STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff - Appellee, vs. JIMMY ALLEN QUICK, JR. , Defen dant - Appellant.
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 9-021 / 08-0523
Filed March 11, 2009
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
JIMMY ALLEN QUICK, JR.,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Jasper County, Thomas W. Mott,
District Associate Judge.
Jimmy Quick appeals following his guilty plea, judgment, and sentence for
the charge of criminal mischief in the fourth degree.
CONVICTION
AND
SENTENCE
VACATED
AND
JUDGMENT OF
REMANDED
FOR
DISMISSAL.
Jimmy Quick, Sioux City, pro se.
Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Martha J. Lucey, Assistant
Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Karen Doland, Assistant Attorney
General, Steve Johnson, County Attorney, and Susan Wendel, Assistant County
Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Sackett, C.J., and Potterfield and Mansfield, JJ.
2
POTTERFIELD, J.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
On June 29, 2007, Jasper County Deputy Scott Zach arrested Jimmy
Allen Quick Jr. for operating while intoxicated. Zach handcuffed Quick, and while
Zach was standing away from Quick, he observed Quick reaching for the front of
his pants. He asked Quick what he was doing, and Quick replied that he was
attempting to answer his cell phone, which was ringing. Zach told Quick not to
answer the phone. This angered Quick, who yelled at Zach and called him “a
few choice names.” Quick then began to struggle physically with Zach, causing
both men to be pushed into Zach’s patrol car. Zach later observed that the
physical struggle had caused a dent in his patrol car, which cost $236 to repair.
The State charged Quick with criminal mischief in the fourth degree in
violation of Iowa Code section 716.1 (2007). Quick filed a written guilty plea to
the charge. The district court sentenced Quick to one year in jail with all but thirty
days suspended and placed him on probation for one year. Quick now appeals,
arguing his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by allowing Quick to
plead guilty to a charge without a factual basis.
II. Standard of Review
Because Quick’s claim involves a constitutional right, we review the totality
of the circumstances de novo.
Taylor v. State, 352 N.W.2d 683, 684 (Iowa
1984).
III. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
In order to prove that his counsel was ineffective, Quick must show that:
(1) his counsel failed to perform an essential duty; and (2) prejudice resulted from
3
that failure.
Id.
The district court may not accept a guilty plea without
determining that the plea has a factual basis. State v. Schminkey, 597 N.W.2d
785, 788 (Iowa 1999). Where no factual basis for the charge exists, but counsel
allows the defendant to plead guilty, counsel has failed to perform an essential
duty. Id. In such a case, prejudice is inherent. Id.
The State contends that prejudice is not inherent in such a case, but must
be proven as discussed in State v. Straw, 709 N.W.2d 128 (2006). In Straw, the
Iowa Supreme Court found that in order to prove prejudice on an ineffective
assistance claim based on the validity of a guilty plea, the appellant is required to
show “that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he
would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Straw,
709 N.W.2d at 136. Straw is distinguishable because Straw did not contend that
he did not commit the crime. Rather, Straw argued that “his decision not to go to
trial would have been different” if the court had informed him of the maximum
possible punishment.
Id. at 137 n.4.
Prejudice is not presumed in such
circumstances. Id. at 138. However, when trial counsel allows a defendant to
plead guilty when no factual basis exists, prejudice is inherent. Schminkey, 597
N.W.2d at 788.
In determining whether a factual basis exists, we consider the entire
record before the district court including the minutes of testimony, statements
made by the defendant, and statements made by the prosecutor. Id. Criminal
mischief is a specific intent crime, which requires proof that Quick intended not
only the act that damaged the patrol car, but also intended to cause the resulting
harm.
State v. Chang, 587 N.W.2d 459, 461 (Iowa 1998).
In determining
4
Quick’s intent, we consider the facts and circumstances surrounding the act and
any reasonable inferences that may be drawn from them.
Schminkey, 597
N.W.2d at 789.
Nothing in the record before the district court would support an inference
that Quick intended to damage the patrol car. In his written guilty plea, Quick
agreed with the minutes of testimony and stated he caused a dent in a patrol car
“without permission.”
The minutes of testimony refer to Zach’s report which
states that, “Quick began struggling with me and caused us to be pushed into the
patrol car.” At Quick’s sentencing hearing, Quick’s counsel stated that Quick
“walks with a cane and has trouble moving around.” Quick told the district court
judge, “I didn’t hit the vehicle or damage it on purpose.”
He described the
incident as “just a weird thing that happened.” The record shows no evidence
that Quick intentionally damaged the patrol car. Rather, the record supports the
inference that Quick’s contact with the patrol car was an accident that resulted
from a physical struggle involving a man who was handcuffed and had difficulty
walking without a cane.
When a guilty plea has no factual basis, two remedies exist:
Where the record establishes that the defendant was charged with
the wrong crime, we have vacated the judgment of conviction and
sentence and remanded for dismissal of the charge. Where,
however, it is possible that a factual basis could be shown, it is
more appropriate merely to vacate the sentence and remand for
further proceedings to give the State an opportunity to establish a
factual basis.
Id. at 792. The record here demonstrates that the State had no evidence that
Quick intended to harm the patrol car. Because the record is complete and
affirmatively shows Quick’s lack of intent, the State would be unable to show a
5
factual basis on remand for further proceedings.
We therefore vacate the
judgment of conviction and sentence and remand for dismissal of the charge.
JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION AND SENTENCE VACATED AND
REMANDED FOR DISMISSAL.
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.