IN THE INTEREST OF D.W., Minor Child, P.L.P., Mother, Appellant.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 9-576 / 09-0941
Filed August 19, 2009
IN THE INTEREST OF D.W.,
Minor Child,
P.L.P., Mother,
Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Karla Fultz, Associate
Juvenile Judge.
A mother appeals from the order terminating her parental rights to her
child. AFFIRMED.
Victoria L. Meade, West Des Moines, for appellant
Barbara Davis, West Des Moines, for intervenor.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kathrine S. Miller-Todd, Assistant
Attorney General, John P. Sarcone, County Attorney, and Faye Jenkins,
Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
Alexandra Nelissen of Nelissen & Juckette, P.C., Des Moines, for father.
Nicole Garbis Nolan, Des Moines, attorney and guardian ad litem for
minor child.
Considered by Sackett, C.J., and Eisenhauer and Doyle, JJ.
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SACKETT, C.J.
A mother1 appeals from the order terminating her parental rights to her
child.
She contends termination is not in the child’s best interests and
reasonable efforts were not made to reunify her with her child. We affirm.
BACKGROUND. The child, born in 2004, first came to the attention of the
Iowa Department of Human Services in 2005 because the mother was actively
using methamphetamine. After the child was removed and found to be in need
of assistance, the child was placed with the maternal grandmother. A year later,
after the mother had successfully completed substance abuse treatment and
“appeared to be in solid recovery,” the child was returned to the mother’s care
and the case was closed.
The child was removed a second time in March of 2008 because the
mother was again actively using methamphetamine and allegedly was selling
methamphetamine from their home.
The mother admitted she had relapsed
around October of 2007, was using methamphetamine five or six times a week,
and was selling methamphetamine.
The child again was placed with the
maternal grandmother, where the child remained throughout this case.
In May, the guardian ad litem filed a motion to waive reasonable efforts.
The court considered the motion at the dispositional hearing in June, but
continued the issue because the department noted the mother was participating
in services and treatment and the department requested that she be given an
additional three months to demonstrate continued stability.
1
The father’s parental rights were not terminated and are not at issue in this appeal.
3
At the August review hearing, the mother was arrested and charged with
multiple felony drug charges. She later pled guilty to two counts of delivery of
methamphetamine and one count of possession with intent to deliver. The court
sentenced her to three consecutive terms of up to ten years each. She began
serving her sentence at the women’s facility in Mitchellville.
In November the court heard evidence on the motion to waive reasonable
efforts. The court denied the motion and made specific findings it would be in the
child’s best interests to allow more services. The father, who was incarcerated at
the time, was likely to be available before the permanency hearing in March of
2009. Additional time would allow for visitation by the paternal grandmother and
continued therapy for the child.
In February of 2009, the mother’s request for a reconsideration of her
sentence was granted, the sentence was suspended, and she was sent to a
recovery facility, where she was to remain until maximum benefits were reached.
Following a permanency hearing in late February, the court allowed the father an
additional six months to work toward reunification. A decision was made to seek
termination of the mother’s parental rights, so a decision on permanency was
continued until a hearing on the termination petition.
By the time of the combined permanency/termination hearing in late April
and early May, the mother had completed her time at the recovery facility and
was on intensive supervision of her probation.
She had recently become
employed. She was attending AA meetings and participating in mental health
services. The child’s therapist testified there was a strong bond between the
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mother and the child, but that the child could not be returned to the mother’s care
at that time and the therapist could not project when it would be possible to
reunite mother and child.
Concerning permanency, the court determined there was no reunification
plan that would allow it to find that the reasons for removal would no longer exist
if the mother were given an additional six months for reunification. The court
determined permanency should be achieved by terminating the mother’s parental
rights. It found the child could not be returned to the mother’s care without being
subject to adjudicatory harm. It further found termination was in the child’s best
interest and would be less detrimental to the child than the harm caused by
continuing the parent-child relationship.
The court terminated the mother’s
parental rights under Iowa Code sections 232.116(1)(d), (e), (f), (i), and (l)
(2009).
SCOPE OF REVIEW.
Our review of termination-of-parental-rights
proceedings is de novo. In re J.E., 723 N.W.2d 793, 798 (Iowa 2006). We
review the facts and the law and adjudicate rights anew. In re H.G., 601 N.W.2d
84, 85 (Iowa 1999). We give weight to the juvenile court’s factual findings but are
not bound by them. In re E.H., III, 578 N.W.2d 243, 248 (Iowa 1998).
The parent-child relationship is constitutionally protected.
Quilloin v.
Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255, 98 S. Ct. 549, 554, 54 L. Ed. 2d 511, 519 (1978);
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233, 92 S. Ct. 1526, 1542, 32 L. Ed. 2d 15, 35
(1972). When the juvenile court terminates a parent’s rights, we affirm if clear
and convincing evidence supports the termination under the cited statutory
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provision. In re S.R., 600 N.W.2d 63, 64 (Iowa Ct. App. 1999). The State has
the burden of proving the allegations by clear and convincing evidence. “Clear
and convincing evidence” is evidence leaving “no serious or substantial doubt
about the correctness of the conclusion drawn from it.” In re D.D., 653 N.W.2d
359, 361 (Iowa 2002) (quoting Raim v. Stancel, 339 N.W.2d 621, 624 (Iowa Ct.
App. 1983)).
BEST INTERESTS.
The mother contends termination of her parental
rights is not in the child’s best interests. She argues that she has cooperated
with services, she wants what is best for the child, she has been the “sole
parental figure” throughout the child’s life, and there is a strong parent-child
bond.
A strong bond between parent and child is a special circumstance that
militates against termination. See Iowa Code § 232.116(3)(c). However, this is
not an overriding consideration, but merely a factor to consider. In re N.F., 579
N.W.2d 338, 341 (Iowa Ct. App. 1998).
We, like the juvenile court, have
considered the parent-child bond here, and find the risk of psychological and
emotional harm to the child if she were returned to her mother and then removed
again far outweighs the parent-child bond. Although the mother has recently
cooperated with services and appears to be maintaining her sobriety, her past
record of responding to treatment, then subsequently relapsing, gives us little
confidence the child could be returned to her in the near future or that she could
successfully parent the child without relapsing, requiring the child’s removal
again. See id. (noting that, in considering the impact of a drug addiction, we
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must consider the treatment history of the parent to gauge the likelihood the
parent will be in a position to parent the child in the foreseeable future).
We find that the bond between the mother and child is not enough to
forestall termination. See In re A.C., 415 N.W.2d 609, 613 (Iowa 1987) (“The
crucial days of childhood cannot be suspended while parents experiment with
ways to face up to their own problems.”); N.F., 579 N.W.2d at 341 (“We have
repeatedly followed the principle that the statutory time line must be followed and
children should not be forced to wait for their parent to grow up.”). “The child will
continue to grow, either in bad or unsettled conditions or in the improved and
permanent shelter which ideally, at least, follows the conclusion of a juvenile
proceeding.” A.C., 415 N.W.2d at 613. The sole, consistent parental figure in
this child’s life has been the maternal grandmother, not the mother. She has
provided a safe, stable, and secure environment in which the child can flourish.
See J.E., 723 N.W.2d at 801 (Cady, J., concurring specially) (“A child’s safety
and the need for a permanent home are now the primary concerns when
determining a child’s best interests.”). We agree with the finding of the juvenile
court on this issue.
REASONABLE EFFORTS. The mother contends the department did not
make reasonable efforts to reunify her with her child.
The court found
reasonable efforts were made, concluding the mother had “been offered every
service available that the Department of Human Services designed to reunify her
with [the child] and to assist her in maintaining stability and sobriety.” They were
provided in part by the department and in part in conjunction with her release
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from prison.
During cross examination, the mother agreed there were no
services that she had asked for that were not provided. From our review of the
evidence, we agree with the juvenile court that the State made reasonable efforts
to reunify this child with her mother and affirm on this issue.
AFFIRMED.
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