IN THE MATTER OF THE JOHN F. MCKERNAN, JR. TRUST JUDITH ANN MCKERNAN and BRIAN MCKERNAN, Trustees-Appellees/Cross-Appellants, vs. MONTGOMERY G. MCKERNAN, Beneficiary-Appellant/Cross-Appellee.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 9-263 / 07-2122
Filed July 2, 2009
IN THE MATTER OF THE JOHN F.
MCKERNAN, JR. TRUST
JUDITH ANN MCKERNAN and
BRIAN MCKERNAN,
Trustees-Appellees/Cross-Appellants,
vs.
MONTGOMERY G. MCKERNAN,
Beneficiary-Appellant/Cross-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Story County, Dale E. Ruigh,
Judge.
Montgomery McKernan appeals from the district court ruling denying his
petition to remove the trustees of the John F. McKernan, Jr. Trust. AFFIRMED.
Montgomery McKernan, Ames, appellant pro se.
Theodore F. Sporer and Meghan S. Hanson of Sporer & Flanagan, P.C.,
Des Moines for appellant/cross-appellee.
James L. Spellman of Law Offices of James Spellman, Des Moines, for
appellees/cross-appellants.
Heard
by
Vaitheswaran,
P.J.,
and
Potterfield
and
Doyle,
JJ.
2
VAITHESWARAN, P.J.
We must decide (1) whether the district court acted equitably in declaring
all, rather than some, of John F. McKernan Jr.’s children the beneficiaries of a
trust created by him, (2) whether the trustees should have been removed, and (3)
whether the district court appropriately denied the trustees’ claim for
compensation.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
McKernan, the father of seventeen children, executed a trust agreement
the day before he died. The agreement named his wife, Judith McKernan, and
son, Gregory McKernan, the trustees. Another son, Brian McKernan, was written
in as “Manager Trustee.”
Article I of the trust agreement states in pertinent part:
The trustor’s minor children now living with him and his wife are
Devon C. McKernan, Montgomery G. McKernan, Jennifer K.
McKernan and Katrina VanKleeck McKernan. All references hereto
to the trustor’s child or children shall refer only to the above-named
children.
Notwithstanding this seemingly clear instruction, another portion of the trust
agreement referred to “the children named in Article III.” That article listed only
Gregory and Brian. A third article of the agreement provided for distribution of
the residuary trust to “each then living child of the trustor,” as follows:
At the death of the trustor’s wife, the trustees shall divide the
RESIDUARY TRUST, together with property from any other source,
into equal shares so as to provide one share for each then living
child of the trustor and one share for the then living descendents
collectively of each deceased child of the trustor.
3
An attachment to the trust document titled “Schedule B – Beneficiaries and
Children” listed all seventeen children of the trustor.
The four children named in Article I of the trust agreement petitioned for
removal of the trustees and the naming of a replacement trustee. They alleged
that the trustees had not made distributions. They sought a complete accounting
of all trust assets and expenses, removal of Judith and Brian as trustees 1 for
“multiple, serious and ongoing breaches of their fiduciary duties,” the
appointment of Montgomery as the successor trustee, and an award of costs and
attorney fees against Judith and Brian.
Judith and Brian filed an answer
admitting that no distributions were made, but stating the children’s financial
needs were met and all the children were currently self-supporting.
They
counterclaimed for a determination of fees and compensation “for [Brian’s]
personal improvements to the Trust properties and for his capital contributions to
the Trust.” Finally, the defendants asked the court to declare all seventeen of
John’s children beneficiaries of the trust.
At trial, the district court was informed that two of the petitioners, Jennifer
and Katrina, did not wish to remain petitioners. Accordingly, trial proceeded with
only Devon and Montgomery as petitioners.
Following trial, the district court concluded that John intended his entire
family to benefit from the trust. The court declined to remove Brian and Judith as
trustees and declined to compensate Brian as he requested.
1
Gregory resigned before this litigation.
4
Montgomery filed a notice of appeal.2 The parties state that our review is
de novo, as all aspects of the case were tried in equity. Garland v. Brandstad,
648 N.W.2d 65, 69 (Iowa 2002).
II. Beneficiaries of Trust
As noted, the district court concluded that all seventeen children of John
were residual beneficiaries of the trust.
Montgomery argues that the court’s
conclusion is contrary to the plain language of the trust agreement. He asserts
that the court erroneously relied on the list of seventeen children marked as
Schedule B, even though that list was not expressly incorporated into the trust
agreement as required by “the doctrine of incorporation.”
See Longfellow v.
Saylor, 737 N.W.2d 148, 154 (2007) (“The doctrine of incorporation requires the
contract to make a clear and specific reference to an extrinsic document to
incorporate the document into the contract.”). We are not persuaded by this
argument.
It is well established that courts may look beyond the words used in the
trust agreement to ascertain a trustor’s intent:
The polestar of our analysis is the rule that the testator’s (or, in this
case, the settlor’s) intent must prevail. That intent is to be
determined from the language of the instrument, the scheme of
distribution, and the facts and circumstances surrounding the
document’s execution.
In re Trust of Killian, 459 N.W.2d 497, 499 (Iowa 1990). It is also clear that
“[t]echnical rules of construction are resorted to only if the settlor’s intent remains
uncertain after that inquiry.” First Nat’l Bank of Dubuque v. Mackey, 338 N.W.2d
361, 363 (Iowa 1983).
2
Based on this precedent, the district court was fully
It appears that Devon is not a party to the appeal.
5
empowered to consider Schedule B and accompanying evidence of the trustor’s
intent, whether or not it was expressly incorporated by reference into the trust
agreement.
That schedule, together with the testimony of key witnesses, clarifies that
the trustor intended to benefit all his children, not just the four children listed in
Article I. Brian testified that his father “wanted to make sure that he treated each
one of his kids fairly.” He said Schedule B was attached to the trust agreement
because his father indicated he wanted all seventeen of the children to share in
the distribution of the trust.
Judith similarly testified that Schedule B was
prepared because John “wanted to make sure that . . . all of his children were
part of the trust.”
Some of John’s other children made similar statements. Gregory testified
that he understood his father’s intent was a distribution that was “[e]qual to all of
his surviving children.” He testified that a limited distribution to the four children
listed in Article I would have been “wholly unlike anything my dad ever did in his
life.” Pamela testified that her father wanted his assets to be distributed among
the seventeen beneficiaries. Cynthia testified that John wanted all the children to
be a part of the “McKernan heritage.” She believed all seventeen children were
to benefit from the trust. Kimberly testified that her father wished to have all
seventeen children benefit from the trust.
Based on this record, we concur with the district court’s declaration of all
seventeen children as beneficiaries of the trust.
6
III. Removal of Trustees.
Montgomery contends Brian and Judith should have been removed as
trustees because they (1) failed to disburse funds, (2) commingled their assets
with trust assets, and (3) refused to provide the beneficiaries with accurate
accountings. The standard for removal of trustees is the best interests of the
operation of the trust. Schildberg v. Schildberg, 461 N.W.2d 186, 191 (Iowa
1990).
On the first point, the trust agreement vested the trustees with discretion
to disburse funds for the minor children’s maintenance, and Brian testified the
trust initially lacked assets to make disbursements. Despite the absence of trust
funds, family members, including Brian and Judith, cared for the minor children
and provided for their needs when necessary.
Turning to Brian’s conceded commingling of trust assets with personal
funds, we conclude this practice was a recipe for fraud. However, we agree with
the district court that there was no showing Brian and Judith “benefited
improperly from those operations.” See id. (“There is no evidence to indicate that
the omission to report resulted from a motive on the part of Dennis to take
advantage of the beneficiaries.”). The trust increased in value with Brian and
Judith at the helm, rising from bankruptcy to a positive net worth of $329,000.
As for Brian’s failure to provide an accounting, there is no question this
was a breach of the trust agreement.
However, the breach was somewhat
mitigated by Brian’s willingness to allow his siblings access to the books and
records of the trust. See id. (finding no evidence that the effectiveness of the
trust was impaired by the technical violation of the reporting requirement).
7
For these reasons, we affirm the district court’s refusal to remove the
trustees.
IV.
Trustee Compensation.
Brian sought compensation for his services as trustee. The district court
stated it “ha[d] no competent factual basis upon which to base a determination of
reasonable compensation” and said, “In any event, Brian testified that, if he was
allowed to continue living on the farm, he would not pursue his request for
compensation.” Brian cross-appealed from this ruling.
On our de novo review, we find support for the district court’s findings and
we concur with the court’s decision to deny Brian compensation.
AFFIRMED.
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