STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. MATTHEW ALLEN GARLICK, Defendant-Appellant.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 9-526 / 08-1134
Filed August 6, 2009
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
MATTHEW ALLEN GARLICK,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Robert A. Hutchinson,
Judge.
Matthew Alan Garlick appeals from the judgment and sentence entered
following his conviction of homicide by vehicle. AFFIRMED.
Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and David Adams, Assistant
Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Jean Pettinger, Assistant Attorney
General, John P. Sarcone, County Attorney, and Steve Fortiano and Jaki
Livingston, Assistant County Attorneys, for appellee.
Considered by Eisenhauer, P.J., Potterfield, J., and Zimmer, S.J.*
*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 (2009).
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ZIMMER, S.J.
Matthew Alan Garlick appeals from the judgment and sentence entered
following his conviction of homicide by vehicle, in violation of Iowa Code section
707.6A(2) (2005). He contends the district court erred in denying his motion for
directed verdict because there was insufficient evidence to support his
conviction. Because the evidence shows Garlick acted recklessly, we affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings. On the evening of June 5,
2007, Garlick was driving his motorcycle around the Des Moines area with
several friends.
With a passenger on his motorcycle, Garlick performed a
“wheelie,” a stunt where the driver raises the front wheel of the motorcycle and
rides only on the back wheel. Garlick performed this stunt three to four times
with Rachel Thomas riding on the back of the motorcycle. Thomas testified that
each time, the wheelie lasted approximately fifteen to twenty seconds. They
were traveling in excess of fifty to fifty-five miles per hour when the stunt was
performed, and Thomas testified she was “very scared.” Thomas asked Garlick
to stop the motorcycle, and she found another ride home.
At approximately midnight, Garlick went to the home of Casey Sellner,
along with Jennifer Reynolds, Morgan Ostendorf, and Robbie Wilson. Garlick
told both Sellner and Wilson that his contact lenses “blew out” while they were
riding. When asked if he needed to return home for a new pair, Garlick replied
that he was “fine,” but couldn’t see “real far, far away.”
After about half an hour, Garlick left Sellner’s residence with Reynolds
riding on the back of his motorcycle. Wilson also left, driving his motorcycle with
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Ostendorf on the back. They were driving in a residential area with a speed limit
of twenty-five miles per hour when Garlick’s motorcycle surged past Wilson’s.
Garlick was performing a wheelie at the time, with the front wheel of his
motorcycle raised approximately five feet off the ground. When Garlick lowered
the front wheel, it struck a curb, propelling Reynolds from the rear of the
motorcycle. She struck a wooden mailbox post and died at the scene. Ostendorf
estimated Garlick’s rate of speed to be approximately fifty miles per hour at the
time of the crash. Wilson estimated Garlick was traveling between sixty-five and
seventy miles per hour compared to the thirty-eight miles per hour Wilson was
traveling.
Accident reconstructionists estimated Garlick was driving between
forty-eight and sixty miles per hour when he struck the curb.
On September 7, 2007, Garlick was formally charged with vehicular
homicide. He pled not guilty, and a jury trial was held in April 2008. At the close
of the State’s evidence, Garlick moved for judgment of acquittal, arguing there
was insufficient evidence to establish he acted recklessly.
The motion was
denied. Garlick renewed the motion at the close of all the evidence, and the
motion was again denied.
The jury returned a verdict, finding him guilty of
vehicular homicide. The court sentenced Garlick to an indeterminate term of
imprisonment, not to exceed ten years. Garlick appeals. He contends the district
court erred in finding there was sufficient evidence to submit this matter to the
jury because he did not act recklessly.
II. Scope and Standard of Review. Our review of a ruling on a motion
for judgment of acquittal is for corrections of errors at law. State v. Corsi, 686
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N.W.2d 215, 218 (Iowa 2004). We will uphold a finding of guilt where the verdict
is supported by substantial evidence. State v. Webb, 648 N.W.2d 72, 75 (Iowa
2002). Substantial evidence is evidence that would convince a rational trier of
fact the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 75-76.
We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State. Id. at 76.
We consider all the evidence—that which detracts from the verdict, as well as
that supporting the verdict. Id.
The State must prove every element of the crime with which the defendant
is charged. Id. “The evidence must raise a fair inference of guilt and do more
than create speculation, suspicion, or conjecture.” Id.
III. Sufficiency of the Evidence. In order to convict Garlick of vehicular
homicide, the State had to prove Garlick was “[d]riving a motor vehicle in a
reckless manner with willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or
property, in violation of section 321.277.” Iowa Code § 707.6A.2(a). Section
321.277 states in pertinent part, “Any person who drives any vehicle in such
manner as to indicate either a willful or a wanton disregard for the safety of
persons or property is guilty of reckless driving.” Garlick contends there was
insufficient evidence to prove he was driving recklessly.
The jury instructions included the following definition of “reckless”:
A person is “reckless” or acts “recklessly” when he willfully
disregards the safety of persons or property. It is more than a lack
of reasonable care which may cause unintentional injury.
Recklessness is conduct which is consciously done with willful
disregard of the consequences. For recklessness to exist, the act
must be highly dangerous. In addition, the danger must be so
obvious that the actor knows or should reasonably foresee that
harm will more likely than not result from the act. Though
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recklessness is willful, it is not intentional in the sense that harm is
intended.
Garlick argues the evidence does not show he acted with a wanton or willful
disregard for the safety of others, claiming he had “mastered” performing
wheelies and had successfully completed several with Thomas on the back of his
motorcycle earlier in the evening.
In order to prove Garlick guilty of vehicular homicide, “the State must
prove the defendant engaged in conduct fraught with a high degree of danger,
conduct so obviously dangerous that the defendant knew or should have
foreseen that harm would flow from it.” State v. Dalton, 674 N.W.2d 111, 116
(Iowa 2004). For recklessness to exist
the act must be fraught with a high degree of danger. In addition
the danger must be so obvious from the facts that the actor knows
or should reasonably foresee that harm will probably-that is, more
likely than not-flow from the act.
State v. Sutton, 636 N.W.2d 107, 111 (Iowa 2001) (quoting State v. Torres, 495
N.W.2d 678, 681 (Iowa 1993)). In other words, a person acts recklessly when
the person’s actions are not merely unreasonable but “highly” unreasonable; not
merely a departure from ordinary care but an “extreme” departure. Id.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we conclude
substantial evidence shows Garlick was driving recklessly at the time of the
crash.
Accident reconstructionists and eyewitnesses estimate Garlick was
traveling at least twice the posted speed limit and as much as thirty-five miles per
hour over the twenty-five mile per hour limit. It was after midnight, and Garlick
was not wearing his contact lenses. Furthermore, Garlick was performing a stunt
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in which his front wheel was raised approximately five feet in the air, further
limiting his line of sight. The combination of these factors resulted in a crash that
threw Reynolds seventy-eight feet from the point of impact and caused the
motorcycle to skid approximately 180 feet. Traveling at such an extreme rate of
speed at night, with impaired vision, on one wheel, with a passenger, can be
categorized by a reasonable factfinder as an extreme departure from ordinary
care. Accordingly, the motion for judgment of acquittal was properly denied, and
we affirm Garlick’s conviction.
AFFIRMED.
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