STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. THOMAS MORGAN DONELSON, Defendant-Appellant.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 9-470 / 07-2044
Filed July 22, 2009
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
THOMAS MORGAN DONELSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Harrison County, James M.
Richardson, Judge.
Defendant appeals resentencing after remand. AFFIRMED.
Drew H. Kouris, Council Bluffs, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Elisabeth S. Reynoldson, Assistant
Attorney General, Jennifer Mumm, County Attorney, and Marcus Gross,
Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Mahan, P.J., and Eisenhauer and Mansfield, JJ.
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EISENHAUER, J.
This is the third appeal concerning Donelson’s conviction for operating
while intoxicated (third offense) as an habitual offender. Initially, Donelson was
sentenced to an indeterminate five-year prison sentence. We granted the State’s
petition for a writ of certiorari and ruled the Iowa Code required an indeterminate
fifteen-year prison sentence. State v. Iowa Dist. Ct. for Harrison County, No. 051472 (Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 30, 2006). We vacated the sentence and remanded for
resentencing. Id.
After resentencing, Donelson appealed claiming a denial of his right of
allocution at the resentencing hearing. We agreed and ruled: “The district court
erred in denying Donelson's right to allocution.” State v. Donelson, No. 07-0304
(Iowa Ct. App. Sept. 6, 2007). Consequently, we vacated Donelson’s sentence
and remanded for resentencing. Id.
After the remand, but before the resentencing hearing, Donelson filed
motions seeking to withdraw his prior admissions of two prior O.W.I. offenses
and two prior felony convictions and seeking a jury trial on those issues. Treating
the motions as a motion for new trial, the district court overruled the defense
requests stating the issues raised involved “trial issues that were addressed at
the time of trial and they will not be addressed today.” The court explained:
This court specifically addressed counsel as well as [Donelson] at
the time of the initial trial on this regard. It was submitted that there
were prior offenses. This is not part of the court of appeals
decision which the court of appeals addressed and overturned the
sentencing, saying that, in essence, [Donelson] should be allowed
to speak at his sentence . . . .
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Donelson now appeals arguing the district court “abused its discretion in
refusing him his right to withdraw his plea and proceed with a jury trial on both
the O.W.I. and habitual offender enhancements.” We review the post-remand
actions of the district court in carrying out a mandate of an appellate court for
legal error. Winnebago Indus. v. Smith, 548 N.W.2d 582, 584 (Iowa 1996).
We find no error. When an appellate court remands a case to a trial court
“for a special purpose,” the district court “is limited to do the special thing
authorized by the appellate court in its opinion and nothing else.” In re Marriage
of Davis, 608 N.W.2d 766, 769 (Iowa 2000). “The district court has no authority
to do anything except to proceed in accordance with the mandate.” Id. “Any
action contrary to or beyond the scope of the mandate is null and void.” State v.
O'Shea, 634 N.W.2d 150, 158 (Iowa Ct. App. 2001). Here the remand to the
district court was for the sole and limited purpose of resentencing Donelson after
affording him the right to allocution.
The district court was wholly without
authority to consider Donelson’s efforts to litigate issues outside the scope of the
remand.
Donelson next argues both his trial and appellate counsel were ineffective.
Generally, we do not resolve claims of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct
appeal. State v. Biddle, 652 N.W.2d 191, 203 (Iowa 2002). We prefer to leave
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims for postconviction relief proceedings to
enable full development of the record and to afford trial counsel an opportunity to
respond. State v. Lopez, 633 N.W.2d 774, 784 (Iowa 2001). “Even a lawyer is
entitled to his day in court, especially when his professional reputation is
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impugned.” State v. Coil, 264 N.W.2d 293, 296 (Iowa 1978). Because we find
the record insufficient to address Donelson’s ineffective assistance of counsel
claims on direct appeal, we preserve his claims for possible postconviction relief
proceedings.
Accordingly, we affirm Donelson’s conviction and sentence and preserve
his ineffective assistance of counsel claims.
AFFIRMED.
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