KIMBERLY BOWN , Plaintiff - Appell ant , vs. HANDY INDUSTRIES, L.L.C. , Employer - Appell ee , a nd ZENITH INSURANCE COMPANY , Insurance Carrier - Appellee.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 9-024 / 08-0636
Filed March 11, 2009
KIMBERLY BOWN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
HANDY INDUSTRIES, L.L.C.,
Employer-Appellee,
and
ZENITH INSURANCE COMPANY,
Insurance Carrier-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Marshall County, David R.
Danilson, Judge.
A workers’ compensation claimant appeals from the decision dismissing
her petition for judicial review. AFFIRMED.
Joanie Grife of Bennett, Steffens & Grife, P.C., Marshalltown, for
appellant.
Jean Dickson of Betty, Neuman & McMahon, P.L.C., Davenport, for
appellees.
Considered by Sackett, C.J., and Potterfield and Mansfield, JJ.
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MANSFIELD, J.
This is an appeal from a dismissal of a petition for judicial review of a
workers’ compensation award. Kimberly Bown sustained a work-related injury
while employed by Handy Industries, L.L.C. on August 1, 2002.
subsequently received workers’ compensation benefits.
She
However, Bown
contends that the commissioner should have awarded her benefits for injuries to
her right shoulder, in addition to her right elbow. Bown also contends that in
awarding permanent partial disability benefits for the right elbow injury, the
commissioner erroneously allowed credit for certain healing period benefits that
had been previously paid to her. For the reasons set forth herein, we affirm.
I. Background Facts & Proceedings
Bown began working in 2000 for Handy Industries, a company that makes
truck parts and accessories, including tailgates. One of Bown’s job duties was
operating a grinder, which is a large vibrating disk, to ―grind tailgates,‖ i.e., to
round out their welds and smooth their surfaces.
On August 1, 2002, Bown sustained a work-related injury. She reported
pain in her right elbow, and also some mild right shoulder pain.
She was
diagnosed with recurrent epicondylitis (inflammation of the elbow joint).
On
September 2, 2002, she returned to work without restrictions, but did not engage
in grinding activities again until December 2. At that time, Bown experienced
pain again. She was placed on a work restriction to avoid grinding activities.
The employer had no work available within her restrictions. Her last day of work
with Handy Industries was December 5, 2002.
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Bown received healing period benefits beginning December 6, 2002.
Meanwhile, she was treated by Dr. Bruce Murphy. As noted by Dr. Murphy,
Bown had a previous history of a work-related right shoulder injury.
While
employed by the Iowa Veterans Home in the late 1980’s, Bown had been
diagnosed with an impingement syndrome of the right shoulder.
undergone surgery for that condition.
She had
On April 26, 1989, she entered into
workers’ compensation settlement with the State, under which it was agreed that
she had a twenty-percent permanent partial disability to the body as a whole.
Bown received a full commutation of benefits under that settlement.
Despite her prior history of right shoulder injury, Dr. Murphy concluded on
March 13, 2003, that Bown’s EMG’s in this area were ―normal.‖ After reviewing a
videotape of Bown’s job at Handy Industries, he concluded that it placed stress
―predominantly on the elbow, forearm and wrist and occasionally at the shoulder.
The grinding unit produces marked vibration and is often operated at very
awkward angles of the elbow and wrist.‖
On May 2, 2003, Dr. Murphy performed a surgical release of the ulnar
nerve at the elbow, also known as a cubital tunnel release.
Dr. Murphy
determined Bown reached maximum medical improvement on August 28, 2003.
Bown was given restrictions of no lifting over thirty pounds and no use of
vibrating tools.
Dr. Murphy found Bown had a four percent permanent
impairment to the right upper extremity.
The employer paid healing period benefits from December 6, 2002, until
October 18, 2003. Thereafter, in accordance with Dr. Murphy’s rating of four
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percent permanent impairment, the employer paid permanency benefits for ten
weeks from October 19, 2003, through December 27, 2003.
Bown is a right-handed bowler who participated in a bowling league. She
admits she bowled throughout 2003, although she maintains she bowled with her
left hand.
On October 30, 2003, approximately six months after the elbow surgery,
Bown saw Dr. Murphy, complaining of shoulder pain and headaches radiating
from her head down into her arm. Dr. Murphy determined the shoulder pain ―is
most likely unrelated to the cubital tunnel release.‖ He recommended an MRI to
look at the cervical spine and the brachial plexus, although nothing remarkable
was found.
In January 2004, Bown underwent an independent medical examination
arranged by her attorney with Dr. Keith Riggins. Dr. Riggins noted that ―Ms.
Bown reports the presence of aching pain extending throughout the entirety of
the right upper extremity, being most severe at the elbow, extending proximally
and distally in the extremity from the elbow.‖ Dr. Riggins found that Bown had
full and complete range of motion in the shoulder. He diagnosed her as having
―[p]ain right upper extremity, etiology undetermined.‖ Ultimately, after review of
additional medical records, Dr. Riggins rated Bown as having a three percent
permanent impairment of the right upper extremity due to residuals of her right
cubital tunnel syndrome.
In March 2004, Handy Industries’ compensation carrier scheduled Bown
for an independent medical examination with Dr. Gary Skaletsy. Dr. Skaletsky
concluded that ―there has not been any injury as the basis for Ms. Bown’s
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complaints, from July 2002 to the present; this includes acute or cumulative.‖ Dr.
Skaletsky stated ―there is no objective clinical or diagnostic study to support that
these [work] activities caused any injury or pathology.‖ Dr. Skaletsky believed
Bown demonstrated symptom magnification.
He determined that other than
Bown’s subjective complaints of pain, her examination was entirely normal. Also,
an EMG and nerve conduction studies were all normal. Dr. Skaletsky concluded
that ―there is no anatomic or physiologic basis for the ongoing complaints of right
upper extremity pain.‖
Bown then saw Dr. Shahin Bagheri in October 2004. A new MRI taken at
Dr. Bagheri’s direction indicated a partial tear in the rotator cuff of the right
shoulder.
Dr. Bagheri referred Bown to an orthopedic surgeon, Dr. Daniel
Fabiano, who performed surgery on November 3, 2004. Dr. Fabiano gave the
opinion that Bown’s injury was work-related and attributable to her grinding
tailgates at Handy Industries. He determined she should have a fifteen percent
impairment of the right upper extremity, which would translate to nine percent of
the whole person.
At the request of the employer, Bown was also examined by Dr. Jerry
Jochims, who stated he did not believe Bown had a true shoulder injury, and that
Bown had magnified her symptoms of shoulder dysfunction. He found that her
shoulder complaints were not work-related issues. Dr. Jochims stated:
I believe that the shoulder is not compensable to the original injury
as described in August of 2002 and the late presentation of surgical
intervention further leads me to believe that there is not a causal
relationship to her 2002 injury.
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Bown had limited employment after leaving Handy Industries. She worked
for six weeks at Pioneer Hi-Bred in September–October 2004, and then
approximately a year later she worked one month as a dishwasher in a
restaurant.
Bown filed a claim for workers’ compensation benefits from Handy
Industries.
A deputy workers’ compensation commissioner determined Bown
had a permanent partial injury to her right elbow caused by her work-related
injury on August 1, 2002. The deputy assigned her a permanent partial disability
rating of ten percent to the right arm. Bown was awarded twenty-five weeks of
benefits. The deputy found, however, that the right torn rotator cuff was not
causally related to the work injury of August 1, 2002. Accordingly, Bown was not
eligible for disability benefits or healing period benefits related to her shoulder.
The original decision of the deputy stated that Bown was entitled to
―twenty-five (25) weeks of permanent partial disability benefits . . . commencing
from December 6, 2002‖—the date when Bown’s employment ended and her
healing period benefits commenced.
The deputy went on to say that
―Defendants shall take credit for the ten weeks of benefits previously paid to
claimant.‖ However, Bown had actually received over a year of benefits, from
December 6, 2002, to December 27, 2003. Healing period benefits had been
paid from December 6, 2002, until October 18, 2003; permanent partial disability
benefits from October 19, 2003, until December 27, 2003.
The employer sought clarification on this issue. The employer pointed out
that the credit should be in excess of ten weeks and should cover a time period
going back either to August 28, 2003, the date when Bown reached maximum
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medical improvement, or to December 6, 2002, the date mentioned by the deputy
in her decision. In response to the employer’s motion, the deputy modified the
sentence regarding the appropriate credit to read, ―Defendants shall take credit
for all benefits previously paid to claimant‖ (emphasis added).
The workers’ compensation commissioner affirmed and adopted the
decision of the deputy.
On judicial review, the district court determined the commissioner’s
decision to deny benefits for the shoulder injury was supported by substantial
evidence. The court also rejected Bown’s argument that the employer should be
entitled to credit for only ten weeks of benefits, from October 19, 2003, through
December 27, 2003. The court noted that the corrected decision clarified that the
employer was to take credit for ―all benefits previously paid,‖ which was
consistent with the commissioner’s determination that December 6, 2002, was to
be the commencement date for permanent partial disability benefits.
This appeal followed.
II. Standard of Review
Our review is governed by the Iowa Administrative Procedure Act. Iowa
Code ch. 17A (2005); Acuity Ins. v. Foreman, 684 N.W.2d 212, 216 (Iowa 2004).
We review the district court’s decision by applying the standards of section
17A.19 to the agency decision to determine if our conclusions are the same as
those reached by the district court.
University of Iowa Hosps. & Clinics v.
Waters, 674 N.W.2d 92, 95 (Iowa 2004).
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III. Substantial Evidence
Bown contends the record lacks substantial evidence to support the
commissioner’s finding that her shoulder injury was not causally related to her
work injury on August 1, 2002. She states the medical evidence supports her
claim that the shoulder injury arose out of and in the course of her employment
with Handy Industries. She points out that she complained of shoulder pain
immediately after the injury, and that she often mentioned her shoulder while
receiving treatment for her elbow.
Under section 17A.19(10)(f), we may grant judicial relief from agency
action if the agency decision is:
Based upon a determination of fact clearly vested by a
provision of law in the discretion of the agency that is not supported
by substantial evidence in the record before the court when that
record is viewed as a whole. For purposes of this paragraph, the
following terms have the following meanings:
(1)
“Substantial evidence” means the quantity and quality
of evidence that would be deemed sufficient by a neutral, detached,
and reasonable person, to establish the fact at issue when the
consequences resulting from the establishment of that fact are
understood to be serious and of great importance.
It is for the commissioner, as the finder of fact, to determine the weight to
be afforded expert testimony. Terwilliger v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 529 N.W.2d
267, 272 (Iowa 1995). We are bound by the commissioner’s factual findings if
they are supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. Meyer v.
IBP, Inc., 710 N.W.2d 213, 218 (Iowa 2006). Evidence is substantial when a
reasonable person could accept it as adequate to reach the same finding.
Asmus v. Waterloo Cmty Sch. Dist., 722 N.W.2d 653, 657 (Iowa 2006). The
question is not whether we agree with the commissioner’s findings, but whether
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there is substantial evidence in the record to support the findings made by the
commissioner. Meyer, 710 N.W.2d at 218. Although we may be able to draw
inconsistent conclusions from the same evidence, this does not mean the
commissioner’s conclusions were unsupported by substantial evidence. Murillo
v. Blackhawk Foundry, 571 N.W.2d 16, 17 (Iowa 1997).
Viewing the record as a whole, substantial evidence supports the
commissioner’s determination that Bown did not establish a connection between
the rotator cuff injury that was diagnosed in October 2004 and her August 1,
2002 work injury. Only one medical expert—Dr. Fabiano—offered an opinion
that the two were related. As the commissioner pointed out, Dr. Fabiano’s initial
examination of Bown occurred over two years after the work injury.
Other
physicians who had examined or treated Bown in the interim, such as Drs.
Murphy, Riggins, and Skaletsky, were unable to find any objective signs of a
shoulder injury. Furthermore, Dr. Jochins, who examined Bown around the same
time as Dr. Fabiano, specifically disagreed with his finding of a work-related
shoulder injury.
IV. Credit for Benefits
On appeal, Bown argues that the commissioner erred in determining that
permanent partial disability benefits should commence as of December 6, 2002,
and by giving the employer credit for all benefits previously paid. She asserts
that maximum medical improvement was not attained until August 28, 2003. She
also asserts that no credit should be given for healing period benefits paid even
after that date because Handy Industries did not provide notice of the conversion
to permanent partial disability payments until October 2003.
Thus, Bown
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contends that no more than ten weeks of credit (October 19, 2003, to December
27, 2003) should have been allowed.
After careful consideration, we agree with Handy Industries that Bown’s
present arguments were not preserved for appeal. See Tussing v. George A.
Hormel & Co., 417 N.W.2d 457, 458 (Iowa 1988) (―Contentions not raised at the
agency hearing or in district court may not be argued before us for the first
time.‖). Before the district court, Bown did not challenge the December 6, 2002
permanent partial disability commencement date. Given that commencement
date, as the district court noted, it was appropriate for the employer to receive
credit for all benefits previously paid, unless the employer failed to exercise
―good faith‖—another argument that was not developed by Bown below. See
Iowa Code § 85.34(4). We note also that Bown’s brief does not ―state how this
issue was preserved for review, with references to the places in the record where
the issue was raised and decided.‖ See Iowa R. App. P. 6.14(1)(f).
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court.
AFFIRMED.
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