IN THE INTEREST OF M.J., Minor Child, D.B., Grandmother, Appellant.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 9-399 / 09-0513
Filed June 17, 2009
IN THE INTEREST OF M.J.,
Minor Child,
D.B., Grandmother,
Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Ida County, Mary L. Timko,
Associate Juvenile Judge.
Maternal grandmother appeals the termination of parental rights.
AFFIRMED.
Lisa Mazurek, Cherokee, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kathrine S. Miller-Todd, Assistant
Attorney General, Kristal L. Philips, County Attorney, and Meghann Cosgrove
Whitmer, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee State.
Marchelle Denker of Sioux City Juvenile Office, Sioux City, for appellee
minor child.
Peter Goldsmith of Boerner & Goldsmith Law Firm, P.C., Ida Grove, for
mother.
Karla Henderson of Forristal & Henderson, Holstein, for father.
Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Potterfield and Doyle, JJ.
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POTTERFIELD, J.
M.J. was born in the state of Washington in October 2006. Her mother,
father and maternal grandmother live there. Her father brought her to Iowa in
December 2007 to escape arrest on a warrant pending in Washington.
He
voluntarily placed M.J. in foster care in June 2008 and returned to Washington.
M.J.’s mother traveled to Iowa a few weeks before M.J. was removed, but
returned to Washington after the CINA petition was filed. The parental rights of
both M.J.’s parents were terminated pursuant to Iowa Code section 232.116(b)
(2009) (abandonment).
D.B., M.J.’s maternal grandmother, appeals the
termination of parental rights. She also asserts the court erred in not placing the
child in her care. We affirm.
Neither the mother nor the father appealed. However, the grandmother
contends there was not clear and convincing evidence of abandonment and the
State has not made reasonable efforts to reunify the child with her parents. She
also contends the court erred in declining to place the child with her.
We review her claims de novo. See In re C.H., 652 N.W.2d 144, 147
(Iowa 2002).
We are aware of no authority that suggests that a grandparent has
standing to contest the termination of parental rights. Standing to sue requires
that a party have a specific personal or legal interest in the litigation and be
injuriously affected. In re Marriage of Mitchell, 531 N.W.2d 132, 133-34 (Iowa
1995) (holding that grandparents do not have standing to seek modification of a
dissolution decree). We find the following passage from Mitchell, 531 N.W.2d at
133-34, instructive:
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“[T]he right of grandparents to custody of a child under a divorce
decree is no different from that of any third person or stranger to
the marriage.” [In re Marriage of] Smith, 269 N.W.2d [406,] 408
[(Iowa 1978)]; see also Olds v. Olds, 356 N.W.2d 571, 572 (Iowa
1984) (at common law “grandparents had neither a right to custody
nor visitation as against a parent”). Cf. In re J.R., 315 N.W.2d 750,
752 (Iowa 1982) (paternal grandparents have right to intervene in
termination proceeding because statute allows court to transfer
custody of child to “relative or other suitable person”); In re C.L.C.,
479 N.W.2d 340, 343 (Iowa Ct. App. 1991) (nonrelatives allowed to
intervene in termination proceeding because of same statute).
Grandparents do not have a “specific, personal, and legal interest”
in the dissolution proceeding that would grant them standing to
petition for modification of the decree.
Finally, Lloyd and Karen argue that disallowing them to
commence a modification action is “to ignore the purpose of the law
which is to protect children.” However, there are other forums in
which they may pursue the children’s protection. They might
petition to become guardians of their grandchildren. See Iowa
Code §§ 633.552-.562. They might also file a petition to find their
grandchildren in need of assistance. See Iowa Code § 232.81.
Children affected by a dissolution decree are not unprotected
merely because strangers to the dissolution may not initiate
modification proceedings.
The general principle is that in termination of parental rights proceedings each
parent’s parental rights are separate adjudications, both factually and legally.
See In re D.G., 704 N.W.2d 454, 459 (Iowa Ct. App. 2005). A grandparent
cannot assert a parent’s rights any more than one parent can assert the unique
rights of the other.
We conclude that D.B. has no standing to contest the
termination of the parents’ rights with respect to M.J. Consequently, the only
issue before this court is whether the court erred in not placing M.J. with her
maternal grandmother.
The ultimate goal of chapter 232 is to “best serve the child’s welfare.”
Iowa Code § 232.1 (2009). Section 232.116(2) provides:
In considering whether to terminate the rights of a parent
under this section, the court shall give primary consideration to the
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child’s safety, to the best placement for furthering the long-term
nurturing and growth of the child, and the physical, mental, and
emotional condition and needs of the child. This consideration may
include any of the following:
....
b. For a child who has been placed in foster family care by a
court or has been voluntarily placed in foster family care by a
parent . . . , whether the child has become integrated into the foster
family to the extent that the child’s familial identity is with the foster
family, and whether the foster family is able and willing to
permanently integrate the child in to the foster family. . . .
M.J. was voluntarily placed in foster care in June 2008 and, at the time of
the hearing, M.J. had been in foster care for eight months. She had not seen
D.B. for more than a year. The juvenile court found:
[I]t is in the best interest of [M.J.] that the parental rights . . . be
terminated. Prior to her placement in foster care, [M.J.] was a
“second thought” to her parents’ way of life. They chose a path of
self-destruction that negatively impacted [M.J.] She has been in
Iowa for over half of her life. She is integrated into her current
foster home. They are willing to permanently integrate her into their
home. [M.J.] has a right to a sure, safe, drug-free environment with
parents who will put her needs above their own selfish desires . . . .
....
Although the maternal grandmother, [D.B.], was allowed to
intervene in this matter, intervention does not necessarily equal the
right to be a placement option for a grandchild when parental rights
have been terminated to the grandchild. Although [D.B.] has
testified to her love of [M.J.] and her gifts and cards, there simply is
not enough evidence presented to convince this court that [M.J.]
should be uprooted and returned to the state of Washington to live
with her. [M.J.]’s life is here, in Iowa, where her father abandoned
her. She has grown and has had stability and has the highest
promise of stability here. It is important that she be allowed to have
the full opportunity afforded to her to establish and bond with a
permanent, forever family.
D.B. argues that placement with a relative should be favored. “There is no
statutory preference for a relative” following termination. In re R.J., 495 N.W.2d
114, 119 (Iowa Ct. App. 1992). Following the termination of parental rights of the
child’s parents, Iowa Code section 232.117(3) requires the court to transfer
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guardianship and custody of children to (1) the department of human services,
(2) a facility licensed to receive and provide care for children, or (3) a parent who
does not have physical care of the child, a relative, or other suitable person.
“The paramount concern is the best interest of the children.” Id.; In re B.B.M.,
514 N.W.2d 425, 429 (Iowa 1994) (noting that the prior termination of parental
rights based on parental disqualification “substantially diminishe[d] the role of the
grandparent-grandchild relationship”). The juvenile court concluded that M.J.’s
best interests were served by the termination of the parental rights and M.J.’s
continued placement in her preadoptive home, a setting where she has thrived.
Upon our de novo review, we find no error.
AFFIRMED.
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