAVIS SMITH SR., Defendant-Appellant.
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 9-624 / 08-0865
Filed September 2, 2009
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
TYRONE DAVIS SMITH SR.,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, Bruce B.
Zager, Judge.
Tyrone Davis Smith Sr. appeals following conviction and sentence for
willful injury causing serious injury, criminal mischief in the second degree,
interference with official acts, and leaving the scene of an accident. AFFIRMED.
Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and David A. Adams, Assistant
Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Cristen Douglass, Assistant Attorney
General, Thomas J. Ferguson, County Attorney, and James Katcher, Assistant
County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Vogel, P.J., Potterfield, J., and Huitink, S.J.*
*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 (2009).
2
HUITINK, S.J.
Tyrone Davis Smith Sr. appeals following conviction and sentence for
willful injury causing serious injury, criminal mischief in the second degree,
interference with official acts, and leaving the scene of an accident.
Smith
argues his counsel was ineffective in failing to (1) move to dismiss for violation of
speedy trial, (2) move for judgment of acquittal on the charge of leaving the
scene of an accident, and (3) object to the jury instruction defining “accident.”
Smith further contends the district court erred in denying his motion in arrest of
judgment when his right to a speedy trial had been violated. We affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
In the afternoon of June 17, 2007, Tyrone Davis Smith Sr. and a friend
were driving around Waterloo in Smith’s white Suburban SUV. They stopped at
a convenience store where Smith’s son worked, just as the store had closed.
Smith saw Roxanne Coffer, a woman he had known for years, outside the store
and began “macking,” or paying her compliments. Smith stated he was not afraid
of Antonio Bruce, the father of Coffer’s child. Smith told Coffer, “I hope you got
some life insurance out on the nigger ’cause I’m going to kill him . . . .”
Shortly thereafter, Smith spotted Bruce on his Honda scooter with Bruce
and Coffer’s daughter riding on the back. Smith cut Bruce off and began yelling
and threatening him. Bruce managed to get his daughter safely back to Coffer,
and then drove off on his scooter to avoid a confrontation with Smith. Smith
followed directly behind Bruce and chased him at more than fifty miles per hour
through Waterloo.
When Bruce arrived at Highway 63, he swerved onto a
sidewalk to avoid a busy intersection. Smith followed and hit Bruce who lost
3
control of his scooter. Several people witnessed the incident. Bruce suffered
numerous injuries, including a collapsed lung, three broken ribs, and severe and
extensive abrasions from the road.
After hitting Bruce, Smith’s speed propelled him onto Highway 63 where
he struck the side of a van. He reversed direction and drove off. Soon, the front
left tire of Smith’s Suburban shredded, and he was forced to stop. Smith heard
police sirens in the area and took off on foot. A police officer chased Smith for
several blocks and eventually got Smith to stop by threatening that Smith would
be “tazed.”
Smith was charged by trial information filed on June 28, 2007. Smith
pleaded not guilty and waived his right to speedy trial.
However, on
September 21, 2007, Smith filed a pro se motion to withdraw his waiver of
speedy trial. This motion was not served on the State or Smith’s counsel. Over
the next three months, the court granted several continuances for delays
attributable to Smith. On December 31, 2007, for the first time since Smith filed
his motion to withdraw his speedy trial waiver, the court and parties addressed
the motion.
As a result of that hearing, the court ordered that Smith had
reasserted his right to a speedy trial, effective as of December 31, 2007.
Trial took place on February 6, 2008, and the jury returned the verdicts
finding Smith guilty of willful injury causing serious injury, criminal mischief in the
second degree, interference with official acts, and leaving the scene of an
accident resulting in serious injury. On March 27, 2008, Smith—through new
counsel—filed a motion in arrest of judgment, claiming his speedy trial rights had
been violated and that charges against him should have been dismissed before
4
trial.
After a hearing on April 7, 2008, the district court determined that no
violation to Smith’s right to speedy trial had occurred and denied his motion.
Smith now appeals.
II. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel.
We conduct a de novo review of ineffective assistance of counsel claims.
State v. Maxwell, 743 N.W.2d 185, 195 (Iowa 2008). To establish a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must prove (1) counsel failed to
perform an essential duty and (2) prejudice resulted to the extent it denied the
defendant a fair trial.
Id.
Ordinarily, we preserve ineffective assistance of
counsel claims for postconviction proceedings to allow the facts to be developed
and give the allegedly ineffective attorney an opportunity to explain his or her
conduct, strategies, and tactical decisions. See State v. Bearse, 748 N.W.2d
211, 214 (Iowa 2008).
A. Failure to Move to Dismiss.
Smith argues his counsel was ineffective in failing to file a motion to
dismiss for violation of his speedy trial rights.
He contends the court (and
counsels) ignored his pro se withdrawal of his waiver of speedy trail, and his
counsel breached an essential duty in failing to make any attempt to secure
Smith’s speedy trial rights. We conclude the record is inadequate to address this
issue, and we therefore preserve Smith’s claim for possible postconviction relief
proceedings.
B. Failure to Move for Judgment of Acquittal.
Smith next contends his counsel was ineffective in failing to file a motion
for judgment of acquittal on Count V, the charge of leaving the scene of an
5
accident. Smith argues that an intentional act is not an “accident,” and therefore,
because the State charged him for intentionally running over Bruce, he cannot
also be charged with leaving the scene of an accident. Essentially, Smith argues
there was insufficient evidence to prove an “accident” and counsel therefore
breached an essential duty by failing to move for judgment of acquittal on that
charge.
A claim based on counsel’s failure to challenge the sufficiency of the
evidence supporting a conviction can ordinarily be resolved on direct appeal.
See State v. Scalise, 660 N.W.2d 58, 62 (Iowa 2003). If the record in this case
fails to reveal substantial evidence to support the conviction, counsel was
ineffective for failing to properly raise the issue and prejudice resulted. See, e.g.,
State v. Truesdell, 679 N.W.2d 611, 616 (Iowa 2004). However, if the record
reveals substantial evidence, counsel’s failure to challenge the sufficiency of the
evidence and move for judgment of acquittal could not have been prejudicial. Id.
To convict Smith of Count V (leaving the scene of an accident resulting in
serious injury), the State had to prove the following elements:
1. On or about the 17th day of June, 2007, the Defendant was the
driver of a vehicle involved in an accident.
2. The accident resulted in an injury to Antonio Bruce.
3. The Defendant failed to immediately stop the vehicle at the
scene of the accident or as close as possible and failed to
remain at the scene to provide driver information.
4. Antonio Bruce suffered a serious injury.
Iowa Criminal Jury Instruction No. 34; see also Iowa Code § 321.261(3) (2007).
Iowa Code chapter 321 does not define “accident,” and there is no Iowa
Uniform Jury Instruction defining the word. In evaluating a charge under section
321.261, our supreme court has used the dictionary definition of “accident” as a
6
“sudden event or change occurring without intent or volition through
carelessness, unawareness, ignorance, or a combination of causes and
producing an unfortunate result.” State v. Carpenter, 334 N.W.2d 137, 140 (Iowa
1983) (quoting Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 11 (1976)). In this
case, the court adopted the State’s proposed Jury Instruction No. 35, which
stated as follows:
“An accident is defined as any motor vehicle collision or
striking of another object, including but not limited to a person or vehicle.”
Smith argues the court should have adopted the meaning of “accident”
that Iowa courts have used in the past, particularly with regard to insurance
cases. Smith contends the term should be defined as something “happening by
chance” that is “sudden, unexpected, and not intended or designed by any
person.” See Austin v. CUNA Mut. Life Ins. Co., 603 N.W.2d 577, 578 (Iowa
1999); Lickleider v. Iowa St. Traveling Men’s Ass’n, 151 N.W. 479, 480 (Iowa
1915).
We find Smith’s argument to be without merit. We cannot interpret section
321.261 to include only motor vehicle accidents that are caused unintentionally.
See Carpenter, 334 N.W.2d at 139-40. Such a distinction could not have been
what the legislature intended. The record indicates Smith sought out Bruce on
the afternoon of June 17, 2007, with the intention to harm him. Earlier that day,
Smith told Coffer (the mother of Bruce’s child) that he was not afraid of Bruce
and that he hoped she had “some life insurance out on the nigger” because he
was “going to kill him.” Smith found Bruce and chased him through Waterloo at
speeds over fifty miles per hour. Smith eventually hit Bruce when Bruce lost
control of the scooter he was driving. After he hit Bruce, Smith ran into a van,
7
and fled the scene. He continued fleeing on foot when his tire shredded and
forced him to stop the Suburban he was driving. This is precisely the type of
situation section 321.261 was designed to address.
Upon our de novo review, we find substantial evidence supported
submission of Count V to the jury.1 Under the circumstances in this case, we find
the district court was correct in interpreting the term “accident” to include both
intentional as well as unintentional acts on the part of the motor vehicle driver.
Smith’s counsel did not breach an essential duty in failing to move for judgment
of acquittal.
C. Failure to Object to Jury Instruction.
Smith argues his counsel was ineffective in failing to object to Jury
Instruction No. 35, which defined the term “accident.” We determined above that
the district court correctly allowed Jury Instruction No. 35, and therefore Smith’s
counsel had no duty to object to it. We find this claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel to be without merit.
III. Motion in Arrest of Judgment.
We review the district court’s grant or denial of a motion in arrest of
judgment for abuse of discretion. State v. Smith, 753 N.W.2d 562, 564 (Iowa
2008). An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court exercises its discretion
“on grounds or for reasons clearly untenable or to an extent clearly
1
Even if we determined section 321.261 should apply only to unintentional motor vehicle
accidents, there is substantial (albeit conflicting) evidence in the record to indicate Smith
did not fully intend to collide with Bruce. Smith repeatedly acknowledged at trial that he
had “left the scene of an accident” and maintained that his collision with Bruce was
accidental. Smith testified he tried to stop before hitting Bruce, but was unable to do so.
He even called a defense witness to support this contention.
8
unreasonable.” State v. Parker, 747 N.W.2d 196, 203 (Iowa 2008). A ground or
reason is untenable when it is not supported by substantial evidence or when it is
based on an erroneous application of the law. Id.
Smith argues the district court erred in denying his motion in arrest of
judgment. He claims judgment should not have been entered when his right to
speedy trial had been violated.2 A trial court may grant a motion in arrest of
judgment when “upon the whole record no legal judgment can be pronounced.”
Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.24(3)(a). In its order denying Smith’s motion, the district court
stated in part:
As indicated by counsel at the time of hearing, the Motion in
Arrest of Judgment is primarily a motion to dismiss based upon the
alleged violation of the right of the Defendant to be tried within
ninety (90) days. However, the record does not support such a
claim. As the State has set forth in great detail in its Resistance to
motion in Arrest of Judgment, the Defendant waived his right to a
speedy trial on September 19, 2007. Thereafter, he filed a pro se
Motion to Withdraw Waiver of Speedy Trial. However, no service of
this document was ever effectuated upon counsel, and no hearing
was ever conducted on this pro se motion. The additional
pleadings in the court file reveal numerous additional requests by
counsel for the Defendant that the trial be continued in order to
perform additional discovery and depositions. All of these delays
were attributable to the Defendant.
As the pleadings also reveal, on December 31, 2007, the
State did file its initial Motion to Continue Trial due to information
which was obtained in depositions which had recently been
completed. A hearing was conducted on the record with all counsel
and the undersigned. At that time the Court did grant the State’s
Motion to Continue Trial over the objection of counsel for the
Defendant. As revealed by the transcript of that proceeding, the
undersigned noted that there was a written Waiver of Speedy Trial
filed on September 19, 2007, and then a Motion to Withdraw
2
The State contends Smith failed to preserve error because he did not file a motion to
dismiss on this issue, which the State contends is the correct motion to claim a violation
of the right to speedy trial. It appears the district court treated Smith’s motion in part as
a motion to dismiss; therefore, we address Smith’s argument on appeal assuming that
he has properly preserved error on this issue.
9
Waiver of Speedy Trial, which had never been ruled on as of
December 31, 2007. As a result of that hearing, the Court did note
that it would grant the Defendant’s motion to reassert his right to a
speedy trial effective December 31, 2007. This is reflected in the
Court’s Order dated December 31, 2007, in which the Court
acknowledges that “the Defendant hereby reasserts his right to a
speedy trial.” Trial was conducted within ninety (90) days of the
Defendant’s reassertion of his right to a speedy trial.
....
Under the facts and circumstances of this case, there is
overwhelming evidence to support the conviction of the Defendant
on each and every essential element of the crimes for which he
was convicted. The verdicts were consistent with the testimony of
the numerous witnesses who testified on behalf of the State, and
with the physical evidence obtained at the scene. For all of these
reasons, the Court concludes that the weight of the evidence
supports the conclusion of the jury and the verdicts which it
reached. Likewise, there is no evidence of additional errors
committed by the Court which would have deprived this Defendant
of a fair and impartial trial warranting this Court to set aside the
judgments rendered by the jury, or to grant the Motion for New
Trial.
Upon our review, we find no error in the district court’s denial of Smith’s
motion in arrest of judgment. The court did not abuse its discretion in denying
the motion, and we therefore affirm as to this issue.
IV. Conclusion.
We affirm Smith’s conviction and sentence and preserve his claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel for a possible postconviction proceeding.
AFFIRMED.
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
