IN THE INTEREST OF O.K.W. and A.M.R., Minor Children, S.B.H., Mother, Appellant .
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 9-166 / 09-0053
Filed March 26, 2009
IN THE INTEREST OF O.K.W. and A.M.R.,
Minor Children,
S.B.H., Mother,
Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Woodbury County, Mary Jane
Sokolovske, Judge.
A mother appeals from the juvenile court orders terminating her parental
rights to two children. AFFIRMED.
Maxine M. Buckmeier, Sioux City, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kathrine S. Miller-Todd, Assistant
Attorney General, Patrick Jennings, County Attorney, and David Dawson,
Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
Stephanie Forker Parry of Forker & Parry, Sioux City, for father of O.K.W.
Joseph Kertels of the Juvenile Law Center, Sioux City, attorney and
guardian ad litem for minor children.
Considered by Sackett, C.J., and Potterfield and Mansfield, JJ.
2
PER CURIAM
Sarah, the mother of nine-year-old Alejandra and seven-year-old Orion,
appeals from the September (Alejandra) and October (Orion) 2008 orders
terminating her parental rights.1
She contends the State did not prove the
statutory grounds for termination by clear and convincing evidence. She further
contends termination is not in the children’s best interest. We affirm.
This family came to the attention of the Iowa Department of Human
Services in March of 2004 based on an investigation of domestic violence in the
home and abuse of illegal substances and alcohol. The children were found to
be in need of assistance in June of 2004. For most of the next four years, Sarah
was in and out of substance abuse treatment and the children were in her
custody subject to the protective supervision of the department. Shortly after
successful or unsuccessful completion of treatment, Sarah would relapse. She
also violated the no contact order designed to keep Orion’s father from abusing
Sarah or having unsupervised contact with the children. In early 2008 evidence
came to light that Sarah had relapsed in September of 2007 and also was
allowing Orion’s father to live with her and the children. Custody was transferred
to the department and the children were placed with their maternal grandparents.
After the court considered and rejected establishing the grandparents as
guardians, it ordered the State to seek termination of all parents’ parental rights.
1
All fathers’ parental rights were terminated, but are not at issue in this appeal.
3
A hearing concerning Alejandra was held in September of 2008, but the
hearing concerning Orion was continued to October of 2008 to allow for notice to
an Indian tribe. Following the hearings, the court found:
The department has been involved with this family for four years.
Numerous services have been offered to Sarah to address her
substance abuse issues and her parenting skills. Sarah did make
some progress, but she appears to be locked into a cyclical pattern
and after four years, is back where she started with when the
department first became involved. Sarah has been dishonest with
the department and has been having contact with [Orion’s father] in
violation of the no contact order. She has been unable to provide
to her children a consistently safe and stable home.
The court found termination of Sarah’s parental rights was in the best interest of
Alejandra and Orion. It ordered her parental rights terminated under Iowa Code
sections 232.116(1)(d) and (l) (2007).
Scope and Standards of Review. Our review of termination proceedings
is de novo. In re C.H., 652 N.W.2d 144, 147 (Iowa 2002). We review the facts
and the law and adjudicate rights anew. In re H.G., 601 N.W.2d 84, 85 (Iowa
1999). We give weight to the juvenile court’s factual findings but are not bound
by them. In re E.H. III, 578 N.W.2d 243, 248 (Iowa 1998).
The parent-child relationship is constitutionally protected.
Quilloin v.
Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255, 98 S. Ct. 549, 554, 54 L. Ed. 2d 511, 519 (1978);
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233, 92 S. Ct. 1526, 1542, 32 L. Ed. 2d 15, 35
(1972). When the juvenile court terminates a parent’s rights, we affirm if clear
and convincing evidence supports the termination under any of the cited statutory
provisions. In re S.R., 600 N.W.2d 63, 64 (Iowa Ct. App. 1999). The State has
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the burden of proving the allegations by clear and convincing evidence. 2 “Clear
and convincing evidence” is evidence leaving “no serious or substantial doubt
about the correctness of the conclusion drawn from it.” In re D.D., 653 N.W.2d
359, 361 (Iowa 2002).
The issue of whether to sever the biological ties between parent and child
legally is an issue of grave importance with serious repercussions to the child as
well as the biological parents. See In re R.B., 493 N.W.2d 897, 899 (Iowa Ct.
App. 1992). The goal of a child-in-need-of-assistance proceeding is to improve
parenting skills and maintain the parent-child relationship. A parent does not
have an unlimited amount of time, however, in which to correct deficiencies. In
re H.L.B.R., 567 N.W.2d 675, 677 (Iowa Ct. App. 1997). We have repeatedly
followed the principle that the statutory time line must be followed and children
should not be forced to wait for their parent to grow up. See In re M.Z., 481
N.W.2d 532, 536 (Iowa Ct. App. 1991). We have also indicated that a good
predictor of the future conduct of a parent is to look at the parent’s past conduct.
See In re C.C., 538 N.W.2d 664, 666 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995). Thus, in considering
the impact of drug or alcohol addiction, “we must consider the treatment history
of the parent to gauge the likelihood the parent will be in a position to parent the
child in the foreseeable future.” In re N.F., 579 N.W.2d 338, 341 (Iowa Ct. App.
1998).
2
“Where the parent has been unable to rise above the addiction and
The Rosebud Sioux Tribe earlier had determined neither child was enrolled in the tribe
or eligible for enrollment. Subsequently, Orion was enrolled. Consequently, the juvenile
court found evidence for termination of Orion’s parents’ parental rights was supported by
evidence beyond a reasonable doubt instead of clear and convincing evidence. See
Iowa Code 232B.6(6)(b) (2007); see also 25 U.S.C. § 1912(f).
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experience sustained sobriety in a noncustodial setting, and establish the
essential support system to maintain sobriety, there is little hope of success in
parenting.” Id.
Statutory Grounds for Termination. Sarah contends the State did not
prove either statutory ground for termination. From our review of the record, we
find evidence supports termination on both statutory grounds.
Sarah first contends the evidence does not support termination under
section 232.116(1)(d) because she has taken significant steps to correct the
circumstance that led to the adjudication by completing substance abuse
treatment and following through with the halfway and three-quarter way
programs. The children were found to be in need of assistance under sections
232.2(6)(b), (c)(2), (n), and (o) (2003) based on their exposure to domestic
disputes and the parents’ alcohol and drug abuse. There was a founded and
registered report for denial of critical care, failure to provide adequate shelter,
failure to provide proper supervision, and presence of illegal drugs in the body of
a child. Sarah was one of the named perpetrators. Throughout the pendency of
these proceedings, Sarah has repeatedly participated in substance abuse
treatment and either did not successfully complete the treatment or quickly
relapsed after completing treatment. She has not demonstrated the ability to
maintain sobriety for any period outside of a regulated or supervised setting. As
soon as she resumes her relationship with Orion’s father, she returns to illegal
substance and alcohol use. Despite the entry of a no contact order between
Orion’s father and Sarah in 2004, she repeatedly returned to him and allowed
6
him to live in the home. She was adept at concealing their continued relationship
from service providers, the department, and the court. We agree with the court’s
findings that Sarah, despite numerous services offered over a period of more
than four years, was basically “back where she started when the department first
became involved” and “has been unable to provide her children a consistently
safe and stable home.” The same basic circumstances that led to the children’s
adjudication continue to exist despite the offer and receipt of services designed
to correct the circumstances. We affirm the termination of Sarah’s parental rights
under section 232.116(1)(d) (2007).
Sarah also contends the evidence does not support termination under
section 232.116(1)(l).
She first argues the children were not adjudicated as
children in need of assistance “pursuant to section 232.96”3 but rather pursuant
to sections 232.2(6)(b), (c)(2), (n), and (o). This argument is without merit. The
children were adjudicated “pursuant to section 232.96,” which describes the
adjudicatory hearing. The adjudicatory hearing occurred on June 11, 2004, and
resulted in a finding the evidence supported the statutory grounds for finding the
children were in need of assistance.
Next Sarah argues custody of the children was not transferred from her
pursuant to section 232.102, as required by section 232.116(1)(l)(1).
This
argument is without merit. Although the initial adjudicatory order continued the
children in Sarah’s custody, they later were removed from Sarah’s custody and
3
Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(l)(1) provides:
The child has been adjudicated a child in need of assistance pursuant to
section 232.96 and custody has been transferred from the child’s parents
for placement pursuant to section 232.102.
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placed in the department’s custody. They were returned to Sarah’s custody, then
again removed and placed in the department’s custody in 2008, where they
remained at the time of the termination.
Sarah’s history of abuse of alcohol and illegal substances, treatment, and
relapse, along with the accompanying history of domestic violence and an
inability to maintain a safe home for her children demonstrates she has “a
severe, chronic substance abuse problem, and presents a danger to self or
others as evidenced by prior acts.” Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(l)(2). She has
repeatedly participated either successfully or unsuccessfully in substance abuse
treatment without any lasting positive results.
Although at the time of the
termination hearing she apparently had been sober for eight months, she had not
been out of a supervised setting or demonstrated that this time she had truly
changed. We find her “prognosis indicates that the child[ren] will not be able to
be returned to [her] custody . . . within a reasonable period of time considering
the child[ren]’s age and need for a permanent home.” Id. § 232.116(1)(l)(3). We
affirm the termination of her parental rights under section 232.116(1)(l).
Sarah also contends termination of her parental rights is not in the
children’s best interest because she loves and is bonded to her children, she has
made significant efforts to understand and meet the children’s special needs, and
she “would be able to regain custody and parent the children in less than six
months time.”
Although Sarah has made progress in dealing with her own
parenting and substance abuse issues and we acknowledge she loves and is
bonded to her children, she has not demonstrated the ability to care for them
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both outside of a supervised setting. Because of her substance abuse history,
she would need to demonstrate a period of sobriety after completing treatment
before she could potentially be in a position to take care of the children. Orion
has behavioral issues and is physically aggressive.
Alejandra has impaired
hearing, but her communication skills and success in school have improved since
she received a cochlear implant.
The statutory time period for correcting the circumstances that led to the
children’s adjudication as children in need of assistance is long past. The court
correctly determined that establishing a guardianship in the maternal
grandparents was not in the children’s best interest. These children should not
have to wait any longer for Sarah to demonstrate she can become a responsible
parent.
See In re L.L., 459 N.W.2d 489, 495 (Iowa 1990).
These children
deserve stability and permanency that Sarah cannot provide. See In re C.D.,
509 N.W.2d 509, 513 (Iowa Ct. App. 1993). When we look at Sarah’s history, the
uncertainty the children have endured, and their immediate and long-range
interests, we agree with the juvenile court that termination of Sarah’s parental
rights is in her children’s best interest. See In re S.N., 500 N.W.2d 32, 34 (Iowa
1993).
AFFIRMED.
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