IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF BARBARA BUDELIER AND RICHARD BUDELIER Upon the Petition of BARBARA S. BUDELIER, Petitioner-Appellant/Cross-Appellee, And Concerning RICHARD T. BUDELIER, Respondent-Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 9-540 / 08-1631
Filed September 2, 2009
IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF BARBARA BUDELIER
AND RICHARD BUDELIER
Upon the Petition of
BARBARA S. BUDELIER,
Petitioner-Appellant/Cross-Appellee,
And Concerning
RICHARD T. BUDELIER,
Respondent-Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Muscatine County, Mary Howes,
Judge.
Barbara Budelier appeals and Richard Budelier cross-appeals from the
decree dissolving their marriage. AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.
Richard Davidson of Lane & Waterman, Davenport, for appellant.
John Wunder, Muscatine, for appellee.
Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Vaitheswaran and Potterfield, JJ.
2
VOGEL, P.J.
Barbara Budelier appeals, and Richard Budelier cross-appeals from the
decree dissolving their marriage. Following a trial, the district court entered a
detailed decree which included valuing and distributing the parties’ substantial
assets and liabilities and awarding spousal support to Barbara. The court made
some amendments to its decree after Richard’s post-trial motion and Barbara’s
response, to enlarge or amend pursuant to Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure
1.904(2). Barbara now appeals, continuing to seek what she perceives to be a
more equitable distribution of the parties’ assets and liabilities, along with
increased spousal support. Richard cross-appeals, arguing that in its ruling on
the motion to amend, the court should not have increased Barbara’s spousal
support. We affirm as modified.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
Barbara and Richard were married on November 14, 1981. At the time of
trial, the parties had been married for twenty-six years. They had three children,
Adam, Eric, and Miles, who at the time of trial were twenty-five, twenty-three, and
twenty, respectively.
During their marriage, the parties lived on a farm, and
Richard primarily ran the grain operation, while Barbara managed the hog
operation, which they pursued in the early years of the marriage. She was also
the primary caretaker of the children.
In 1987, they invested in real estate,
apartments, and “spec” homes, and began a rental business with these
properties. Barbara was primarily responsible for this business.
The parties owned two farms in Muscatine County totaling approximately
215 acres, and one in Cedar County of seventy-five acres. The family lived on
3
the “Yankee Farm,” which was owned by Richard’s parents, but with Richard
having an irrevocable option to purchase the residence and five acres of land for
$40,000. Richard farmed the land on the Yankee Farm, Muscatine and Cedar
County farms, as well as the “Herring Farm,” a farm jointly owned by Richard’s
mother and aunt, and rented by the parties. The parties separated in August
2006, and trial was held on February 11, 2008, upon Barbara’s petition for
dissolution of marriage. Barbara appeals and Richard cross-appeals from the
decree entered on April 18, 2008, as amended on September 5, 2008.
II. Standard of Review.
We review dissolution of marriage proceedings de novo. Iowa R. App. P.
6.4; In re Marriage of Smith, 573 N.W.2d 924, 926 (Iowa 1998). We examine the
entire record and adjudicate rights anew on the issues properly presented. In re
Marriage of Geil, 509 N.W.2d 738, 740 (Iowa 1993). Although we are not bound
by the district court’s factual findings, we give them weight, especially when
assessing the credibility of witnesses. Iowa R. App. P. 6.14(6)(g).
III. Property Distribution.
Iowa law requires that marital property be divided “equitably between the
parties,” considering several factors. Iowa Code § 598.21(1) (2007). “Although
an equal division is not required, it is generally recognized that equality is often
most equitable.” In re Marriage of Fennelly, 737 N.W.2d 97, 102 (Iowa 2007).
To make an equitable distribution of assets, the court must first determine what
assets are available to be allocated between the spouses. In re Marriage of
Driscoll, 563 N.W.2d 640, 641-42 (Iowa Ct. App. 1997). To do this, the court
must identify and value the assets of the parties held both jointly and separately.
4
Id. All property of the marriage that exists at the time of the divorce, other than
gifts and inheritances to one spouse, is divisible property.
In re Marriage of
Schriner, 695 N.W.2d 493, 496 (Iowa 2005) (citing Iowa Code § 598.21(1)).
a. Marital Residence with Five Acres: The Yankee Farm
Barbara asserts that she is entitled to the marital residence property,
claiming she has a greater need for the outbuildings for storage in order to
continue her rental property business and house the peacocks she raises.
Richard responds that the decision to award him the marital residence was
proper. At trial, Barbara was asked “[w]ould either of those [Yankee Farm or the
gray house] be suitable for your living arrangements?”
“Yes.”
Barbara responded,
The district court found Richard would receive the marital residence
because his parents owned the residence and the associated farmland, he has
the option to purchase, he remained in the home upon separation, and “based on
Barbara’s other award of property, including a farm home and 76 acres just down
the road, that she had ample space there to store her building materials and
peacocks.”
Although Barbara claims she contributed to the upkeep and
improvement to the residence and therefore should be awarded the home, the
testimony indicates both parties contributed to the substantial renovation and
upkeep. We find nothing inequitable in the district court’s allocation of this asset
to Richard and affirm.
b. Missing Grain
The district court found that 40,000 bushels of corn were missing from the
accounting of the 2006 crop, and made an appropriate adjustment in the assets.
Barbara calculated that 47,896 bushels of corn should have been accounted for,
5
and she therefore claims she was entitled to a greater share of the missing grain.
The testimony of the parties’ son, Adam, supports the 40,000 figure. However,
even if we were to agree with Barbara that the district court underestimated the
number of bushels of missing corn, Barbara fails to give us a cost adjustment for
the expenses associated with the harvesting of those additional bushels, or
explain how a more equitable figure could have been reached. The district court
made a decision by factoring in all information available and set a reasonable
value based on expected yields and cost adjustments. We affirm this finding of
the district court.
c. Living Expenses
Barbara next asserts that the district court erred in reducing the
equalization payment by one-half of the amount of the cash she took at the time
the parties separated. Richard maintains that near the time of their separation in
August 2006, Barbara took $9000 from the family safe, $15,000 from the parties’
joint bank accounts, and $15,000 of rental income. The district court stated,
[t]here is a dispute between the parties as to whether or not
Barbara took $9000 in cash missing from the family safe. On this
issue, the court finds Richard’s testimony more credible and does
find that she took $9000 from the family safe. The Court also finds
she took $15,000 of joint money from a bank account and $15,000
of joint rental income. Thus the court finds as Richard maintains
Barbara did get $39,000 of marital money at the time of the
separation without his agreement.
The court thus reduced Barbara’s property equalization payment by $19,500,
one-half of the $39,000 of marital money. In the post-decree ruling, the court
then “decline[d] to change the $19,500 reduction even though Barbara used it for
legitimate living expenses.” (emphasis added).
6
The value of the assets should be determined as of the date of trial. In re
Marriage of Campbell, 623 N.W.2d 585, 589 (Iowa Ct. App. 2001) (“We use the
date of trial as the most appropriate date to value assets, while recognizing the
need for flexibility in making equitable distributions based on the unique
circumstances of each case.”); Driscoll, 563 N.W.2d at 641-42. “In determining
whether dissipation has occurred, courts must decide (1) whether the alleged
purpose of the expenditure is supported by the evidence, and if so, (2) whether
that purpose amounts to dissipation under the circumstances.” Fennelly, 737
N.W.2d at 104.
Eighteen months lapsed between the time of the separation when Barbara
took the additional marital cash and the time of trial. The money was no longer
an asset to be distributed, as the court found that the money Barbara used was
for “legitimate living expenses.”
There was no allegation in the record that
Barbara had dissipated, hid, depleted or diverted this cash, other than to use for
her own living expenses during the pendency of the dissolution.1 See id. at 105.
In addition to using the money for living expenses, the record indicated Barbara
used the money for repair and improvement to the rental properties, thereby
increasing the value of those assets, which were then valued as of the date of
trial and subject to division. As there is no proof of any inappropriate dissipation
of the cash, the court should not have considered this spent marital asset to
reduce the equalization payment.
We therefore modify to increase the
equalization payment from Richard to Barbara by $19,500.
1
The court did find Richard had diverted 2007 farm income, attempting to hide this
marital asset from Barbara; the income was imputed back to Richard and considered in
the distribution of assets.
7
d. Personal Property
Barbara asserts that Richard removed or sold many items of personal
property, including gifts to her, and did not return the missing items. Richard, in
turn, testified that Barbara took many items of personal property, such as tools,
and did not return them. The district court stated,
[t]he parties have a huge amount of personal property in dispute.
. . . The Court has no way based on the evidence of fixing the
value of these items. It is also not really possible as between the
parties for the Court to know who is telling the truth and who is not
as to who has taken certain items. Thus, the court finds the fairest
distribution of personal property, that the parties cannot amicably
split between the two of them, ordered be sold at a public auction
and the proceeds be split fifty-fifty between Barbara and Richard.
Each party may bid on the items for sale at the public auction.
The district court found each had listed “hundreds of items” as evidenced by over
twenty, single-spaced pages of personal property. We affirm the district court’s
remedy as being both practical and equitable under the evidence presented.
e. Income and Property Taxes and Allocation of Indebtedness
Barbara contends that Richard should be responsible for the farm and
rental property taxes on the income from property under his control during their
separation in 2007, and she should be responsible for the taxes on the income
from the rental property under her control during that timeframe.
She also
contends Richard will continue to have a substantially higher income, so
therefore should also be allocated a greater share of the overall marital
indebtedness. Richard disagrees, arguing that both have benefitted from the
income generated, so should share the debt equally.
The trial court divided the total assets and liabilities between Barbara and
Richard at approximately one-half to each, using the trial date as the determining
8
point.2 See In re Marriage of Dean, 642 N.W.2d 321, 323 (Iowa Ct. App. 2002)
(“Before making an equitable distribution of assets in a dissolution, the court
must determine all assets held in the name of either or both parties as well as the
debts owed by either or both. The assets should then be given their value as of
the date of trial.”) The district court found that “[s]ince the parties were married
for all of 2007, and the Court has attempted to fairly divide the 2007 income and
assets between them, they should equally divide any income tax owed for that
year.” In the post-trial ruling, the court added, “the Court has awarded [Barbara]
a judgment based in part on the farming income for 2007 so the Court finds it is
not unfair for her to share in the tax burden.” In the same fashion, the court also
found that “[w]hen at all possible, the Court also assigned the debt to the party
getting the real estate connected with the debt.”
We agree that the court
equitably divided the 2007 income tax liability, as well as the debt accumulated
over the course of the marriage as associated with the property distributed.
f. Division of Farm Land
The district court found that Richard would continue to be primarily
responsible for the farmland and Barbara for the majority of the rental property as
their separate sources of income.3 In addition, Barbara was awarded the Cedar
County farm (seventy-five acres). Barbara contends that their positions should
be reversed, and she should be awarded the two Muscatine County farms (215
acres) in order to generate additional farm income for herself; and Richard
2
With the exception of the living expenses mentioned above and imputed 2007 farm
income.
3
The division of farmland is complicated by the ownership of some land by Richard’s
parents and aunt, as well as the transfer by Richard during the pendency of the
dissolution of some of the farm operations to the parties’ sons.
9
should be awarded the Cedar County farmland, while also retaining his rights to
farm the Yankee and Herring farms. The district court considered the different
pieces of farmland, as well as the many rental properties, and divided the
properties based on the parties’ past involvement with the properties and need
for future income. The court found that Richard was given the majority of the
farmland because he was the spouse “actively engaged in farming,” allowing him
to continue to do so. Barbara was given the majority of the rental properties, as
she was primarily responsible for the management of those properties during the
marriage. The district court also awarded Barbara some farmland, specifically
chosen for its proximity to her house. The division by the district court was made
in order to “balanc[e] their work skill and the goal of equalizing division of the
marital assets.” The division is equitable and we therefore affirm.
g. Building Supplies and Farm Equipment
Barbara raises an argument that she was entitled to one-half of the value
of some building supplies and farm equipment. Barbara assigns values to the
building supplies, but this value was not found in the record.
Barbara also
assigns a value of $56,571 for farm equipment, but the only value in the record
was $8025, which was found in the parties’ joint stipulation of assets and
liabilities. The farm equipment was not owned by Richard, but by his parents,
which Barbara admits. Therefore, the only valuation of Richard’s award of “all
farm equipment” was the $8025. There is no support for the remainder of the
value. We agree with Richard that Barbara did not preserve these claims, as
they were not raised nor ruled on below. See Meier v. Senecaut, 641 N.W.2d
532, 537 (Iowa 2006) (“It is a fundamental doctrine of appellate review that
10
issues must ordinarily be both raised and decided by the district court before we
will decide them on appeal.”). Further, Barbara did not preserve this issue in her
post-trial motion pursuant to Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.904(2).
See id.
(“When a district court fails to rule on an issue properly raised by a party, the
party who raised the issue must file a motion requesting a ruling in order to
preserve error for appeal.”). Thus, we conclude that error was not preserved on
these arguments.
h. Spousal Support
In its dissolution decree, the district court awarded Barbara rehabilitative
and traditional alimony in the amount of $1500 per month for forty-eight months,
and then amended the amount to $2500 per month for forty-eight months after
reconsidering the full picture of assets, liabilities, and likely income to be
generated by the parties in the near future.4
Barbara contends that she is
entitled to greater spousal support, and seeks an increase to $4000 per month
for ten years.
Richard cross-appeals, requesting the lower award from the
original decree be reinstated. Rehabilitative alimony was fashioned as a method
of supporting an economically dependent spouse through a limited period of reeducation or retraining following a dissolution, thereby creating opportunity and
incentive for that spouse to become self-supporting. In re Marriage of Wessels,
542 N.W.2d 486, 489 (Iowa 1995).
4
We consider the award of alimony in
While the district court also used the word “traditional” alimony based on Barbara’s
contributions to the long marriage, the award more closely resembled rehabilitative
alimony, as traditional alimony is “payable for life or so long as a spouse is incapable of
self-support.” In re Marriage of Anliker, 694 N.W.2d 535, 540 (Iowa 2005). See In re
Marriage of Becker, 756 N.W.2d 822, 827 (Iowa 2008) (stating that regardless of the
label associated with the type of spousal support, the courts are required “to consider
the factors mandated by the legislature contained in section 598.21(3).”
11
conjunction with the property award. In re Marriage of Van Regenmorter, 587
N.W.2d 493 (Iowa Ct. App. 1998). In the post-dissolution decree, the district
court stated “Barbara’s spousal support should be increased to allow her
sufficient time to rehabilitate her income by pursuing her rental property
business.” It is clear the district court stepped back and looked at the full picture
of the parties’ assets and what those assets could generate as income. Richard
asserts the court misread his 2007 income “dummy” tax returns, as they reflected
his grain income for both calendar years 2006 and 2007, which greatly increased
his projected future income. However, the court also noted that regardless of
how the separate future earnings of Barbara and Richard were estimated, “both
parties’ figures place [Barbara’s] post dissolution income significantly lower than
Richard’s.”
Even with the disparity of methods used and wide swings in
projected incomes, the conclusion of the district court, in conjunction with the
substantial assets awarded, was both fair and equitable. Having reviewed the
circumstances of both parties, we find the costs of this appeal should be divided
between them.
AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.
Potterfield, J. concurs. Vaitheswaran, J. partially dissents.
12
VAITHESWARAN, J. (Dissenting partially)
I respectfully dissent from that portion of the majority opinion increasing
the equalization payment by $19,500. The district court found that Barbara “took”
marital money without Richard’s agreement and found Richard’s testimony more
credible than Barbara’s on this question. I would give weight to this credibility
finding which, in my view, was effectively a finding that Barbara dissipated
assets. See In re Marriage of Fennelly, 737 N.W.2d 97, 104–06 (Iowa 2007).
Based on that finding, I would affirm the district court’s decision concerning the
equalization payment.
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.