IN THE INTEREST OF E.L.C., Minor Child, STATE OF IOWA, Appellant.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 9-290 / 08-1483
Filed July 2, 2009
IN THE INTEREST OF E.L.C.,
Minor Child,
STATE OF IOWA,
Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Carol S. Egly, District
Associate Judge.
Following the grant of discretionary review, the State seeks reversal of the
juvenile court’s ruling denying its application for waiver of juvenile court
jurisdiction. REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Bruce Kempkes, Assistant Attorney
General, John P. Sarcone, County Attorney, and Kevin Brownell, Assistant
County Attorney, for appellant State.
M. Kathryn Miller, Juvenile Public Defender, Des Moines, for minor child.
Heard by Sackett, C.J., and Vogel and Miller, JJ.
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VOGEL, J.
The State filed a petition alleging E.L.C. to have committed delinquent
acts and subsequently requested that the juvenile court waive its jurisdiction.
The juvenile court denied the State’s request and the State sought discretionary
review, which was granted. The State asserts that the juvenile court abused its
discretion in denying its request for waiver of jurisdiction.
We reverse and
remand.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
The delinquency petition and police reports reveal the following facts. On
August 6, 2008, seventeen-year-old E.L.C. was involved in a vehicle accident
that killed a motorcycle driver. E.L.C. first struck a van with her vehicle and sped
away. She then ran a red light and struck a motorcycle, resulting in the death of
the driver. She again drove away, but crashed into a nearby telephone pole.
Although E.L.C. got out of her vehicle and attempted to walk away, two
bystanders approached her and brought her back to the accident scene.
The State filed a delinquency petition charging E.L.C. with the acts of (1)
homicide by vehicle in violation of Iowa Code section 707.6A(2) (2007); (2) failure
to give information and aid, leaving the scene of an accident resulting in death in
violation of Iowa Code sections 321.261(4) and 321.263; and (3) failure to give
information and aid, leaving the scene of an accident resulting in vehicle damage
in violation of Iowa Code sections 321.262 and 321.263.
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Subsequently, the State sought waiver of juvenile court jurisdiction. 1 On
September 3, 2008, a hearing was held. The evidence revealed that E.L.C. had
previously attended Roosevelt High School in the ninth and tenth grades, but due
to truancy problems was transferred to SCAVO High School, where she was
currently in the twelfth grade. While at SCAVO High School, E.L.C. was in the
Future Pathways Program and did not have any reported problems. Additionally,
E.L.C. had no prior criminal history.
The State introduced the report and recommendation completed by John
Hawkins, a juvenile court officer (JCO).
Hawkins testified that prior to the
accident, E.L.C. had not stayed at her parents’ home for two or three days, had
purchased a vehicle, and against her parents’ instructions, drove the vehicle in
spite of the fact that she did not have a valid driver’s license or automobile
insurance. He described the accident as not just a thirty-second situation, but
rather “a series of bad decisions on her part.” However, he believed this was an
isolated incident that took place over the course of three days.
After an exhaustive examination of many specific factors, he ultimately
recommended the juvenile court waive its jurisdiction. He noted the seriousness
of the offense resulting in the death of another, which warranted both appropriate
consequences and services. Although Hawkins did not see a pattern of behavior
1
It appears that the State did not file a written motion requesting the juvenile court to
waive jurisdiction. However, the State served E.L.C. with notice stating that a motion to
waive jurisdiction was on file. In response to a motion to waive jurisdiction, a juvenile
court officer provided the juvenile court and E.L.C. with a written report and
recommendation prior to the hearing. On August 13, 2008, a detention hearing was
held, during which the juvenile court discussed with the parties that the waiver hearing
was scheduled for September 3. On that date, E.L.C. and her attorney participated in
the hearing without objection. Therefore, we find any objection to the lack of a written
motion waived. See Meier v. Senecaut, 641 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Iowa 2006) (stating we
will not address an issue raised for the first time on appeal).
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that requires rehabilitation, he opined that E.L.C. still had “some thinking errors
. . . that need to be corrected.” Because E.L.C. was then eighteen years old, the
juvenile court could only supervise her on probation for eighteen months with jail
time as the consequence if she violated probation.
Therefore, Hawkins
concluded there were not any reasonable prospects that E.L.C. would be
adequately served if the juvenile court retained jurisdiction.
However, if
jurisdiction was waived, the adult court could offer more services, including the
Youthful Offender Program. This program would offer more intense services,
including driver’s education and other classes as well as education and
employment requirements, for a longer period of time.
He reviewed the
appropriate factors, focusing on finding a balance for “what’s best for the
community as a whole and rehabilitation which address what is best for [E.L.C.]
at this time.”
Dr. Ruth Webb also testified that she had completed a psychological
evaluation of E.L.C., but was instructed not to discuss with E.L.C. the legal
charges, including E.L.C.’s rebellious behavior that led up to the accident or the
accident itself.
She opined that E.L.C. did not need any mental health
rehabilitation, but then stated that E.L.C. would benefit from counseling to
address feelings of hopelessness and sadness that may have existed prior to the
accident and to address the sobering consequences from the accident.
Additionally, she stated that she saw no evidence of “criminal thinking” by E.L.C.,
but qualified this by stating that she did not discuss the event with her and later
admitted that if a person is aware of the law and chooses to violate it, such could
be considered “criminal thinking.” Finally, although Dr. Webb had no background
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with the adult system and the services available, she did not think there would be
any benefit to E.L.C. if the juvenile court waived its jurisdiction.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the juvenile court denied the State’s
request. The court discussed that it was the State’s burden to prove both that
there were not reasonable prospects for rehabilitation in juvenile court and that it
was in the child’s and the community’s best interests to waive jurisdiction. As for
the reasonable prospects for rehabilitation, the juvenile court concluded that
“there may be no need for rehabilitation.” The juvenile court then found the
record was absent any evidence that it would be in E.L.C.’s best interests for the
court to waive jurisdiction.
As for the adult system, “[T]here’s been mention
about a Youthful Offender Program. That has not been disclosed to this judge as
an option in this circumstance.”
The juvenile court then characterized the
Youthful Offender Program as one for “criminal thinking youths.”
Finally, the
juvenile court discussed that if waived to adult court, E.L.C. could be sentenced
to prison if the court waived its jurisdiction and E.L.C. was found guilty of
homicide by vehicle and the other charges. Thus, the court denied the motion to
waive jurisdiction.
The State sought discretionary review, which our supreme court granted.
On appeal, the State asserts that the district court abused its discretion in
denying its motion to waive jurisdiction.
II. Scope of Review
Generally, we review juvenile proceedings de novo. State v. Tesch, 704
N.W.2d 440, 448 (Iowa 2005). However, we review a decision on whether a
waiver of juvenile court jurisdiction is warranted for an abuse of discretion. Id.
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“An abuse of discretion occurs when the court’s decision is based on grounds or
reasons that are clearly untenable or unreasonable.” Id. We give weight to the
juvenile court’s factual findings, especially when concerning the credibility of
witnesses, but are not bound by them.
Id.; see also State v. Greiman, 344
N.W.2d 249, 251 (Iowa 1984) (discussing that although we review a decision on
waiver for an abuse of discretion, our review is de novo to the extent of
examining all the evidence to determine whether the district court abused its
discretion).
III. Waiver Proceeding
Pursuant to Iowa Code section 232.45(6), following a hearing the juvenile
court may waive its jurisdiction over a child if the following criteria are met: (a)
the child is fourteen years of age or older; (b) the juvenile court determines there
is probable cause to believe the child committed a delinquent act, which would
constitute a public offense; and
(c) The court determines that the state has established that there
are not reasonable prospects for rehabilitating the child if the
juvenile court retains jurisdiction over the child and the child is
adjudicated to have committed the delinquent act, and that waiver
of the court’s jurisdiction over the child for the alleged commission
of the public offense would be in the best interests of the child and
the community.
There is no dispute that E.L.C. was seventeen at the time she allegedly
committed the delinquent acts and that there was probable cause that she
committed the delinquent acts.
Rather the juvenile court denied the State’s
motion based upon the grounds of subsection (c). Iowa Code § 232.45(6)(c). In
determining whether the State has met its burden on this prong, the juvenile
court must consider:
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(a) The nature of the alleged delinquent act and the circumstances
under which it was committed.
(b) The nature and extent of the child’s prior contacts with juvenile
authorities, including past efforts of such authorities to treat and
rehabilitate the child and the response to such efforts.
(c) The programs, facilities and personnel available to the juvenile
court for rehabilitation and treatment of the child, and the programs,
facilities and personnel which would be available to the court that
would have jurisdiction in the event the juvenile court waives its
jurisdiction so that the child can be prosecuted as an adult.
Id. § 232.45(8). Again, there is no dispute that E.L.C. was less than two weeks
from her eighteenth birthday when she allegedly committed a serious crime that
resulted in the death of a man. However, she has no prior contacts with the
juvenile authorities. Once more, it is subsection (c) that is at issue.
The State asserts that the district court abused its discretion in denying its
request for waiver because (1) the juvenile court did not give sufficient weight to
E.L.C.’s age and the seriousness of the offense; (2) the juvenile court did not
give sufficient weight to the JCO’s recommendation of waiver; (3) adult court has
more options and provides the better chance for rehabilitation; and (4) the
juvenile court placed too much emphasis on the possibility of prison time. We
first note that although E.L.C. does not have a criminal history, her age and the
seriousness of the alleged offense weigh heavily in favor of waiver. Greiman,
344 N.W.2d at 251 (“While [her] minimal contacts with authorities prior to this
incident militate against waiver, the nature of the act weighs strongly in favor of
waiver.”). Additionally, the JCO’s recommendation of waiver should be given
significant weight.
See id. (stating that the juvenile court probation officer’s
opinion should be entitled to considerable weight).
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Next, we examine what the record reveals as to the differences between
the juvenile and adult systems. Id. (stating the statute requires weighing of the
prospects for rehabilitation offered by the juvenile and adult systems). If the
juvenile court retains jurisdiction, due to E.L.C.’s age, she would only be subject
to probation for a period of eighteen months. JCO Hawkins mentioned in his
report that services available would be court supervision, tracking and
monitoring, and counseling. Services beyond E.L.C.’s eighteenth birthday could
include therapy or out-patient treatment, but Hawkins did not believe she needed
either. If she were to violate probation, the only remedy would be a contempt
proceeding, possibly resulting in jail time. However, if the juvenile court waived
jurisdiction, Hawkins noted other options are available, including the Youthful
Offender’s Program. This program allows first-time offenders who are charged
with a felony to plead guilty to a non-felony charge and, in most cases, receive a
deferred judgment.2 The duration of probation under this more intense program
may last up to five years and include education and employment requirements,
additional services, and programming.
If an offender fails to complete the
program, she is prosecuted for the initial offense for which she was charged.
Although prosecution is available should E.L.C. fail in the Youthful Offender’s
Program, any probation failure of E.L.C. and subsequent repercussions are
purely speculative.
2
The Youthful Offender Program is geared toward first-time felons ages sixteen to
twenty-one. Under the program, an offender is released on a pre-trial status and
required to complete all program requirements, which may take six months to two years.
The program requirements may include maintaining employment and obtaining a high
school diploma. Once the offender has completed the program requirements, the felony
charge is dismissed and the offender pleads guilty to a non-felony charge and, in most
cases, is granted a deferred judgment and placed on formal probation.
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In weighing the services offered by the juvenile system and the adult
system, we agree with the State that in this case, the juvenile system provides
fewer options and for a shorter time frame than the adult system, particularly in
light of the Youthful Offender Program. Under that program, E.L.C. would be
required to obtain her high school diploma, maintain employment, and receive
counseling. She would also be required to complete driver’s education classes
and obtain her driver’s license.
Additionally, the duration of probation would
allow her more time to mature, which was specifically mentioned by Dr. Webb as
something E.L.C. would benefit from.
Dr. Webb testified that E.L.C. needed
supervision by someone whose rules she would follow, but did not know if it
would be in E.L.C.’s best interests if she continued under the supervision of her
parents, which testimony indicated would occur if E.L.C. remained in the juvenile
system.
Additionally, the JCO testified that he felt the serious nature of the
offense as well as the death of another warranted both appropriate
consequences and services, which would be better provided for in the adult
system.
Furthermore, we find that the juvenile court failed to weigh the programs
available in the juvenile and adult systems. See Greiman, 344 N.W.2d at 251
(stating the statute requires weighing of the prospects for rehabilitation offered by
the juvenile and adult systems). Although presented with testimony regarding
the Youthful Offender program, the juvenile court found that “there had been
mention about a Youthful Offender Program. That has not been disclosed to this
judge as an option in this circumstance.”
The JCO specifically testified that
although not under his control, the Youthful Offender Program was an option if
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E.L.C. was waived into adult court. The juvenile court placed emphasis on the
possibility of E.L.C. facing prison time if simply tried and convicted in adult court
rather than the possibility of being admitted into the Youthful Offender Program.
As the JCO carefully noted in his written report:
What is the best way to meet society’s need to feel safe and know
that our members are going to be held accountable for their actions
and, how is this young woman best served in the court system for a
series of immature, disobedient and reckless acts that resulted in a
death?
This Officer cannot honestly state that there are any reasonable
prospects of rehabilitating this child if returned to Juvenile Court nor
am I comfortable stating that it is in [E.L.C.’s] best interest to be
waived to the Adult Court. My problem with both options is that
there is no middle ground. It is either all or nothing. To keep
jurisdiction with the Juvenile Court means that [E.L.C.] could never
be held accountable for violations of her probation without first
being found in contempt of court. On the other hand if jurisdiction is
waived to the Adult Court there are no guarantees that she would
not spend time in prison. Nevertheless, due to the seriousness of
the charge combined with [E.L.C.’s] age at the time of the offense I
feel that I am left with only one option . . . . [Waiver.]
On our de novo review of the entire record, we find the juvenile court
abused its discretion in concluding the State failed to meet its burden of proof
that waiver to the adult system was not in E.L.C.’s or the community’s best
interests. Therefore, we reverse and remand.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Miller, J. concurs. Sackett, C.J. dissents.
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Sackett, C.J., (dissenting)
I would affirm.
Both the juvenile court officer and the juvenile court
weighed all options and reached reasonable but different conclusions in this case
where there are no clear answers. The juvenile court officer is charged with
making a recommendation to the juvenile court and the juvenile court is charged
to making the decision whether or not to transfer. The juvenile court clearly
considered the recommendation of the juvenile court officer, but for reasons
clearly articulated in its order the juvenile court did not accept the juvenile court
officer’s recommendation.
discretion.
I do not believe the juvenile court abused its
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