ABF FREIGHT SYSTEM, INC., and ACE USA WORKERS' COMPENSATION, Petitioners-Appellants, vs. BRADLEY J. HUFF, Respondent-Appellee.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 9-164 / 08-1637
Filed April 22, 2009
ABF FREIGHT SYSTEM, INC., and
ACE USA WORKERS’ COMPENSATION,
Petitioners-Appellants,
vs.
BRADLEY J. HUFF,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Michael D. Huppert,
Judge.
ABF Freight System appeals from the district court’s judicial review
decision that affirmed the agency decision awarding employee benefits for a
permanent partial disability. AFFIRMED.
Stephen W. Spencer and Joseph M. Barron of Peddicord, Wharton,
Spender, Hook, Barron & Wegman, Des Moines, for appellants.
Thomas M. Wertz and Daniel J. Anderson of Wertz Law Firm, Cedar
Rapids, for appellee.
Considered by Miller, P.J., and Eisenhauer and Potterfield, JJ.
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POTTERFIELD, J.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
Bradley Huff began working at ABF Freight System, Inc. (ABF) as a
dockman/driver in 1980. His job duties included loading and unloading trailers
and delivering freight. Huff sustained several injuries during the time that he
worked at ABF. Huff alleged that he was injured at work on November 24, 1997.
Another injury on May 10, 1999, resulted in surgery on his shoulder and back on
November 15, 1999.
Huff filed a claim against ABF seeking workers’
compensation benefits as a result of these injuries, but his claim was denied. An
arbitration decision found that Huff failed to establish that he sustained a workrelated injury on November 15, 1999, and that Huff failed to prove that the 1997
injury was the cause of a temporary or permanent disability. Huff filed another
claim after an injury on November 14, 2001, while he was sorting and
segregating freight. The deputy workers’ compensation commissioner found that
Huff failed to meet his burden of proving a compensable work injury occurred on
November 14, 2001.
Huff was still undergoing treatment for his back two and one-half months
later, in February 2002, though he did not have any formal job restrictions. On
February 5, 2002, Huff was dispatched to the Nash Finch grocery warehouse to
perform the task known as “sorting and segregating,” which was the cause of his
claimed November 2001 injury. This task required lifting and twisting, which had
been problematic for Huff because of his prior back problems. Huff generally
was not required to do sorting and segregating, but he had been reassigned from
his normal schedule so that he would be able to attend a medical appointment to
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receive an injection in his back later that day.1
Huff spoke with the ABF
dispatcher, Terry Hindt, and requested that he not be required to go to Nash
Finch. After involvement by Teamster officials, ABF required Huff to make the
run to Nash Finch.
Huff testified that while he was sorting and segregating, his low back pain
intensified and he could not finish the job. Another driver from ABF relieved Huff
of his duties, and Huff went to Mercy Medical Center. He received his previously
scheduled back injection, a three-day release from work, and temporary lifting
and twisting restrictions. Huff went to his family physician, Mark Hogenson, on
February 18, 2002. Dr. Hogenson issued a work restriction limiting Huff to jobs
“involving no sorting and segregating.” On February 25, 2002, Huff saw Chad
Abernathey, a physician by whom Huff had previously been treated for his back
pain in November and December 2001.
Dr. Abernathey continued Dr.
Hogenson’s restrictions until Huff’s follow-up appointment with Dr. Hogenson the
next week.
ABF sent Huff to see occupational specialist David R. Durand, who
indicated Huff could return to work with no restrictions.
Pursuant to the
applicable union contract, Huff was sent to a third physician, Ray Miller, on April
15, 2002, to resolve the conflicting medical opinions. Dr. Miller’s report stated, “I
think it is appropriate that [Huff] have permanent restrictions and that one of
those restrictions be no sort and segregate.”
1
ABF refused to honor these
Huff had reached a level of seniority that allowed him to avoid sorting and segregating
for the most part. He testified that he would have such a task assigned roughly one or
two times per month.
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restrictions and discharged Huff from employment. Huff took retirement and has
not worked as a driver since February 5, 2002.
Huff filed a petition with the Iowa Workers’ Compensation Commissioner
on January 24, 2004, alleging that he sustained permanent injury to his low back
and body as a result of his injury on February 5, 2002, while working for ABF.
After a hearing, the deputy issued an arbitration decision finding Huff failed to
prove that the February 5, 2002 incident caused a permanent worsening or
aggravation of Huff’s pre-existing condition.
The parties introduced the
conflicting medical evidence from Drs. Hogenson, Durand, Abernathey, and
Miller.
Huff appealed to the workers’ compensation commissioner, who issued an
appeal decision reversing the deputy’s determination. The commissioner found
Huff met his burden of proving a compensable aggravation injury that created the
need for permanent restrictions. ABF filed a petition for judicial review. On
September 12, 2008, the district court issued a ruling affirming the agency
decision. ABF now appeals, arguing that the commissioner erred in finding that
Huff met his burden to prove that he sustained permanent disability relating to his
injury on February 5, 2002.
II. Standard of Review
Judicial review of an agency decision is governed by Iowa Code chapter
17A (2007). Quaker Oats Co. v. Ciha, 552 N.W.2d 143, 149 (Iowa 1996). We
apply the standards of chapter 17A to determine whether we reach the same
conclusions as the district court. Mycogen Seeds v. Sands, 686 N.W.2d 457,
464 (Iowa 2004). If we reach the same conclusions, we affirm; if not, we reverse.
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Id. Our review of administrative agency decisions is limited to correcting errors of
law. Id.
The commissioner’s findings have the same weight as a jury verdict, and
we apply those findings to uphold rather than defeat the commissioner’s
decision. Id. We reverse the agency if its decision is “[b]ased upon an irrational,
illogical, or wholly unjustifiable application of law to fact.”
Iowa Code
§ 17A.19(10)(m). To the extent that ABF appeals from the agency’s findings of
fact, we reverse if the agency action is “[b]ased upon a determination of fact . . .
that is not supported by substantial evidence in the record before the court when
that record is viewed as a whole.” Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(f).
“Substantial evidence” means the quantity and quality of evidence
that would be deemed sufficient by a neutral, detached, and
reasonable person, to establish the fact at issue when the
consequences resulting from the establishment of that fact are
understood to be serious and of great importance.
Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(f)(1). We are therefore bound by the agency’s findings
of fact if they are supported by substantial evidence.
Mycogen Seeds, 686
N.W.2d at 465. “The mere fact that we could draw inconsistent conclusions from
the same evidence does not mean that substantial evidence does not support the
commissioner’s determinations.”
Terwilliger v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 529
N.W.2d 267, 271 (Iowa 1995).
III. Finding of Permanent Partial Disability
ABF argues that the commissioner improperly used the previous denials
of Huff’s workers’ compensation claims to shift the burden of proof on the
February 2002 claim.
The commissioner discussed the contrary medical
opinions of Drs. Durand and Abernathey, which stated that the work activities of
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February 5, 2002, were not the cause of Huff’s condition and need for
restrictions, saying:
The opinions of Drs. Durand and Abernathey acknowledge
claimant’s present physical condition and need for activity
restrictions, but dispute that the work activities of February 5, 2002,
are the cause. Dr. Durand specifically ties the need for restrictions
to claimant’s pre-existing low back condition. However, this agency
had previously concluded that claimant had no permanent condition
resulting from his prior work activities and injuries. There is no
evidence in the record that claimant sustained any low back injury
outside of his employment with ABF.
ABF argues that the commissioner’s language reveals a misunderstanding
of previous denials of Huff’s workers’ compensation claims and a refusal to
acknowledge Huff’s pre-existing condition. However, the commissioner’s ruling
clearly acknowledges the pre-existing condition as well as the conflicting medical
testimony regarding the extent of the condition before and after the February
2002 injury. The commissioner did not find, as ABF suggests, that the prior
denials of Huff’s claims meant that he had no prior disability.
The commissioner properly imposed the burden of proof on Huff and ruled
that he had proved causation and permanency of a disability as a result of the
February 5, 2002 injury.
As the district court noted, the commissioner was
entitled to rely on the medical opinions of Drs. Hogenson and Miller, supported
by Huff’s subjective complaints, and was not required to accept the conflicting
opinions of Drs. Durand and Abernathey. The four doctors involved had differing
opinions as to whether the aggravation of Huff’s pre-existing condition was
permanent or temporary. The evidence for both conclusions was substantial and
fairly evenly divided. However, we do not change an agency decision simply
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because we may have reached a different conclusion. Terwilliger, 529 N.W.2d at
271.
AFFIRMED.
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