STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellee, vs. ANDREA BIRDSALL LAFORGE, Defendant-Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 9-298 / 08-1660
Filed June 17, 2009
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellee,
vs.
ANDREA BIRDSALL LAFORGE,
Defendant-Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Don C. Nickerson,
Judge.
The State appeals and the defendant cross-appeals from a district court
ruling denying the defendant‟s motion to suppress evidence but granting her
motion to dismiss the criminal charge against her.
AFFIRMED IN PART,
REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Jean C. Pettinger and Mary Tabor,
Assistant Attorney Generals, John P. Sarcone, County Attorney, and David
Porter and Steve Foritano, Assistant County Attorneys, for appellant.
Robert G. Rehkemper of Gourley, Rehkemper & Lindholm, P.L.C., Des
Moines, for appellee.
Heard by Sackett, C.J., and Vogel and Miller, JJ.
2
MILLER, J.
The State appeals from a district court ruling dismissing the charge of
homicide by vehicle in violation of Iowa Code section 707.6A(1) (2007) against
Andrea LaForge. LaForge cross-appealed and was granted discretionary review
of the court‟s denial of her motion to suppress evidence of her blood-alcohol
concentration. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
I.
BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS.
On February 27, 2007, at about 11:15 p.m., LaForge lost control of her
vehicle on an exit ramp off of the interstate. Jamie Hill, a passenger in the
vehicle, died as a result of the accident. LaForge and the other passenger in the
vehicle, Alan Hill, were transported to Mercy Hospital for treatment.
Iowa State Troopers John Salesberry and Tyson Underwood arrived at the
scene of the accident at approximately 11:23 p.m.
Salesberry observed the
roadway was slightly icy with snow on the ground. He discovered a beer bottle
near the vehicle. Salesberry and Underwood contacted Iowa State Trooper Kirk
Lundgren for technical assistance in investigating the scene of the accident. He
arrived at around 11:45 p.m. and sent Underwood to the hospital to interview the
vehicle‟s occupants.
Salesberry and Lundgren stayed at the scene of the
accident to continue their investigation.
Underwood arrived at the hospital shortly after midnight. He spoke with
Alan Hill first and obtained his consent to withdraw a blood sample for alcohol
testing.
While waiting for Hill‟s blood to be withdrawn, Underwood learned
LaForge had informed staff at the hospital that she had been driving the vehicle
3
when the accident occurred.
An individual that witnessed the accident had
previously informed Underwood at the scene of the accident that LaForge was
driving the vehicle.
Underwood spoke with LaForge in her hospital room at about 2:00 a.m.
He noticed she had bloodshot, watery eyes and smelled of alcohol. LaForge
admitted she was the driver of the vehicle, and Underwood requested that she
provide a breath sample. LaForge refused. Her mother then demanded that
Underwood leave the hospital room. Underwood continued to try to speak to
LaForge and read the implied consent advisory to her, but he was prevented
from doing so by LaForge‟s mother.
LaForge‟s mother eventually called an
attorney who informed the officers that LaForge would not consent to the
withdrawal of her blood for chemical testing.
Lundgren, who had arrived at the hospital after completing his
investigation of the accident scene, began working on a search warrant
application around 3:15 a.m. He contacted the on-call assistant county attorney
and was advised to proceed with the blood withdrawal from LaForge while
continuing to prepare the warrant application. LaForge‟s blood was withdrawn
without her consent sometime after 4:16 a.m. by a technician from the medical
examiner‟s office. A search warrant was not obtained until 6:30 a.m. LaForge
was never placed under arrest during the officers‟ investigation of the accident
that night.
On March 8, 2007, in anticipation of possible criminal charges stemming
from the accident, LaForge sent letters to the Iowa State Patrol, the Polk County
4
Sheriff‟s Department, and the Polk County Attorney‟s Office requesting
preservation of “[a]ny and all bodily fluids withdrawn or obtained for the purposes
of scientific testing.” LaForge‟s blood sample was tested by the Iowa Department
of Criminal Investigation (DCI) the following day. The test results showed her
blood-alcohol concentration was .057%. The lab sent a report documenting its
findings to the Iowa State Patrol and the Polk County Attorney‟s Office on March
12. That report indicated the blood sample would be destroyed within ninety
days unless there was a request to preserve it. No request was made, and the
blood sample was destroyed on August 23, 2007.
On October 3, 2007, LaForge was charged, by trial information, with
homicide by vehicle in violation of Iowa Code section 707.6A(1). She filed a
motion to suppress evidence and a motion to dismiss the criminal charge against
her. In support of those motions, she contended the warrantless withdrawal of
her blood without her consent violated Iowa Code section 321J.10A and her right
to be free from unreasonable search and seizure, as guaranteed by the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, section 8 of the Iowa
Constitution. She additionally contended the destruction of her blood sample
violated her rights to a fair trial and to due process of law under Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963), the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and Article I, sections
9 and 10 of the Iowa Constitution.
Following a hearing, the district court denied LaForge‟s motion to
suppress, concluding the warrantless withdrawal of LaForge‟s blood “even in the
5
absence of an arrest” did not violate section 321J.10A and was not
unconstitutional.
The court did, however, grant LaForge‟s motion to dismiss
based on the destruction of the blood sample. Although it rejected her Brady
claim, the court found the destruction of the blood sample “deprived [LaForge] of
a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense,” thus denying her of her
constitutional right to a fair trial.
The State appeals from the district court‟s dismissal of the criminal charge
against LaForge. It claims the court erred in concluding the destruction of the
blood sample deprived LaForge of her right to a fair trial. LaForge filed a crossappeal from the court‟s denial of her motion to suppress. Our supreme court
ordered that LaForge‟s cross-appeal be treated as an application for
discretionary review, which it then granted.
On appeal, LaForge claims the
district court erred in rejecting her federal and state due process claims under
Brady and in concluding the withdrawal of her blood without a warrant did not
violate section 321J.10A and her right to be free from unreasonable search and
seizure.
II.
SCOPE AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW.
“Our review of the constitutional issues is de novo, which involves an
independent evaluation of the totality of the circumstances as shown by the
entire record.” State v. Stanford, 474 N.W.2d 573, 575 (Iowa 1991). However,
“[i]n considering the statutory questions our review is to correct errors of law.” Id.
6
III.
MERITS.
A.
Warrantless Withdrawal of Blood.
We begin our discussion with the district court‟s ruling denying LaForge‟s
motion to suppress the blood test results obtained from the warrantless
withdrawal of her blood. LaForge claims the court erred in not suppressing that
evidence because she was not under arrest when the blood sample was drawn
as required by Iowa Code section 321J.10A. We agree.
As our supreme court recently explained in State v. Harris, 763 N.W.2d
269, 271 (Iowa 2009), when a traffic accident has resulted in death and there are
reasonable grounds to believe the driver at fault for the accident was intoxicated,
Iowa Code section 321J.10 allows for the withdrawal of a specimen of blood for
chemical testing over the individual‟s objection, pursuant to a search warrant.
Notwithstanding that section, withdrawal of blood without a warrant is permitted
in certain circumstances under section 321J.10A(1), which provides in relevant
part that
if a person is under arrest for an offense arising out of acts alleged
to have been committed while the person was operating a motor
vehicle in violation of section 321J.2 or 321J.2A, and that arrest
results from an accident that causes a death or personal injury
reasonably likely to cause death, a chemical test of blood may be
administered without the consent of the person arrested to
determine the amount of alcohol or a controlled substance in that
person‟s blood . . . .
(Emphasis added.)
In finding that LaForge‟s blood was not withdrawn in violation of section
321J.10A(1), the district court stated,
7
While [LaForge] is correct that the plain language of Iowa Code
section 321J.10A requires an arrest, this Court concludes as a
matter of law, the purpose and intent is to ensure law enforcement
officials can provide specific, and articulable facts needed to
support a probable cause finding. That threshold was clearly
established.
The State asserts the court “correctly concluded that although [LaForge] was not
under arrest as set forth in section 321J.10A, the existence of probable cause to
arrest substituted for a technical arrest.”1 We cannot agree with this assertion as
it ignores the unambiguous language of the statute. See Harris, 744 N.W.2d at
271 (“When the language of a criminal statute is clear, the court looks no further
for meaning than its express terms.”).
Iowa Code section 804.5 defines “arrest” as “the taking of a person into
custody when and in the manner authorized by law, including restraint of the
person or the person‟s submission to custody.”
Where the legislature has
defined a term, courts cannot rewrite the statute and apply a definition more to its
liking. State v. Palmer, 554 N.W.2d 859, 865 (Iowa 1996). If the legislature had
meant the term “arrest” in section 321J.10A to be synonymous with “probable
cause,” it would have said so. See, e.g., Iowa Code § 321J.10(3)(e) (requiring
magistrate to be “satisfied from the oral testimony that the grounds for the
warrant exist or that there is probable cause to believe that they exist” (emphasis
1
The district court concluded the officers had probable cause to arrest LaForge based
on their observations that she “had bloodshot and watery eyes and that they detected
alcohol emanating from [her].” However, both Underwood and Lundgren testified at the
hearing on LaForge‟s motions they did not place LaForge under arrest before having her
blood withdrawn because they did not have sufficient information at that time to believe
she had committed a crime. See State v. Freeman, 705 N.W.2d 293, 298 (Iowa 2005)
(stating probable cause exists “if the totality of the circumstances as viewed by a
reasonable and prudent person would lead that person to believe that a crime has been
or is being committed and that the arrestee committed or is committing it”).
8
added)). We are bound by what the legislature said, not by what it should or
might have said. See Palmer, 554 N.W.2d at 865. Where the meaning of a
statute is clear, as it is here, our role is simply to enforce the law according to its
terms. Id.
Our conclusion is supported by our supreme court‟s observation in State
v. Johnson, 744 N.W.2d 340, 343 (Iowa 2008) that the wording of section
321J.10A “tracks closely with the language of” Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S.
757, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966). In that case, the United States
Supreme Court “concluded that the warrantless withdrawal of blood from an
individual implicates the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.”2
Johnson, 744 N.W.2d at 342. In considering whether such an “intrusion into the
petitioner‟s body was constitutional, the Court noted, „The overriding function of
the Fourth Amendment is to protect personal privacy and dignity against
unwarranted intrusion by the States.‟”
Palmer, 554 N.W.2d at 861 (quoting
Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 766, 86 S. Ct. at 1834, 16 L. Ed. 2d at 917). The Court
in Schmerber acknowledged that despite those Fourth Amendment implications
“alcohol naturally dissipates from the body shortly after its consumption.”
Johnson, 744 N.W.2d at 342. It therefore concluded “the warrantless seizure of
blood for purposes of chemical testing may be justified by the exigentcircumstances exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment.”
Id.
2
The rights guaranteed in the Fourth Amendment apply to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655, 81 S. Ct. 1684, 1694, 6 L.
Ed. 2d 1081, 1090 (1961).
9
Having reached that conclusion, the Schmerber Court proceeded to
consider whether that exception applied in the case before it. It stated, “In this
case, as will often be true when charges of driving under the influence of alcohol
are pressed, these questions arise in the context of an arrest.” Schmerber, 384
U.S. at 768, 86 S. Ct. at 1834, 16 L. Ed. 2d at 918. The “mere fact of a lawful
arrest” did not, however, end the Court‟s inquiry. Id. at 769, 86 S. Ct. at 1835, 16
L. Ed. 2d at 919. In finding the “attempt to secure evidence of blood-alcohol
content in this case was an appropriate incident to petitioner‟s arrest,” the Court
observed the officer “might reasonably have believed that he was confronted with
an emergency, in which the delay necessary to obtain a warrant, under the
circumstances, threatened „the destruction of evidence.‟” Id. at 770-71, 86 S. Ct.
at 1835-36, 16 L. Ed. 2d at 919-20 (citation omitted). In so concluding, the Court
“warned against ill-considered extensions of its decision,” Palmer, 554 N.W.2d at
862, stating:
We thus conclude that the present record shows no violation of
petitioner‟s right under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to
be free of unreasonable searches and seizures. It bears repeating,
however, that we reach this judgment only on the facts of the
present record. The integrity of an individual‟s person is a
cherished value of our society. That we today hold that the
Constitution does not forbid the States minor intrusions into an
individual‟s body under stringently limited conditions in no way
indicates that it permits more substantial intrusions, or intrusions
under other conditions.
Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 772, 86 S. Ct. at 1836, 16 L. Ed. 2d at 920 (emphasis
added); see also State v. Christianson, 627 N.W.2d 910, 913 (Iowa 2001)
(applying our implied-consent statute strictly because of the “sensitive and
unique nature of any procedures involving intrusions into the human body”).
10
“The Iowa legislature was sensitive to these concerns because in enacting
Iowa‟s implied consent statute, the legislature incorporated limitations on the
State‟s ability to conduct a warrantless search of a suspected drunk driver.”
Palmer, 554 N.W.2d at 862; see also Johnson, 744 N.W.2d at 343 (noting
section 321J.10A “tracks closely with the language of Schmerber” and Iowa case
law has followed the rationale set forth in that case). “We will not undermine the
legislature‟s policy decision by ignoring the plain language of the statute.”
Palmer, 554 N.W.2d at 865 (rejecting State‟s argument that a law enforcement
officer without the training required by the implied consent statute “is,
nevertheless, a de facto peace officer under that section”).
Because LaForge was not under arrest as required by section 321J.10A,3
we conclude the district court erred in denying her motion to suppress the blood
3
We also do not agree with the district court that the record in this case supports the
existence of facts satisfying another requirement of section 321J.10A(1) for an
unconsented withdrawal of blood. Section 321J.10A(1)(c) requires that the peace officer
ordering such a withdrawal “reasonably believes the officer is confronted with an
emergency situation in which the delay necessary to obtain a warrant under section
321J.10 threatens the destruction of the evidence [of intoxication].” (Emphasis added.)
The officers stated that an OWI investigation is time sensitive, as they were aware of the
body‟s natural dissipation of alcohol over time. However, “this knowledge alone is not
sufficient to satisfy the statute.” Harris, 763 N.W.2d at 274. The actual time to obtain a
warrant is an important fact in considering whether exigent circumstances exist to justify
a warrantless search. See State v. Lovig, 675 N.W.2d 557, 566 (Iowa 2004). From
almost the initiation of their investigation at the scene of the accident the officers had
information indicating that LaForge had been the driver of the vehicle involved in the
accident. The withdrawal of LaForge‟s blood without her consent and without a warrant
was performed on instruction from an assistant county attorney. No officer testified to a
belief that evidence of LaForge‟s blood-alcohol concentration would have been
destroyed or compromised if they had timely sought a search warrant and waited to
draw blood until a search warrant was obtained. Compare Harris, 763 N.W.2d at 275
(affirming court‟s suppression of blood test results where the officer simply acted on the
instructions of the county attorney in withdrawing the suspect‟s blood without a warrant
and “never asserted the reason he ordered the warrantless blood sample was his belief
that the time it would take to obtain the warrant would result in the destruction of
evidence”), with Johnson, 744 N.W.2d at 344 (affirming court‟s admission of blood test
11
test results obtained from the warrantless withdrawal of her blood. We therefore
reverse that portion of the district court‟s ruling. The question remains, however,
whether the court erred in dismissing the criminal charge against LaForge based
on the destruction of the blood sample.
B.
Destruction of Blood Sample.
“Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, criminal
prosecutions must comport with prevailing notions of fundamental fairness.”
California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485, 104 S. Ct. 2528, 2532, 81 L. Ed. 2d
413, 419 (1984). The United States Supreme Court “has long interpreted this
standard of fairness to require that criminal defendants be afforded a meaningful
opportunity to present a complete defense.” Id. “To safeguard that right, the
Court has developed „what might loosely be called the area of constitutionally
guaranteed access to evidence,‟ which “delivers exculpatory evidence into the
hands of the accused, thereby protecting the innocent from erroneous conviction
and ensuring the integrity of our criminal justice system.” Id. at 485, 104 S. Ct. at
2532, 81 L. Ed. 2d at 419-20 (citation omitted).
In considering the failure of police officers to preserve a defendant‟s
breath samples in a drunk driving case, the Court in Trombetta noted it had
“never squarely addressed the government‟s duty to take affirmative steps to
preserve evidence on behalf of criminal defendants,” which it attributed in part to
“the difficulty of developing rules to deal with evidence destroyed through
prosecutorial neglect or oversight.” Id. at 486, 104 S. Ct. at 2533, 81 L. Ed. 2d at
results where the “traffic officer testified that he believed evidence of Johnson‟s bloodalcohol concentration would be destroyed if he waited to withdraw blood until after a
search warrant was obtained”).
12
420-21. “Whenever potentially exculpatory evidence is permanently lost, courts
face the treacherous task of divining the import of materials whose contents are
unknown and, very often, disputed.”
Id.
The Court accordingly set out the
following standard for the State‟s duty to preserve evidence:
Whatever duty the Constitution imposes on the States to preserve
evidence, that duty must be limited to evidence that might be
expected to play a significant role in the suspect‟s defense. To
meet this standard of constitutional materiality . . . evidence must
both possess an exculpatory value that was apparent before the
evidence was destroyed, and be of such a nature that the
defendant would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by other
reasonably available means.
Id. at 488-89, 104 S. Ct. at 2534, 81 L. Ed. 2d at 422 (emphasis added). In
finding that standard was not violated in the case before it, the Court also
focused on the State‟s intent, stating the breath samples were not destroyed “in a
calculated effort to circumvent the disclosure requirements established by
Brady.”4 Id. at 488, 104 S. Ct. at 2533, 81 L. Ed. 2d at 422. Instead, in failing to
preserve the breath samples, the officers were “acting „in good faith and in
accord with their normal practice.‟” Id. (citation omitted).
The Supreme Court expounded on the State‟s duty to preserve evidence
in the later case of Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 109 S. Ct. 333, 102 L.
Ed. 2d 281 (1988). The Court acknowledged its decision in Brady in which it had
held a state‟s good or bad faith is irrelevant when the prosecution fails to disclose
to a defendant “material exculpatory evidence.” Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 57, 109
4
In the seminal “access to evidence” case of Brady, 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S. Ct. at 1197,
10 L. Ed. 2d at 218, where a co-defendant‟s confession to murder was withheld from the
defense by the prosecution, the Court held: “[T]he suppression by the prosecution of
evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the
evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad
faith of the prosecution.”
13
S. Ct. at 337, 102 L. Ed. 2d at 289 (emphasis added). But, according to the
Court in Youngblood, the Due Process Clause
requires a different result when we deal with the failure of the State
to preserve evidentiary material of which no more can be said than
that it could have been subjected to tests, the results of which might
have exonerated the defendant.
Id. (emphasis added). In those cases, “unless a criminal defendant can show
bad faith on the part of the police, failure to preserve potentially useful evidence
does not constitute a denial of due process of law.” Id. at 58, 109 S. Ct. at 337,
102 L. Ed. 2d at 289 (emphasis added).
Our supreme court adopted this standard in State v. Dulaney, 493 N.W.2d
787, 791 (Iowa 1992), a drunk driving case in which the defendant sought to
suppress test results from a warrantless blood withdrawal. Like LaForge, the
defendant in Dulaney argued the State violated his due process rights under
Brady by destroying his blood sample before he was able to have it
independently tested.
Dulaney, 493 N.W.2d at 790.
After setting forth the
standard articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Trombetta and
Youngblood, our supreme court concluded: “[T]he State‟s blood sample merely
could have been subjected to tests, and the results merely might have
exonerated Dulaney This is not enough under Trombetta and Youngblood to find
a violation of Dulaney‟s due process rights.” Id. at 791.
Citing Dulaney, the district court in this case determined “there is no
evidence that the State intentionally destroyed [LaForge‟s blood] sample in an
effort to deprive [her] of evidence as required by the current Iowa law.”
It
accordingly rejected LaForge‟s federal and state due process claims under
14
Brady. LaForge claims the court erred in so doing because “[t]here is no need
for a defendant to establish the exculpatory nature of the evidence, nor bad faith
on the part of the State” when a defendant has made a “specific request to
preserve evidence.”
That claim is clearly belied by the Supreme Court‟s opinions in Trombetta
and Youngblood, which as set forth above expressly require a showing of bad
faith when the State has failed to preserve potentially exculpatory evidence
regardless of whether a request had been made for preservation. Moreover, a
similar argument was rejected in Illinois v. Fisher, 540 U.S. 544, 548, 124 S. Ct.
1200, 1202, 157 L. Ed. 2d 1060, 1066 (2004), in which the Court stated, “We
have never held or suggested that the existence of a pending discovery request
eliminates the necessity of showing bad faith on the part of police.” Given our
supreme court‟s wholesale adoption of Trombetta and Youngblood in Dulaney, a
case that involved both federal and state due process claims, there is no merit to
LaForge‟s alternative claim that the Iowa Due Process Clause does not require a
showing of bad faith.5 See also State v. Craig, 490 N.W.2d 795, 796 (Iowa 1992)
(holding that in order to find a due process violation, “Youngblood requires more
objectionable police conduct (bad faith) when the exculpatory value of the
5
Our supreme court has held that our state constitution provides the same due process
protections found in the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and
thus Iowa constitutional principles follow federal principles. State v. Klawonn, 609
N.W.2d 515, 519 (Iowa 2000). Furthermore, LaForge‟s reliance on State v. Brown, 337
N.W.2d 507, 509 (Iowa 1983), a case in which our supreme court affirmed suppression
of the defendant‟s blood-alcohol test results irrespective of the good or bad faith on the
part of the State in failing to preserve the blood sample, is misplaced for the reasons
stated in Dulaney. See Dulaney, 493 N.W.2d at 790-92 (noting the development of
Supreme Court and Iowa case law after its decision in Brown required a showing of bad
faith when considering potentially useful evidence lost or destroyed by the State).
15
destroyed evidence is not suitable for evaluation”); accord State v. Hulbert, 481
N.W.2d 329, 334 (Iowa 1992).
As in Dulaney, there is no evidence here that the State intentionally
destroyed LaForge‟s blood sample in an effort to deprive her of evidence.
Instead, it appears the State‟s failure to inform the DCI lab of LaForge‟s request
that the evidence be preserved was an oversight on its part. The sample was
then destroyed pursuant to the lab‟s usual procedure. In addition, there is no
evidence that LaForge‟s blood sample was exculpatory in any way.
The
testimony of her expert at the hearing on her motions simply established that had
the sample been preserved it “could have been subjected to tests,” the results of
which “might have exonerated” LaForge. Dulaney, 493 N.W.2d at 791. Like the
blood-alcohol test results in Trombetta, “the chances are extremely low that
preserved samples would have been exculpatory.” Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 489,
104 S. Ct. at 2534, 81 L. Ed. 2d at 422. That possibility is not sufficient to find a
due process violation under Trombetta and Youngblood.
N.W.2d at 791.
See Dulaney, 493
We therefore affirm that portion of the district court‟s ruling
denying LaForge‟s federal and state due process claims under Brady and its
progeny.
This brings us to the State‟s sole claim on appeal: whether the district
court erred in dismissing the criminal charges against LaForge based on its
conclusion that the destruction of her blood sample “deprived [her] of a
meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.” We conclude it did.
16
Despite its determination that LaForge did not establish a due process
violation under Brady and its progeny, the district court found her “right to a fair
trial pursuant to the 6th and 14th Amendments to the United State Constitution
and Article 1, Section 10 of the Iowa Constitution” was violated by the State‟s
destruction of her blood sample. The court reasoned that irrespective of the lack
of bad faith on the part of the State in destroying the evidence,
the inability of [LaForge to] physically inspect the blood test
evidence; the inability to subject the blood test evidence to scientific
testing; and the inability to retain an expert to assist in evaluating
and rebutting the expert analysis of physical and testimony of the
State‟s expert witness is fundamentally unfair.
However, in State v. Steadman, 350 N.W.2d 172, 175 (Iowa 1984), our
supreme court rejected the notion that the “[l]ack of an independent test . . .
leave[s] a defendant defenseless.” It stated,
Drunk driving cases have been defended successfully for years
through use of traditional trial resources including crossexamination and extrinsic evidence that cast doubt on the reliability
and accuracy of particular test results. . . . Machine accuracy,
testing procedures and compliance with foundational requirements
are always open to question.
Steadman, 350 N.W.2d at 175 (concluding the due process clauses of the state
and federal constitutions did not require suppression of blood alcohol test results
obtained through implied consent procedures where officer did not preserve a
sample of the specimen tested in the absence of a request to do so); see also
Iowa Code § 321J.11 (“The failure or inability of the person to obtain an
independent chemical test or tests does not preclude the admission of evidence
of the results of the test or tests administered at the direction of the peace
officer.”).
17
Furthermore, when deciding issues related to the right to present a
defense under the Sixth Amendment to the Federal Constitution,6 the United
States Supreme Court, along with our own supreme court, “has ignored
mentioning the Sixth Amendment genesis of [that right] and has simply relied on
the Due Process Clause alone when deciding issues in this area.” Simpson, 587
N.W.2d at 771; see also State v. Weaver, 608 N.W.2d 797, 802 (Iowa 2000)
(analyzing defendant‟s Sixth Amendment right-to-present-a-defense claim under
a due-process analysis).
This is because the right to present a defense is
essential to a fair trial and is thus a fundamental element of due process of law.
Simpson, 587 N.W.2d at 771. “For that reason, it is an incorporated right in the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,” and as such, the right is
binding on the states. Id.
Because the Sixth Amendment right to present a defense is subsumed
within a defendant‟s fundamental right to a fair trial under the Fourteenth
Amendment, we believe the district court erred in disregarding the State‟s lack of
bad faith in destroying the blood sample. See, e.g., State v. Rush, 242 N.W.2d
313, 316 (Iowa 1976) (recognizing “[a] good faith loss [of evidence] does not
trigger exclusion, and does not even rise to the dignity of constitutional
dimension” in denying defendant‟s Sixth Amendment claim). Under Trombetta
and Youngblood—both of which were concerned with ensuring that “criminal
defendants be afforded a meaningful opportunity to present a complete
6
The Sixth Amendment provides in relevant part that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in
his favor.” U.S. Const. amend. VI; see also Iowa Const. art. I § 10. “The right to present
a defense stems from this Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process.” State v.
Simpson, 587 N.W.2d 770, 771 (Iowa 1998).
18
defense”—the failure to preserve potentially useful evidence does not deprive a
defendant of a fair trial unless the defendant can show the State acted in bad
faith. Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 485, 104 S. Ct. at 2532, 81 L. Ed. 2d at 419;
Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 55-56, 109 S. Ct. at 336, 102 L. Ed. 2d at 287-88.
LaForge did not make that showing here for the reasons previously set forth. We
therefore conclude the district court erred in dismissing the criminal charge
against her.
IV.
CONCLUSION.
Because LaForge was not under arrest as required by Iowa Code section
321J.10A when her blood was withdrawn without a warrant, we conclude the
district court erred in denying her motion to suppress the blood test results. That
portion of the district court‟s ruling is therefore reversed. We agree with the court
that LaForge did not establish bad faith on the part of the State in failing to
preserve the potentially useful evidence of her blood sample. Based on that lack
of bad faith, we conclude the court erred in proceeding to find LaForge‟s right to
a fair trial was violated by the destruction of her blood sample and in dismissing
the criminal charge against her. We therefore affirm in part, reverse in part, and
remand for further proceedings.
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.
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