STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. ROBERT JOSEPH VANCE, Defendant-Appellant.
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 8-492 / 08-1761
Filed July 22, 2009
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
ROBERT JOSEPH VANCE,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, Bradley J.
Harris (plea) and Thomas N. Bower (sentencing), Judges.
Appeal from judgment and convictions for various drug offenses following
a plea. AFFIRMED.
Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Thomas Gaul, Assistant
State Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Darrel Mullins, Assistant Attorney
General, Thomas J. Ferguson, County Attorney, and Brad Walz, Assistant
County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Sackett, C.J., and Vogel and Miller, JJ.
2
SACKETT, C.J.
The defendant-appellant, Robert Vance, appeals from the judgment and
convictions entered following his Alford1 plea to various drug charges, contending
his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to object to the court’s
misstatement of the standards of an Alford plea proceeding. We affirm.
In December of 2007, the State charged Vance with conspiracy to
manufacture
a
controlled
substance
and
possession
of
ephedrine
or
pseudoephedrine with the intent to manufacture a controlled substance.
In
August of 2008 the State amended the trial information to add the charge of
habitual felon. Following plea negotiations, the defendant entered an Alford plea
to the initial two counts and the State dismissed the habitual felon charge.
During the plea colloquy, the court explained the rights the defendant was
waiving, what the State would have to prove, the minimum and maximum
sentences for the charges, and other potential consequences of the plea. The
colloquy included the following exchange between the court and the defendant:
Court: Mr. Vance, an Alford plea is a plea without admitting
that you’re guilty of this offense you agree that the court can find
you guilty based upon what the evidence would be at trial and the
evidence that the state would present. You can do that if it is in
your best interests to take advantage of the plea agreement, and if
there is a reasonable likelihood that you would be convicted if this
case did go to trial. Do you understand that? Defendant: Yes, sir.
1
An Alford plea is a variation of a guilty plea in which a defendant does not admit
participation in the acts constituting the crime but consents to the imposition of a
sentence. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37, 91 S. Ct. 160, 167, 27 L. Ed. 2d
162, 171 (1970) (holding Constitution does not bar sentence where accused is unwilling
to admit guilt but is willing to waive trial and accept sentence).
3
(Emphasis added.) At the sentencing hearing in November of 2008, the State
recommended consecutive sentences on the two counts. The court sentenced
the defendant to concurrent sentences, reduced by one-third for entering a plea.
The defendant appeals, claiming counsel was ineffective in not objecting to the
court’s misstatement of the standards of an Alford plea.
We review claims that counsel rendered ineffective assistance de novo.
State v. Maxwell, 743 N.W.2d 185, 195 (Iowa 2008). Unless the record on direct
appeal is adequate to address the issue, a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel is generally preserved for possible postconviction proceedings. State v.
Bearse, 748 N.W.2d 211, 214 (Iowa 2008). We conclude the record is adequate
to address the defendant’s claim of ineffectiveness.
To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must
prove (1) counsel failed to perform an essential duty and (2) prejudice resulted.
Maxwell, 743 N.W.2d at 195. A defendant’s failure to prove either element by a
preponderance of the evidence is fatal to the claim. State v. Polly, 657 N.W.2d
462, 465 (Iowa 2003). With respect to the first element of the test, “counsel’s
performance is measured against the standard of a reasonably competent
practitioner, with the presumption that the attorney performed his duties in a
competent manner.”
State v. Stallings, 658 N.W.2d 106, 109 (Iowa 2003),
overruled on other grounds by State v. Feregrino, 756 N.W.2d 700 (Iowa 2008)).
To demonstrate prejudice, a defendant must show that, “but for counsel’s errors,
he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.”
State v. Straw, 709 N.W.2d 128, 136-37 (Iowa 2006).
4
The defendant contends he had not spoken with his attorney about an
Alford plea and the court did not properly explain the standard of proof
necessary.
He asserts the proper standard of proof is not “a reasonable
likelihood” as stated by the court, but “the evidence strongly negates the
defendant’s claim of innocence.” State v. Knight, 701 N.W.2d 83, 85 (Iowa 2005)
(emphasis added). He argues there is “grave doubt” that he entered a voluntary
and intelligent plea. He further argues, “It is difficult to believe that a Defendant
who has not spoken with his attorney about an Alford plea and who has a judge
misstate what an Alford plea is can voluntarily and understandably agree to an
Alford plea.”
The defendant makes no claim he would have insisted on going to trial.
See Straw, 709 N.W.2d at 136-37. He does not even claim his plea was not
voluntary or intelligent, but only “it was not clear he understood what an Alford
plea was.”
(Emphasis added).
demonstrated prejudice.
AFFIRMED.
We conclude the defendant has not
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
