IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF ANNE C. HUDSON AND SCOTT A. HUDSON Upon the Petition of ANNE C. HUDSON, Petitioner-Appellant, And Concerning SCOTT A. HUDSON, Respondent-Appellee.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 9-557 / 09-0009
Filed October 7, 2009
IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF ANNE C. HUDSON
AND SCOTT A. HUDSON
Upon the Petition of
ANNE C. HUDSON,
Petitioner-Appellant,
And Concerning
SCOTT A. HUDSON,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, George L.
Stigler, Judge.
Anne Hudson appeals from the economic provisions of a dissolution
decree. AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.
John R. Walker, Jr. of Beecher, Field, Walker, Morris, Hoffman & Johnson,
P.C., Waterloo, for appellant.
Cheryl L. Weber of Dutton, Braun, Staack, Hellman, P.L.C., Waterloo, for
appellee.
Considered by Sackett, C.J., and Vaitheswaran and Mansfield, JJ.
2
VAITHESWARAN, J.
Anne Hudson appeals from the economic provisions of a dissolution
decree.
I.
Background Facts and Proceedings.
Scott and Anne Hudson married in 1985.1 At the time of the marriage,
Scott had a degree in mechanical engineering and Anne was working towards a
degree in business administration. Because Scott‟s employment required him to
move, Anne quit college for a period of time. She eventually returned to college
and obtained a bachelor‟s and master‟s degree in business administration.
Scott relocated several times to pursue job opportunities. At his most
recent job, he earned up to $209,000 annually in wages and bonuses. Anne had
various jobs during the marriage. Her highest earnings were $23,500 annually.
In 2007, Anne petitioned for a dissolution of the marriage. The district
court awarded Anne $555,755 in assets and Scott $573,687.
The court
explained the approximately $18,000 difference in Scott‟s favor as follows:
Scott leaves this marriage with approximately $18,000 in assets
more than does Anne. Anne however at time of trial had
approximately $9000 in her Veridian Credit Union [account] against
which a number of checks yet had to clear. Scott had only
approximately $671 in his Wells Fargo checking account.
Offsetting the two, each leaves with approximately the same
amount of assets.
The court also ordered Scott to pay Anne $1000 per month in
rehabilitative spousal support for two years and $500 per month for an additional
year. The court reasoned that Anne “should be able to return to the University of
1
The couple had three children, whose custody is not at issue.
3
Northern Iowa and refresh her MBA within a period of two years and within a
third year obtain a job that will pay her above-average wages.” In setting the
amount of spousal support, the court also considered “the rather substantial
property and child support awards.2
Both parties filed post-trial motions pursuant to Iowa Rule of Civil
Procedure 1.904(2).
The district court denied the relevant portions of the
motions and Anne appealed.
On appeal, she challenges the district court‟s
property division and spousal support awards.
II.
Analysis.
A.
Property Division.
Anne first takes issue with the $18,000 differential in the property
distribution. She concedes, as she must, “that the courts are not required to split
the marital assets on a dollar for dollar basis.” See In re Marriage of Russell, 473
N.W.2d 244, 246 (Iowa Ct. App. 1991) (stating Iowa courts do not require an
equal division or percentage distribution). She argues, however, that factual and
mathematical errors in the district court‟s reasoning render the award inequitable.
See id. (stating the determining factor is what is fair and equitable in each
particular circumstance).
We agree with Anne that certain fact findings underlying the property
award are not supported by the record. For example, at the time of trial, Anne
2
The district court ordered both parents to pay child support based on the custody
arrangement to which they agreed. Although the support order is not at issue on appeal,
both parents allude to it in their discussions of the remaining economic provisions. We
find it unnecessary to address the arguments that are based on these awards, except as
noted in footnote 3.
4
had less money in her bank account than the court found and Scott had more
money than the court found. However, these errors do not automatically require
modification because our review is de novo and we are “obliged to examine the
entire record and adjudicate rights anew on the issues properly presented.” In re
Marriage of Smith, 573 N.W.2d 924, 926 (Iowa 1998) (emphasis added); see
also Lessenger v. Lessenger, 261 Iowa 1076, 1078, 156 N.W.2d 845, 846 (1968)
(stating the court does not “reverse an equity case upon such complaints as
these” but instead draws such conclusions from its review as it deems proper).
On our de novo review, we note that the factual errors cited by Anne
resulted in $2472.66 more in assets on her side of the ledger and $3866 less on
Scott‟s side of the ledger. We are persuaded that these errors were insignificant
in relation to the total asset value of more than a million dollars.
See In re
Marriage of Johnson, 455 N.W.2d 281, 283 (Iowa Ct. App. 1990) (characterizing
a $6500 differential in property awarded to parties as “slight” and “insubstantial”
in light of the “large amounts of property involved” (nearly $500,000) in the
dissolution).
Additionally, the differential in favor of Scott was minimized by
Scott‟s overpayment of close to $7000 in temporary support.3 We conclude the
court‟s marginally unequal property division was equitable.
B.
Spousal Support.
“Rehabilitative spousal support is „a way of supporting an economically
dependent spouse through a limited period of re-education or retraining following
3
Scott‟s temporary support obligations totaled $3943.50 per month.
Between
September 1 and September 12, 2007, he paid Anne $6923.96 directly. An additional
$4000 was garnished from Scott‟s wages that month and deposited into Anne‟s savings
account. Thus, Scott paid Anne a total of $10,923.96 in September 2007 rather than the
obligatory $3943.50.
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divorce, thereby creating incentive and opportunity for that spouse to become
self-supporting.‟” In re Marriage of Becker, 756 N.W.2d 822, 826 (Iowa 2008)
(citation omitted). “The goal of rehabilitative spousal support is self-sufficiency
and for that reason „such an award may be limited or extended depending on the
realistic needs of the economically dependent spouse.‟” Id. (citation omitted).
Anne does not dispute the district court‟s characterization of her spousal
support as “rehabilitative” but argues that the court‟s award will only allow her to
become self-sufficient at an entry-level position rather than at a level
commensurate with her education and experience. We agree.
Anne was married to Scott for twenty-two years. During the marriage, she
consigned her career to a back seat, allowing Scott to relocate and advance in
his. While she held some positions that were consistent with her education, she
did not hold any single job for more than five years.
When she and Scott
separated, she diligently sought employment in her field but was forced to settle
for a part-time job as a bank-teller, which paid $9.34 per hour. This job netted
her monthly income of $1106.69 relative to Scott‟s net monthly income of
$7067.69, exclusive of annual bonuses. While there is no question that her
earning potential was significantly higher, even the highest potential earnings
figures in the record were about sixty percent less than Scott‟s actual earnings.
Additionally, the assumption that Anne would secure a more lucrative job in the
near term was belied by the types of positions for which she applied and was
rejected.
We conclude the spousal support award should be modified to $1500 per
month for a period of five years.
We decline Anne‟s request for a specific
6
provision that spousal support would continue “regardless of whether or not [she]
remarries during this period.” Rather, we affirm the dissolution decree to the
extent it makes no mention of terminating the obligation on her remarriage. This
means that if a remarriage occurs, what happens to the spousal support award
will be determined in accordance with the applicable Iowa precedents. See In re
Marriage of Smith, 573 N.W.2d 924, 927 (Iowa 1998).
III.
Appellate Attorney Fees.
Anne requests an award of appellate attorney fees. Appellate attorney
fees are discretionary. In re Marriage of Okland, 699 N.W.2d 260, 270 (Iowa
2005). As Anne partially prevailed, we order Scott to pay $1000 toward her
appellate attorney fees. Costs are taxed equally to each party.
AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.
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