MARIANNE CRAFT NORTON TRUST, Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. CITY COUNCIL OF HUDSON, IOWA, TIMOTHY L. MANATT, GENEVIEVE L. MANATT, GALE M. PETERSON, JR., and REBECCA RAE PETERSON, Defendants-Appellees.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 9-450 / 08-1704
Filed October 7, 2009
MARIANNE CRAFT NORTON TRUST,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
CITY COUNCIL OF HUDSON, IOWA,
TIMOTHY L. MANATT, GENEVIEVE L.
MANATT, GALE M. PETERSON, JR.,
and REBECCA RAE PETERSON,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, Todd A. Geer,
Judge.
Appeal from denial of writ of certiorari challenging city‟s rezoning of land
from suburban agricultural to large-lot residential. AFFIRMED.
Wallace Taylor, Cedar Rapids, for appellant.
Natalie Burris and Beth Hansen of Swisher & Cohrt, P.L.C., Waterloo, for
appellee city council.
Richard Morris and Katie Mitchell of Beecher, Field, Walker, Morris,
Hoffman & Johnson, P.C., Waterloo, for appellees Manatt and Peterson.
Heard by Sackett, C.J., and Eisenhauer and Doyle, JJ.
2
SACKETT, C.J.
Plaintiff-appellant, Marianne Craft Norton Trust, appeals from the district
court ruling that overruled its petition for writ of certiorari, challenging the city‟s
decision to rezone forty acres of land from suburban agricultural to large-lot
residential. Appellant contends the rezoning (1) did not follow the requirements
in Iowa Code section 414.3 (2007), and (2) was arbitrary and capricious, an
abuse of discretion, and not based on substantial evidence. We affirm.
BACKGROUND AND PROCEEDINGS. Defendants-appellees, Manatts
and Petersons, own eighty acres of land on the west side of Highway 58, north of
the core of the city of Hudson. The eastern forty acres lie within the city limits
and are the subject of this appeal. Appellant owns eighty acres of land west of
Highway 58 that is immediately south of the forty acres at issue.
Although the land along both sides of Highway 58 north of the city core is
primarily farm land, there are more than twenty homes in the four-mile corridor
between the city core and Highway 20. In October of 2006 the city adopted an
updated comprehensive plan that designated an area of land of approximately
160 acres along the west side of Highway 58 between the core of the city and
Highway 20 for future residential use. The land designated for future residential
use includes forty acres of appellee‟s land, forty acres of appellant‟s land, and
about eighty acres to the north of appellees‟ land.
In November of 2006 Timothy Manatt filed an application for rezoning,
seeking to have the appellees‟ forty acres at issue rezoned from A-1 suburban
agricultural to R-5 large-lot residential. The proposed plat submitted with the
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rezoning request showed four residential lots—each larger than four and one-half
acres, one residential lot of three and one-third acres, and two tracts of
undeveloped space along Highway 58 totaling nearly fourteen acres. Manatts
and Petersons planned to live on two of the residential lots and to offer the other
three for sale.
After a time for public comment, the Hudson Planning and Zoning
Commission voted in January of 2007 to recommend the request for rezoning to
the Hudson City Council. After public hearings in February and March, the city
council voted in April to rezone the property as requested.
In May, plaintiff filed a petition for writ of certiorari, alleging the rezoning
was illegal, arbitrary and capricious, unreasonable, not based on substantial
evidence, and an abuse of discretion. The petition was heard in April of 2008.
With the parties‟ agreement the court made its own independent inspection of the
Highway 58 area between Highway 20 and downtown Hudson. It also heard
testimony from several witnesses, received exhibits, and considered arguments,
authorities, and briefs submitted by the parties.
The court found the character of the area in question, while once primarily
agricultural, “has changed significantly” and “visually appears to be more rural
residential than agricultural.” The court found the city council members gave
proper reasons for granting the rezoning request and “gave consideration to
appropriate factors to be considered.” The court compared the permitted uses in
A-1 and R-5 and found them “quite similar and compatible,” although “R-5 is, in
fact, more restrictive in terms of permitted uses.” The court determined, “even if
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the ordinance does fit within the definition of spot zoning, it is not illegal” in that
the rezoning relates to an object within the police power of the city, there was a
reasonable basis for making a distinction between the rezoned property and the
surrounding property, and the rezoning was consistent with the comprehensive
plan.
The court overruled the petition for writ of certiorari, concluding plaintiff
failed to meet its burden of proof that the city council acted illegally, improperly,
arbitrarily, capriciously, or in a discriminatory manner.
The court further
concluded the city council did not abuse its discretion in granting the rezoning
request.
SCOPE OF REVIEW. Appeal of certiorari proceeding is “governed by the
rules applicable to appeals in ordinary actions.” Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.1412. Thus,
our review is limited to correction of errors at law, and we are bound by the
findings of the trial court if they are supported by substantial evidence in the
record. Iowa R. App. P. 6.14(6)(a); accord Osage Conservation Club v. Bd. of
Supervisors, 611 N.W.2d 294, 296 (Iowa 2000). “A writ of certiorari is proper
under Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure [1.1401] when one „exercising judicial
functions . . . is alleged to have . . . acted illegally.‟” Dressler v. Iowa Dep’t of
Transp., 542 N.W.2d 563, 564 (Iowa 1996) (quoting Iowa R. Civ. P. [1.1401]).
“An illegality is established if the board has not acted in accordance with a
statute; if its decision was not supported by substantial evidence; or if its actions
were unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious.” Norland v. Worth County Comp.
Bd., 323 N.W.2d 251, 253 (Iowa 1982).
5
In reviewing the statutory language of section 335.21, which is identical to
the language in section 414.18 that is relevant to our appeal, the supreme court
stated:
In a certiorari proceeding in a zoning case the district court finds the
facts anew on the record made in the certiorari proceeding. That
record will include the return to the writ and any additional evidence
which may have been offered by the parties. However, the district
court is not free to decide the case anew. Illegality of the
challenged board action is established by reason of the court‟s
findings of fact if they do not provide substantial support for the
board decision. If the district court‟s findings of fact leave the
reasonableness of the board‟s action open to a fair difference of
opinion, the court may not substitute its decision for that of the
board.
Fox v. Polk County Bd. of Supervisors, 569 N.W.2d 503, 507 (Iowa 1997)
(quoting Helmke v. Bd. of Adjustment, 418 N.W.2d 346, 347 (Iowa 1988) (citation
omitted)).
There is a strong presumption of the validity of a city ordinance,
including any amendments. Neuzil v. City of Iowa City, 451 N.W.2d 159, 163
(Iowa 1990). “Courts reviewing zoning ordinances should not substitute their
judgment as to the propriety of the city‟s action when the reasonableness of the
ordinance or its amendment is fairly debatable.” Id. at 166.
IOWA CODE SECTION 414.3. Appellant contends the rezoning does not
comply with the statutory requirements for zoning in section 414.3. The statute
provides, in relevant part:
The regulations shall be made in accordance with a
comprehensive plan and designed to preserve the availability of
agricultural land; to consider the protection of soil from wind and
water erosion; to encourage efficient urban development patterns;
to lessen congestion in the street; to secure safety from fire, flood,
panic, and other dangers; to promote health and the general
welfare; to provide adequate light and air; to prevent the
overcrowding of land; to avoid undue concentration of population;
to promote the conservation of energy resources; to promote
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reasonable access to solar energy; and to facilitate the adequate
provision of transportation, water, sewerage, schools, parks, and
other public requirements. . . .
Such regulations shall be made with reasonable
consideration, among other things, as to the character of the area
of the district and the peculiar suitability of such area for particular
uses, and with a view to conserving the value of buildings and
encouraging the most appropriate use of land throughout such city.
Appellant argues the city council did not follow the elements of this section
when deciding to rezone the property. Appellant argues through each of the
sixteen statutory elements in addition to the goals stated in the city‟s
comprehensive plan and the statements of development policy in the plan.
Appellant argues the city council, in performing a quasi-judicial function, should
have made findings. See Sutton v. Dubuque City Council, 729 N.W.2d 796, 798
(Iowa 2007) (noting a “quasi-judicial function is involved if the activity (1) involves
proceedings in which notice and an opportunity to be heard are required, or (2) a
determination of rights of parties is made which requires the exercise of
discretion in finding facts and applying the law thereto”). Appellees respond that
the city council, and the district court when considering the petition for writ of
certiorari, considered the statutory elements that are applicable under the
circumstances. They assert substantial evidence supports the actions of the
council and the decision of the court.
The city council minutes show the council received and considered public
input more than once, considered the statements of the city‟s zoning
administrator, considered the recommendation of the planning and zoning
commission, discussed the issue at more than one meeting, and made a
decision.
Although appellant suggests the city council did not comply with
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section 414.3 in that it did not address each statutory element in making its
decision and because no substantial evidence supports a decision based on the
statutory elements, the district court considered the applicable elements and
concluded otherwise. Because the court did not expressly mention the statutory
elements as it considered them, appellant moved the court to amend or enlarge
its findings and modify its ruling. In its ruling on the motion, the court stated it
“gave consideration to the factors set forth in that code section, to the extent
applicable.” The court also stated it did not “read Sutton as requiring a council to
issue written findings.”
From our reading of section 414.3, it is clear not all the elements listed
apply to every zoning decision or to the decision before us.
A primary
consideration of the statute is that zoning must be “in accordance with a
comprehensive plan.” Iowa Code § 414.3; Molo Oil Co. v. City of Dubuque, 692
N.W.2d 686, 691 (Iowa 2005); Kane v. City Council, 537 N.W.2d 718, 721 (Iowa
1995). The city amended its comprehensive plan in October of 2006. That
amendment was not challenged and is not at issue in this appeal.
The
challenged zoning ordinance changed property from A-1 to R-5 within an area
the comprehensive plan map designated for future residential use. The two city
councilmen who testified provided evidence the rezoning also follows many land
use goals and development policies set forth in the comprehensive plan and
does not appear to conflict with any of the goals or development policies.
Substantial evidence supports a finding that the rezoning is “in accordance with”
the city‟s comprehensive plan.
8
Of the other elements in section 414.3, many do not apply to this rezoning
or no evidence appears in the record on them. We highlight a few that are
relevant to the decision to rezone.
To preserve the availability of agricultural land. The rezoning takes forty
acres out of production.
To consider the protection of soil from wind and water erosion.
The
evidence before the council was that this parcel is classified as highly erodible.
Taking it out of production will help protect it from erosion.
To encourage efficient urban development patterns.
The evidence is
mixed. The city zoning administrator testified it did not promote “infill” growth
within the core of the city, but using R-5 zoning was an attempt by the city to
control growth because R-5 zoning instead of A-1 zoning prevents owners from
parceling off lots for housing without a platting requirement or city approval. She
recommended against the rezoning. Other evidence shows the rezoning can be
the start of a barrier of residential zoning running between Highway 58 and
Butterfield Road that would help protect the city from incursions from the north
through de-annexation in favor of annexation by Cedar Falls. The rezoning also
helps promote the orderly change of properties along Highway 58 from
agricultural to large-lot suburban residential instead of allowing the haphazard
and uncontrolled change already occurring by the parceling off of lots for
housing.
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To lessen congestion in the street. Although the rezoning potentially adds
five homes that access Highway 58, it provides for access through one street
instead of five separate driveways.
To facilitate the adequate provision of transportation, water, sewerage,
schools, parks, and other public requirements.
The rezoning provides
substantially more tax revenue from the property than its use as agricultural land,
but does not require the city to spend money to provide water or sewerage.
The character of the area of the district.
The evidence shows the
properties along Highway 58 are in transition. Although the land primarily is
agricultural, large-lot residential development has increased along the corridor.
The peculiar suitability of such area for particular uses. The corridor along
Highway 58, connecting downtown Hudson with Highway 20, is particularly
suitable for residential development, except at the southern end, which is in a
floodplain. The rezoning recognizes that suitability, but allows the city to control
the growth. The majority of the land along the corridor currently is agricultural.
The particular forty acres that were rezoned contain a low ridge running parallel
to the highway and the land slopes down to the west from the ridge. Houses built
on the lots as shown in the plat could be partially or mostly hidden from the
highway.
Encouraging the most appropriate use of land throughout such city. The
evidence is mixed. The property that was rezoned has a good corn suitability
rating but also is rated highly erodible. Of the land within the city limits, there is
little available land near the core of the city that is suitable for large-lot residential
10
development. The land along the Highway 58 corridor has been shifting toward
large-lot residential for several years.
Appellant summarizes: “There is nothing in the record to support the
district court‟s decision.”
From our review of the record, we cannot agree.
Although the evidence on some elements of the statute is mixed and could
support a decision supporting or reversing the rezoning, the bulk of the evidence
on the elements of section 414.3 supports the district court‟s decision to uphold
the rezoning. In addition, if the reasonableness of a zoning decision is open to a
fair difference of opinion, courts do not interfere with the decision. Fox, 569
N.W.2d at 507. A “fair difference of opinion” aptly describes the parties‟ positions
and the evidence before us. We conclude substantial evidence supports the
district court‟s determination the zoning ordinance complies with the applicable
factors in section 414.3.
ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS, AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION, NOT
BASED ON SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. Appellant contends the city‟s decision
was not done according to reason and judgment or in a proper exercise of
discretion and was not set forth in a written decision explaining the reasons for its
decision. It argues the district court, in its review of the city‟s action, “simply
summarized” some of the testimony of the council members without analysis and
without addressing the points now raised on appeal. Appellant further contends
the rezoning is illegal spot zoning.
We start with the strong presumption that city zoning ordinances, including
any amendments to them, are valid. Shriver v. City of Okoboji, 567 N.W.2d 397,
11
401 (Iowa 1997).
Appellant has the burden “to rebut the presumption and
demonstrate the ordinance‟s invalidity” by showing it “is unreasonable, arbitrary,
capricious or discriminatory, with no reasonable relationship to the promotion of
public health, safety, or welfare.” Id.
The district court, after hearing the evidence and considering the
applicable law determined:
Upon consideration of the evidence presented, the court
concludes that plaintiff has failed to meet its burden of proof that
the city council acted arbitrarily, capriciously or in a discriminatory
manner. The city council did not abuse its discretion in granting the
rezoning request. The city council granted the rezoning request
after public hearings, review of the comprehensive plan and city
zoning ordinances and future land use map.
A city council acts arbitrarily or capriciously if it acts “without regard to the
law or facts of the case.” See Dawson v. Iowa Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 654 N.W.2d
514, 519-20 (Iowa 2002). As the court noted, the city council conducted public
hearings and took public comments.
It considered the comprehensive plan,
future land use map, and the recommendation of the planning and zoning
commission. The council delayed action in order to receive additional public
comments. It considered the advice of the city attorney on applicable law. The
council also heard from the city zoning administrator, who opposed the rezoning.
We do not find such carefully considered action to be arbitrary or capricious.
An abuse of discretion occurs when the action complained of “rests on
grounds or reasons clearly untenable or unreasonable.”
Foods, Inc., 560 N.W.2d 595, 598 (Iowa 1997).
Schoenfeld v. FDL
An “„abuse of discretion is
synonymous with unreasonableness, and involves lack of rationality, focusing on
whether the [decision made was] clearly against reason and evidence.‟”
Id.
12
(quoting Stephenson v. Furnas Elec. Co., 522 N.W.2d 828, 831 (Iowa 1994)). A
decision is unreasonable if it is against reason and evidence “as to which there is
no room for difference of opinion among reasonable minds.” Stephenson, 522
N.W.2d at 831.
Appellant deposed two council members and questioned them at trial.
Appellant argues the council members, when asked about the list of six reasons
for rezoning1 that appear in the council minutes from March 27, “said clearly that
they did not know where this list came from and they repudiated the list.”
From our review of the council minutes and the record of the public
comments it appears the city clerk took what she heard and set it out in a simple
list. Although appellant takes great pains to go through each item in the list and
each reason given by council members Sadler and Spake2 in order to show the
1
The minutes of the March 26, 2007 council meeting list the following “reasons to vote
in favor of the rezoning:”
(1) increased property tax base, (2) this rezoning complies with State of
Iowa statutes and the City‟s current Comprehensive Plan and Future
Land Use Map, (3) this rezoning will meet the objectives of the current
owners of the property to be rezoned, (4) “R-5” zoning was created to
provide low density housing opportunities in the City of Hudson, (5) this
rezoning is the best use of the Highway 58 corridor, (6) following Planning
and Zoning Commission recommendation to approve the rezoning.
2
The city‟s brief summarized these reasons given by the council members:
Public comment and letters favored the rezoning.
The city‟s Planning and Zoning Commission recommended the rezoning.
The proposed development was consistent with lot and home sizes in the vicinity.
It allowed the city more control over growth.
It added diversity in available neighborhood types.
It was positive growth, sought by people who want to move to the city.
It complied with the comprehensive plan and future land use map.
It has the potential to be connected in the future with other similar residential
zoning to the east.
It helps protect the city from encroaching development by Cedar Falls.
It meets a demand and allows the city to expand as a bedroom community for
nearby cities.
13
reasons given for the rezoning are not supported by competent and substantial
evidence, we cannot say the decision was clearly against reason and evidence
or that the evidence is so clearly one-sided that there is no room for difference of
opinion among reasonable minds about the propriety of the rezoning decision.
See Schoenfeld, 560 N.W.2d at 598, Stephenson, 522 N.W.2d at 831.
The
reasonableness of an ordinance is “fairly debatable” where the record shows a
basis for a fair difference of opinion. Neuzil, 451 N.W.2d at 163-64. “If „there is
room for two opinions,‟ the challenged ordinance is valid.” Shriver, 567 N.W.2d
at 401 (citation omitted). Consequently, we conclude the city council did not
abuse its discretion in approving the rezoning request.
ILLEGAL SPOT ZONING. An underlying thread woven throughout much
of the discussion by the parties is whether the rezoning constituted illegal spot
zoning. This discussion does not fit neatly either within the claim the rezoning
does not comply with Iowa Code section 414.3 or within the claim the rezoning
was arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion, as is evidenced by the varied
placement of the discussion in the briefs. We, like the district court, consider the
issue separately.
The district court “examined permitted uses in A-1 and R-5 districts,”
finding them “quite similar and compatible.” Based on the similarities between
the zoning districts, the fact R-5 is more restrictive than A-1, and the evidence
this rezoning “is a first step in what will be a larger rezoning in the future
according to the future land use plan,” the court determined the rezoning was not
spot zoning.
14
Although the court disagreed with appellants that the rezoning met the
definition of spot zoning, the court concluded in the alternative, that even if it was
spot zoning, it was not illegal. Citing the factors3 set forth in Perkins v. Bd. of
Supervisors, 636 N.W.2d 58, 68 (Iowa 2001), the court concluded,
that any “spot zoning” in this case is not illegal. The rezoning
determination is related to an object within the police power of the
city of Hudson. There is a reasonable basis for making a distinction
between the rezoned land and the surrounding property, and the
rezoning is consistent with the comprehensive plan. . . . In
examining the basis for making the distinction between the subject
property and the surrounding property, the court considers the size
of the spot-zoned land, the uses of the surrounding property, the
changing conditions of the area, the use to which the subject
property has been put, and its suitability for various uses. . . . As
previously noted, the allowed uses in A-1 and R-5 are not
significantly incompatible with each other.
In addition, the
conditions of the area have changed significantly over the years, to
the point that the area is more accurately described as rural
residential area. The uses are not inconsistent with each other.
The use of this property is quite suitable to R-5, and is consistent
with the future land use development plans north of the core area of
Hudson, Iowa.
“Spot zoning results when a zoning ordinance creates a small island of
property with restrictions on its use different from those imposed on the
surrounding property.” Kane v. City Council of Cedar Rapids, 537 N.W.2d 718,
723 (Iowa 1995); accord Perkins, 636 N.W.2d at 67.
“„Spot zoning‟ when
construed to mean reclassification of one or more like tracts or similar lots for a
use prohibited by the original zoning ordinance and out of harmony therewith is
3
The court held:
We determine if spot zoning is valid under a three prong test in which we
consider: (1) whether the new zoning is germane to an object within the
police power; (2) whether there is a reasonable basis for making a
distinction between the spot zoned land and the surrounding property;
and (3) whether the rezoning is consistent with the comprehensive plan.
Perkins v. Bd. of Supervisors, 636 N.W.2d 58, 68 (Iowa 2001).
15
illegal.” Keller v. City of Council Bluffs, 246 Iowa 202, 213, 66 N.W.2d 113, 120
(1954).
The city‟s zoning administrator testified she believed the rezoning
constituted spot zoning. We agree that the rezoning “creates a small island of
property with restrictions on its use different from those imposed on the
surrounding property.”
Kane, 537 N.W.2d at 723.
definition of spot zoning.
It therefore meets the
We disagree with the district court‟s contrary
determination. We agree, however, with the district court that the permitted uses
in A-1 and R-5 are very similar and not incompatible. In contrast to some other
spot zoning cases, where the rezoned property was freed from some restrictions
placed on the surrounding property, the rezoning in the case before us is more
restrictive than the zoning on the surrounding property. See, e.g., Perkins, 636
N.W.2d at 68-69 (exempting the fairgrounds from surrounding zoning restrictions,
including adherence to a comprehensive plan, during the five-day period of the
fair); Fox, 569 N.W.2d at 506 (rezoning allowed construction of softball complex);
Kane, 537 N.W.2d at 721 (allowing use of a residential lot for access to a
condominium complex).
Considering the factors listed in Perkins that we set out in footnote three,
we agree with the district court that the rezoning does not constitute illegal spot
zoning. Zoning decisions are “an exercise of the police powers delegated by the
State to municipalities.” Neuzil, 451 N.W.2d at 163; see Iowa Code §§ 414.1-2.
We first consider whether the new zoning is germane to an object within the
police power. “Police power” is not precisely defined in prior zoning cases, but
16
includes promoting “health and the general welfare,” and “the health, safety,
morals, or the general welfare of the community.” Iowa Code §§ 414.1, .3; see
Brackett v. City of Des Moines, 246 Iowa 249, 256, 67 N.W.2d 542, 545 (1954)
(noting “amendatory or subsequent zoning ordinances may be enacted where
they are necessary to secure the public health, safety, morals or welfare or other
legitimate object of the police power”).
For the reasons set forth in our
discussions of the rezoning‟s compliance with Iowa Code section 414.3 and the
council‟s actions not being arbitrary or capricious, we conclude the rezoning is
germane to an object within the police power of the city to promote its general
welfare.
We also consider whether there is a reasonable basis for making a
distinction between the rezoned land and the surrounding property.
In this
analysis “we consider the size of the spot zoned, the uses of the surrounding
property, the changing conditions of the area, the use to which the subject
property has been put, and its suitability for various uses.” Kane, 537 N.W.2d at
723.
Size. As the land is outside the core of the city, in more “wide open
spaces” this consideration is less important in our determination whether there is
a reasonable basis for making a distinction between this property and the
surrounding property. See Montgomery v. Bremer County Bd. of Supervisors,
299 N.W.2d 687, 696 (Iowa 1980). The rezoned land comprises forty acres out
of 160 acres designated “residential” in the future land use map.
17
Surrounding Uses. The surrounding land is primarily agricultural, although
there are two residences immediately to the north and one across Highway 58
from the rezoned land. There previously were two residences to the south on
appellant‟s land.
Changing Conditions. The future land use map and comprehensive plan
were amended in October of 2006 to show 160 acres of land zoned agricultural
along the west side of Highway 58 as “residential.” The district court personally
inspected the Highway 58 corridor from the core of Hudson to the junction with
Highway 20, finding, “[w]hile at one time the area along Highway 58 was
undoubtedly primarily agricultural, . . . the character of the area has changed
significantly. Currently, the area along Highway 58 visually appears more rural
residential than agricultural.”
There is evidence the majority of people living
along Highway 58 are not engaged in farming.
The R-5 rezoning along
Butterfield Road, the purchase of the subject property with a view toward largelot residential use, and the inquiries about the availability of lots show a demand
for rural residential property.
Prior Use. The property has been agricultural in the past.
Suitability for Various Uses. The rezoned land has a good corn suitability
rating, but is considered highly erodible. It is along a highway between Cedar
Falls and Hudson, providing good access. There is a low ridge running parallel
to the highway and the land slopes down to the west from the ridge providing
good views. It does not contain any structures that would have to be removed.
18
Based on our consideration of the evidence concerning these factors, we
conclude there is a reasonable basis for making a distinction between the
rezoned land and the surrounding property.
The final factor listed in Perkins is whether the rezoning is consistent with
the comprehensive plan. The comprehensive plan was amended in October of
2006.
As set forth above in our consideration of section 414.3, substantial
evidence supports a finding the rezoning is “in accordance with” the
comprehensive plan. See Iowa Code § 414.3.
CONCLUSION.
From our review of the evidence, the district court‟s
decision and analysis, the arguments of the parties, and the applicable statutory
and case law, we conclude the city council did not act illegally. See Iowa R. Civ.
P. 1.1401. The council‟s actions complied with the requirements of Iowa Code
section 414.3, are supported by substantial evidence, and are not arbitrary,
capricious, or an abuse of discretion. See Norland, 323 N.W.2d at 253. The
district court‟s findings are supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, we
affirm the district court‟s decision that overruled the petition for writ of certiorari.
AFFIRMED.
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