IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF KATHERINE M. BONE AND MARK W. BONE Upon the Petition of KATHERINE M. BONE, Petitioner-Appellee/Cross-Appellant, And Concerning MARK W. BONE, Respondent-Appellant/Cross-Appellee.
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 9-162 / 08-1198
Filed April 8, 2009
IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF KATHERINE M. BONE
AND MARK W. BONE
Upon the Petition of
KATHERINE M. BONE,
Petitioner-Appellee/Cross-Appellant,
And Concerning
MARK W. BONE,
Respondent-Appellant/Cross-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Jones County, Robert E. Sosalla,
Judge.
Mark Bone appeals and Katherine Bone cross-appeals from the district
court’s decree dissolving their marriage. AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.
Steven E. Howes of Howes Law Firm, P.C., Cedar Rapids, for appellant.
William D. Werger of Werger Law Firm, Manchester, for appellee.
Considered by Mahan, P.J., and Miller and Doyle, JJ.
2
DOYLE, J.
Mark Bone appeals and Katherine Bone cross-appeals from the district
court’s decree dissolving their marriage. Upon our de novo review, we affirm as
modified.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
Mark and Katherine were married in June 1989. They have two daughters
born of the marriage, both minors at the time of the dissolution.
Katherine is a high school graduate and has one year of college
education. She has been employed full time at a local bank since 1975 and
worked throughout the parties’ marriage. She currently earns $26,329 a year
through her employment with the bank, and also recently began working a parttime job two nights a week. Additionally, Katherine contributed to IRAs and a
401(k) account during the time of her employment.
From 2004 to 2006,
Katherine withdrew over $75,000 from her IRA. At the time of trial, Katherine’s
IRAs had a value of approximately $28,592, and her 401(k) had a value of
$20,557.
Prior to the parties’ marriage, Mark began working full time for the Bomont
Land Co., a closely-held family farm corporation formed by Mark’s parents, W.C.
and Virginia Bone, on June 1, 1980.
corporation equaling $4800 a year.
Mark is paid wages monthly by the
The corporation also contributes $2000
annually on Mark’s behalf to various IRA accounts. Some years Mark receives a
bonus, but there is no set means for determining when or if he will receive a
bonus. From 2002 to 2007, Mark earned an average wage of approximately
3
$7000 a year from the corporation. At the time of trial, Mark’s IRAs had a value
of approximately $212,680.
In addition to wages, the corporation provides extra benefits to Mark. The
home the parties lived in during the marriage is owned by the corporation. The
corporation allows Mark and his family to live in the home at no cost and pays the
utilities and the home telephone bill. The corporation owns the vehicle Mark
drives and pays the vehicle expenses, including licensing fees, insurance, and
gas. The corporation provides Mark with the use of a motorcycle and an allterrain vehicle. The corporation provides Mark with a quarter of beef every year
for his and his family’s consumption. The corporation also pays for Mark’s work
clothes and pays the family’s medical costs that are not covered by Katherine’s
insurance.
Additionally, Mark has been issued shares of the corporation’s
common stock.
Katherine filed for dissolution of marriage on March 19, 2007. The matter
proceeded to trial on March 25, 2008. Katherine testified that she and Mark held
separate bank accounts and that the bills and necessities not covered by the
corporation were paid by her out of her earnings. She testified that she paid for
her and the children’s clothing, childcare, groceries, household items, and the
children’s athletic activities.
She further testified that the amount of money
withdrawn from her IRA went towards family expenses. Katherine sought child
support, alimony, and attorney fees, along with an equitable distribution of the
marital property. Katherine further asserted that Mark’s corporate stock was an
asset to be considered in equitably dividing the property.
4
Mark testified that he led a frugal lifestyle prior to and during the marriage.
He disagreed with Katherine’s taking withdrawals from her IRA to pay for the
children’s athletic activities. Additionally, Mark testified that the stock he had
been given was intended to be his inheritance, and he argued its valuation
should not be considered in the property distribution. As to his common stock’s
valuation, he testified that the corporation was authorized to issue 500,000
shares of preferred stock and 500,000 shares of common stock. The preferred
stock holders were to have no voting rights in the corporation, and each share of
preferred stock was set at the fixed price of one dollar per share. Mark testified
that his mother owned the majority interest in the corporation and he owned
12.25% of the corporation’s common stock. Mark testified he did not “have a
clue” as to how he came up with that percentage. Nine corporate records, each
entitled “Report of Stock Gifted,” show stocks held by Mark’s parents were
transferred over a period of time to their children by various certificates.
However, there are gaps in the certificate numbers issued—the records begin
with certificate number two and several certificate numbers are missing.
A
summary of his gifted stock shares states that Mark owned 61,269 shares,
equaling 12.25% of the authorized common stock.1 This summary does not state
the total number of common stock shares issued by the company.
Mark’s mother, Virginia Bone, testified by deposition that she and her
husband “started the giving-away [of stock] process as soon as [they]
incorporated.” However, she was unable to state how much stock was owned by
her at the time of her husband’s death, or how much total common stock had
1
61,269 shares equals 12.25% of 500,000 shares.
5
been issued by the corporation. When pressed on the issue, she reviewed the
corporation’s “Book of Certificates” that she brought with her to the deposition. In
addition to the nine corporate records introduced at trial, Virginia testified as to
the contents of several other records containing missing certificate information
(though several remain absent).
She testified that certificate number one
represented the 20,269 shares of common stock issued to her husband and
certificate number two represented the 89,135 shares of common stock issued to
her. She also testified that Mark and her other children had been gifted other
stock not reflected on the corporate reports introduced at trial, including an
additional 5000 shares to Mark in 1993.
After the March 25, 2008 trial, the district court took the matter under
advisement. On March 31, 2008, the court entered an order setting the case for
further hearing. The order stated that the “facts of this case indicate that the
circumstances presented . . . may very well warrant inclusion of all or part of the
value of Mark’s interest in [the corporation.]” However, the court found that upon
its initial review of the evidence, it had no basis upon which to value Mark’s
interest. The court then set the matter for further hearing to allow the parties to
present evidence concerning the value of the corporation and the value of Mark’s
interest in the corporation as of the original date of trial.
The trial reconvened on May 30, 2008. There, Katherine introduced an
appraisal of the corporation’s land and buildings, valuing those assets to be
$1,911,000.
The appraisal does not include valuation of corporation’s
machinery, equipment, crops in the ground, harvested corn and beans in
storage, cattle, money in the bank, or other assets. Mark did not provide an
6
appraisal of the corporation, but testified he thought Katherine’s appraisal’s
valuation was high.
Mark offered, without objection, three documents concerning the
corporation’s stock. The first document, Exhibit M, prepared by Virginia, states
that Mark owned fourteen percent of the common stock, his brother owned
sixteen percent of the common stock, and Virginia owned the seventy percent of
common stock.2 Mark explained that the second document, Exhibit P, shows the
number of stocks owned by everyone in his family. This document states that
Mark’s father owned 30,269 shares of stock, his mother owned 192,135 shares
of stock, his brother owned 41,135 shares of common stock, and Mark owned
66,269 shares of common stock. It also states that his sisters owned a total of
178,000 shares of preferred stock.3
However, Mark testified it was his
understanding that his father’s stock had transferred to his mother at his father’s
death. The document also states that Mark owned 13.3% of 500,000 common
shares. The final document, Exhibit Q, prepared by Virginia as secretary of the
company, is a record of minutes from various corporate meetings. The minutes
of the January 20, 2007 meeting note that “nothing had been done with the
remaining stock. It was decided that this should be issued to Virginia.” When
asked about this minute, Mark testified he didn’t know if the remaining stock had
been issued to Virginia, and no further testimony or evidence was introduced on
the issue.
2
Only percentages are stated—the number of shares used to derive the percentages
are not revealed.
3
This document does not specify the number of common and preferred shares owned
by Mark’s parents.
7
On July 2, 2008, the district court entered its decree of dissolution of
marriage. The court found the corporation’s perks provided to Mark constituted
income and found Mark’s total annual income from the corporation to be
approximately $27,750 a year.4
The court found Katherine’s annual income,
including her additional part-time employment, was $29,500. Based upon these
numbers and the child support guidelines, the court determined Mark should pay
child support for the two children in the amount of $583 a month.
The court found the corporation had gifted 66,269 shares of common
stock to Mark—36,134 shares issued before the parties’ marriage and 30,135
shares during the marriage.
In dividing the property, the court found it was
equitable to award Katherine fifty percent of the value of Mark’s corporate stock
he received during the marriage.
The court determined the corporation had
issued a total of 329,808 shares of common stock and Mark’s interest
represented over twenty percent of the total shares of common stock.5 The court
further found that 188,000 shares of preferred stock had been issued to Mark’s
sisters, for a total value of $188,000.6 The court found the appraised value of the
4
The court found Mark’s averaged annual traditional wages from the corporation to be
$7000 (respondent’s Exhibit A). The court also included the following as income: $3600
a year for use of the home, $1500 a year for utilities, $600 a year for the home phone,
$200 a year for the quarter of beef, $500 a year for clothes and medical costs, and
$5360 a year for the use of the vehicle. Additionally, the court found Mark’s income
included an annual $9000 contribution by the corporation to a separate IRA account.
The court also noted that Mark had been paid dividends, averaging $3250 a year, due to
his stockholder status in the corporation.
5
The court cited Mark’s Exhibit P in arriving at this number of total shares of issued
common stock. It is assumed the court took the total number of shares listed in Mark’s
parents’ columns and added them to the total number of Mark and his brother’s shares
of common stock listed on the exhibit. See also footnote 10.
6
It is unclear how the court arrived at 188,000 shares of preferred stock. Mark’s
Exhibit P reflects that his sisters had been issued 178,000 shares of preferred stock;
however, the court’s number is not disputed by the parties.
8
corporation’s land and building to be reasonable and subtracted the total value of
the preferred stock ($188,000) from the appraised value, finding the corporation
to have a net value of $1,723,000. Then dividing the net value by the number of
common shares issued (329,808), the court found the common shares had a
value of $5.22 each. Based upon that valuation, the court determined Mark’s
30,135 shares of common stock issued during the marriage had a value of
$157,306, and that Katherine was entitled to one-half, or $78,652.
Additionally, the court determined Katherine was entitled to half of Mark’s
retirement accounts, that she should retrieve one-half of the $75,000 she
depleted from her IRA for family expenditures, and that she was entitled to onehalf of her IRA’s present value, all equaling $131,130.7 The court declined to
award Katherine alimony or attorney fees, and ordered Mark to pay Katherine the
sum of $209,782, payable in installments.
Mark appeals, and Katherine cross-appeals.
II. Scope and Standards of Review.
We review dissolution of marriage proceedings de novo. In re Marriage of
Smith, 573 N.W.2d 924, 926 (Iowa 1998). We examine the entire record and
adjudicate rights anew on the issues properly presented. Id. Although we are
not bound by the district court’s factual findings, we give them weight, especially
when assessing the credibility of witnesses. Iowa R. App. P. 6.14(6)(g). Our
7
The court broke down the $131,130 as follows: “One-half of Katherine’s lost $75,000 is
$37,500. Mark’s IRA accounts have a value of $212,680. One-half of that amount is
$106,340. Katherine’s IRA account has a present value of $25,420. One-half of that
amount is $12,710. $37,500 + $106,340 - $12,710 = $131,130.”
9
review of a district court’s decision concerning a request for attorney fees is for
abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768, 773 (Iowa 2003).
III. Merits.
A. Property Division.
1. Stock.
Mark first argues that the district court erred in including a portion of his
shares of stock in the division of property. Mark asserts his stock should not
have been included because the stock was gifted as inheritance and Katherine
did not contribute to care, preservation, or improvement of Mark’s stock’s
valuation. We disagree.
Generally, property should be equitably divided between the parties in a
dissolution decree.
In re Marriage of Schriner, 695 N.W.2d 493, 496 (Iowa
2005). There is an exception, however, for inherited property and gifts received
by one party. In re Marriage of Rhinehart, 704 N.W.2d 677, 682 (Iowa 2005).
“This property is normally awarded to the individual spouse who owns the
property, independent from the equitable distribution process.”
Schriner, 695
N.W.2d at 496. Nevertheless, Iowa Code section 598.21(6) (2007) provides:
Property inherited by either party or gifts received by either
party prior to or during the course of the marriage is the property of
that party and is not subject to a property division under this section
except upon a finding that refusal to divide the property is
inequitable to the other party or to the children of the marriage.
Thus, inherited or gifted property may be divided when it would be inequitable to
award the property to one spouse. In re Marriage of Goodwin, 606 N.W.2d 315,
319 (Iowa 2000). In determining whether inherited or gifted property should be
equitably divided, we consider “the length of the marriage; contributions made by
10
either party toward the property’s care, preservation, or improvement; and the
impact of the property on the parties’ standard of living.” In re Marriage of Geil,
509 N.W.2d 738, 741 (Iowa 1993) (citations omitted).
The district court found:
Mark’s appreciation in the value of his assets was not
fortuitous. It resulted from his hard work and attention to the farm
operation. But also, . . . Katherine’s efforts allowed Mark to
concentrate his efforts on his work.
She provided marital
companionship and contributed to the marriage as she was able.
Her indirect contributions assisted Mark in his endeavors.
Concluding otherwise needlessly diminishes a [nineteen] year
marriage.
Additionally, I find that it would be inequitable in this case to
complete disallow the value of Mark’s . . . stock in determining a fair
property division because it was property Mark brought into the
marriage and/or a gift. It would be inequitable to both Katherine
and the children. Once again, Katherine invested all of her income
into the marriage, assisting in enabling the farm operation to be
successful. . . . It is unreasonable to expect that Katherine should
alone make those sacrifices for the children and the home when
they are joint responsibilities.
It would also be inequitable to fail to recognize Katherine’s
contribution to Mark’s ability to maintain the successful farm
operation. Even though [the corporation] gifted the stock to him,
Katherine’s efforts enabled the stock to maintain and even increase
in value. For example, when the farm operation included dairy
cows, Katherine assisted in the dairy operation. Mark’s frugal
lifestyle and refusal to support the children’s activities required
Katherine to mortgage her future retirement by $75,000.
(Footnotes omitted.) We agree with the district court’s conclusions and find the
court did not err in determining a portion of Mark’s stock’s valuation should be
awarded to Katherine. However, whether the percentage awarded to Katherine
is equitable necessarily depends upon the stock’s valuation, and we next turn to
that issue.
To demonstrate our frustration in reviewing this issue, we quote from the
record deposition testimony of Virginia Bone, mother of Mark Bone, matriarch of
11
the Bone family, and secretary/treasurer of Bomont Land Co. since the day the
farm was incorporated:
Q. Can you tell us, at the present time, how much common
stock there is, total? A. No, I can’t.
Q. How many shares of stock are outstanding at this time, in
the Bomont Land Company? A. I don’t know.
Q. And I’m asking you how many certificates are
outstanding? A. I can’t tell you, and what difference does that
make?
So, we are faced with a record clear as mud.
Our task would have been
lightened considerably had these seemingly simple questions been answered
somewhere in the record.
Katherine argues the court incorrectly found there had been 329,808
shares of common stock issued by the corporation.
Katherine contends the
corporation had only issued 109,404 total shares of common stock and thus the
price per share was greater than the price the district court found. Mark, still
indecisive as to how many common stock shares had been issued, suggests on
appeal there had either been 500,000 or 329,808 shares of common stock
issued by the corporation. Upon our review, we agree with Katherine.
The corporation is a closely held family farm corporation. Mark was not an
outsider. He and his brother served for many years as “co-presidents” of the
corporation.8 Mark was asked repeatedly to disclose the total number of shares
issued by the corporation, and the district court even reconvened the trial for the
8
About three months after Katherine filed her petition for dissolution of marriage, it was
decided to do away with the co-presidents of the company, and Mark’s brother was
elected president and Virginia remained as secretary/treasurer. Mark was then no
longer an officer in the company. When it was suggested that this decision was made
because his wife had filed for divorce and he didn’t want to be president anymore, Mark
responded: “Could have been, yeah.”
12
presentation of evidence on this issue. Mark merely produced several conflicting
documents, none of which disclosed the total number of shares issued. The
district court relied upon Mark’s Exhibit P in calculating the total number of
shares of common stock, apparently adding together the amount of shares listed
as being held by Mark, Mark’s parents, and Mark’s brother. To the district court’s
credit, it did the best it could with the unclear evidence. Nevertheless, upon our
review, we find no corroborating evidence to support a finding that 329,808
shares of common stock had been issued.9
Although Mark and his mother Virginia testified that Mark was a minority
shareholder and Virginia was a majority shareholder in the corporation, the
documentary evidence presented at trial indicates otherwise.
Mark’s mother
testified she was unable to tell how much stock she owned when her husband
died, or how much common stock had been issued, or how many shares or
certificates were outstanding. When pressed on the issue, she testified that her
husband was initially issued 20,269 shares of common stock and she had been
issued 89,135 shares of common stock, along with shares of preferred stock. 10
She testified that she and her husband began giving the stock away to their
9
W.C.’s and Virginia’s shares are not designated as common or preferred on Mark’s
Exhibit P. It appears Virginia’s 192,135 listed shares include 103,000 preferred shares,
and these preferred shares were included in the district court’s total of common shares
outstanding. It also appears the district court included some shares twice in its tally; the
original number of shares held by W.C. and Virginia were added to the number of
common shares they gifted to their sons.
10
Exhibit P shows Virginia having 192,135 shares of stock. Based upon Virginia’s
testimony and the corporate “Report of Stock Gifted,” Virginia had been initially issued
89,135 shares of common stock and W.C. gifted her 103,000 shares of preferred stock,
which together, total 192,135 shares.
13
children immediately thereafter.11 Based upon Virginia’s testimony, her stock
was gifted to her children. There was no evidence presented that the corporation
issued any additional stock to Virginia or her husband. In fact, the corporate
minutes indicate she and her sons recognized in 2007 that all of the remaining
stock had not been issued. Although the minutes authorized the remaining stock
be issued to Virginia, there was no evidence presented that the stock was ever
issued to Virginia. When asked, Mark testified he did not know if the remaining
stock had been issued to Virginia.
Based upon Mark’s and Virginia’s testimony, along with the corporate
“Report of Stock Gifted” documents, we find that at the time of trial the amount of
corporate common stock issued was a total of 109,404 shares. Of those shares,
we find 66,269 shares had been gifted to Mark (36,134 shares issued before the
parties’ marriage and 30,135 during the parties’ marriage), and 41,135 shares
had been gifted to Mark’s brother, leaving Virginia with 2,000 shares.
We next turn to the stock’s valuation. Mark argues that the district court
erred when it did not make various deductions or adjustments to its valuation of
the corporation. We disagree.
The district court found the appraised value of $1,911,000 for the
corporation’s land and buildings to be reasonable. It subtracted the value of the
preferred stock ($188,000) from the appraised value to arrive at a net value of
$1,723,000. Although our review is de novo, we ordinarily defer to the district
court when valuations are accompanied by corroborating evidence.
11
In re
The corporate “Report of Stock Gifted” documents show W.C. and Virginia began
gifting stock to their children on October 17, 1980.
14
Marriage of Vieth, 591 N.W.2d 639, 640 (Iowa Ct. App. 1999). We first note the
appraised value did not include the value of any machinery, crops, or other
assets held by the corporation. Secondly, we note that the reduction for the
preferred stock obligation was $10,000 too high since the evidence supports a
finding there were 178,000, not 188,000, outstanding preferred stock shares.
Nevertheless, we find the district court’s valuation to be within the permissible
range of the evidence and, as a result, should not be disturbed.
See In re
Marriage of Williams, 449 N.W.2d 878, 881 (Iowa Ct. App. 1990). Consequently,
we agree the net value of the corporation was $1,723,000.
With a total of
109,404 shares of common stock issued, each share’s value equals $15.74.
Thus, the total valuation of Mark’s 66,269 shares equals $1,043,074.06. The
value of Mark’s 30,135 shares issued during the parties’ marriage equals
$474,324.90.
Although the district court found that fifty percent of the value of Mark’s
stock received during the marriage should be awarded to Katherine, we find that,
given our valuation of the stock, a fifty/fifty split would not be equitable. We find
Katherine should be awarded $80,000 as her equitable share in the value of
Mark’s stock.
2. Division of Retirement Accounts.
Mark next argues the court erred in requiring Mark to pay one-half of the
IRA account Katherine depleted during the course of the marriage, and that the
court should have counted the assets Katherine depleted in calculating each
party’s share.
Additionally, Mark contends the court incorrectly valued
Katherine’s IRA and 401(k) accounts.
15
The court found Katherine depleted her IRA account by $75,000 during
the marriage to pay for family expenses.
We find this determination to be
supported by the evidence and therefore find the court did not err in requiring
Mark to pay one-half of the $75,000. However, we agree the court incorrectly
valued Katherine’s IRA and 401(k) accounts.
Although the court determined
Katherine’s IRA was valued at $25,420, Katherine acknowledges her IRA and
401(k) accounts were valued at approximately $49,149 at the time of trial. 12
Consequently, we find Katherine should be awarded a net amount of
$119,265.50 from the retirement accounts.13 Therefore, as a part of the property
division, Katherine is awarded an equalization payment of $199,265.50.
B. Child Support.
Mark next contends that the district court erred in its calculation of child
support. Mark argues the amount of child support is more than he has available
in cash each month. He also argues his annual income with the corporate perks
is less than the amount determined by the district court. We disagree.
“Both parents have a legal obligation to support their children, not
necessarily equally but in accordance with his or her ability to pay.” Moore v.
Kriegel, 551 N.W.2d 887, 889 (Iowa Ct. App. 1996). Parents must give their
12
See footnote 7. The district court erroneously obtained this figure from Exhibit 21, a
portfolio analysis dated March 7, 2007. Subsequent to that date, Katherine moved her
IRA accounts to another institution. Additionally, the court did not take into account
Katherine’s 401(k) account. To be fair to the district court, the parties’ financial exhibits
were offered and received en masse at the commencement of trial, with little or no
testimonial follow-up. On appeal Katherine agrees the value of her 401(k) and IRA
accounts at the time of trial was about $49,149. This figure is consistent with trial
Exhibits 4, 5, 14, and 15.
13
One-half of Katherine’s lost $75,000 is $37,500. Mark’s IRA accounts had a value of
$212,680. One-half of that amount is $106,340. Katherine’s IRA and 401(k) accounts
had a present value of $49,149. One-half of that amount is $24,574.50. $37,500 +
$106,340 - $24,574.50 = $119,265.50.
16
children’s needs high priority and be willing to make reasonable sacrifices to
assure their care. In re Marriage of Fidone, 462 N.W.2d 710, 712 (Iowa Ct. App.
1990). All income that is not anomalous, uncertain, or speculative should be
included when determining a party’s child support obligation. See In re Marriage
of Brown, 487 N.W.2d 331, 333 (Iowa 1992).
Support may be based on a
payor’s earning capacity rather than actual earnings. Moore, 551 N.W.2d at 889.
Here, the district court found Mark’s annual income to be $27,750 a year,
including his wages, perks, and retirement contributions. We find the district
court’s determination was within the permissible range of the evidence and, as a
result, find the determination should not be disturbed.
C. Alimony.
Katherine argues the court erred in failing to award her alimony. We
disagree.
Alimony is not an absolute right. In re Marriage of Anliker, 694 N.W.2d
535, 540 (Iowa 2005).
Whether alimony is awarded depends on the
circumstances of each particular case. Id. In determining whether to award
alimony, the district court is to consider the factors in Iowa Code section
598.21A(1). That section allows the court to consider the property division in
connection with the alimony award. In re Marriage of Probasco, 676 N.W.2d
179, 184 (Iowa 2004). We only disturb the district court’s decision if there is a
failure to do equity.
Anliker, 694 N.W.2d at 540; see also Iowa Code §
598.21A(1).
Here, we find the district court’s decision declining Katherine’s request for
alimony to be equitable and therefore do not disturb the decision.
17
D. Trial Attorney Fees.
Katherine asserts the district court erred in not awarding her trial attorney
fees. An award of attorney fees rests in the sound discretion of the district court
and will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of an abuse of discretion. In
re Marriage of Wessels, 542 N.W.2d 486, 491 (Iowa 1995). We find no abuse of
discretion in the district court’s determination that each party should pay his or
her own trial attorney fees.
E. Appellate Attorney Fees.
Katherine also seeks attorney fees for this appeal. An award of appellate
attorney fees is not a matter of right, but rests within our discretion.
In re
Marriage of Kurtt, 561 N.W.2d 385, 389 (Iowa Ct. App. 1997). We consider the
needs of the party making the request, the ability of the other party to pay, and
the relative merits of the appeal. In re Marriage of Sullins, 715 N.W.2d 242, 255
(Iowa 2006). We determine each party should pay his or her own appellate
attorney fees.
IV. Conclusion.
After considering all issues raised on appeal, whether or not specifically
addressed in this opinion, we modify the property equalization so that Mark is
required to pay Katherine the sum of $199,265.50. The rest of the decree is
affirmed. Costs of appeal are taxed one-half to each party.
AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
