IN THE INTEREST OF J.J., A.J., and C.D., Minor Children, L.M.J., Mother, Appellant.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 9-249 / 09-0284
Filed May 6, 2009
IN THE INTEREST OF J.J., A.J., and C.D.,
Minor Children,
L.M.J., Mother,
Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Karla J. Fultz,
Associate Juvenile Judge.
A mother appeals from the district court’s order terminating her parental
rights to her three children. AFFIRMED.
Jennifer L. Oetker of Parrish, Kruidenier, Dunn, Boles, Gribble, Parrish,
Gentry & Fisher, L.L.P., Des Moines, for appellant mother.
Stephie Tran, Des Moines, for father of J.J.
Jane Orlanes, Des Moines, for father of A.J.
Christine Bisignano, West Des Moines, for father of C.D.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kathrine Miller-Todd, Assistant
Attorney General, John P. Sarcone, County Attorney, and Annette Taylor,
Assistant County Attorney, for appellee State.
Jessica Miskimins and Nicole Garbis Nolan of the Youth Law Center, for
minor children.
Considered by Sackett, C.J., and Potterfield and Mansfield, JJ.
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MANSFIELD, J.
Lacy appeals from the juvenile court’s order terminating her parental rights
to A.J. (born January 2002), J.J. (born October 2004), and C.D. (born March
2008) pursuant to Iowa Code sections 232.116(1)(d), (i), and (l) (2007).1 She
challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and asserts that termination is not in
the children’s best interests. We affirm.
We review termination of parental rights cases de novo. In re J.E., 723
N.W.2d 793, 798 (Iowa 2006).
“When the juvenile court terminates parental
rights on more than one statutory ground, we need only find grounds to terminate
under one of the sections cited by the juvenile court to affirm.” In re S.R., 600
N.W.2d 63, 64 (Iowa Ct. App. 1999). Among other sections, Lacy’s parental
rights to A.J., J.J., and C.D. were terminated pursuant to section 232.116(1)(i).
Termination pursuant to this section requires that the children meet the definition
of a child in need of assistance based upon a finding of abuse or neglect; the
abuse or neglect constituted imminent danger to the children; and services would
not correct the conditions that led to the abuse or neglect within a reasonable
amount of time. Lacy’s challenge to termination under this subsection is limited
to the third element—whether there is clear and convincing evidence that
services would not correct the conditions which led to the neglect within a
reasonable amount of time.
In November 2006, The Iowa Department of Human Services (DHS)
became involved with the family following a domestic violence incident, which led
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The district court also terminated the parental rights of A.J.’s father and J.J.’s father,
which are not at issue in this appeal.
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to a founded report of denial of critical care and failure to provide proper
supervision. Although Lacy agreed to participate in services, she failed to do so
and remained unemployed and homeless.
Lacy had mental health and
substance abuse issues, and had struggled with substance abuse since she was
a teenager. Additionally, she mainly allowed for family members and friends to
care for A.J. and J.J. As a result, in February 2007, A.J. and J.J. were removed
from Lacy’s care and placed with A.J.’s paternal grandparents. Subsequently,
they were adjudicated in need of assistance pursuant to Iowa Code sections
232.2(6)(c)(2) and (n).
DHS continued to offer Lacy services, but her participation was sporadic.
In July 2007, while in drug court, Lacy reported that she was pregnant with C.D.
In September 2007, Lacy entered an inpatient treatment center, the House of
Mercy.
In March 2008, Lacy gave birth to C.D., who was subsequently
adjudicated a child in need of assistance, but remained in Lacy’s care so long as
she resided at the House of Mercy. Although workers remained concerned about
Lacy’s parenting skills, they felt the House of Mercy was a safe environment that
would provide structure and supervision to allow the children to be returned to
Lacy’s care. Thus, on May 14, 2008, A.J. and J.J. were also returned to Lacy’s
care so long as she resided at the House of Mercy.
Although Lacy was in a structured environment, she continued to have
substance abuse issues and failed to progress so that she could safely parent
the children. She allowed the children to have contact with an individual whom
the children’s therapist suspected had sexually abused A.J. When given her first
weekend pass in June 2008, she relapsed on alcohol. Lacy also failed to feed
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C.D. on several occasions. In a July 2008 report, the children’s therapist stated
that “Lacy is still struggling to meet her children’s needs in a highly structured
setting.” On October 8, 2008, A.J. and J.J. were returned to the care of A.J.’s
paternal grandparents and C.J. was placed with his father.
In November 2008, Lacy continued to struggle and not participate in
services. After she was granted a weekend pass, Lacy submitted to a drug test,
which was extremely diluted and caused concerns that she had been drinking
alcohol or using drugs.
A report stated that Lacy had not attended her
counseling sessions for the past three weeks, stopped taking her mental health
medication, missed parenting sessions, and stopped participating in selfsufficiency assistance, such as budgeting and employment assistance.
In
December 2008, Lacy had received maximum benefits and was discharged from
the House of Mercy.
On January 15, 2009, the termination hearing was held. The evidence
indicated that since leaving the House of Mercy, Lacy has not been properly
attending to either her mental health or substance abuse issues.
She had
supervised visitation with the children once a week for two hours. When asked if
she could take the children home with her today, Lacy answered no and stated
she could not take care of all three children. However, her plan was to get one
child back and have “joint custody” of the other two.
Indeed, Lacy’s testimony was revealing. On friendly, direct examination
from her attorney, Lacy initially gave the “right” answers. However, when it came
to the concluding questions about her children, Lacy appeared to surprise her
own attorney with her responses:
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Q. Do you believe that all three children could be returned to
you today? A. No, they probably wouldn’t.
Q. And why don’t you think that that would be an option for
you? A. Because it’s the State versus me, which they always win.
Q. But do you think that you could take all three children
home with you today and be able to get them to day care, get them
to school, get them to doctor’s appointments? That’s the question
I’m asking you. A. No. That’s why I would ask for one child and
joint custody of the other two.
Q. And what plan is that? I mean, you must have thought
that through a little bit. What specifically are you thinking about?
A. What do you mean?
Q. Well, I mean, you’re picking a child over the other kids. I
mean who— A. I wouldn’t know who to pick. You know, I love my
kids very much, and, yeah, it does get nerve-racking with three
children, but, you know, I shouldn’t have to sign my rights over. It
ain’t like I was starving my kids for days.
The denouement continued when Lacy was cross-examined. It then became
clear that Lacy’s direct testimony had exaggerated her work hours, her UA
compliance, and her record of taking prescribed medications.
In addition to contesting the finding that services would not correct the
conditions that led to the neglect, Lacy also asserts that the district court should
have entered a permanency order finding that the children could be returned to
Lacy within six months.
However, Lacy had been offered services from
November 2006 to January 2009, but she simply did not progress such that she
could safely parent A.J., J.J., and C.D. The evidence clearly supports the district
court’s finding that “[Lacy] was unable to adequately care for the children even in
the structured and supportive atmosphere of the House of Mercy.” We agree
with the district court that Lacy has “had every opportunity to regain custody of
[her] children, and [she] is simply unable to place the children’s needs above
[her] own to ensure a safe and stable environment.” We conclude that neither
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additional time nor additional services will result in the return of the children to
Lacy’s care.
Furthermore, we find termination is in the children’s best interests. The
children are in need of a safe and permanent home. See J.E., 723 N.W.2d at
801 (Cady, J., concurring specially) (stating a child’s safety and need for a
permanent home are the defining elements in determining a child’s best
interests). A.J. and J.J. have found that home with A.J.’s paternal grandparents,
who are willing to adopt them and have attended to their needs. Both A.J. and
J.J. have needed therapy and their therapist reported that “[A.J. and J.J.’s]
mental health continues to stabilize in the care of their grandparents . . . . [A.J.
and J.J.] feel safe and protected in their current environment and trust that their
grandparents are there for them.” C.D. has been in his father’s custody since
October 2008, who has demonstrated his ability to provide for C.D so far.
Thus, we conclude that the grounds for termination pursuant to Iowa Code
section 232.116(1)(i) were proved by clear and convincing evidence and
termination is in A.J., J.J., and C.D.’s best interests. We affirm the juvenile court.
AFFIRMED.
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