STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. STEPHEN CRAIG LEONARD, Defendant-Appellant.
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 9-225 / 08-0867
Filed June 17, 2009
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
STEPHEN CRAIG LEONARD,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Cherokee County, Nancy L.
Whittenburg, Judge.
Stephen Leonard appeals from the district court’s denial of his application
for the return of seized property. REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Jack Bjornstad, Spirit Lake, for appellant.
Stephen Leonard, Anamosa, pro se.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Richard Bennett, Assistant Attorney
General, Ryan Kolpin, County Attorney, and Douglas S. Phillips, Special
Prosecutor, for appellee.
Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Vaitheswaran and Eisenhauer, JJ.
2
VAITHESWARAN, J.
In 1995, the Cherokee Iowa Police Department obtained and executed
two search warrants on Stephen Leonard’s home. Within a month, Leonard
applied for the return of property seized under the first search warrant. Thirteen
years later, Leonard filed an application for the return of property seized under
the second search warrant. He alleged that he did not learn about the execution
of the second search warrant until August 2007.
Leonard sought a hearing on his second application. The State filed a
resistance, stating the property had been returned to a “fiduciary” of Leonard at
his request and there was no need for a hearing. Leonard responded that the
State’s resistance raised facts pertaining to the first search warrant, not the
second.
The district court did not schedule a hearing on Leonard’s second
application for the return of seized property. The court denied the application,
stating “[t]here is no credible evidence that the defendant was not informed in
1995 of the property seized at that time.” The court also noted that, according to
the State’s resistance, the property was returned.
On appeal, Leonard contends he was entitled to a hearing by statute and
under the United States and Iowa Constitutions. The State concedes that, “[t]he
statutory law applicable in 1995 when the property at issue was seized does not
contain a statute of limitations or any other temporal requirement regarding when
a property claimant must file an application for return of seized property.” The
State maintains, however, that the equitable doctrine of laches, which precludes
consideration of stale claims, supports the district court’s summary dismissal of
3
Leonard’s application. See State v. Moret, 504 N.W.2d 452, 453 (Iowa 1993)
(“Essentially, the doctrine [of laches] applies to those situations in which a party
has delayed prosecution of a claim to the prejudice of the party against whom the
claim is made.”).
The problem with this argument is that it was not preserved for review.
See DeVoss v. State, 648 N.W.2d 56, 60 (Iowa 2002) (“[I]t is fundamentally
unfair to fault the trial court for failing to rule correctly on an issue it was never
given the opportunity to consider.”). The prosecutor did not mention the doctrine
of laches in the resistance to Leonard’s application, nor did the district court cite
this doctrine in its dismissal order. While the court stated that the seizure took
place in 1995, neither the doctrine of laches nor the principle of staleness
underlying this doctrine was cited or discussed. For that reason, we decline to
consider the State’s ground for affirmance.
Leonard’s application was filed under Iowa Code chapter 809 (2007),
governing disposition of seized property. That chapter requires the court to set a
hearing on an application for the return of seized property unless (1) “no specific
grounds are set out in the application for return,” (2) “the grounds set out are
insufficient as a matter of law,” or (3) seized property is returned to the owner.
Iowa Code §§ 809.3, 809.4, 809.5(1).
The first exception to the hearing requirement was not applicable, as
Leonard’s application set forth a detailed and specific ground for relief.
Turning to the second exception, the application alleged that Leonard
“was never served a copy of this warrant or given notice of the seizure of
property.” As noted, the district court said that “no credible evidence” supported
4
this ground. This statement is effectively a concession that the sufficiency of this
ground could not be decided as a matter of law. Therefore, the second exception
to the hearing requirement also did not apply.
The third exception addresses the return of seized property. The State
asserted that the property was returned.
Leonard, however, disputed this
assertion. Therefore, whether the property was returned was a fact issue that
required a hearing for resolution.
As the cited exceptions to the hearing requirement did not apply, Leonard
was entitled to a hearing on his second application.
Iowa Code § 809.4.
Because one was not afforded, we reverse the district court and remand for a
hearing on his second application for return of seized property. See State v.
Ludtke, 446 N.W.2d 797 (Iowa 1989) (holding that under predecessor statute
“the legislature did not intend that a notice of seizure would trigger abandonment
or establish a time within which claims must be filed;” for that, a “notice of release
or notice of forfeiture” was necessary).
In light of our conclusion, we find it unnecessary to reach the constitutional
argument raised by Leonard. State v. Quintero, 480 N.W.2d 50, 51 (Iowa 1992)
(“We need not, and therefore should not, invoke the Iowa Constitution in
resolving the present appeal; we have consistently refrained from answering
constitutional questions when the issue can be otherwise resolved. This has
long been our rule.”).
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
