STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. ANTHONY LAMONT JOHNSON, Defendant-Appellant.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 9-327 / 08-1078
Filed May 29, 2009
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
ANTHONY LAMONT JOHNSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, Gary D. McKenrick,
Judge.
Anthony Johnson appeals from the district court‟s ruling that he was not
entitled to interest on monies returned to him by the clerk‟s office. AFFIRMED.
Anthony Lamont Johnson, Anamosa, appellant pro se.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Martha E. Boesen Trout, Assistant
Attorney General, and Michael J. Walton, County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Potterfield and Doyle, JJ.
2
POTTERFIELD, J.
Anthony Johnson appeals from the district court‟s ruling that he was not
entitled to interest on monies returned to him by the clerk of court. We affirm.
On February 15, 2008, our supreme court remanded this case to the
district court “for further proceedings to enforce the terms of the 1998 order
releasing Johnson from any restitution obligation.” State v. Johnson, 744 N.W.2d
646, 649 (Iowa 2008) (vacating district court‟s 2006 order nunc pro tunc that
attempted to change a 1998 order stating Johnson was “not responsible for any
restitution in this matter.”).
On April 22, 2008, the district court ordered the clerk of court to “return to
[Johnson], the amount paid by him for attorney fees and court costs of
$1245.41.” On May 1, 2008, Johnson filed a motion to amend or enlarge in
which he acknowledged the return of $1245.41, but asked for a hearing “to
resolve the matter of interest concerning this matter.” Citing Iowa Code section
535.3, Johnson argued that interest accrues on judgments even if the judgment
itself does not mention interest.
The State resisted, arguing that restitution
orders are not judgments within the meaning of Iowa Code section 535.3. The
district court ruled that Johnson was not entitled to interest on the sum refunded.
Johnson filed a motion to reconsider, which was denied.
Johnson now appeals. He contends the district court erred in concluding
interest was not available.
Johnson relies upon two statutory provisions to
support his claim for interest.
Section 535.3 states: “Interest shall be allowed on all money due on
judgments and decrees of courts at a rate calculated according to section 668.13
3
. . . .” Johnson argues the 1998 order stating he was not responsible for any
restitution constitutes a judgment for purposes of section 535.3.
Iowa appellate courts have identified exceptions from the requirement of
interest in section 535.3. See In re Marriage of Baculis, 430 N.W.2d 399, 40102 (Iowa 1988). Thus, it has been held that prejudgment interest pursuant to
section 535.3 is not applicable to awards of punitive damages. See id. at 402
and cases cited therein.
It has also been held that an order for specific
performance was not the equivalent of a money judgment as contemplated under
section 535.3. Id. (citing Dillon v. City of Davenport, 366 N.W.2d 918, 920-21
(Iowa 1985)).
In State v. Akers, 435 N.W.2d 332, 335 (Iowa 1989), the Iowa Supreme
Court found that “restitution orders are not covered by the reference to
„judgments and decrees‟ in section 535.3, and the imposition of interest on
restitution amounts is therefore improper.”
We find Johnson‟s attempts to
distinguish the Akers case unconvincing. The supreme court earlier ruled on
Johnson‟s appeal of a 2006 nunc pro tunc order concerning a 1998 restitution
ruling. The Johnson court stated: “[W]e conclude the 1998 order in this matter
extinguished the State‟s right to any restitution from Johnson, including court
costs and attorneys‟ fees.”
Johnson, 744 N.W.2d at 650.
The court thus
remanded to enforce the release of Johnson‟s funds from the restitution order.
We conclude this ruling is not a judgment or decree for which judgment interest
accrues. Rather, it is a restitution order and an order for specific performance of
an earlier order, neither of which qualifies for judgment interest.
4
Johnson also cites Iowa Code section 602.8102(5) as authority for his
entitlement to interest. That statutory provision allows interest if the clerk fails to
provide notice to the appropriate recipient of money paid by another party to the
clerk.1 The provision is not applicable to Johnson, who provided the funds to the
clerk through his inmate account, and had notice that the clerk was holding the
funds.
We agree with the district court that Johnson is not entitled to interest on
the sum refunded from the clerk‟s office for amounts taken from his prison
account for restitution.
We do not address Johnson‟s claim that the clerk
refunded an inaccurate amount as that issue was not addressed by the district
court. See Meier v. Senecaut, 641 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Iowa 2002) (“issues must
ordinarily be both raised and decided by the district court before we will decide
them on appeal”). We affirm.
AFFIRMED.
1
The clerk shall:
....
(5) When money in the amount of five hundred dollars or more is paid to
the clerk to be paid to another person and the money is not disbursed within
thirty days, notify the person who is entitled to the money or for whose
account the money is paid or the attorney of record of the person. The notice
shall be given by certified mail within forty days of the receipt of the money to
the last known address of the person or the person‟s attorney and a
memorandum of the notice shall be made in the proper record. If the notice
is not given, the clerk and the clerk‟s sureties are liable for interest at the rate
specified in section 535.2, subsection 1, on the money from the date of
receipt to the date that the money is paid to the person entitled to it or the
person‟s attorney.
(Emphasis added.)
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