PAUL LAIR, Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellee, vs. MOTOR INN OF SPIRIT LAKE, INC., and DAVID FAHLSING, Defendants-Appellees/Cross-Appellants.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 9-045 / 08-0769
Filed May 29, 2009
PAUL LAIR,
Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellee,
vs.
MOTOR INN OF SPIRIT LAKE, INC.,
and DAVID FAHLSING,
Defendants-Appellees/Cross-Appellants.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Dickinson County, David A. Lester,
Judge.
The plaintiff appeals from the district court‟s ruling denying him
compensatory damages for repairs to his vehicle. AFFIRMED.
Michael Bovee, Spencer, for appellant.
Rene Lapierre, Sioux City, for appellee Motor Inn.
James Daane, Sioux City, for appellee Fahlsing.
Heard by Sackett, C.J., and Vogel, J. and Nelson, S.J.*
*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 (2009).
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VOGEL, J.
Paul Lair appeals a district court‟s ruling that dismissed his petition
seeking compensatory damage for repairs to his car following an accident. We
affirm.
I. Background Facts & Proceedings
Lair purchased a 1996 Dodge Viper, in pristine condition, in the spring of
2002 for $39,500. The model purchased was a sought-after collector‟s item, with
an estimated value of $45,000-$55,000.
After purchasing the vehicle, Lair
brought it to Spirit Lake Motor Inn (Motor Inn) in order to show the manager and
sales staff; he also invited them to take the Viper for a test drive. Lair returned to
Motor Inn in late June 2002 when he heard a “clunking noise” and wanted it
inspected. Approximately two weeks later, Lair returned to monitor the progress,
and Motor Inn employee, David Fahlsing, informed him that they had not yet
been able to determine the source of the clunking noise. Lair agreed to allow
Fahlsing to drive the Viper to his home overnight in order to further test for the
source of the noise. It was disputed as to whether Lair had knowledge that it was
Fahlsing‟s birthday, and because of that, gave him permission to drive the Viper.
After work, Fahlsing drove the Viper to his home in Lakefield, Minnesota, which is
approximately twenty miles from Motor Inn. Lair assumed Fahlsing lived in Spirit
Lake.
Because he left his own car at Motor Inn, and Fahlsing needed
transportation for the evening, he proceeded to drive the Viper to a nearby
campground. There, he celebrated his birthday with friends for the next three to
four hours. After consuming three beers and eating dinner, Fahlsing started
driving back to his home around 10:30 p.m.
3
On his drive home, Fahlsing encountered two deer that darted into the
road. He slammed on his brakes and turned the steering wheel to the right,
causing the vehicle to spin, and hit the double posts of a road sign before sliding
into the ditch. Fahlsing testified that he was driving approximately 40-45 miles
per hour, well within the posted speed limit.
The highway patrolman who
investigated the accident administered a preliminary breath test, which indicated
Fahlsing‟s blood alcohol was .04, which is below the legal limit. Fahlsing was not
cited for any traffic violations. The next morning, Fahlsing returned to Motor Inn
and telephoned Lair to report the incident.
Lair obtained two estimates for repair on the Viper, ranging from $18,000$24,000, and received $14,654.34 from his insurance carrier.1 Fahlsing also
reported the accident to his insurance carrier, but was denied coverage for the
damages. Motor Inn determined that the accident occurred under circumstances
unrelated to employment, and denied Lair reimbursement. Lair filed a lawsuit
against Motor Inn and Fahlsing for damages.
The district court found that there was insufficient evidence to prove,
among other things, that Fahlsing: was driving at an excessive or unsafe speed;
operating the Viper in a reckless or careless manner; or failing to maintain a
proper lookout. It did find Fahlsing failed to have the Viper under control, as he
was unable to stop the car when confronted with the deer bounding onto the
roadway. However, the court found Fahlsing met his burden of proof that any
alleged negligence was legally excused by the application of the sudden
emergency doctrine.
1
It then concluded that even if the sudden emergency
Lair paid $500 for his deductible.
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doctrine did not apply, Motor Inn was not liable because Fahlsing‟s actions of
driving the Viper for his own personal use and enjoyment were outside the scope
of his employment.
In addition, the court determined Lair could not recover
under his bailment claim against Motor Inn: discussions between Fahlsing and
Lair as to Fahlsing‟s use of the Viper created a separate bailment or modified the
original bailment such that Motor Inn was not contractually liable to Lair for the
damages suffered. Lair appeals.2
II. Standard of Review
Findings of fact in jury-waived cases shall have the effect of a special
verdict. Iowa R. App. P. 6.4. Our review is limited to correction of errors at law,
and we are bound by the findings of the trial court if they are supported by
substantial evidence in the record.
Iowa R. App. P. 6.14(6)(a); Osage
Conservation Club v. Bd. of Supervisors, 611 N.W.2d 294, 296 (Iowa 2000).
III. Negligence
Lair asserts that Fahlsing was negligent in his operation of the Viper, and
the district court erred in finding that negligence was excused by application of
the sudden emergency doctrine. The sudden emergency doctrine excuses a
defendant‟s failure to obey statutory law when confronted with an emergency not
of the defendant‟s own making. Foster v. Ankrum, 636 N.W.2d 104, 106 (Iowa
2001). Sudden emergency has been defined as: (1) an unforeseen combination
of circumstances which calls for immediate action; (2) a perplexing contingency
2
Fahlsing cross appeals the district court‟s finding that he was not acting within the
scope of his employment or that he had a separate bailment agreement with Lair, in the
event that we would reverse the district court. As we affirm, we need not address his
cross appeal.
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or complication of circumstances; (3) a sudden or unexpected occasion for
action, exigency, or pressing necessity. Id. When the actor‟s own negligence is
the cause of the emergency, the fact that he then behaved in a manner entirely
reasonable in the light of the situation, does not insulate his liability for his prior
conduct.
Bannon v. Pfiffner, 333 N.W.2d 464, 470 (Iowa 1983) (citations
omitted). It is negligence prior to the accident which makes a person liable for
the emergency and its ramifications. Id. The standard of conduct that applies to
an action for negligence is the care of a reasonable person under the
circumstances. Benham v. King, 700 N.W.2d 314, 317 (Iowa 2005).
Lair claims the district court should have found Fahlsing was operating the
Viper at an excessive or unsafe speed, or in a reckless or careless manner, and
failed to maintain a proper lookout.
No one except Fahlsing witnessed the
accident and the investigating state trooper issued Fahlsing no citations. As the
district court found in referencing Iowa Code section 321.285, there is no
evidence that Fahlsing was driving faster than would allow him to stop the vehicle
for “noticeable objects reasonably expected or anticipated to be on the highway.”
There is simply no evidence to support Lair‟s assertions. Further, while Fahlsing
did register a blood alcohol content of .04, this was within the legal limit and there
is no evidence this impaired his operation of the vehicle. The district court found
that Fahlsing‟s conduct prior to the accident was not negligent, and the record
supports this finding.
The district court did find that because Fahlsing was unable to stop when
the deer ran out that he did not have control over the vehicle. However, it also
found Fahlsing met his burden of proof that any such negligence was legally
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excused under the sudden emergency doctrine. We agree with the district court
that Fahlsing proved that the sudden emergency was not created by his own
negligent conduct and was therefore available for his defense. Fahlsing was met
with the unforeseen situation of two deer suddenly bolting out in front of him on
the highway. He reacted by braking and turning the wheel in order to avoid
hitting the deer. While Lair claims Fahlsing‟s reactions were not reasonable, as
he caused the car to spin 180 degrees, hit a post, and slid into the ditch, there is
no evidence in the record to support these assertions. The record does support
the district court‟s conclusion that Fahlsing reacted in a manner that was
reasonable and proper. We affirm.
IV. Scope of Employment
Lair next asserts the district court erred when it found that at the time of
the accident, Fahlsing was acting outside the scope of his employment with
Motor Inn. While we need not reach this issue, as we find no negligence that
could be imputed to Motor Inn, we will briefly discuss this claim. For an act to be
within the scope of employment, the conduct complained of “must be of the same
general nature as that authorized or incidental to the conduct authorized.” Godar
v. Edwards, 588 N.W.2d 701, 705 (Iowa 1999).
The question, therefore, is
whether the employee‟s conduct “is so unlike that authorized that it is
„substantially different.‟” Id. at 706 (citation omitted).
In his deposition, the general manager of Motor Inn, Nick Stamoulis,
testified that at no time in the six years since he had worked at Motor Inn had an
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employee ever been allowed to test drive a vehicle after work hours. 3 He stated
that any agreement between Fahlsing and Lair to drive the vehicle was a
separate agreement, outside of the knowledge or consent of Motor Inn. Dennis
Quastad, the service manager of Motor Inn at the time of the incident, agreed
testifying that while working on a customer‟s vehicle it would be unacceptable for
an employee to take that vehicle to some place like a campground; and if an
employee did so after hours, it was their responsibility.
The district court was correct in finding that Fahlsing‟s conduct was
“substantially different” from the authorized standard. The agreement between
Lair and Fahlsing, in which Fahlsing would drive the Viper to his home and keep
it overnight, went outside the bounds of the protocol for “test driving” utilized by
Motor Inn. Beyond that, for his own pleasure, Fahlsing then drove the Viper to a
campground where he ate and drank with friends. Substantial evidence supports
that this was not a practice authorized by Motor Inn. Therefore, we agree with
the district court that Fahlsing was not operating within the scope of his
employment with Motor Inn when he drove the Viper for his own purposes.
V. Bailment
Lair next contends that leaving his car in Motor Inn‟s overnight care
created a bailment and the district court erred in finding Motor Inn was not liable
under this theory.
Where there exists a bailment for mutual benefit, if the
bailment was damaged while in the bailee‟s possession, there is a presumption
that the damage is due to the negligence of the bailee. Naxera v. Wathan, 159
N.W.2d 513, 518 (Iowa 1968).
3
Motor Inn, as the bailee, has the burden of
Depositions were made a part of the record in this case.
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showing that the damage occurred despite exercising due care. Id. We agree
with the district court that Motor Inn met this burden because Fahlsing‟s taking of
Lair‟s Viper overnight, and for his own personal use, was outside his scope of
employment. Two former Motor Inn employees testified to the side agreement
between Fahlsing and Lair, in which Lair allowed Fahlsing to drive the Viper to
his home and keep it overnight without any restrictions. In addition, the district
court found the side agreement included Lair‟s knowledge that it was Fahlsing‟s
birthday. This separate agreement was made without the knowledge or approval
of Motor Inn.
Substantial evidence supports the district court‟s finding that
consequently Motor Inn was not bound by the original bailment agreement and
therefore not liable for the damages to Lair‟s vehicle.
Having reviewed all of plaintiff‟s arguments on appeal, we affirm the
district court.
AFFIRMED.
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