STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. RANDY LEROY CUE, Defendant-Appellee.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 9-589 / 08-1596
Filed October 7, 2009
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
RANDY LEROY CUE,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Pottawattamie County, Charles L.
Smith III, Judge.
The State appeals from the district court‟s ruling suppressing statements
of the defendant. AFFIRMED.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Mary Tabor and Kevin Cmelik,
Assistant Attorneys General, Matthew D. Wilber, County Attorney, and Jon
Jacobmeier, Assistant County Attorney, for appellant.
Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Nan Jennisch, Assistant
Appellate Defender, and Frank E. Robak, Robak Law Office, Council Bluffs, for
appellant.
Heard by Sackett, C.J., and Eisenhauer and Doyle, JJ.
2
DOYLE, J.
The State appeals from a district court ruling which suppressed
statements made by defendant Randy Cue to Council Bluffs police officers during
two separate interviews. The State contends the Miranda1 warnings were not
required and thus the statements were admissible because Cue was not in
custody when he made statements on the street and at the police station, and
because Cue was not interrogated at the police station. Additionally, the State
argues Cue‟s statements made at the police station before, during, and after the
Miranda warnings were volunteered and not obtained in violation of the Fifth
Amendment. Upon our review, we affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
Randy Cue is Florence Cue‟s son and was a close friend of Rodney
Deville. On March 24, 2008, at approximately 10:40 p.m., Florence reported a
stabbing at her residence in Council Bluffs. Police officers were dispatched and
found Deville dead at the scene in a pool of blood.
After a preliminary
investigation, the officers suspected Deville was stabbed by the defendant.
The officers spoke to several individuals in attempting to locate Cue. One
individual told the investigators that she did not know where Cue was, but
indicated he might be found at the residence of his friend, Bill Hanson, in Omaha,
Nebraska.
The individual also stated that Cue was mentally and physically
disabled. During their investigation, the officers were also told Cue was illiterate
and could not read or write.
1
See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 1612. 16 L. Ed. 2d 694,
706 (1966).
3
The Council Bluffs Police Department requested assistance from the
Omaha Police Department, and a total of six police officers in three squad cars,
from both departments, converged on the Hanson residence to apprehend Cue.
In the early morning hours of March 25, 2008, Omaha officers first arrived at the
Hanson residence and found Cue lying in the street in front of the residence.
Cue was highly intoxicated and could not stand or sit up without assistance.
Council Bluffs Detective Steve Andrews testified that Cue was their key suspect.
Detective Andrews also testified that he would not have considered Cue free to
leave the scene, though he testified that Cue “would not have [had] any idea of
that.”
Detective Andrews began talking with Cue.
Detective Andrews had a
pocket digital recorder and recorded a portion of his conversation with Cue.2
Without advising Cue of his Miranda rights, Detective Andrews questioned Cue
about Deville‟s death, specifically asking him:
“You want to tell me about
tonight?” “So you say [Deville] got violent with you?” “Where is your car at . . . ?”
“Where did you park?” “You got blood on your hands?” “So what brought it all
on tonight?” “You said you stabbed him?” “How many times [do] you think you
stabbed [Deville]?” “Where did you stab him at?” and “You know where the knife
is at?” Cue gave incriminating responses to these questions. Detective Andrews
testified that the other officers at the scene were somewhere behind him and did
not participate in his conversation with Cue.3
2
The audio recording of the street conversation is approximately six minutes in length
and begins with Cue responding to an unrecorded question.
3
Detective Andrews testified he could overhear the officers behind him and that they can
be heard in the background of his audio recording.
4
After being requested to do so, Cue eventually agreed to go to the Omaha
police station for another interview. 4
He was not formally arrested or put in
handcuffs at that point. He was transported to the Omaha police station in a
squad car accompanied by two Omaha police officers, and the squad car‟s video
camera recorded his transport. During the trip, Cue was handcuffed after he
became rowdy and unruly in the car. They arrived at the police station at about
3:48 a.m. where Cue was taken to an interrogation room.
In the interrogation room, Detective Andrews and another officer began
interviewing Cue. Cue talked over many of Detective Andrews‟s statements and
Cue‟s responses were often slurred or inaudible.
Cue was also extremely
emotional during the interview.
Detective Andrews recorded the beginning of the interview with his pocket
digital recorder.5 The audio recording begins:
DETECTIVE ANDREWS: I don‟t know, why would I have a
reason to be upset?
THE DEFENDANT: Because my friend what, what
happened.
Detective Andrews then attempted to give Cue the Miranda warnings, and the
following exchange6 occurred:
DETECTIVE ANDREWS: I just got some technical stuff I got
to go through here, alright? This . . . just basically states before we
ask you any questions that you got to understand your rights,
4
Cue‟s agreement to go to the police station was not captured on the audio recording.
This audio recording lasts approximately eighteen minutes. Although the interrogation
room had video-recording capabilities, the video recording did not start until
approximately nine minutes into the audio recording.
6
An unofficial transcript of the audio recordings was submitted into evidence at the
suppression hearing; however, after reviewing the audiotapes and the transcripts, it is
clear the transcripts often do not accurately reflect the statements heard on the
audiotapes. We therefore rely only on the audio recordings.
5
5
right? . . . Okay, it says, before we talk to you, . . . you have the
right to remain silent. You understand that?
THE DEFENDANT: (Inaudible) yea, whatever.
DETECTIVE ANDREWS: Okay. It says anything you say
can be used against you in court. You understand that? You have
the right to talk to a lawyer.
THE DEFENDANT: What am I arrested for, killing my best
friend or what?
DETECTIVE ANDREWS: (Inaudible).
THE DEFENDANT: Is that what happened? Tell me.
DETECTIVE ANDREWS (and other officer(s)): You‟re not
under arrest.
(Inaudible).
THE DEFENDANT: Tell me, is that what happened?
DETECTIVE ANDREWS: You‟re not under arrest.
THE DEFENDANT: Did he die?
DETECTIVE ANDREWS: I don‟t know.
....
DETECTIVE ANDREWS: It says if you can‟t afford an
attorney, that one will be appointed (inaudible), okay?
THE DEFENDANT: (Inaudible).
DETECTIVE ANDREWS: You understand those rights?
THE DEFENDANT: (Inaudible).
DETECTIVE ANDREWS: Can you sign this for me?
THE DEFENDANT: (Inaudible).
DETECTIVE ANDREWS: Huh?
THE DEFENDANT: What happened, did he die?
DETECTIVE ANDREWS: I don‟t know, Randy.
THE DEFENDANT: (Inaudible).
I ain‟t signing nothing
(inaudible).
DETECTIVE ANDREWS: Okay, can you sign this for me
(inaudible)?
THE DEFENDANT: No (inaudible).
[OTHER OFFICER]: You understand your rights, don‟t you?
THE DEFENDANT: I got no rights man, I ain‟t got a lawyer
right now.
[OTHER OFFICER]: You wanna talk to us?
THE DEFENDANT: What happened, what happened, what?
[OTHER OFFICER]: You don‟t have to talk to us.
DETECTIVE ANDREWS: Randy, Randy, we can‟t talk to
you unless you agree to talk to us.
THE DEFENDANT: No (inaudible) no, no. What happened,
why am I here?
[OTHER OFFICER]: You tell us.
THE DEFENDANT: You tell me. (Inaudible).
....
6
DETECTIVE ANDREWS: I mean, I would love to be able to
talk to you Randy, but—
THE DEFENDANT: (Inaudible) you didn‟t tell me why I‟m
here for (inaudible).
DETECTIVE ANDREWS: Well, you‟re here because you
talked to the officer out there that brought you down here and said
you wanted to come down here and talk to us.
THE DEFENDANT: No (inaudible) you make me feel I need
a lawyer now.
DETECTIVE ANDREWS: I don‟t, you know, that‟s up to
you. . . .
THE DEFENDANT: (Inaudible) freak thing that happened.
DETECTIVE ANDREWS: You seen TV, right? You have to
be read your rights and all that stuff?
THE DEFENDANT: Read my rights, got a lawyer, I got five
of them.
....
DETECTIVE ANDREWS: I can‟t understand what you‟re
saying, Randy.
THE DEFENDANT: Yeah I talk to my lawyer. (Inaudible). I
want to talk to my lawyer. (Inaudible). My head (inaudible) my
brain is like really slow. . . . (Inaudible).
DETECTIVE ANDREWS: Excuse me?
THE DEFENDANT: I don‟t like fucking lawyers anyways.
DETECTIVE ANDREWS: Okay.
....
THE DEFENDANT: (Inaudible). Okay. Frank Ro-fuckingbak. Okay?
DETECTIVE ANDREWS: Mm hmm.
THE DEFENDANT: Talk to him, alright?
DETECTIVE ANDREWS: Frank?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
DETECTIVE ANDREWS: Who‟s that?
THE DEFENDANT: Frank Robak.
DETECTIVE ANDREWS: Who is Frank Robak?
THE DEFENDANT: My fucking lawyer, talk to him from now
on. Anything you say to me, can say to him, okay?
DETECTIVE ANDREWS: I‟m not saying anything to you Mr.
Cue.
THE DEFENDANT: I‟m saying to you right fucking straight,
fucking now, you got something to say what the fuck I did
(inaudible) Robak. (Inaudible) two or three other lawyers, talk to
them too. (Inaudible) . . . I‟m not gonna say another fucking thing
until you talk to my lawyer. . . . I want something to drink, that‟d be
really nice. My head hurts, got a bad neck and bad back . . . .
7
The video of the interview starts right after Cue asks for a drink and
continues for approximately fifty-three minutes. The video initially shows another
officer coming into the room after Cue told the officers to talk to his lawyer. The
officer sat down, and Detective Andrews and the officer converse shortly. The
officer passed Detective Andrews a paper, and Detective Andrews then told the
officer, “Mr. Cue talked to me out on the street before we came in.” Cue then
interrupted with incriminating statements.
Thereafter, officers responded to
various statements made by Cue, asking questions not specifically related to the
investigation, including questions about Cue‟s back pain and Wiccan religion.
After Cue made more incriminating statements, the officers asked him, “What
exactly happened?” Cue made more incriminating statements. Cue then stated
he had nothing to say and again asked for a drink of water. The officers told Cue
they would see what they could do, but the “guys out there have to get it.”
Detective Andrews left the interrogation room, and the other officer
remained with Cue. Cue and the officer talked about various subjects, including
the Harley-Davidson motorcycle Cue recently purchased, Cue‟s genealogy, and
his family. Cue often responded to questions with unrelated answers. While
conversing on these subjects, Cue regularly interjected with incriminating
statements and asking why he was there and if Deville had died. Cue also asked
for a drink of water two more times; he was finally given a cup of water
approximately twenty-eight minutes into the video of the interview.
Towards the end of the interview, the officers took Cue‟s clothing, asked
him to put on an orange jumpsuit, and photographed him. Approximately fortytwo minutes into the video of the interview, Cue stated he was really tired and
8
tried to lie down on the floor of the interrogation room. The officers asked him to
sit up and then took swabs from his feet for blood and DNA analysis. Cue was
then placed under arrest.
The officers never re-attempted to give Cue the
Miranda warnings and never communicated with him about his request that they
contact his attorney.
On April 10, 2008, Cue was charged with murder in the first degree. He
filed a motion to suppress the statements he made to the police officers. Among
other things, he claimed that his Miranda rights and Fifth Amendment right to
counsel were violated.
Following a hearing on the motion, the district court
granted Cue‟s motion to suppress the audiotape of his statements on the street
and the audio and videotapes of his statements at the Omaha police station.
The State filed an application for discretionary review. The Iowa Supreme
Court granted the application and stayed the district court proceedings. The
matter was then transferred to this court for review.
II. Scope and Standards of Review.
Our review of the constitutional issues raised is de novo. State v. Ortiz,
766 N.W.2d 244, 249 (Iowa 2009). We independently evaluate the totality of the
circumstances shown by the record and “give deference to the district court‟s fact
findings due to its opportunity to assess the credibility of witnesses.” State v.
Miranda, 672 N.W.2d 753, 758 (Iowa 2003) (citation omitted). However, we are
not bound by the district court‟s findings. State v. Simmons, 714 N.W.2d 264,
271 (Iowa 2006).
9
III. Discussion.
The State contends the district court erred in suppressing the audio and
video recordings containing statements made by Cue on the street and at the
police station. The State argues Miranda warnings were not required because
Cue was not in police custody when he made statements on the street and at the
police station, and he was not interrogated at the police station. Additionally, the
State argues Cue‟s statements made at the police station before, during, and
after the Miranda warnings were volunteered and not obtained in violation of the
Fifth Amendment. We address the State‟s arguments in turn.
A. Miranda Analysis.
The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution, made applicable
to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, promises that “[n]o person . . .
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” U.S.
Const. amend. V; Miranda, 672 N.W.2d at 758. This constitutional guarantee
applies when one is subject to “custodial interrogation” by police. Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444-45, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 1612, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 706-07
(1966). To safeguard this right, prior to custodial interrogation, a person must be
informed of the right to remain silent, the right to obtain or be appointed an
attorney, and that any statements can be used against the person in court. Id. at
478-79, 86 S. Ct. at 1630, 16 L. Ed. 2d at 726. “The requirement that police
officers advise suspects of their Miranda rights is more than a mere procedural
nicety or legal technicality.” Ortiz, 766 N.W.2d at 251 (citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at
476, 86 S. Ct. at 1629, 16 L. Ed. 2d at 725). “Absent a recitation of the Miranda
warnings and a valid waiver of the right to remain silent and the right to the
10
presence of an attorney, any statement made by an individual in response to
custodial interrogation is inadmissible.” State v. Harris, 741 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Iowa
2007) (citations omitted).
“[W]hen an accused has invoked his right to have counsel
present during custodial interrogation, a valid waiver of that right
cannot be established by showing only that he responded to further
police-initiated custodial interrogation even if he has been advised
of his rights.” Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484, 101 S.Ct.
1880, 1884-85, 68 L. Ed. 2d 378, 386 (1981). In other words, “an
accused, . . . having expressed his desire to deal with the police
only through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the
authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the
accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or
conversations with the police.” Id. at 484-85, 101 S. Ct. at 1885, 68
L. Ed. 2d at 386 (emphasis added).
Id. at 6. The bright line rule announced in Edwards reflects the Supreme Court‟s
concern that
if a suspect believes that he is not capable of undergoing [custodial]
questioning without advice of counsel, then it is presumed that any
subsequent waiver that has come at the authorities‟ behest, and not
at the suspect‟s own instigation, is itself the product of the
“inherently compelling pressures” and not the purely voluntary
choice of the suspect.
Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 681, 108 S. Ct. 2093, 2097-98, 100 L. Ed. 2d
704, 713 (1988) (citations omitted).
“[E]ven if a conversation . . . is initiated by the accused, where
reinterrogation follows, the burden remains upon the prosecution to
show that subsequent events indicated a waiver of the Fifth
Amendment right to have counsel present during the interrogation.”
Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1044, 103 S. Ct. 2830, 2834,
77 L. Ed. 2d 405, 412 (1983). A valid waiver under these
circumstances requires the individual to “evince[ ] a willingness and
a desire for a generalized discussion about the investigation.” Id. at
1045-46, 103 S. Ct. at 2835, 77 L. Ed. 2d at 412.
Harris, 741 N.W.2d at 6.
While the officers may inquire if the suspect has
decided to retract his request for counsel, they may not use subtle, coercive
11
means to achieve a change of mind. See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 399,
405, 97 S. Ct. 1232, 1241, 1243, 51 L. Ed. 2d 424, 436-37, 440-41 (1977).
A critical question to the analysis is whether the suspect was subject to
“custodial interrogation,” as the “Miranda requirements do not come into play
unless both custody and interrogation are present.” Simmons, 714 N.W.2d at
274 (citation omitted).
Custodial interrogation is “questioning initiated by law
enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at
444, 86 S. Ct. at 1612, 16 L. Ed. 2d at 706; see also Simmons, 714 N.W.2d at
274. The fact police officers are involved in questioning a person does not make
it a custodial interrogation. State v. Astello, 602 N.W.2d 190, 195 (Iowa Ct. App.
1999). Similarly, the mere fact an individual is questioned at a law enforcement
center does not render the interview a custodial interrogation.
See State v.
Schwartz, 467 N.W.2d 240, 245 (Iowa 1991).
[A] noncustodial situation is not converted to one in which Miranda
applies simply because a reviewing court concludes that, even in
the absence of any formal arrest or restraint on freedom of
movement, the questioning took place in a “coercive environment.”
Any interview of one suspected of a crime by a police officer will
have coercive aspects to it, simply by virtue of the fact that the
police officer is part of a law enforcement system which may
ultimately cause the suspect to be charged with a crime. But police
officers are not required to administer Miranda warnings to
everyone whom they question. Nor is the requirement of warnings
to be imposed simply because the questioning takes place in the
station house, or because the questioned person is one whom the
police suspect. Miranda warnings are required only where there
has been such a restriction on a person‟s freedom as to render him
“in custody.” It was that sort of coercive environment to which
Miranda by its terms was made applicable, and to which it is
limited.
12
Astello, 602 N.W.2d at 195 (quoting Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495, 97
S. Ct. 711, 714, 50 L. Ed. 2d 714, 719 (1977)).
The custody determination depends on the objective circumstances of the
interrogation, not on subjective views harbored either by the officer or the person
being questioned. Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 323, 114 S. Ct. 1526,
1529, 128 L. Ed. 2d 293, 2998 (1994).
The appropriate test is whether a
reasonable person in Cue‟s position would understand himself or herself to be in
custody. See State v. Countryman, 572 N.W.2d 553, 558 (Iowa 1997).
In making this determination, we may consider “„the language used
to summon the individual, the purpose, place and manner of the
interrogation, the extent to which the defendant is confronted with
evidence of his guilt, and whether the defendant is free to leave the
place of questioning.‟”
Simmons, 714 N.W.2d at 274-275 (citations omitted). We note that when “the
confrontation between the suspect and the criminal justice system is instigated at
the direction of law enforcement authorities, rather than the suspect, custody is
more likely to exist.” Miranda, 672 N.W.2d at 759 (citation omitted).
As for the interrogation determination:
[T]he term “interrogation” under Miranda refers not only to express
questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the
police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody)
that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an
incriminating response from the suspect.
Harris, 741 N.W.2d at 5 (quoting Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301, 100
S. Ct. 1682, 1689-90, 64 L. Ed. 2d 297, 308 (1980)). As one court aptly stated,
“interrogation . . . is not limited to direct inquisitorial repartee[;] it includes the
various approaches police have available to obtain an incriminating statement.”
State v. Johnson, 586 P.2d 811, 814 (Or. Ct. App. 1978).
13
1. Statements Made in the Street.
The State concedes that Cue was interrogated by the Council Bluffs police
officers when they interviewed him in the street. However, the State argues that
Cue was not in custody at the time of the interrogation by the officers when he
made the statements in the street. The State urges that Cue was not in custody
because he was not summoned to the location of the first interview, the first
interview took place in a public location where he could have declined to answer
the detective‟s questions, he was not placed under arrest or told he was under
arrest, he agreed to return to Omaha with the officers to finish talking to them,
and he was not placed in handcuffs until he became unruly and created the
possibility of injuring himself.
After reviewing the principles demanded by Miranda, the guiding factors,
and all of the circumstances surrounding the questioning evidenced by the
record, we find Cue was in custody when he was interrogated on the street, and
therefore Miranda warnings were required. Although Cue was not summoned to
the street where he was first questioned, he was first found lying in the street,
highly intoxicated, and unable to stand or sit up without assistance, and thus was
unable to simply walk away from the interview. At the time he was interviewed
on the street, Cue was the prime suspect in Deville‟s murder. Although Cue was
only interviewed by Detective Andrews, five other officers were on the scene,
several of which were standing close behind Detective Andrews and Cue such
that they can be heard on Detective Andrews‟s audio recording of the street
interview. Furthermore, Detective Andrews asked Cue specific questions about
the murder and Cue‟s involvement in the crime. Detective Andrews also testified
14
that Cue was not free to leave the scene, although he qualified his testimony
stating that Cue would not have known that. Based on the foregoing, we find a
reasonable person in Cue‟s position would understand himself or herself to be in
custody, and thus Miranda warnings were required. Consequently, we conclude
the district court did not err in suppressing the audio recording containing Cue‟s
statements made on the street.
2. Statements Made at the Police Station.
a. Custody.
The State argues that Cue was not in custody at the time of the interview
at the Omaha police station.
The State urges that Cue was not in custody
because he had agreed to speak with the officers at the police station, he was
not placed under arrest or told he was under arrest, and the interview did not
reflect a police-dominated atmosphere. We disagree.
After being requested to do so, Cue agreed to go to the Omaha police
station.
Cue ultimately arrived at the police station in handcuffs, and the
handcuffs were not removed until he promised to be good and behave. Cue
repeatedly asked why he was there. Although he was told he was not under
arrest, Cue was never told he was free to leave, and even the officers did not
believe he was free to leave. See Ortiz, 766 N.W.2d at 252 (citations omitted).
Although Cue asked for a lawyer and told the officers to talk to his lawyer, the
officers made no movements or communications with Cue to honor the assertion
of his right. We find this suggests a police-dominated atmosphere. Based on the
foregoing, we find a reasonable person in Cue‟s position would understand
15
himself or herself to be in custody when he was interviewed at the police station,
and therefore Miranda warnings were required.
b. Interrogation.
The State also argues that although the officers intended to interrogate
Cue at the police station, an interrogation never occurred because Cue
voluntarily gave incriminating statements before, during, and after the Miranda
warnings were given. We disagree.
The audio recording begins with Detective Andrews asking, “I don‟t know,
why would I have a reason to be upset?” The purpose of the question clearly
was to elicit an incriminating response from Cue, of which the officers were
aware, therefore satisfying the definition of interrogation. Additionally, we agree
with the district court‟s conclusion that the officers‟ remaining in the interrogation
room and engaging in “small talk” after Cue asserted his right to counsel was
“undoubtedly designed to illicit statements from [the defendant].” Because Cue
was subject to custodial interrogation, the Miranda warnings were required.
c. Waiver of Miranda.
At the police station, the officers attempted to give Cue the Miranda
warnings.
The State argues that Cue effectively waived his Miranda rights
thereafter by reinitiating a dialogue with the officers about the investigation after
he was advised of his Miranda rights, and therefore those statements made after
the Miranda warnings are admissible. Upon our review, we disagree.
For Cue‟s statements to be admissible, the State must first prove he “was
adequately informed of his Miranda rights, understood them, and knowingly and
intelligently waived them.” Ortiz, 766 N.W.2d at 249 (citations omitted). Second,
16
the State must prove Cue “gave his statement voluntarily.” Id. (citation omitted).
It is the State‟s burden to prove Cue knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily
waived his Miranda rights by a preponderance of the evidence. See id.
A court looks at the totality of the circumstances to determine
voluntariness. State v. Payton, 481 N.W.2d 325, 328 (Iowa 1992).
The ultimate test is whether, under the totality of circumstances, the
statements were the product of an essentially free and
unconstrained choice, made by the subject at a time when that
person‟s will was not overborne or the capacity for selfdetermination critically impaired.
State v. Bowers, 656 N.W.2d 349, 353 (Iowa 2002). The court considers several
factors, including the intellectual abilities of the defendant, whether the
interrogator acted in a deceptive manner, whether the subject appeared to
understand and respond to questions, and whether the subject was physically
abused or deprived of food or sleep. Id. (citations omitted).
After reviewing the entire record, including the audio and videotapes, with
the factors set forth above in mind, we conclude the totality of the circumstances
demonstrates Cue‟s inculpatory statements at the police station were not made
voluntarily.
We find it very troublesome that after Cue unequivocally and
repeatedly asserted his right to counsel, the officers did nothing to accommodate
his request. Rather, the officers stayed in the room and conversed with each
other without ever acknowledging Cue‟s clear assertion of his right. However,
even assuming without deciding Cue‟s statements made at the police station
were the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice, the totality of
the circumstances clearly establishes the statements were made by Cue at a
time when his capacity for self-determination was critically impaired.
17
A review of the audio and videotapes evidences Cue‟s inability to
understand the officers‟ questions as well as the Miranda warnings. Cue was
highly intoxicated during his interviews with the officers, and he often responded
to questions with unrelated answers. Although intoxication is not conclusive on
the issue of voluntariness, Cue‟s intoxication is “one factor to be considered” in
the totality of the circumstances surrounding the statements made.
Edman, 452 N.W.2d 169, 170 (Iowa 1990).
State v.
Additionally, Cue‟s physical and
emotional reaction to the interrogation weighs in favor of finding his statements
were not voluntarily made. Cue was extremely emotional, often times rambling
and confused, sobbing, and very difficult to understand, further evidencing his
mental state was so disabling as to render him unable to make a voluntary
statement. See State v. Countryman, 572 N.W.2d 553, 559 (Iowa 1997). The
record also shows Cue‟s requests for water were ignored for a substantial period
of time.
The interview took place at approximately four in the morning, and
although Cue told officers he was really tired and tried to lie down on the floor of
the interrogation room, the interview continued.
Additionally, a witness had
previously stated to the officers that Cue was mentally and physically disabled.
For these reasons, we conclude the totality of the circumstances clearly
establishes the statements were made by Cue at a time when his capacity for
self-determination was critically impaired and thus were not voluntarily made.
Accordingly, the district court did not err in suppressing his recorded statements.
B. Voluntary Statements.
We note that even if Miranda warnings are not required, a suspect‟s
statements are still subject to suppression at the suspect‟s criminal trial if those
18
statements were not made voluntarily. See State v. Trigon, Inc., 657 N.W.2d
441, 445 (Iowa 2003) (citation omitted). The State again has the burden of
proving voluntariness. Id. Factors bearing on the issue of voluntariness where
Miranda warnings were not required include:
the defendant‟s age, experience, prior record, level of education
and intelligence; the length of time defendant is detained and
interrogated; whether physical punishment was used, including the
deprivation of food or sleep; defendant‟s ability to understand the
questions; the defendant‟s physical and emotional condition and his
reaction to the interrogation; whether any deceit or improper
promises were used in gaining the admissions; [and] any mental
weakness the defendant may possess.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
Even if Cue was not subject to custodial interrogations and Miranda
warnings were not required, for the reasons stated above, we conclude his
statements were not voluntarily given.
Therefore, even if the court erred in
determining Cue was subject to custodial interrogations, the district court did not
err in suppressing his statements.
IV. Conclusion.
We find Cue was subject to custodial interrogation at the times of his
interviews and Miranda warnings were not given prior to his incriminating
statements. Additionally, we find Cue‟s statements made after officers attempted
to give him the Miranda warning and after he asserted his to right to counsel
were not voluntarily made. We therefore conclude the district court did not err in
suppressing Cue‟s recorded statements and accordingly affirm the district court‟s
ruling.
AFFIRMED.
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