IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF DAVID A. MYERS AND JODY R. MEYERS Upon the Petition of DAVID A. MYERS, Petitioner-Appellant, And Concerning JODY R. MYERS, Respondent-Appellee.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 9-065 / 08-1310
Filed April 8, 2009
IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF DAVID A. MYERS AND JODY R. MEYERS
Upon the Petition of
DAVID A. MYERS,
Petitioner-Appellant,
And Concerning
JODY R. MYERS,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Howard County, James C. Bauch,
Judge.
David Myers appeals the alimony and property division provisions of the
decree dissolving his marriage to Jody Myers. Jody seeks an award of appellate
attorney fees. AFFIRMED.
Marion L. Beatty of Miller, Pearson, Gloe, Burns, Beatty & Cowie, P.L.C.,
Decorah, for appellant.
Dale L. Putnam, Decorah, for appellee.
Considered by Mahan, P.J., and Miller and Doyle, JJ.
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MILLER, J.
David Myers appeals the alimony and property division provisions of the
decree dissolving his marriage to Jody Myers. He contends the district court
erred in ordering him to pay alimony to Jody of $1,000 per month until she dies or
re-marries, and its division of property was unjust and inequitable. Jody seeks
an award of appellate attorney fees. We affirm.
David and Jody were married on June 3, 1978. They have two adult
children.
David filed a petition for dissolution of marriage on September 10,
2007. On September 27, 2007, the court entered an order preventing either
party from dissipating assets, and on October 29, 2007, an order requiring David
to pay Jody $500 per month in temporary support and $2,500 in temporary
attorney fees. The matter proceeded to trial in April 2008.
David was fifty-one years of age at the time of trial.
He has been
employed at R.R. Donnelley since 1984 and has farmed for twenty-four years.
David’s 2007 W-2 form shows gross pay of $43,027.91, from which $4,302.79
went into a 401(k) plan, and another $6,602.24 was used to purchase additional
“cafeteria” benefits. He had a retirement account with a value of $247,111. The
district court found that although David has some pain in his knees and back the
pain was not inconsistent with his age and the type of work he does, and it did
not preclude him from continuing any of his work. The parties agreed David
would receive the family homestead at the appraised value of $137,000, subject
to the debt on it, and that he would keep certain equipment that he would need to
continue farming.
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Jody was forty-eight years of age at the time of trial.
She completed
school only through the eighth grade and never received a GED. She reads at
approximately a third grade level, does math at a fifth grade level, has difficulty
spelling words beyond the third grade level, and has an overall IQ of eighty. She
has done manual labor her entire working life, and during the parties’ marriage
worked in a hog confinement facility as well as on their farm.
In January 1999 Jody injured her back while working at the hog
confinement facility and has not been employed since. Under the Social Security
Administration’s rules and regulations Jody was classified as totally disabled as
of March 1999. She receives $669 per month in social security disability benefits
as a result of this classification, but is required to pay $100 per month of that for
Medicaid, giving her a net monthly amount of social security benefits of $569.
Jody also received a worker’s compensation award in November 2001 as
a result of her work-related injury.
The Iowa Worker’s Compensation
Commissioner assigned her a seventy-five percent industrial disability and
awarded her 375 weeks of permanent partial disability at $311.28 per week,
effective January 11, 2001. We note that based on this date and the number of
weeks of benefits Jody’s worker’s compensation benefits ended approximately a
month before trial in this case.
Jody continues to have several health problems, including chronic back
pain and chronic pain syndrome, and takes a multitude of prescription
medications for these and other problems.
The district court found that her
limited education and health issues are significant and permanent problems that
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will preclude her from obtaining employment and make it highly unlikely that she
will ever become self-supporting in any work, let alone be in a position to enjoy
the standard of living she enjoyed during the marriage.
The court filed a dissolution decree on July 1, 2008. Each party filed a
motion pursuant to Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.904(2). In ruling on these
motions the court amended its decree. As amended, the decree ordered David
to pay Jody $1,000 per month in alimony until she dies or remarries; awarded
David property with a net value of approximately $251,000 and awarded Jody
property with a net value of approximately $240,000; and ordered David to pay
an additional $4,000 toward Jody’s attorney fees. In making its property division
the court ordered David to sell a sufficient amount of stored grain to pay Jody
$100,000 and to be responsible for any resulting taxes, and awarded Jody onehalf of David’s 401(k) plan.
David appeals, contending the court’s award of $1,000 per month in
traditional alimony was excessive and inequitable relative to his income and
ability to pay, and particularly so given the court’s property division. He further
claims the property division, particularly the division of his retirement account,
was unjust and inequitable. Jody seeks an award of appellate attorney fees.
In this equity case our review is de novo.
Iowa R. App. P. 6.4. We
examine the entire record and adjudicate rights anew on the issues properly
presented. In re Marriage of Rhinehart, 704 N.W.2d 677, 680 (Iowa 2005). We
need not separately consider assignment of error in the trial court’s findings of
fact and conclusions of law, but make such findings and conclusions from our de
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novo review as we deem appropriate. Lessenger v. Lessenger, 261 Iowa 1076,
1078, 156 N.W.2d 845, 846 (1968). We give weight to the fact-findings of the
trial court, especially when considering the credibility of the witnesses, but are
not bound by them. Iowa R. App. 6.14(6)(g). This is because the trial court has
a firsthand opportunity to hear the evidence and view the witnesses.
In re
Marriage of Will, 489 N.W.2d 394, 397 (Iowa 1992).
David first contends the district court’s award of $1,000 per month
traditional alimony to Jody was excessive relative to his income and ability to
pay, and particularly so given the court’s property division.
“Alimony is an allowance to the spouse in lieu of the legal obligation for
support.” In re Marriage of Sjulin, 431 N.W.2d 773, 775 (Iowa 1988). Any form
of spousal support is discretionary with the court. In re Marriage of Ask, 551
N.W.2d 643, 645 (Iowa 1996).
Spousal support is not an absolute right; an
award depends on the circumstances of each particular case. In re Marriage of
Dieger, 584 N.W.2d 567, 570 (Iowa Ct. App. 1998). The discretionary award of
spousal support is made after considering the factors listed in what is now Iowa
Code section 598.21A(1) (2007). Id. Even though our review is de novo, we
accord the district court considerable discretion in making spousal support
determinations and will disturb its ruling only where there has been a failure to do
equity. In re Marriage of Kurtt, 561 N.W.2d 385, 388 (Iowa Ct. App. 1997). We
consider the length of the marriage, the age and health of the parties, the parties’
earning capacities, the levels of education, and the likelihood the party seeking
alimony will be self-supporting at a standard of living comparable to the one
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enjoyed during the marriage. In re Marriage of Clinton, 579 N.W.2d 835, 839
(Iowa Ct. App. 1998).
Property division and alimony should be considered
together in evaluating their individual sufficiency. In re Marriage of Trickey, 589
N.W.2d 753, 756 (Iowa Ct. App. 1998).
An alimony award will differ in amount and duration according to the
purpose it is designed to serve. In re Marriage of Hettinga, 574 N.W.2d 920, 922
(Iowa Ct. App. 1997). Traditional alimony, such as was awarded here, is payable
for life or for so long as a dependent spouse is incapable of self-support. In re
Marriage of O'Rourke, 547 N.W.2d 864, 866 (Iowa Ct. App. 1996). In marriages
of long duration where the earning disparity between the parties is great, both
spousal support and nearly equal property division may be appropriate. In re
Marriage of Weinberger, 507 N.W.2d 733, 735 (Iowa Ct. App. 1993).
Here the parties had been married for nearly thirty years, David was fiftyone and Jody was forty-eight. David was in relatively good health other than
some minor knee, back, and hip problems, which the district court found were not
inconsistent with his age and work, and no substantial evidence indicates these
problems will prevent him from working and continuing to farm, now or in the
foreseeable future. The evidence shows that David’s gross income for 2007 was
$43,027.91.
Jody, on the other hand, has been found by the Social Security
Administration to have become permanently disabled in 1999, has been found by
the worker’s compensation commissioner to have a seventy-five percent
industrial disability, and suffers from several work-related and other health
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problems. She attended school only through the eighth grade, and reads, writes,
and performs math at very low levels. Jody has not worked outside the home
since her 1999 work injury.
Although she has attempted to obtain other
employment she has been unsuccessful due to her physical conditions and her
limited reading, writing, and math abilities. Jody’s only sources of income at the
time of trial were her social security disability benefits and temporary spousal
support. Accordingly we, like the district court, find Jody’s health problems and
her low level of education and functioning to be significant and permanent
problems that severely limit her earning capacity and ability to work, even if they
perhaps do not entirely prevent her from some work. Further, Jody is only fortyeight years of age and her health problems may only worsen with age. It is
highly unlikely she will ever become self-supporting at a standard of living
comparable to the one she enjoyed during marriage.
Applying the factors under section 598.21A(1), and for the reasons set
forth above, we conclude Jody is entitled to the award of traditional spousal
support of $1,000 per month until she dies or remarries. Although we agree with
the district court that the amount of $1,000 per month of traditional alimony is
rather high, based on the particular facts and circumstances of this case as
detailed above we conclude the district court did not act inequitably or abuse its
discretion in awarding the amount and duration of alimony. As noted above, in
marriages of long duration where the earning disparity between the parties is
great, such as here, both spousal support and nearly equal property division may
be appropriate. Weinberger, 507 N.W.2d at 735. David’s alimony payments will
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be deductible from his gross income in calculating his income tax obligation,
giving him some income tax benefit. See I.R.C. §§ 62(a)(10), 215(a) (2007).
David received a substantial property award, including the homestead, which will
allow him to continue working and farming, thus enjoying a lifestyle approaching
the one he enjoyed during the course of the marriage, even after his alimony
payments. The alimony award was not excessive in relation to David’s current
income and earning capacity.
David next contends the district court’s property division, particularly the
division of his retirement account, was unjust and inequitable because the court
required him “to pay the taxes on all of the assets,”1 and he received mostly nonliquid assets while Jody received more liquid assets. He claims the division was
also inequitable given the court’s alimony award.
Iowa is an equitable distribution state, which means the partners in a
marriage that is to be dissolved are entitled to a just and equitable share of the
property accumulated through their joint efforts. In re Marriage of Robison, 542
N.W.2d 4, 5 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995). Iowa courts do not require an equal division
or percentage distribution. In re Marriage of Russell, 473 N.W.2d 244, 246 (Iowa
Ct. App. 1991). The determining factor is what is fair and equitable in each
particular circumstance.
Id.
When distributing property we take into
consideration the criteria now codified in Iowa Code section 598.21(5). In re
Marriage of Goodwin, 606 N.W.2d 315, 319 (Iowa 2000). In dividing property the
court is to consider the tax consequences to each party. Iowa Code §
1
We presume David means the court required him to pay any income taxes that
resulted from the court’s order that he sell stored grain to generate the funds to pay Jody
the $100,000 ordered by the court.
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598.21(5)(j). In making a property division we have taken into consideration the
tax consequences a party is expected to face in satisfying a property distribution.
See e.g., In re Marriage of Miller, 552 N.W.2d 460, 465 (Iowa Ct. App. 1996).
Where a payment of a lump sum of cash to a spouse will in all probability require
the liquidation of capital assets, the income tax consequences of such a sale
should be considered by the trial court in assessing the equities of the property
and spousal support awards. See In re Marriage of Hogeland, 448 N.W.2d 678,
680-81 (Iowa Ct. App. 1989).
In making the property distribution, the district court stated it took into
account the deposition testimony of attorney Robert Story, the parties’ tax
preparer. Story testified that David may incur approximately $28,619 in federal
taxes and approximately $10,776 in state taxes if the court were to require him to
sell his stored grain worth approximately $110,000 in order to pay Jody the
$100,000 lump sum she was requesting. The court ordered David to sell the
grain in order to pay Jody $100,000, and to be responsible for any taxes resulting
from that sale.
In doing so the court stated, “[I]t is apparent that what tax
consequences may occur to David will be significantly reduced or eliminated as a
result of his farming operation.”
Considering the factors set forth in section 598.21(5), and based on our de
novo review, we conclude the district court’s property division was not unjust or
inequitable. The court’s division of David’s retirement plan was necessary in
order to make the property division equitable. Furthermore, assuming without
deciding that the district court somewhat underestimated the income tax
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consequences to David from the sale of the grain, we conclude the property
division would not be inequitable even if David must pay all or most of the
approximately $39,000 in taxes that may result from the sale. After the payment
of such taxes David would have a net property award of approximately $212,000,
while Jody would have a net award of approximately $240,000. Considering the
fact David received the homestead, thus allowing him to continue the farming
operation, the length of the marriage, Jody’s poor health, and the great
disparities in income and earning capacities of the parties, we believe the
property division, while somewhat favorable to Jody, would nevertheless remain
equitable.
The economic provisions of a dissolution decree are “not a
computation of dollars and cents, but a balancing of equities.”
Clinton, 579
N.W.2d at 839.
Jody seeks an award of appellate attorney fees. Appellate attorney fees
are not a matter of right, but rather rest in the appellate court's discretion. In re
Marriage of Sullins, 715 N.W.2d 242, 255 (Iowa 2006). We consider the needs
of a party seeking an award, the ability of the other party to pay, and the relative
merits of the appeal. Id. Applying these factors to the circumstances in this
case, we award Jody $2,000 in appellate attorney fees.
AFFIRMED.
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