IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF DEWEY M. GOINS AND MARY P. GOINS Upon the Petition of DEWEY M. GOINS, Petitioner-Appellant/Cross-Appellee, And Concerning MARY P. GOINS, Respondent-Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 9-283 / 08-1416
Filed May 6, 2009
IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF DEWEY M. GOINS
AND MARY P. GOINS
Upon the Petition of
DEWEY M. GOINS,
Petitioner-Appellant/Cross-Appellee,
And Concerning
MARY P. GOINS,
Respondent-Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Linn County, Denver D. Dillard,
Judge.
Dewey Goins appeals, and Mary Goins cross-appeals, from the district
court’s decree dissolving their marriage. AFFIRMED.
Henry E. Nathanson of Nazette, Marner, Nathanson & Shea, L.L.P., Cedar
Rapids, for appellant.
Stephen B. Jackson and Stephen B. Jackson, Jr., Cedar Rapids, for
appellee.
Considered by Mahan, P.J., and Eisenhauer and Mansfield, JJ.
2
MAHAN, P.J.
Dewey Goins appeals from the spousal support and attorney fee awards
of the parties’ dissolution decree. Mary “Pat” Goins cross-appeals the amount of
the spousal support award. We affirm.
At the time of trial Dewey was fifty-one years old and Pat was fifty-nine
years old. The parties had been married ten years and had lived together in a
relationship similar to a marriage for several years more.1 Sometime in 2006 or
2007, Dewey informed Pat that he wished to dissolve the marriage.2 Dewey is a
high school graduate, and Pat received her GED and attended one year of
community college. Currently, Dewey is employed at Pickwick Manufacturing
Company earning $13.50 hourly. Pat is employed at Wal-Mart earning $15.30
hourly. Annually, the parties earn less than $30,000 each; however, Dewey also
earns more than that amount in income from his investments. Dewey is in good
physical and mental health. Pat has no current health issues, but has a history of
some medical problems, one of which was serious.
The record shows that the parties (Dewey especially) lived very frugally
and within their means. The district court even noted that Dewey’s “penurious
nature”
made
the
dissolution
process
“somewhat
more
complicated.”
Throughout the marriage, Pat deposited her paychecks into a joint checking
account, from which she paid bills and living expenses for the parties. Dewey
kept his own checking account, but deposited a specific monthly share of his
1
2
This was the first marriage for both parties.
Pat eventually moved out and purchased a home in her name.
3
paycheck into the joint account.3
According to Pat, the parties were under
agreement that Pat’s paychecks were for day-to-day living expenses and
Dewey’s paychecks were being saved for the parties’ retirement.
Pat brought very few assets into the marriage. Dewey, however, brought
assets totaling $361,000 into the marriage, in addition to the parties’ home, which
was paid for and in his name.
Prior to the marriage, the parties signed an
antenuptial agreement because Dewey refused to be married without such an
agreement. The agreement provided that each party’s premarital property and
earnings therefrom would remain his or her own separate property and would not
be subject to division in the event of dissolution. The district court found the
agreement to be valid and enforceable in all respects.4
At the time of trial, Dewey’s assets had increased and were worth more
than $840,000, which the dissolution decree ordered him to receive. At the same
time, Pat was making mortgage payments on her home in the amount of $675.72
per month and had less than $20,000 in assets. After considering the factors
listed in Iowa Code section 598.21A (2007), the court concluded Pat was entitled
to spousal support in the amount of $700 per month:
While Respondent’s hourly wage is greater than Petitioner’s, her
actual income is substantially less and will continue to be
substantially less than Petitioner’s because of the number of hours
worked, their relative ages and the interest income on Petitioner’s
investments. Respondent has virtually no opportunity for retraining
and greater income potential. Further, her health is more fragile
than Petitioner’s with a recurrence of her serious health problem
being a real potential. Finally, the application of the antenuptial
3
The monthly sum was originally $400, then grew to $450, and then $500. Eventually,
the sum became $700, which included $150 for a hospital bill and $50 for a vacation
fund.
4
Therefore, spousal support was the only substantial issue before the court.
4
agreement in this case creates a substantially bigger disparity in
wealth and income than would otherwise be the case. The parties
were married for ten years and had a relationship not unlike a
marriage for several years more. In contrast, Petitioner will have
available to him an income tax deduction for alimony and his
lifestyle is such that a reasonable award of spousal support will not
interfere with his enjoyment of life. Finally, an evaluation of
Respondent’s circumstances shows that her major need for a
comfortable existence is coverage of the housing expense she has
incurred. But for the dissolution of marriage, that expense would
not exist. A reasonable amount of spousal support to cover that
housing expense is $700 per month.
Dewey argues the court erred in awarding spousal support to Pat. Pat
argues the court should have awarded spousal support in the amount of $1000
instead of $700.
After a thorough review and consideration of the evidence
presented, the contentions of the parties, and the court’s resolution of the issues
presented, we find no error in and agree with the district court’s ruling.
Therefore, we affirm on this issue. We disagree with Dewey’s contention that the
award of spousal support amounts to a circumvention of the antenuptial
agreement. Among other things, the record shows that Dewey, unlike Pat, did
not put all of his paychecks into the parties’ joint account during the marriage, but
used portions of those checks to add to the assets that were in his own name.
Dewey further argues the district court erroneously awarded Pat trial
attorney fees in the amount of $2000. An award of attorney fees is not a matter
of right, but rather rests within the court’s discretion. In re Marriage of Hocker,
752 N.W.2d 447, 451 (Iowa 2008).
We review the district court’s award of
attorney fees for abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of Sullins, 715 N.W.2d 242,
255 (Iowa 2006).
An award of attorney fees is based upon the respective
abilities of the parties to pay the fees and whether the fees are fair and
5
reasonable. In re Marriage of Applegate, 567 N.W.2d 671, 675 (Iowa Ct. App.
1997).
Dewey filed the petition for dissolution of the parties’ marriage, and
thereafter the court-enforced antenuptial agreement created a large disparity of
wealth between the parties. We conclude the district court did not abuse its
discretion when it awarded Pat attorney fees.
Pat requests appellate attorney fees. This court has broad discretion in
awarding appellate attorney fees. In re Marriage of Okland, 699 N.W.2d 260,
270 (Iowa 2005). An award of appellate attorney fees is based upon the needs
of the party seeking the award, the ability of the other party to pay, and the
relative merits of the appeal. Id.; In re Marriage of Berning, 745 N.W.2d 90, 94
(Iowa Ct. App. 2007). Given the working statuses of the parties and the merits of
their arguments, we conclude each party should pay his or her own attorney fees
for this appeal. Costs on appeals are assessed one-half to each party.
AFFIRMED.
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