MARTIN L. WATERS and LESLIE WATERS, Plaintiffs-Appellees, vs. DONALD DEEDS, LANCE E. MADSEN, Defendants, and STATE OF IOWA, Defendant-Appellant.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 9-233 / 08-1258
Filed May 6, 2009
MARTIN L. WATERS and
LESLIE WATERS,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
vs.
DONALD DEEDS, LANCE E. MADSEN,
Defendants, and
STATE OF IOWA,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Madison County, Martha L. Mertz,
Judge.
On interlocutory appeal, the State of Iowa appeals the district court’s ruling
affirming its prior summary judgment ruling and setting a date for trial.
AFFIRMED.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Richard E. Mull and Robin G.
Formaker, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellant.
Dean T. Jennings of Jennings Law Firm, Council Bluffs, and Jerry W.
Katskee of Katskee, Henatsch & Suing, Omaha, Nebraska, for appellee.
Considered by Mahan, P.J., and Miller and Doyle, JJ.
2
DOYLE, J.
The issue presented to us on interlocutory appeal is very narrow: Can the
State be ordered to trial in view of the district court’s resolution of the State’s
motion for summary judgment? The State argues there is no issue left to be
submitted to the jury regarding the State’s liability in the aftermath of Judge
Mertz’s summary judgment ruling. Upon our review for the correction of errors at
law, Iowa R. App. P. 6.4, we affirm the district court.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
The record on summary judgment, when viewed in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party, see Crippen v. City of Cedar Rapids, 618
N.W.2d 562, 565 (Iowa 2000), reveals the following:
During the night of
February 8, 2004, portions of Interstate 80 in Madison County became 100%
snow and ice covered due to severe winter weather conditions. In the early
morning hours of February 9, Donald Deeds was driving on I-80 when his Jeep
Liberty spun out of control and landed on its side in the median. 1 He was not
injured and had a ride take him from the scene. He left his Jeep in the interstate
median, and no warning devices indicated the Jeep’s location.
Sometime between 3:00 a.m. and 4:00 a.m., Iowa Highway Patrol Trooper
Jody Elliott came upon the abandoned Jeep. He found the Jeep completely
within the median and not on any part of the roadway. He determined the Jeep
was not a hazard to other traffic, and he left the scene to resume his patrol. At
the time, the blowing snow was so bad that authorities banned towing operators
1
Deeds testified the Jeep came to rest in the median five feet beyond the edge of the
shoulder. Waters asserts Deeds’s vehicle was not completely off the highway.
3
from this segment of the interstate. At about 5:15 a.m., Martin Waters was riding
as a passenger in a Ford Expedition driven by Lance Madsen on I-80. As they
neared the location of Deeds’s incident, Madsen lost control of the Expedition
and struck Deeds’s Jeep.
On January 24, 2006, Martin and his wife, Leslie Waters, filed a lawsuit
against Deeds, Madsen, and the State seeking recovery of personal injury and
loss of consortium damages.2 Martin alleged the State was negligent in the
following particulars: (a) failing to timely remove the obstruction to highway travel
caused by Deeds’s vehicle, (b) failing to timely remove accumulated snow and
ice from the traveled portion of the roadway, (c) failing to guard the area of the
highway obstruction, (d) failing to warn of the obstruction, (e) failing to warn of
the slippery condition of the highway surface, (f) failing to follow its own policies
pertaining to removal of snow and ice and obstructions.
On May 10, 2007, the State filed a motion for summary judgment or
dismissal, asserting seven grounds for judgment or dismissal in its favor. At
issue here are three of the seven grounds. The first ground addressed Martin’s
claim against the Iowa Department of Public Safety, asserting the claim failed
because there was no special relationship between the department and Martin,
2
In the original petition, Leslie asserted a claim for loss of consortium damages against
defendants Deeds and Madsen only. Later, the Waters filed an amended and
substituted petition adding a loss of consortium claim against the State; however, this
claim was dismissed by the district court for failure to properly amend the petition as
required by Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.402(4). The Waters later settled their claims
against Deeds and Madsen, and those defendants were dismissed from the suit.
Additionally, the Iowa Departments of Transportation and Public Safety, named as
defendants in the original petition, were dropped from the suit after the State filed a
motion to dismiss the departments. This left Martin as the sole plaintiff and the State as
the sole defendant in the litigation.
4
and thus the State had no legal duty to protect him from colliding with the Jeep.3
As its relief pertaining to this ground, the State requested summary judgment “be
granted in favor of the [State] upon the claims made by [Martin] regarding the
Department of Public Safety.”
The second ground asserted the State was
immunized by the discretionary function immunity afforded in Iowa Code section
669.14(1) (2003), and requested judgment be entered in favor of the State on all
claims made by Martin.
The fourth ground raised by the State alternatively
alleged that the State did not have a reasonable opportunity to remove Deeds’s
vehicle prior to the subject accident. Martin resisted the State’s motion, and a
hearing was subsequently held.
On January 15, 2008, the district court entered its ruling on the State’s
motion for summary judgment.4 In its ruling, the district court discussed each of
the grounds the State asserted on appeal.
In addressing the State’s first
asserted ground, the court found that Iowa Code section 321.356 (2003), which
authorizes peace officers to remove vehicles from the highway, was not
mandatory and did not place Martin in a special class of people to whom the
State owed such a duty. The court then concluded: “In the absence of any facts
establishing a special relationship between [Martin] and the State, the court
3
The State is not liable for a breach of a duty owed to the public at large unless a
plaintiff can establish, based on the unique or particular facts of their case, a special
relationship existed between the State and the plaintiff. Kolbe v. State, 625 N.W.2d 721,
725 (Iowa 2001). When the parties are not privy to a special relationship, but rather of
the same status as a member of the general public, then there is no duty imposed.
Morris v. Leaf, 534 N.W.2d 388, 390 (Iowa 1995).
4
The district court also ruled upon Deeds’s motion for summary judgment and the
State’s motion to dismiss Martin’s wife’s loss of consortium claim. Those rulings are not
at issue in this interlocutory appeal.
5
concludes the public duty doctrine insulates the State from liability on this issue.”
(Emphasis added).
The court next addressed the State’s assertion of discretionary function
immunity as it applied to Martin’s claims that the State was negligent in its
decision not to tow Deeds’s vehicle from the scene, the decision to keep I-80
open, and the State’s road maintenance activities in clearing snow and ice. The
court concluded that “the undisputed facts support a conclusion that discretionary
function immunity applies to each of these decisions and the activities, or lack
thereof, associated with them.”
Regarding the decision not to tow Deeds’s
vehicle, the court specifically concluded “the trooper’s decision and the reasons
for it support a finding of immunity.”
The court therefore granted summary
judgment “on these issues.”
The court went on to address the State’s fourth alternative ground for
summary judgment, alleging the State did not have a reasonable opportunity to
remove Deeds’s vehicle prior to the subject accident.
The court noted that
generally what is reasonable under any given set of circumstances presents a
fact question, precluding summary judgment. The court concluded that because
what is a reasonable length of time to remedy the condition depends on facts and
circumstances of each case presents a jury question, it was “unwilling to
determine as a matter of law that the State lacked a reasonable opportunity to
remove the vehicle.” The court then denied the State’s motion for summary
judgment on this issue. In its order, the court denied the State’s motion for
summary judgment “with regard to reasonable opportunity to remove [Deeds’s]
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vehicle,” and granted summary judgment in favor of the State in all other
respects.
Thereafter, the Waters settled their claims with defendants Deeds and
Madsen. On July 17, 2008, Martin filed a motion for clarification, noting that the
court had denied one ground asserted in the State’s motion for summary
judgment; that no dismissal had been filed; and that the State had taken the
position that all issues had been resolved and therefore refused to participate in
mediation or trial of the matter.
The State resisted, claiming the motion for
summary judgment had been granted in its favor in all respects and a
subsequent dismissal order was unnecessary. By calendar entry the court ruled:
“Court does not change its ruling. Counsel shall obtain a new trial date, present
a new order for trial on or before 2:00 p.m. on [August 18, 2008]. The scheduling
conference is continued to that date.” The State appealed from this order and
was granted permission by the supreme court to take the appeal in advance of
final judgment.
II. Discussion.
On interlocutory appeal, the question before us is whether the State can
be ordered to trial in view of the district court’s summary judgment ruling. The
State argues the district court’s ruling disposed of all claims against the State.
Martin argues the district court left one issue on the table to be adjudicated:
whether the State had a reasonable opportunity to remove Deeds’s Jeep
following Trooper Elliott’s departure from the scene.
The State’s motion for summary judgment asserted that Martin’s claim of
failure to remove the vehicle was barred by public duty doctrine and requested
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summary judgment be granted in its favor upon the claims made by Martin
regarding the Department of Public Safety. The court agreed, concluding the
public duty doctrine “insulate[d] the State from liability on this issue,” and granted
the relief requested by the State. The court’s ruling is silent as to whether the
public duty doctrine extended to any duty the State may have had to remove the
vehicle after the trooper left the scene, as that issue was not raised by the State
in its motion.
The State’s motion also asserted it was immunized from Martin’s claim of
failure to remove the vehicle by the discretionary function immunity. Although the
State sought summary judgment in its favor as to all of Martin’s claims, in ruling
upon Martin’s failure to remove the vehicle claim, the court apparently only ruled
upon the discretionary function immunity as it applied to the trooper’s actions. It
concluded the “trooper’s decision [not to have Deeds’s vehicle towed] and the
reasons for it support a finding of immunity.” The court’s ruling is silent as to
whether the discretionary function immunity extended to any duty the State may
have had to remove the vehicle after the trooper left the scene.
As to the State’s alternative ground for summary judgment, that it did not
have a reasonable opportunity to remove Deeds’s vehicle prior to the incident
involving Martin, the court clearly denied summary judgment on the issue,
concluding it was “unwilling to determine as a matter of law that the State lacked
a reasonable opportunity to remove the vehicle.” In addressing this issue, the
district court cited to Koehler v. State, 263 N.W.2d 760, 765 (Iowa 1978).
Koehler points out that the State had a statutory duty to maintain its highways
and a specific statutory duty to remove all obstructions in highways, citing Iowa
8
Code sections 313.36 and 319.1 (1973).5
Id.
The source of the State’s
obligation to remove obstructions from the highway are separate and distinct
from a peace officer’s section 321.356 authority to remove a vehicle the officer
finds standing upon the highway. Therefore, the district court’s discussion and
rulings concerning the immunities applicable to Trooper Elliott’s decision not to
remove Deeds’s Jeep are not necessarily, or automatically, applicable to Martin’s
claim the State was negligent in failing to timely remove the vehicle after the
trooper left the scene.
On appeal, the State suggests:
[Martin’s argument] is, in essence, a claim the district court’s ruling
preserved for the jury the issue of whether or not the State of Iowa
was negligent in failing to remove Deeds’s vehicle “following the
officer’s departure.” Under this tortured reasoning, the State of
Iowa is immune from liability “up to and including the officer’s arrival
at [Deeds’s] vehicle.” However, this immunity magically evaporates
. . . the minute the officer departs the scene since the State was on
notice once the trooper observed the disabled vehicle.
We do not read the court’s decision that way. A careful reading of the decision
leads us to conclude the court addressed only application of the public duty and
discretionary function defenses to the actions of the trooper. The decision is
silent as to application of these defenses to the State’s conduct after the trooper
left the scene.6 Thus, Martin’s claim for failure to timely remove the vehicle was
left viable for litigation.7 To find otherwise ignores the plain language of the
5
Iowa Code sections 313.36 and 319.1 (1973) had not been substantively changed in
the 2003 Iowa Code, the Code in effect at the time the petition was filed. Chapter 319
was repealed by the legislature in 2006 and was replaced with the provisions that
currently appear in chapter 318 of the 2009 Code.
6
On remand, the State will no doubt ask the district court to revisit this issue.
7
Due to the posture of this appeal, it is not necessary for us to comment or decide the
merits of this or any other substantive or procedural issues raised by the parties in their
pleadings or pretrial motions.
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court’s ruling. This conclusion is further bolstered by the court’s subsequent
calendar entry ordering the parties to obtain a new trial date. It is elementary that
a trial would not be necessary if there were nothing to litigate. Accordingly, we
affirm the district court’s July 28, 2008 calendar entry order requiring the parties
to obtain a new trial date.
III. Conclusion.
Because we conclude the district court only addressed the application of
the public duty and discretionary function defenses to the actions of the trooper,
leaving Martin’s claim for failure to timely remove the vehicle viable for litigation,
we affirm the district court’s July 28, 2008 calendar entry order requiring the
parties to obtain a new trial date.
AFFIRMED.
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