STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. JAMES MICHAEL COLEMAN, Defendant-Appellant.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 9-481 / 08-1435
Filed July 22, 2009
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
JAMES MICHAEL COLEMAN,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, George L.
Stigler, Judge.
A defendant appeals his conviction for forgery. AFFIRMED.
Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Patricia Reynolds, Assistant
Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Sharon Hall, Assistant Attorney
General, Thomas J. Ferguson, County Attorney, and Kimberly A. Griffith,
Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Mahan, P.J., and Eisenhauer and Mansfield, JJ.
2
MANSFIELD, J.
James Coleman appeals his conviction for forgery in violation of Iowa
Code section 715A.2 (2007). He asserts that the district court erred in denying
his motion for new trial. We affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
Coleman worked for R.J. Meyers Company, a contractor based in Vinton,
as a seasonal laborer in 2006 and 2007.
As part of the regular course of
business, R.J. Meyers would occasionally give employees filled-in checks with
which to purchase supplies for the company. Meyers’s checkbook was typically
kept in his office or in the glove box of his truck when he was on a jobsite. The
truck and the glove box were unlocked. The jobsites were closed to the public.
Meyers testified he had never given an employee a blank check. Furthermore,
he noted that one check had gone missing on or about August 13, 2007.
In early January 2008, Salana Scarborough, Jessica Ogden, and Markaye
Cox were sharing an apartment in Waterloo. They were behind on the rent and
were facing eviction if they could not pay $470. Coleman was dating Cox at the
time and was often at the apartment.
According to Cox, Scarborough, and
Ogden, Coleman said he could help them with the rent using a check he had
from his boss for emergencies.
The next day, January 7, 2008, Coleman and Scarborough went to
Coleman’s parents’ house to obtain the check. Scarborough testified that she
completed the amount of the check ($800), made it payable to “John Smith,” and
endorsed the back of the check to herself—all as directed by Coleman.
3
According to Scarborough, Coleman filled out the date himself. A handwriting
expert later confirmed that the date was in Coleman’s handwriting. The signature
on the front of the check could not be attributed to anyone because, according to
the expert, it had been scribbled quickly in an attempt to obscure the handwriting.
In the memo line Scarborough indicated that the check was for a “pay advance,”
again at Coleman’s direction.
Scarborough understood that Coleman would
receive the balance of the funds after the overdue rent had been paid.
Later that day, Scarborough attempted to cash the check at a Wells Fargo
Bank branch in Waterloo. The bank declined Scarborough’s request because it
was a third-party check. At some point, the group decided Scarborough should
deposit the check at an ATM. Scarborough did so. She then tried the next day
(January 8) to withdraw cash in person at the Wells Fargo branch, based on the
prior ATM deposit. A bank manager became suspicious and contacted the bank
in Vinton that had issued the check. That bank then called Meyers, its customer,
who explained that the check had been missing since August 2007.
The
Waterloo police were alerted, and Scarborough’s Wells Fargo account was
closed.1
Scarborough was charged with forgery.
She pled guilty, but her
sentencing was postponed until after Coleman’s trial. Cox and Ogden were not
charged, although they also testified against Coleman. Before Cox’s deposition,
Coleman wrote Cox from jail as follows:
All you need to say is that, that whole day I was at the apartment
with you and Jess [Ogden] until Salana [Scarborough] asked you
and Jess to go to the bank with her to cash a check. I staid [sic] at
1
None of the bank employees testified to seeing Coleman in the bank either day.
4
the apt. and all she told you about the check is that a friend had
loaned her the money for rent. I knew nothing about the check until
the police came and took me to the station and questioned me. I
will handel [sic] the rest.
At the close of evidence, Coleman moved for a judgment of acquittal.
That motion was denied, and the jury found Coleman guilty. Coleman then filed
a combined motion for judgment of acquittal and motion for new trial, wherein he
argued that the evidence was “insufficient” to find him “guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt,” particularly in light of the rule that accomplice testimony must
have independent corroboration. See Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.21(3).2 His counsel
elaborated at the hearing as follows:
Yes, my client believes there is not enough evidence. There has
been no evidence that he signed anything on the check. . . . There
was no evidence other than the testimony of co-defendants, that
the check came from my client, Mr. Coleman, and so we would
request that the court order a new trial on that—or a judgment of
acquittal.
The court responded:
Mr. Coleman, in terms of the level of corroboration of a codefendant’s testimony or an accomplice’s testimony, the
corroboration does not have to be very great. In this instance the
evidence is clear that you were the only person working for your
employer, that your accomplices had never been to the job site and
if that check turned up missing and later in your possession, you’re
the only person who reasonably could have taken it. Additionally,
there is evidence to support a finding that you were involved in the
signing of that check, giving directions and the like, and so your
motion for a judgment of acquittal and motion for a new trial . . . will
be overruled.
2
Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.21(3) provides:
A conviction cannot be had upon the testimony of an accomplice or a
solicited person, unless corroborated by other evidence which shall tend
to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense; and the
corroboration is not sufficient if it merely shows the commission of the
offense or the circumstances thereof.
5
Coleman appeals. Coleman apparently now concedes that the evidence
was sufficient to convict him but that the trial court erred in denying his motion for
new trial, because the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. He also
argues that the district court erred in applying a “sufficiency of the evidence” test
to his motion for new trial.
II. Standard and Scope of Review.
The district court has “wide discretion in deciding motions for new trial.”
State v. Ellis, 578 N.W.2d 655, 659 (Iowa 1993); see also Iowa R. App. P.
6.14(6)(c) (“In ruling upon motions for new trial the district court has a broad but
not unlimited discretion in determining whether the verdict effectuates substantial
justice between the parties.”).
We reverse only where the district court has
abused that discretion. State v. Reeves, 670 N.W.2d 199, 202 (Iowa 2003). To
establish such reversible error, the State must show the district court exercised
its discretion on grounds or for reasons clearly untenable or to an extent clearly
unreasonable. Id.
III. Analysis.
Coleman argues that the district court erroneously applied a “sufficiency of
the evidence” test to both the motion for judgment of acquittal and the motion for
new trial. In Coleman’s view, when the district court ruled on the motion for new
trial, it should have expressly determined whether the verdict was “contrary to the
weight of the evidence.” Ellis, 578 N.W.2d at 659. This alleged oversight, in
Coleman’s view, necessitates at least a remand for the district court to apply the
correct legal standard.
6
If any fault exists here, it rests with Coleman’s counsel and not the district
court. Coleman’s arguments did not distinguish between the motion for judgment
of acquittal and the motion for new trial. Coleman simply argued the evidence
was “insufficient” and, accordingly, one of the two motions should be granted.
Just as Coleman’s counsel did not separate the two motions in her advocacy, the
district court did not do so in its ruling. We are then left with two choices: Either
we can hold Coleman waived his motion for new trial by failing to argue it
adequately, or we can hold the district court was quite familiar with the differing
standards applicable to the two post-trial motions, and applied them, but like
Coleman’s counsel, did not expressly describe those differences.
We
believe
the
second
approach
better
comports
with
reality.
Experienced trial judges rule on these kinds of motions frequently and are very
familiar with what the law requires. Absent a clear showing that the district court
did not apply the correct legal standard on a motion for new trial, we believe the
appellate court should presume that the district court followed the law. See, e.g.,
State v. Wells, 738 N.W.2d 214, 219 (Iowa 2007) (finding the district court
applied the correct standard in denying a motion for new trial when the court said
during the sentencing hearing that it would “stand by” the rulings it made during
trial). Thus, we now turn to whether the district court abused its discretion in its
implicit determination that the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence.
We believe the district court did not. We keep in mind the supreme court’s
admonition that “[e]xcept in the extraordinary case where the evidence
preponderates heavily against the verdict, trial courts should not lessen the jury's
7
role as the primary trier of facts and invoke their power to grant a new trial.”
State v. Shanahan, 712 N.W.2d 121, 135 (Iowa 2006).
Setting aside the testimony of the three women, there was substantial
evidence of Coleman’s guilt. He worked for A.J. Meyers, likely knew about the
blank checks, and was one of a limited group of people who had access to them.
The check in question disappeared at a time when Coleman was working there.
Coleman’s handwriting was identified on the check. Coleman’s girlfriend was
indisputably one of the beneficiaries of the check. Coleman then wrote a letter to
the girlfriend from jail telling her to testify that he (Coleman) knew nothing about
the check. The letter, however, concedes that Coleman was at the women’s
apartment at the time the effort was made to cash the check.
Moreover, while one might regard all three women as potential
accomplices, this only means their testimony needs some corroboration to
convict Coleman; it does not mean it should be disregarded in ruling on the
motion for new trial. True, there were some conflicts in their stories. However,
the overall gist of their testimony was clear: Coleman had obtained a blank
check from his employer that was filled in and used to pay their back rent. A
reasonable jury could even have found the discrepancies somewhat heightened
the credibility of these witnesses. It would be surprising if each of these young
and clearly nervous women had exactly the same recollection of events,
particularly with respect to matters such as who came up with the idea of
depositing the check in an ATM. Accordingly, we hold the district court did not
8
abuse its discretion in denying Coleman’s motion for new trial. For the foregoing
reasons, we affirm the judgment below.
AFFIRMED.
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