BONNIE FITZPATRICK, Plaintiff - Appellant, vs. SQUARE D, Employer - Appellee, INSURANCE COMPANY, STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA, Insurance Carrier/Respondent - Appellee.
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 9-106 / 08-0945
Filed March 26, 2009
BONNIE FITZPATRICK,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
SQUARE D,
Employer-Appellee,
INSURANCE COMPANY, STATE
OF PENNSYLVANIA,
Insurance Carrier/Respondent-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Linn County, Marsha M.
Beckelman, Judge.
Employee appeals from a district court judicial review ruling affirming the
appeal decision of the workers‟ compensation commissioner. AFFIRMED.
Thomas M. Wertz and Matthew D. Dake of Wertz Law Firm, P.C., Cedar
Rapids, for appellant.
John M. Bickel and Sarah Anderson of Shuttleworth & Ingersoll, P.L.C.,
Cedar Rapids, for appellees.
Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Eisenhauer and Doyle, JJ.
2
DOYLE, J.
Bonnie Fitzpatrick appeals from a district court judicial review ruling
affirming the appeal decision of the workers‟ compensation commissioner. She
claims the agency erred in failing to award permanent partial disability benefits.
We affirm the decision of the district court.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
Fitzpatrick
was
employed
by
Square
D,
an
electrical
breaker
manufacturing company, for forty-one years. She worked on the assembly line
as a breaker technician, which required her to rotate among different positions on
the line assembling, inspecting, and packaging breakers. She frequently had to
bend over and lift breakers weighing about thirty pounds each.
Fitzpatrick suffered from back pain throughout her employment with
Square D. She first visited a physician due to low back pain in 1974. In 1979
she fractured two vertebras in her back after falling off a horse. She missed six
weeks of work as a result of that accident. Fitzpatrick was thrown from a horse
again in 1992, resulting in renewed low back pain.
She was off work for
approximately eight weeks due to that accident. By 1994, x-rays of Fitzpatrick‟s
back revealed disc degeneration. Her complaints of back pain began to increase
in the following years. She visited her family physician on multiple occasions
from 1998 through 2002 due to pain in her low back, and she began seeing a
chiropractor every three to four months in 1991. Her back pain was so severe in
June and December 2002 that she missed several days of work.
On August 5, 2003, while lifting a breaker and leaning over a table,
Fitzpatrick felt a “tremendous pain” “like a big burning sensation” in her lower
3
back. She completed her shift and attempted to work the following night, but the
pain worsened. Fitzpatrick decided to seek treatment from her family physician
on August 7. She told him she had been suffering from pain in her low back
“over the past couple weeks.” He removed her from work for one week.
Fitzpatrick reported her injury to Square D upon her return to work on
August 15, 2003. She was referred to Dr. Jeffrey Westpheling at the Work Well
Clinic in St. Luke‟s Hospital. At her first appointment with Dr. Westpheling on
September 8, she told him her low back pain “began approximately 6 months
ago” and “has become progressively worse.”
He ordered several diagnostic
studies, all of which were “essentially negative.” An x-ray of her lumbosacral
spine was unremarkable, a bone scan revealed no abnormalities, and an MRI
showed “mild degenerative disk disease at L2-L3 and L3-L4 with no disk
herniations identified.”
Dr. Westpheling implemented a conservative course of treatment, which
included physical therapy.
He placed Fitzpatrick at maximum medical
improvement on March 29, 2004, opining that her “pain remains mechanical in
nature, in that it is exacerbated with lifting and bending.” Although he imposed
permanent work restrictions, he did not believe she suffered any permanent
impairment as a result of her August 5, 2003 work injury. He later characterized
the restrictions as preventative and necessary due to her “age, degenerative disc
disease, and general level of conditioning.”
Square D accommodated Fitzpatrick‟s work restrictions and placed her in
a light duty position at her customary wage. Fitzpatrick was subsequently offered
4
an early retirement package due to downsizing at the plant. She accepted the
package and retired on February 18, 2005.
Fitzpatrick filed a petition with the Iowa Workers‟ Compensation
Commissioner on May 25, 2005, alleging she suffered an injury to her whole
body on August 5, 2003. Following an arbitration hearing, the deputy workers‟
compensation commissioner determined Fitzpatrick proved “that she sustained a
temporary aggravation of her pre-existing low back condition” on August 5, 2003,
and awarded her medical expenses related thereto. However, the deputy further
determined she did not prove that she “sustained a permanent injury as a result
of her work injury on August 5, 2003,” and denied her request for permanent
partial disability payments.
Fitzpatrick appealed, and the workers‟ compensation commissioner
affirmed and adopted the deputy‟s decision. Fitzpatrick then filed a petition for
judicial review.
Following a hearing, the district court affirmed the agency
decision. Fitzpatrick now appeals the district court‟s ruling on her petition for
judicial review. She claims the agency erred in failing to award her permanent
partial disability benefits.
II. Scope and Standards of Review.
The Iowa Administrative Procedure Act, chapter 17A of the Iowa Code,
governs the scope of our review in workers‟ compensation cases. Iowa Code §
86.26 (2007); Meyer v. IBP, Inc., 710 N.W.2d 213, 218 (Iowa 2006). “Under the
Act, we may only interfere with the commissioner‟s decision if it is erroneous
under one of the grounds enumerated in the statute, and a party‟s substantial
rights have been prejudiced.” Meyer, 710 N.W.2d at 218. The district court acts
5
in an appellate capacity to correct errors of law on the part of the agency.
Grundmeyer v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 649 N.W.2d 744, 748 (Iowa 2002).
In
reviewing the district court‟s decision, we apply the standards of chapter 17A to
determine whether our conclusions are the same as those reached by the district
court. Clark v. Vicorp Rests., Inc., 696 N.W.2d 596, 603 (Iowa 2005).
“If the claim of error lies with the agency‟s findings of fact, the proper
question on review is whether substantial evidence supports those findings of
fact” when the record is viewed as a whole. Meyer, 710 N.W.2d at 219. Factual
findings regarding the award of workers‟ compensation benefits are within the
commissioner‟s discretion, so we are bound by the commissioner‟s findings of
fact if they are supported by substantial evidence. Mycogen Seeds v. Sands,
686 N.W.2d 457, 464-65 (Iowa 2004).
Because factual determinations are within the discretion of the agency, so
is its application of law to the facts. Clark, 696 N.W.2d at 604; see also Meyer,
710 N.W.2d at 219 (stating the reviewing court should “allocate some degree of
discretion” in considering the agency‟s application of law to facts, “but not the
breadth of discretion given to the findings of facts”). We will reverse the agency‟s
application of the law to the facts if we determine its application was “irrational,
illogical, or wholly unjustifiable.” Meyer, 710 N.W.2d at 218.
III. Discussion.
Fitzpatrick claims the deputy erred in determining that she did not suffer a
permanent disability as a result of her work injury on August 5, 2003.
argues this decision was not based on substantial evidence and was illogical.
She
6
Permanent partial disability is determined by ascertaining the employee‟s
industrial disability. Hill v. Fleetguard, Inc., 705 N.W.2d 665, 673 (Iowa 2005).
“Industrial disability is based upon a loss in earning capacity, which „rests on a
comparison of what the injured worker could earn before the injury as compared
to what the same person could earn after the injury.‟” Id. (citation omitted). Loss
of earning capacity is determined by “considering the employee‟s functional
impairment, age, education, work experience, qualifications, ability to engage in
similar employment, and adaptability to retraining to the extent any of these
factors affect the employee‟s prospects for relocation in the job market.” Id.
The deputy‟s analysis of whether Fitzpatrick suffered permanent disability
focused primarily on whether she suffered any permanent functional impairment
to her back.
“However, functional impairment is only one of the factors we
consider when determining industrial disability.”1
Id.
It is “not solely
determinative.” Id. We must therefore first analyze whether substantial evidence
supports the deputy‟s finding that Fitzpatrick did not suffer a permanent
functional impairment to her back as a result of her August 5, 2003 work injury.
We will then analyze whether substantial evidence supports the deputy‟s ultimate
conclusion that Fitzpatrick did not suffer a permanent disability of any type.
1
As our supreme court explained in Bearce v. FMC Corp., 465 N.W.2d 531, 535 (Iowa
1999), functional and industrial disability are dissimilar.
Functional disability is assessed solely by determining the impairment of
the body function of the employee; industrial disability is gauged by
determining the loss to the employee‟s earning capacity. Functional
disability is limited to the loss of physiological capacity of the body or
body part. Industrial disability is not bound to the organ or body
incapacity, but measures the extent to which the injury impairs the
employee in the ability to earn wages.
Bearce, 465 N.W.2d at 535.
7
A. Permanent Physical Impairment.
In concluding Fitzpatrick did not suffer a permanent functional impairment
to her back as a result of her August 5, 2003 work injury, the deputy stated in
relevant part:
There is no dispute. Claimant has experienced prolonged back
pain, dating back to 1974. The back pain has waxed and waned
with time. Usually there is not a definitive diagnosis to accompany
any treatment . . . . Claimant begins to improve after a course of
conservative treatment.
Subsequent to the date of her work injury, claimant has
undergone extensive diagnostic testing. There are few objective
findings to conclude claimant‟s condition has permanently changed
since August 5, 2003.
Fitzpatrick argues that substantial evidence does not support the deputy‟s
finding that she “experienced prolonged back pain” that “waxed and waned” in
the years leading up to her work injury, instead characterizing her low back pain
prior to August 5, 2003, as “minimal and intermittent.” This argument is belied by
her medical records, which reveal she suffered from back pain for many years
prior to her work injury on August 5, 2003.
Fitzpatrick first began complaining of low back pain in 1974.
She
sustained a serious injury to her back in 1974 after she fell off a horse and
fractured two vertebras.
Fitzpatrick‟s back problems worsened in the 1990s
following another horse accident. She began seeing a chiropractor every three
to four months for her back pain and told her chiropractor in 1994 that she had
been having problems with her back “off and on for years.”
Fitzpatrick
consistently complained of low back pain to her family physician from 1998
through 2002. She missed several days of work in June 2002 and again in
December 2002 due to pain in her low back. Her back began bothering her
8
again approximately six months before the incident at work on August 5, 2003.
We believe a reasonable person could accept this evidence as sufficient to
conclude, like the deputy did here, that Fitzpatrick had a long history of back
problems preceding her work injury. See Iowa Code § 17A.19(f)(1) (defining
substantial evidence); Asmus v. Waterloo Cmty. Sch. Dist., 722 N.W2d 653, 657
(Iowa 2006) (stating evidence is substantial when a reasonable person could
accept it as adequate to reach the same finding).
Fitzpatrick next argues the deputy erred in failing to find her preexisting
back condition was aggravated by her work injury and resulted in a permanent
impairment. She is correct that it is “well settled that when an employee is hired,
the employer takes him subject to any active or dormant health impairments
incurred prior to this employment.” Ziegler v. United States Gypsum Co., 252
Iowa 613, 620, 106 N.W.2d 591, 595 (1961). Our supreme court has therefore
recognized that if an employee‟s preexisting condition was “aggravated,
accelerated, worsened or „lighted up‟ by the injury so it resulted in the disability
found to exist,” the employee is entitled to recover benefits from the employer.
Rose v. John Deere Ottumwa Works, 247 Iowa 900, 908, 76 N.W.2d 756, 761
(1956).
However, there is substantial evidence present in the record that
Fitzpatrick‟s preexisting back condition was not permanently aggravated by her
work injury on August 5, 2003.
Dr. Westpheling, who began treating Fitzpatrick for her back condition in
September 2003 following her injury at work, stated that although Fitzpatrick
initially attributed her back pain “to lifting breakers at work and leaning over a
table,” during his “treatment of her over . . . 13 occasions, it became more clear
9
that her symptoms were related to a degenerative condition of the back and not
related to a specific work injury.”
Although he imposed permanent work
restrictions, he stated they were preventative and required due to her “age,
degenerative disc disease, and general level of conditioning” rather than her
work injury. He opined that she did not suffer a permanent partial impairment as
a result of the incident at work on August 5, 2003.
Orthopedic surgeon Dr. Kevin Eck, who examined Fitzpatrick at
Dr. Westpheling‟s request, agreed with Dr. Westpheling‟s assessment of
Fitzpatrick‟s condition. He stated it was “clear . . . that Mrs. Fitzpatrick has had
problems predating the date of her injury . . . with respect to her lumbar spine.”
He believed her “symptoms were referable to myofascial pain and possibly also
relating to symptoms from underlying spondylosis.” Dr. Eck thus concurred with
Dr. Westpheling that “her need for restrictions [was] preventative” and that “she
did not sustain any permanent partial impairment as a result of” her work injury.
Dr. Ray Miller, Square D‟s examining physician, likewise opined that
Fitzpatrick had “chronic problems with her back for the past 30 years” with no
indication from any of the diagnostic studies “of an injury to the spine that can be
identified related to her activities in 8/2003.” He further noted “[t]here was no
evidence of any change in [her] low back from previous evaluations and previous
occurrences of low back pain.” Dr. Miller thus did not believe there was any
“injury to the back that occurred related to Ms. Fitzpatrick‟s employment at
Square D and there is no indication for permanent partial impairment.”
He
agreed with Drs. Westpheling and Eck that her work restrictions “were not
10
precipitated by a new injury that occurred at Square D but were prescribed to try
to lessen the occurrence of further flares of her chronic low back pain.”
Dr.
Nathan
Brady
examined
Fitzpatrick
on
one
occasion
in
Dr. Westpheling‟s absence and was the only physician to opine that she was
suffering from “an unresolved strain rather than a degenerative condition.” He
characterized her need for “physician care between 1994 and 2002 for low back
pain” as “quite minimal,” finding “little evidence that she was having chronic,
progressive back complaints due to disc degeneration or arthritis.” Dr. Brady
consequently determined Fitzpatrick suffered a five percent permanent
impairment of her whole body due to her work injury on August 5, 2003.
Fitzpatrick asserts the deputy erred in disregarding Dr. Brady‟s opinion.
However, it is the role of the agency to determine the credibility of the witnesses
and the weight to be given to any evidence, and it may accept or reject an expert
opinion in whole or in part. Sherman v. Pella Corp., 576 N.W.2d 312, 321 (Iowa
1998). Thus, the deputy was free to accept the opinions of Drs. Westpheling,
Eck, and Miller over that of Dr. Brady.2
The deputy specifically found
Dr. Westpheling‟s opinion was entitled to more weight than the contrary opinion
of Dr. Brady because Dr. Westpheling “treated [Fitzpatrick] for more than six
2
Fitzpatrick argues that the deputy erred in relying on the opinions of Drs. Westpheling,
Eck, and Miller because their opinions lacked “legal foundation” as there was “no
indication that they were provided the knowledge that the workplace injury only needed
to be one cause, not the only cause, in Fitzpatrick‟s disability.” Fitzpatrick, however, did
not raise such an objection at the time of the arbitration hearing when these physicians‟
opinions were admitted into evidence. She therefore did not afford Square D an
opportunity “to remedy the alleged defect.” See McSpadden v. Big Ben Coal Co., 288
N.W.2d 181, 187 (Iowa 1980). Her argument concerning the admission of their opinion
was thus not preserved. Id. Furthermore, as long as a logical basis exists for an
expert‟s opinion, any supposed weaknesses in that opinion “goes to its weight, not to its
admissibility.” Williams v. Hedican, 561 N.W.2d 817, 831 (Iowa 1997).
11
months and had ample opportunity to observe [her] over the course of her
treatment.”
Dr. Brady, on the other hand, “examined [Fitzpatrick] on one
occasion” and “holds a specialty in public health” while Dr. Eck, who agreed with
Dr. Westpheling‟s assessment of Fitzpatrick, is an orthopedic surgeon.
Furthermore, as Square D notes, Dr. Brady was not provided with Fitzpatrick‟s
entire medical history as the other physicians were.
It is not the role of the district court on judicial review, nor this court on
appeal, to reassess the weight and credibility of any of this evidence. See Arndt
v. City of Le Claire, 728 N.W.2d 389, 394-95 (Iowa 2007).
We accordingly
conclude substantial evidence supports the deputy‟s finding that Fitzpatrick did
not suffer a permanent functional impairment to her back as a result of the
incident at work on August 5, 2003.
B. Industrial Disability.
Having found substantial evidence to support the deputy‟s finding that
Fitzpatrick suffered no permanent injury to her back, we turn to the remaining
industrial disability factors to determine whether she suffered a permanent
disability. See Hill, 705 N.W.2d at 675. Before doing so, we must first address
Fitzpatrick‟s argument that “an award of industrial disability may be appropriate
even in the absence of a physical impairment.” In support of this argument, she
relies on our supreme court‟s opinions in McSpadden, 288 N.W.2d at 192, and
Blacksmith v. All-American, Inc., 290 N.W.2d 348, 354 (Iowa 1980).
We agree with Fitzpatrick that those two cases stand for her above-stated
proposition: a permanent partial disability award may be proper where there is
no functional impairment. See Blacksmith, 290 N.W.2d at 354; McSpadden, 288
12
N.W.2d at 192. In McSpadden, 288 N.W.2d at 192, our supreme court indicated
an award of permanent partial disability benefits would be justified even in the
absence of functional impairment if an employer refused to provide an employee
work, or if an employee could not find “other suitable work after making bona fide
efforts.”
In light of the principles enunciated in McSpadden, the court in
Blacksmith, 290 N.W.2d at 354, determined an employee was “not barred from
recovery by failure to prove an increased functional disability of his leg” where
the employee was precluded from working at the job he had before “because his
employer believes the past injury disqualifies him, resulting in a palpable
reduction in earning capacity.” However, the key to determining disability in both
cases remained the employee‟s “capacity to perform his work or to earn equal
wages in other suitable employment.” See McSpadden, 288 N.W.2d at 192;
Blacksmith, 290 N.W.2d at 350, 354.
We do not believe either McSpadden or Blacksmith controls the result in
this case as Fitzpatrick made no showing that Square D refused to provide her
work or that she could not find “other suitable work after making bona fide
efforts.” See McSpadden, 288 N.W.2d at 192. Rather, the record establishes
Square D provided Fitzpatrick with employment within her work restrictions at her
same wage until she accepted its early retirement offer in February 2005. See
Hill, 705 N.W.2d at 675 (stating the fact that the employee “continued to work the
same amount of hours, at the same rate of pay, weighs against any finding of
reduced earning capacity”). Furthermore, although Fitzpatrick continually asserts
in her appellate brief that she was “unable to return to her 41 year position at
Square D” following her injury on August 5, 2003, the facts presented at the
13
arbitration hearing show she was offered and voluntarily accepted an attractive
early retirement package due to downsizing at the plant. See Clark, 696 N.W.2d
at 606 (finding no injury-caused reduction in earning capacity where employee
was terminated because she did not return to work within the time required by
company policy); U.S. West Commc’ns, Inc. v. Overholser, 566 N.W.2d 873, 877
(Iowa 1997) (determining employee did not show a reduction in earning capacity
caused by her work injury where she was terminated as a result of company
downsizing). A representative of Square D testified that if Fitzpatrick had chosen
not to accept the early retirement package, the company would have been able
to continue to employ her within her work restrictions.
We believe this case is more akin to the facts presented in Hill, 705
N.W.2d at 675. Like the employee in Hill, Fitzpatrick did not prove she had any
permanent restrictions caused by her work-related injuries, contrary to her
arguments otherwise. 705 N.W.2d at 675. Drs. Westpheling, Eck, and Miller all
stated her restrictions were preventative and necessary due to her preexisting
back condition, rejecting the notion the restrictions were “precipitated by a new
injury that occurred at Square D.”3 Only Dr. Brady, whose opinion was dismissed
3
Fitzpatrick argues that labeling the work restrictions as preventative does not change
their detrimental impact on her earning capacity, which is the proper focus of an
industrial disability inquiry. She is correct that our supreme court in Excel Corp. v.
Smithart, 654 N.W.2d 891, 901 (Iowa 2002), stated it is the impact of a restriction on the
worker that is important rather than its supposed preventative nature. However, there is
substantial evidence present in the record to support the agency‟s conclusion that
Fitzpatrick‟s work restrictions were not related to her August 5, 2003 work injury and
were instead required due to her preexisting back condition. See Terwilliger v. Snap-On
Tools Corp., 529 N.W.2d 267, 271 (Iowa 1995) (“The mere fact that we could draw
inconsistent conclusions from the same evidence does not mean that substantial
evidence does not support the commissioner‟s determinations.”).
14
by the agency, believed her permanent restrictions were necessitated by her
August 5, 2003 work injury.
It is the agency‟s duty as the trier of fact “to determine the credibility of the
witnesses, weigh the evidence, and decide the facts in issue.”
Arndt, 728
N.W.2d at 394-95. Our job as the reviewing court is simply to determine whether
substantial evidence supports a finding “according to those witnesses whom the
[commissioner] believed.” Id. at 395. We thus reject Fitzpatrick‟s attempts on
appeal to argue that the permanent restrictions imposed by Dr. Westpheling were
related to her injury on August 5, 2003.
“Without proof of permanent restrictions caused by work-related injuries,
the additional factors of age, limited vocational experience, and education lose
their importance.” Hill, 705 N.W.2d at 675. This is especially so in light of the
fact that Fitzpatrick continued to work the same amount of hours at the same rate
of pay prior to her voluntary early retirement. Id. In addition, like the employee in
Hill, Fitzpatrick‟s “only remaining proof of industrial disability comes from her
testimony that she could perform many activities before” August 5, 2003, but now
is unable to perform many of those same activities. Id. Although this may be a
persuasive argument, when it is viewed in light of the medical evidence, lack of
impairment rating, and Fitzpatrick‟s past medical problems, we cannot say the
agency‟s findings are not supported by substantial evidence. See id.
In light of our conclusion that substantial evidence supports the agency‟s
determination that Fitzpatrick did not establish she suffered a permanent
disability, we must reject her remaining argument that the agency erred in its
application of the apportionment rule as articulated in Second Injury Fund v.
15
Nelson, 544 N.W.2d 258, 264 (Iowa 1995). That rule provides that “[w]hen a
prior injury, condition or illness, unrelated to employment, independently
produces an ascertainable portion of an injured employee‟s cumulative industrial
disability, the employer is liable only for that portion of the industrial disability
attributable to the current injury.” Nelson, 544 N.W.2d at 264.
However, there are two limitations on this rule. Id. The first is that relied
upon by Fitzpatrick:
[T]he prior injury or condition must cause an “ascertainable portion”
of the ultimate industrial disability. Thus, if the portion of the
industrial disability resulting from the pre-existing, nonwork-related
injury or condition cannot be determined, the employer is liable for
the full industrial disability of the employee.
Id. (internal citation omitted).
Fitzpatrick interprets this limitation as meaning
“unless the preexisting condition was acting to prevent the subsequently injured
employee from working,” which she asserts was not the case here, “the
preexisting condition does not allow the employer to avoid its liability.” But as
Square D correctly observes, in order for the apportionment rule to even apply,
there must be a finding of industrial disability. See id. Because the agency
determined Fitzpatrick did not prove she was permanently disabled, it did not and
could not have applied the apportionment rule or its exceptions as articulated in
Nelson.
We therefore disagree with Fitzpatrick‟s assertions that the agency
incorrectly, or otherwise, applied the apportionment rule in this case.
IV. Conclusion.
We, like the district court, conclude there was substantial evidence to
support the agency‟s determination that Fitzpatrick did not establish an industrial
16
disability and she was thus not entitled to permanent partial disability benefits.
We therefore affirm the decision of the district court.
AFFIRMED.
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.