STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER, Plaintiff, vs. IOWA DISTRICT COURT FOR WOODBURY COUNTY, Defendant.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 9-264 / 08-0358
Filed May 29, 2009
STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER,
Plaintiff,
vs.
IOWA DISTRICT COURT FOR
WOODBURY COUNTY,
Defendant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Woodbury County, Mary Jane
Sokolovske, Judge.
The State Public Defender filed this petition for certiorari, contending that
the district court acted illegally in ordering it to pay fees to an attorney incurred in
assisting a victim in preparing a victim impact statement. WRIT SUSTAINED.
Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Julie Miller, Assistant State
Public Defender, for appellant.
Maxine Buckmeier, Sioux City, for appellee, Iowa District Court for
Woodbury County.
Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Potterfield and Doyle, JJ.
2
VAITHESWARAN, P.J.
Attorney Maxine Buckmeier was appointed to represent an indigent
mother in a child-in-need-of-assistance action. The action was based on the
children‟s exposure to the father‟s domestic abuse of their mother. The father
ultimately pled guilty to assaulting the mother. At the request of the district court,
Buckmeier assisted the mother in preparing a victim impact statement1 for
consideration at the father‟s criminal sentencing hearing.
Buckmeier submitted a bill to the State Public Defender, who is charged
with administering the indigent defense fund. See State Pub. Defender v. Iowa
Dist. Ct. for Linn County, 728 N.W.2d 817, 819 (Iowa 2007). The defender paid
her for her representation in juvenile court but declined to pay her for 6.7 hours
spent on the criminal matter.
Buckmeier sought district court review. See id. (describing procedures for
consideration and review of attorney fee claims). The court recapped the facts
leading to Buckmeier‟s involvement in the criminal proceeding as follows:
After Ms. Buckmeier was notified [of the need to assist the
mother in the preparation of the victim impact statement], it became
apparent that the matter of submitting a victim impact statement . . .
was directly linked to the ultimate outcome of the child in need of
assistance case. In order to effectively represent her client‟s
interest in juvenile court, it was necessary that Ms. Buckmeier act in
her capacity as [the mother‟s] juvenile court attorney in resolving
the issue of the victim impact statement.
...
[T]he legal work done for [the mother] regarding the
preparation of the victim impact statement by Ms. Buckmeier was
integral to the juvenile court action . . . . Ms. Buckmeier was
1
“Victim impact statement” is defined as “a written or oral presentation to the court by
the victim or the victim‟s representative that indicates the physical, emotional, financial,
or other effects of the offense upon the victim.” Iowa Code § 915.10(4) (2007).
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endeavoring to protect her client‟s interest in reunifying her with her
children.
The court ordered the State Public Defender to reimburse Buckmeier for the time
she spent on the criminal matter.
The State Public Defender filed a petition for writ of certiorari, contending
Buckmeier‟s fees for assisting the mother in the criminal matter were not
authorized by statute. Our review is for correction of errors at law. State Pub.
Defender v. Iowa Dist. Ct. for Plymouth County, 747 N.W.2d 218, 220 (Iowa
2008). We may only examine the jurisdiction of the district court and the legality
of its actions. Christensen v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 578 N.W.2d 675, 678 (Iowa 1998).
The statutory provision authorizing the creation of a fund for the payment
of indigent attorney fees states in pertinent part:
Costs incurred under . . . section 232.141, subsection 3, paragraph
“d” . . . on behalf of an indigent shall be paid from moneys
appropriated by the general assembly to the office of the state
public defender in the department of inspections and appeals and
deposited in an account to be known as the indigent defense fund
. . . . However, costs incurred in any administrative proceeding or
in any other proceeding under chapter . . . 915 or other provisions
of the Code of administrative rules are not payable from the fund.
Iowa Code § 815.11 (2007). By its terms, that provision precludes the payment
of legal representation costs incurred under Iowa Code chapter 915, the chapter
governing “victim rights” and “victim impact statements.”
Id.; see also id.
§ 915.21 (addressing victim impact statements). Therefore, the district court did
not have authority to require the payment of Buckmeier‟s fees generated in her
preparation of the victim impact statement.
See State Pub. Defender, 728
N.W.2d at 821 (“If the representation does not fall into one of these enumerated
sections or chapters, the „costs incurred . . . are not payable‟ from the fund.”).
4
We reach this conclusion notwithstanding the district court‟s undisputed
fact-finding that Buckmeier‟s assistance in the criminal matter was simply an
attempt to protect her client‟s interests in the juvenile matter. It is true that Iowa
Code section 815.11 authorizes the payment of attorney fees from the indigent
defense fund in juvenile matters. See Iowa Code § 815.11 (referring to section
232.141(3)(d), which states costs incurred by attorney appointed to represent
party in juvenile court “shall be paid by the state from the appropriations to the
indigent defense fund”).
However, payment is limited to “[r]easonable
compensation for an attorney appointed by the court to serve as counsel to any
party . . . in juvenile court.” Id. § 232.141(2)(b) (emphasis added). As noted, the
victim impact statement was not prepared in or for the juvenile court. Indeed, the
district court found that the mother was reluctant to provide such a statement
because she believed it would jeopardize her reunification efforts in juvenile
court. Moreover, there is nothing in this record indicating that the Department of
Human Services, the agency charged with facilitating the mother‟s reunification
with her children, expected the mother to provide a victim impact statement in the
father‟s criminal proceeding as a precursor to reunification.
See State Pub.
Defender v. Iowa Dist. Ct. for Polk County, 620 N.W.2d 268, 270–71 (Iowa 2000)
(upholding a district court order requiring the State Public Defender to pay
appointed attorney‟s juvenile court fees for helping a client obtain housing where
department documents showed that the mother “faced the real possibility that the
State would move to terminate her parental rights if suitable housing could not be
secured”).
For these reasons, we are not persuaded that Buckmeier‟s
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representation of the mother in the criminal matter was a necessary part of her
representation of the mother in juvenile court.
We recognize the result is harsh; Buckmeier was not paid for legal work
that she was told to perform.
Nonetheless, we are convinced that the
unambiguous language of Iowa Code section 815.11 mandates this result. For
this reason, we sustain the writ of certiorari.
WRIT SUSTAINED.
Doyle, J. concurs specially. Potterfield, J. dissents.
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DOYLE, J. (concurring specially)
I reluctantly concur. But for the last sentence of Iowa Code section 815.11
that specifically states proceedings under chapter 915 (Victim Rights) are not
payable from the fund, I would annul the writ. As the dissent aptly points out, the
legal work performed by attorney Buckmeier on the victim impact statement was
“integral to the juvenile court action” for work she was appointed and “directly
linked to the ultimate outcome of the child in need of assistance case.” There
was no evidence to the contrary.
Additionally, the judge presiding over the
criminal case contacted Buckmeier and required her to assist her client in the
preparation of a victim impact statement. As a practical matter, Buckmeier was
not in a position to refuse the judge‟s request. It seems patently unfair that
Buckmeier is now refused payment for the legal services she provided at court
request. I agree with the majority opinion that the result is harsh, but that the
unambiguous language of section 815.11 mandates the result.
7
POTTERFIELD, J. (dissenting)
I respectfully dissent. The majority finds nothing in the record “indicating
that the Department of Human Services . . . expected the mother to provide a
victim impact statement in the father‟s criminal proceeding as a precursor to
reunification.” Yet, the district court ordered attorney Buckmeier, in her capacity
as court-appointed counsel in juvenile court, to assist her client in preparation of
the victim impact statement. After an evidentiary hearing, another district court
judge specifically ruled that the legal work performed by Buckmeier on the victim
impact statement was “integral to the juvenile court action” for which she was
appointed and “directly linked to the ultimate outcome of the child in need of
assistance case.” The public defender tendered no evidence to the contrary.
Representation of an indigent parent in juvenile court is a challenging,
multifaceted undertaking, which requires counsel to assist the parent in making
life-changing decisions for the benefit of the children. See State Pub. Defender
v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 620 N.W.2d 268, 271 (Iowa 2000). I cannot say that the district
court erred, as a matter of law, when it found that the attorney‟s work was
compensable by the State Public Defender as part of her representation of her
client in the juvenile court matter. I would annul the writ.
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