KERRY NEIBERGALL, Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. JOHN DEERE CREDIT CORP., Defendant-Appellee.
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 9-474 / 08-0828
Filed July 22, 2009
KERRY NEIBERGALL,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
JOHN DEERE CREDIT CORP.,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Joel D. Novak, Judge.
Appeal from the district court‟s grant of summary judgment in favor of the
defendant. AFFIRMED.
Gordon Fischer of Bradshaw, Fowler, Proctor & Fairgrave, P.C., Des
Moines, for appellant.
Frank Harty and Anna Mundy of Nyemaster, Goode, West, Hansell &
O‟Brien, P.C., Des Moines, for appellee.
Considered by Sackett, C.J., and Vogel and Miller, JJ.
2
SACKETT, C.J.
Plaintiff-appellant, Kerry Neibergall, appeals from the district court‟s grant
of summary judgment for defendant in her suit alleging breach of oral and written
contracts and violation of the Iowa Wage Payment and Collection Act. 1 She
contends the court erred in holding there were no genuine issues of material fact
concerning her claims. She further contends the court erred in not holding its
decision in abeyance until she could complete discovery. We affirm.
I. Background.
Neibergall was employed by defendant John Deere Credit Corp. for about
eight years until her position was eliminated in October of 2004. During several
years, she was given stock options, confirmed by an award letter. Based on
advice from her financial advisor, Neibergall did not exercise her stock options as
they became available. On October 25, 2004, Neibergall‟s manager told her that
her position had been eliminated.
She was given a packet of information
including a severance agreement and release to review.
She consulted her
financial advisor. Her employment ended on November 1, 2004. She signed the
severance agreement and release on November 10.
In consideration, she
received three and one-half months of salary and life and health benefits. In
January of 2005, when Neibergall considered exercising some stock options, she
was informed they expired on the date her employment was terminated.
On October 26, 2006, Neibergall filed suit against John Deere Credit,
alleging (1) defendant did not provide stock options that were due her under Iowa
1
The Iowa Wage Payment & Collection Act is found in Iowa Code chapter 91A (2005).
3
Code chapter 91A, (2) defendant breached oral agreements to provide her with
stock options, and (3) defendant “breached the intent of the stock option award”
and company policy by canceling the stock option awards she had been given.
On February 4, 2008, about two months before the end of discovery, defendant
moved for summary judgment on all three claims. Hearing on the motion was set
for April 4. Neibergall filed her resistance on March 27.
Following the April 4 hearing, Neibergall requested, and defendant agreed
to deposition of three employees of defendant. The depositions were scheduled
for mid-May. On April 26, the district court filed its ruling on defendant‟s motion
for summary judgment, granting summary judgment on all claims and dismissing
Neibergall‟s petition.
Defendant then filed a motion to quash the scheduled
depositions. On April 29, Neibergall filed a motion for the court to hold its ruling
granting summary judgment in abeyance until after the scheduled depositions.
On May 6, the court denied Neibergall‟s motion to hold in abeyance and granted
defendant‟s motion to quash.
Neibergall appeals from all the court‟s rulings.
II. Scope and Standards of Review.
We review a district court‟s ruling on summary judgment for correction of
errors at law. Overturff v. Raddatz Funeral Servs., Inc., 757 N.W.2d 241, 244
(Iowa 2008). A party is entitled to summary judgment when the record shows no
genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment
as a matter of law. Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.981(3). “In ascertaining whether there is a
genuine issue of material fact, we review the record in the light most favorable to
4
the non-moving party.” Anderson v. Nextel Partners, Inc., 745 N.W.2d 464, 466
(Iowa 2008). “A question of fact exists „if reasonable minds can differ on how the
issue should be resolved.‟”
Murtha v. Cahalan, 745 N.W.2d 711, 713 (Iowa
2008) (quoting Walker v. Gribble, 689 N.W.2d 104, 108 (Iowa 2004)).
We review a district court‟s rulings on post-trial motions for correction of
errors at law. Lovick v. Wil-Rich, 588 N.W.2d 688, 692 (Iowa 1999). However,
its rulings on the discovery process are reviewed for an abuse of discretion.
Baker v. City of Iowa City, 750 N.W.2d 93, 97 (Iowa 2008).
An abuse of
discretion occurs when the district court exercises its discretion on grounds or for
reasons that are clearly untenable or to a clearly unreasonable extent. Id.
III. Merits.
Summary Judgment. In its ruling on defendant‟s motion for summary
judgment, the court discussed the settlement agreement and release that
Neibergall signed.
The court determined that the language of the release
precludes pursuit of any claims that arise or occur before the date of the release.
The court stated, “If it is determined that Plaintiff‟s claims arose prior to the
signing of the Release, Plaintiff‟s claims must be dismissed.” The court then
analyzed the contract claims to determine when Neibergall‟s claim arose or
accrued.
The district court determined the written stock option plans in effect when
Neibergall was awarded the stock options all provided that the options expire
upon termination of employment for reasons other than death, disability or
retirement. All of the award letters provided that the stock option award was
5
governed by the provisions of the stock option plan. In addition, at least two of
the award letters noted that “options will be canceled upon date of termination of
employment for reasons other than death, disability, or retirement.” The court
concluded defendant did not breach the written agreement.
The court also determined Neibergall failed to prove the existence of any
separate oral contracts that would allow her to exercise her stock options after
termination of employment or that modified the terms of the written agreements.
Based on its conclusion that Neibergall was not entitled to exercise her stock
options after termination of her employment, the court concluded her wage claim
under Iowa Code chapter 91A failed as a matter of law.
From our review of the record and consideration of the arguments of the
parties, we agree with the district court‟s determination there are no genuine
issues of material fact. We find no error in its legal analysis of the contract and
wage claims.
The language of the release precludes pursuing “any and all
demands, claims, charges, or suits, known or unknown . . . relating in any
manner whatsoever to Ms. Neibergall‟s employment or termination thereof.” It
expressly does not prohibit “filing a claim, charge, or lawsuit for rights or claims
that arise or occur after the date this document is signed.” The district court did
not err in determining that all of Neibergall‟s claims arose prior to the date she
signed the release. Defendant was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of
law. We affirm the grant of summary judgment.
Post-trial Motions. In considering Neibergall‟s motion to hold the ruling
on summary judgment in abeyance, the court noted that she did not advise the
6
court before it ruled that she wanted it to withhold ruling on the motion for
summary judgment until she could take the additional depositions. The record
reveals Neibergall did not request the additional depositions until after the
hearing on the motion for summary judgment, which was held two months after
the motion was filed.
The resistance to the motion for summary judgment
contained no assertion that additional discovery was necessary in order to resist
the motion adequately. See Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.981(5) (allowing for a continuance
“to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be
had”). “[T]here is no requirement in rule [1.981] that summary judgment not be
entered until all discovery is completed.” Bitner v. Ottumwa Cmty. Sch. Dist., 549
N.W.2d 295, 302 (Iowa 1996). We conclude the district court did not err in
denying the motion to hold the ruling in abeyance.
The district court also granted defendant‟s motion to quash the notices of
deposition for the three scheduled depositions. The district court already had
granted summary judgment and dismissed Neibergall‟s petition. As there was no
pending case, there could be no need for depositions. We conclude the district
court did not abuse its discretion in granting the motion to quash.
AFFIRMED.
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
