STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. HARLAN MOTT JR., Respondent-Appellant.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 9-297 / 08-1656
Filed June 17, 2009
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
HARLAN MOTT JR.,
Respondent-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Arthur E. Gamble,
Judge.
Harlan Mott Jr. appeals from the district court’s rejection of his challenges
to a restitution order requiring him to pay restitution to reimburse the crime victim
compensation program. AFFIRMED.
Susan R. Stockdale, Des Moines, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Sharon K. Hall, Assistant Attorney
General, John P. Sarcone, County Attorney, and George Karnas, Assistant
County Attorney, for appellee.
Heard by Sackett, C.J., and Vogel and Miller, JJ.
2
MILLER, J.
Harlan Mott Jr. appeals from the district court’s rejection of his challenges
to a restitution order requiring him to pay restitution to reimburse the crime victim
compensation program (CVCP) for medical expense payments made on behalf
of Mott’s victim following his conviction for kidnapping in the first degree. We
affirm.
A jury found Mott guilty of first-degree kidnapping. The conviction was
based on Mott’s kidnapping and assault of his then girlfriend, Lisa Floyd, in early
November 2006. In a sentencing order filed June 19, 2007, the district court
sentenced Mott to life in prison and ordered him to pay restitution. The amount
of restitution was not available at the time of sentencing, and the order provided,
in part: “At such time as the amounts are available, a supplemental order will
follow.” On or about June 25, 2007, the State filed a “Statement of Additional
Pecuniary Damages” asserting the CVCP had paid $2,839.41 as the result of
Mott’s criminal activities. The State then filed a motion seeking amendment of
the sentencing order to include the $2,839.41. The district court entered an order
granting the motion, subject to Mott’s right to object to the order.
Mott filed a pro se objection to the supplemental restitution order. The
State resisted Mott’s objection on several grounds. The district court held a
status hearing, declined to dismiss Mott’s challenge to the restitution order, and
appointed counsel to represent Mott.
Mott’s attorney filed an amended motion for correction of restitution,
claiming there was no causal connection between the $2,839.41 paid by the
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CVCP and the crime of which Mott was convicted. The district court held a
hearing on the merits of Mott’s challenge.
At the hearing Mott lodged an
objection to State’s exhibit 1, a printed summary of payments allegedly made by
the CVCP on behalf of Floyd, asserting that “no foundation has been laid to bring
it into any exception to the hearsay rule.” The court agreed the State had not laid
any foundation for admission of the exhibit, but received it subject to the
objection, noting that the issue before it was not the amount paid by the CVCP
but instead the question was whether the payment was related to the crime.
Floyd testified about the injuries inflicted on her by Mott on November 4
and 5, 2006, and the medical treatment she received at Broadlawns Medical
Center on November 5 and 7, 2006, as a result of those injuries. She also
identified hospital bills for her treatment, which she had submitted to the CVCP.
Those bills were admitted in evidence without objection at the hearing.
On
September 17, 2008, the district court entered a written ruling finding that the
$2,839.41 the CVCP paid to Broadlawns on behalf of Floyd was for reasonable
and necessary medical services causally related to damages Floyd suffered as a
result of Mott’s crime. The court concluded that Mott was properly ordered to pay
restitution to the CVCP in that amount, and overruled Mott’s amended motion.
Mott appeals the district court’s order, claiming the district court abused its
discretion when it received exhibit 1 subject to the hearsay objection. He further
claims the court erred when it determined he owed restitution to the CVCP,
asserting the State did not establish the requisite causal connection between
Mott’s acts and Floyd’s damages.
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In the case of hearsay rulings our review is for correction of errors at law.
State v. Ross, 573 N.W.2d 906, 910 (Iowa 1998).
Our review of restitution
orders is also for correction of errors at law. State v. Watts, 587 N.W.2d 750,
751 (Iowa 1998).
Mott first contends the district court erred in admitting exhibit 1 because
the record lacked sufficient foundation to support its admission under the
business records exception to the hearsay rule. See Iowa R. Evid. 5.803(6). A
restitution order that is part of an original sentencing order, or, as here, is made
as part of a supplemental order pursuant to Iowa Code section 910.3 (2005), is a
phase of sentencing. State v. Jose, 636 N.W.2d 38, 46 (Iowa 2001); State v.
Alspach, 554 N.W.2d 882, 883 (Iowa 1996). As the Iowa Rules of Evidence are
inapplicable to criminal sentencing proceedings, Iowa R. Evid. 5.1101(c)(4), the
court did not err in considering the evidence over Mott’s hearsay objection.
Mott also argues that the evidence does not establish the requisite causal
connection between his criminal acts and the reimbursement sought on behalf of
the CVCP for money it paid for Floyd’s medical expenses. Assuming without
deciding that Mott’s challenge to the court’s order claims that the order for
payment made by the CVCP was unauthorized by rule or statute,1 we conclude
1
See State v. Bradley, 637 N.W.2d 206, 215 (Iowa Ct. App. 2001) (holding that
although when ordering restitution to the crime victim compensation program the district
court is not required to find proximate causation between the defendant’s criminal acts
and those payments, a defendant may challenge an order for payment made by the
CVCP on the ground the payment was unauthorized by rule or statute); see also Iowa
Code § 915.81 (2005) (“The department shall award compensation authorized by this
subchapter if the department is satisfied that the requirements for compensation have
been met.”).
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there is sufficient evidence in the record to satisfy the requirement of a causal
connection.
Floyd testified about Mott’s actions and the resulting injuries she sustained
on November 4 and 5.
She testified that those injuries required medical
treatment, which she received at Broadlawns on November 5 and 7, and that her
treatment did not include treatment for any injuries sustained or incurred prior to
the injuries caused by Mott. Floyd testified she received bills for the services
rendered for her injuries and applied to the CVCP to pay them. She identified the
bills for her treatment and those bills, totaling the $2,839.41 on State’s exhibit 1,
were admitted in evidence without objection. We conclude the State satisfied
any burden of proof it had to show a causal connection between Mott’s criminal
acts and the restitution sought to reimburse the CVCP.
For the reasons set forth above, we conclude the district court did not err
in admitting exhibit 1 over Mott’s hearsay objection or in finding the State had
proved a causal connection between Mott’s criminal acts and the $2,839.41
sought by the CVCP.
AFFIRMED.
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