STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. GERALD CLAYTON MULLER, Defendant-Appellant.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 9-276 / 08-1191
Filed June 17, 2009
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
GERALD CLAYTON MULLER,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Tama County, Patrick R. Grady,
Judge.
Appellant appeals his conviction for operating while intoxicated (OWI), and
asserts that he was denied his right to a speedy trial.
REVERSED AND
REMANDED.
D. Raymond Walton, Waterloo, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Karen Doland, Assistant Attorney
General, and Brent D. Heeren, County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Sackett, C.J., and Vogel and Miller, JJ. Potterfield, J. takes
no part.
2
VOGEL, J.
After a trial on the minutes of testimony, Gerald Muller appeals his
conviction for operating while intoxicated (OWI), in violation of Iowa Code section
321J.2 (2007). He asserts the district court should have granted his motion to
dismiss, as he was denied his right to a speedy trial. We agree and reverse.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
On June 9, 2007, Muller was arrested for OWI. The trial information was
filed on June 28, starting the ninety-day time period during which he was entitled
to be brought to trial.
Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.33(2)(b).
An order following
arraignment set the pretrial conference for August 23 and the trial for September
4.
On August 17, 2007, Muller filed a motion to suppress all evidence
obtained from the stop of his vehicle. On August 20, while preserving his right to
a speedy trial, Muller filed a motion to continue both the pretrial conference and
the trial, indicating his counsel had a scheduling conflict with both days. At the
scheduled pretrial conference on August 23, Muller‟s counsel appeared via
telephone conference call with the court and the assistant county attorney. The
court noted, “[D]efendant has demanded speedy trial, and a review of the court
file reflects that the last date available within the 90-day speedy trial demand
period is September 24, 2007.” The court then set the motion to suppress for
September 7, and reset the pretrial for September 13, and the trial for September
24.
The motion to suppress was heard by the district court, as scheduled on
September 7, 2007. On September 13, another district court judge reset the
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pretrial conference for September 20 and the trial date of September 24 was
confirmed. At the September 20 pretrial conference, while still awaiting a ruling
on the motion to suppress, the court found that the “[D]efendant does not wish to
proceed to trial without a ruling on his motion to suppress, but asks that trial be
re-set as soon as possible.” The order reset the pretrial for October 4 and the
trial for October 15, outside the speedy trial deadline. The ruling on the motion to
suppress was eventually filed on September 26.
On October 3, 2007, Muller filed a motion to dismiss, asserting a denial of
his speedy trial rights. His motion was overruled on October 12, and following a
trial on the minutes of testimony, which resulted in a conviction and sentence for
OWI, Muller appeals.
II. Scope of Review
We review a district court‟s ruling on a motion to dismiss based on
speedy-trial grounds for an abuse of discretion. State v. Winters, 690 N.W.2d
903, 907 (Iowa 2005). However, in ruling on such motions, that discretion is
narrow. Id.
III. Speedy Trial
Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.33(2)(b) states:
If a defendant indicted for a public offense has not waived the
defendant‟s right to a speedy trial, the defendant must be brought
to trial within 90 days after indictment is found or the court must
order the indictment to be dismissed unless good cause to the
contrary be shown.
Under this rule, good cause focuses on only one factor: the reason for the delay.
State v. Petersen, 288 N.W.2d 332, 335 (Iowa 1980). It is the State‟s burden to
demonstrate good cause in order to be excused from the ninety-day trial
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requirement. Id. at 334. The surrounding circumstances bear on that inquiry
only to the extent they relate to the sufficiency of the reason itself.
State v.
Campbell, 714 N.W.2d 622, 627 (Iowa 2006).
The State argues Muller is partly to fault for the delay, because on August
23, 2007, his attorney requested the trial be continued from its scheduled
September 4 date, due to scheduling conflicts. We reject that argument, as from
that August 23 hearing, more than a month still remained on the speedy trial
deadline to the rescheduled trial date of September 24.
In denying Muller‟s
motion to dismiss, the district court focused on whether the nineteen days from
hearing to ruling (September 7 to September 26), was an unnecessary delay on
a relatively routine motion to suppress. The court concluded, “[G]iven that there
is no record on what else [the judge] had on her docket during that time frame, I
do not find that delay to be unreasonable in the normal course of judicial
events.”1
Generally, a defendant must accept the passage of time that is reasonably
necessary for a court to hear and rule on dispositive pretrial motions. Winters,
690 N.W.2d at 908 (citing State v. Nelson, 600 N.W.2d 598, 601 (Iowa 1999)).
However, defendants do not waive their right to be tried within the speedy-trial
deadline by filing timely pretrial motions. Id. The pretrial process is set up to
normally dispose of pretrial motions within the speedy-trial deadline. Id. at 90809.
1
The court also found the three-week delay did not cause Muller any prejudice. Such
rationale was rejected in State v. Miller, 637 N.W.2d 201, 206 (Iowa 2001), as “[t]he
burden was on the State in the first instance, to prove „good cause‟ for missing the
deadline.”
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In this case, Muller filed his motion to suppress thirty-seven days after
arraignment. See Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.11(4) (stating motions generally must be
filed no later than forty days after arraignment). From the filing of the motion to
suppress to the hearing on the motion, twenty-one days elapsed.
After the
hearing, another nineteen days passed before the ruling was filed. See Iowa
Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.11(8) (requiring pretrial motions “be determined
without unreasonable delay”). While the written ruling was factually detailed and
well reasoned, a summary decision, with a more expansive ruling to follow, would
have sufficed to keep the trial on schedule. Without a ruling just four days before
the scheduled trial, Muller declared he did not want to go forward with the trial
until he had a ruling on his motion. Consequently, the trial was rescheduled,
pushing it beyond the ninety-day limit. In all, from the time Muller filed his motion
to suppress to when it was ruled on, forty days elapsed.
Although there appear to be no lengthy gaps in the pretrial progression of
the case, our supreme court has repeatedly emphasized a defendant‟s right to be
brought to trial under the ninety-day speedy trial rule. See, e.g., State v. Miller,
637 N.W.2d 201, 204 (Iowa 2001) (stating that a defendant must be brought to
trial within ninety days after indictment is found, and unless good cause is shown,
the indictment must be dismissed).
Any delay causing a violation of a
defendant‟s right to speedy trial cannot be excused even in light of busy court
dockets. State v. Bond, 340 N.W.2d 276, 279 (Iowa 1983) (noting the distinction
between “chronic court congestion and specific circumstances arising out of
unique, non-recurring events which create a particular scheduling problem,” that
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may support the State‟s burden to show good cause for the delay not attributable
to the defendant).
Muller timely filed the motion to suppress, yet the motion was not ruled on
for another forty days, therefore the delay was not attributable to Muller. The
State did not carry its burden to prove good cause for the delay. Campbell, 714
N.W.2d at 628 (“The decisive inquiry in these matters should be whether events
that impeded the progress of the case and were attributable to the defendant or
to some other good cause for delay served as a matter of practical necessity to
move the trial date beyond the initial ninety-day period required by the rule.”).
Therefore, the district court abused its narrow discretion in overruling Muller‟s
motion to dismiss. See Winters, 690 N.W.2d at 907-09.
We reverse the judgment entered upon Muller‟s conviction and remand to
the district court for dismissal of the trial information.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
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