IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF GRANT C. BRINTNALL AND LINDA K. BRINTNALL Upon the Petition of GRANT CHRISTOPHER BRINTNALL, Petitioner - Appellee, And Concerning LINDA K. BRINTNALL, Respondent - Appellant.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 9-043 / 08-0732
Filed March 26, 2009
IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF GRANT C. BRINTNALL AND LINDA K.
BRINTNALL
Upon the Petition of
GRANT CHRISTOPHER BRINTNALL,
Petitioner-Appellee,
And Concerning
LINDA K. BRINTNALL,
Respondent-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Marshall County, Michael J. Moon,
Judge.
Respondent appeals the child custody and financial provisions of the
decree dissolving her marriage to petitioner. AFFIRMED.
John J. Wood of Beecher, Field, Walker, Morris, Hoffman & Johnson,
P.C., Waterloo, for appellant.
Barry S. Kaplan and Melissa A. Nine of Kaplan, Frese & Nine, L.L.P.,
Marshalltown, for appellee.
Heard by Sackett, C.J., and Potterfield and Mansfield, JJ.
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SACKETT, C.J.
Linda Brintnall appeals from the decree dissolving her fifteen-year
marriage to Grant Brintnall. She contends (1) she should have been named
primary custodian of the parties’ three children, (2) the children should not have
been placed in the parties’ joint physical care, and (3) if the award of joint
physical care is approved we should modify the decree and adopt her proposed
schedule for exchanging the children.
She also contends the district court’s
division of assets was not equitable. We affirm.
SCOPE OF REVIEW. Equity proceedings, such as dissolution decrees,
are reviewed de novo on appeal.
Iowa R. App. P. 6.4; In re Marriage of
McCurnin, 681 N.W.2d 322, 327 (Iowa 2004).
BACKGROUND AND PROCEEDINGS. The parties, both born in 1959,
were married in 1993. Grant is a middle school teacher in the Marshalltown
Community School District and earns about $68,000 annually.
He holds a
bachelor and master’s degree from Iowa State University and has earned fortyfive hours towards a doctorate. Linda, a half-time teacher in the same school
district, earns about $30,000 annually.
She holds a bachelor and master’s
degree from the University of Northern Iowa and has earned forty-five hours
towards a doctorate. If employed in education on a full-time basis her earnings
would be comparable to Grant’s. The parties have two sons, born in 1998 and
2000, respectively, and a daughter, born in 2002.
In the summer of 2007 Grant filed the petition for dissolution of their
marriage. He sought joint physical care of the children and an equitable division
3
of assets. Linda answered, denying that the children should be placed in the
parties’ joint physical care. She contended that the children should be in her
primary physical care.
The matter came on for trial in March of 2008. The district court entered a
decree in April of the same year. The court found Grant and Linda both to be
exceptional parents and the children to be bright, articulate, well-behaved, and
fun-loving, who were faring well under the circumstances. The court noted the
parties had agreed they should have joint legal custody of the children. After
analyzing the applicable law and considering the facts, the court concluded the
parties should have shared physical care alternating on a weekly basis. The
court found such an arrangement to be in the best long-range interest of the
children. Grant was ordered to pay child support to Linda of $658.86 a month.
Medical support and college support issues were addressed. The district court
divided the parties’ assets and in doing so considered inherited and gifted
property, property brought to the marriage, and property accumulated during the
marriage. The division reached by the district court resulted in Grant receiving
equities of $336,950 and Linda receiving equities of $290,307.
Grant was
awarded the additional amount based on the district court’s determination he
brought more assets to the marriage than did Linda.
CUSTODY. Linda contends she should be the primary care parent and if
she is not so named then the arrangement for exchanging the children should be
modified. Grant contends the district court was correct in awarding joint physical
care and the district court should be affirmed in all respects on this issue.
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When considering issues of child custody we give weight to the fact
findings of the district court, especially when considering the credibility of
witnesses, but are not bound by them.
Iowa R. App. P. 6.14(6)(g). This is
because the trial court has a firsthand opportunity to hear the evidence and view
the witnesses. In re Marriage of Will, 489 N.W.2d 394, 397 (Iowa 1992). Prior
cases have little precedential value with respect to custodial issues, and this
court must make its decision on the particular circumstances unique to each
case. In re Marriage of Rierson, 537 N.W.2d 806, 807 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995).
The district court ordered joint physical care and found it to be in the best
interest of the children. Only if joint physical care is not warranted would we
choose a primary caretaker who would be solely responsible for decisions
concerning the children’s routine care. In re Marriage of Hansen, 733 N.W.2d
683, 691 (Iowa 2007). Consequently, the first issue we need address is whether
on our de novo review we agree with the district court’s conclusion that joint
physical care is in the children’s best interest.
“Joint physical care” means an award of physical care of a minor child to
both joint legal custodial parents where both parents have rights and
responsibilities toward the child. Iowa Code § 598.1(4) (2007). The rights and
responsibilities include, but are not limited to, shared parenting time with the
child, maintaining homes for the child, and providing routine care for the child. Id.
With joint physical care, “neither parent has physical care rights superior to those
of the other parent.” Id.
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Joint physical care is a relatively new concept. See Hansen, 733 N.W.2d
at 690-92 (discussing at length its history in Iowa). Joint physical care should not
be granted if it is not in the best interest of the children. See Iowa Code §
598.41(5)(a).1 Physical care issues are not to be resolved based upon perceived
fairness to the spouses, but primarily upon what is best for the children. The
objective of a physical care determination is to place the children in the
environment most likely to bring them to health, both physically and mentally, and
to social maturity. Hansen, 733 N.W.2d at 695-96; Phillips v. Davis-Spurling, 541
N.W.2d 846, 847 (Iowa 1995); In re Marriage of Courtade, 560 N.W.2d 36, 38
(Iowa Ct. App. 1996).
Both parties work outside the home. Linda taught full-time at the time of
the marriage. She took time off following the birth of the first and second children
but returned to full-time teaching. She took time off following the birth of the third
child and returned to work on a part-time basis. She had not returned to full-time
work at the time of the dissolution hearing but there was an indication she might
be able to do so. Grant has held full-time employment during the entire course of
the marriage.
When the matter came on for trial in March of 2008, the parties were still
both living in the same house with their three children though they had not
1
Iowa Code section 598.41(5)(a) provides in relevant part:
If joint legal custody is awarded to both parents, the court may award joint
physical care to both joint custodial parents upon the request of either
parent. . . . If the court denies the request for joint physical care, the
determination shall be accompanied by specific findings of fact and
conclusions of law that the awarding of joint physical care is not in the
best interest of the child.
(Emphasis supplied.)
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maintained a marital relationship for five years. Grant slept in the basement and
Linda in an upstairs bedroom. The couple jointly cared for their children and
attended many of the children’s events together. The children were not aware
their parents were seeking to dissolve their marriage until the day of trial.
These children have flourished because while both parents worked
outside the home and the children spent time in school and or at day care, the
parents both have a strong relationship with the children and both have assumed
substantial responsibility though not necessarily equal responsibility for the
children’s care. Despite the breakdown of the marriage in the five years prior to
divorce, the parents have jointly provided for their children’s care and both have
remained a substantial influence in the children’s lives. The joint physical care
plan provided by the district court judge will approximate in a reasonable way the
post-divorce care of the children to the past care giving of the parents and will not
make a detrimental change to the historical care giving arrangement for the
children between the two parties. Long-term successful joint care is a significant
factor in considering the viability of joint physical care after divorce. Hansen, 733
N.W.2d at 697 (citing In re Marriage of Ellis, 705 N.W.2d 96, 103 (Iowa Ct. App.
2005)). Furthermore, because the parents now live and plan to live in close
geographic proximity to each other, the parenting plan will allow the children to
attend the same school and associate with the same peers in whichever home
they are residing.
Yet our inquiry does not end here.
We must also assure that the
arrangement will not put the children in a place where they are the victims of their
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parents’ failure to cooperate, communicate, and show respect for each other and
that the parents seek the same general goals for their children.2 See Hansen,
733 N.W.2d at 697-99.
The only conclusion that can be drawn from this record is that both Linda
and Grant are fully committed to their children’s well-being and historically both
have been substantially engaged with their children’s care. They appear to have
the same general goals for their children. Linda is Catholic and Grant is not, yet
Grant supports Linda’s decision to send the children to Catholic school. In fact
Grant seems very willing without reservation to support Linda’s place in the
children’s lives. Linda is more reluctant to support his. Her position at trial was
that she should be the primary care parent and she seemed unwilling to
recognize that might not be the case. Furthermore, she testified that if she were
the primary care parent that Grant should only have the children two weekends a
month and for two separate weeks in the summer. Her attitude causes us some
concern that if Grant is not granted joint care, that Linda may seek to limit his
time in the children’s lives. If this were to happen it would not be in the children’s
interests.
The record fails to support a finding that joint physical care is not in the
children’s best interest and we find no reason to disagree with the district court
that it is in their best interest. Consequently we do not address the issue of a
primary care parent.
2
In saying this we do not mean to infer that these factors are less important in cases
where one parent has primary care and the other visitation. See Iowa Code §
598.41(5)(b) (requiring the parent awarded physical care to support the other parent’s
relationship with the children).
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That said, we address Linda’s contention that the arrangement for the
children should be modified. The district court alternated weeks. Linda believes
that is too long for the children to be away from one parent. She contends that
the children should have two consecutive school nights each week with each
parent and then alternate weekends. The parents submitted different parenting
plans and the court elected to adopt Grant’s selection. Each plan has strengths
and drawbacks. The district court saw the parties and is in a better position to
assess the plans. See In re Marriage of Engler, 503 N.W.2d 623, 625 (Iowa Ct.
App. 1993) (noting the district court was able to observe the parties and thus was
in a better position to evaluate them as custodians). Giving that discretion to the
district court, we affirm on this issue.
PROPERTY DIVISION.
Linda contends the property division is not
equitable and the district court failed to properly consider assets she contends
she brought to the marriage and it gave too much consideration to property that
Grant brought to the marriage. She specifically argues that while the district
court considered property Grant brought to the marriage, the court failed to
recognize $30,000 in assets she brought to the marriage that she now claims on
appeal3 was used to assist in the purchase of the family home.
Iowa is an equitable division state which means the partners in a marriage
that is to be dissolved are entitled to a just and equitable share of the property
accumulated through their joint efforts. In re Marriage of Robison, 542 N.W.2d 4,
5 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995).
3
Iowa courts do not require an equal division or
Her trial testimony does not support the argument she now makes.
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percentage distribution. In re Marriage of Russell, 473 N.W.2d 244, 246 (Iowa
Ct. App. 1991). The determining factor is what is fair and equitable in each
particular circumstance.
Id.
When distributing property we take into
consideration the criteria codified in Iowa Code section 598.21(5); In re Marriage
of Estlund, 344 N.W.2d 276, 280 (Iowa Ct. App. 1983).
Property which a party brings into the marriage is a factor to consider in
making an equitable division. Iowa Code § 598.21(5)(b). In some instances, this
factor may justify a full credit, but does not require it. In re Marriage of Miller, 552
N.W.2d 460, 465 (Iowa Ct. App. 1996). However, these assets are not set aside
in the same manner that we set aside gifted and inherited property. Id. Instead,
the fact property is brought to a marriage is a factor to consider, together with all
the other circumstances, in making an overall division. Id. Its impact on the
ultimate distribution will vary with the particular circumstance of each case. Id.
In determining what constitutes a fair and equitable property division we consider
the overall property division, rather than the treatment of a particular item or
items in isolation. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Pittman, 346 N.W.2d 33, 37 (Iowa
1984). We do not divide property as if we are dealing with a business venture.
See In re Marriage of Briggs, 225 N.W.2d 911, 913 (Iowa 1975). We find no
reasons to disagree with the district court’s determination of the property brought
to the marriage and find its division of these assets equitable.
Linda further contends it was inequitable for the court to award Grant
$46,000 more than she received. Linda also challenges the court giving Grant
credit for a $10,000 gift his parents gave him that went to the purchase of a
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pickup truck. Linda asks for an additional $25,000, arguing that she should have
received more assets than did Grant because she was out of the job market to
raise the children, has done a good job in doing so, and because she spent
money she brought to the marriage for family expenses. Grant contends the
division made by the district court is equitable. We have carefully examined
Linda’s arguments and find no reasons to modify the district court’s division.
We award no appellate attorney fees. Costs on appeal are taxed to Linda.
AFFIRMED.
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