WES GLASGOW , Plaintiff - Appell ant , vs. WILLIAMSON NISSAN, INC. , Defendant - Appell ee .
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 9-018 / 08-0350
Filed March 11, 2009
WES GLASGOW,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
WILLIAMSON NISSAN, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Johnson County, Marsha Bergen,
Judge.
Appellant Wes Glasgow appeals from the district court decision denying
his petition for unpaid wages, liquidated damages, and attorney fees against his
former employer, appellee Williamson Nissan, Inc., an auto dealership.
AFFIRMED.
Steven Howes and Curtis Den Beste of Howes Law Firm, P.C., Cedar
Rapids, for appellant.
Thomas D. Hobart of Meardon, Suepell & Downer, P.L.C., Iowa City, for
appellee.
Considered by Sackett, C.J., and Vogel and Eisenhauer, JJ.
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SACKETT, C.J.
The appellant, Wes Glasgow, appeals from the district court decision
denying his petition for unpaid wages, liquidated damages, and attorney fees
against his former employer, the appellee, Williamson Nissan, Inc., an auto
dealership. He contends the court erred in finding he was paid all the wages due
him. We affirm.
Scope of Review. Our review of actions at law is for correction of errors
at law. Iowa R. App. P. 6.4; Meincke v. Northwest Bank & Trust Co., 756 N.W.2d
223, 227 (Iowa 2008).
The district court’s findings of fact are binding on the court if they
are supported by substantial evidence. We view the evidence in
the light most favorable to the judgment when a party argues the
trial court’s ruling is not supported by substantial evidence.
Evidence is substantial when reasonable minds accept the
evidence as adequate to reach a conclusion. Evidence is not
insubstantial merely because we may draw different conclusions
from it; the ultimate question is whether it supports the finding
actually made, not whether the evidence would support a different
finding. However, appellate courts are not bound to a district
court’s conclusion of law or that court’s application of legal
conclusions.
Meinke, 756 N.W.2d at 227 (citations omitted).
Background Facts and Proceedings. Glasgow was employed by the
auto dealership as finance director between March of 2005 and April of 2006. He
was paid on a written commission plan as set forth in a document dated March 4,
2005. It provided:
1) F&I Manager will be paid on a commission plan as described
below, with draws paid each 2 week period which will be subtracted
from the total commission earned for the month.
2) Deficit earnings between draws paid and commissions earned
will not be carried forward to the following month.
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3) A $4,500 draw will be paid each month ($2,076.92 per pay
period).
4) The commission detail is as follows:
5) 90 days no charge backs from start date
A) 15% commission on total net Finance Reserve revenue
(net of charge-backs)
B) Monthly retail unit bonus:
-80-89 units $500
-90-99 units $750
-100+ units $1,500
A minimum commission will be paid after close of month of
$2,000.
Twice annually, the manufacturer rebates to successful dealerships an
amount based on the dealership’s sales of warranties and service contracts
during the preceding six months.
The rebate periods close in March and
September each year, with the rebate being received by the dealerships two or
three months later. The rebate increases the net Finance Reserve in the month
it is received.
The amount of the rebate for the period ending in March of 2006 was
$28,072. Glasgow’s employment ended in April. The rebate was received by the
dealership in July.
Glasgow was paid all of the commission guarantees for
March and the prorated commissions for April to the date his employment ended.
He was not paid any of the rebate the dealership received in July. He filed suit
under Iowa Code chapter 91A (2007), claiming he was owed $4210.80 in wages,
plus a statutory penalty of up to 100 percent of the wages owed, plus attorney
fees necessary to recover the unpaid wages. See Iowa Code § 91A.8.
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Following a trial to the court, the district court found the written
commission plan was unambiguous and provided for payment from each month’s
net finance reserve revenue, an employee must be working for the dealership in
order to have a commission calculated, and the dealership paid Glasgow his
guaranteed commission for March and a prorated commission for the portion of
April he worked for the dealership. The court further found the testimony of the
dealership’s witness credible and persuasive concerning the dealership’s policies
about calculating commissions. It noted:
The court finds that, consistent with operating on a cash basis,
Defendant’s policy has been to include the dealer bonus rebate in
company reserves when actually received. Thus, calculations for
commissions based on the reserve can only be made after the
revenue has been received by Defendant company. Further, the
policy has been that, if an employee is no longer working for
Defendant when the dealer bonus rebate is received, that
employee is not entitled to be paid a commission.
The court ruled:
Plaintiff employee failed to carry the burden of proof to show
any agreement or policy whereby Defendant car dealership owed
Plaintiff employee a fifteen percent commission on rebate funds
paid to Defendant by the national company over two months
following Plaintiff employee’s last date of employment, even though
the national rebate was based upon dealership activity during the
period of Plaintiff’s employment.
Glasgow appeals from the ruling that dismissed his claim for unpaid
wages, liquidated damages, and attorney fees. He contends the court erred in
finding he was paid all wages owed him.
Discussion. Upon our review of the record, we conclude the district court
findings are supported by substantial evidence.
From the testimony of the
dealership’s witness and its exhibits, the district court correctly found the
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dealership handles its commission compensation on a cash basis, calculated
monthly.
Glasgow’s fifteen percent commission was based on the total net
finance reserve revenue each month. The semiannual rebates from Nissan are
included in the net finance reserve revenue for purposes of calculating the
commission as set forth in Glasgow’s pay plan document. The dealership has
followed this commission compensation policy with other employees and did not
modify its policy in Glasgow’s case.
commission of $6500.
Glasgow was guaranteed a monthly
The dealership paid Glasgow all of the guaranteed
commissions to which he was entitled under the pay plan.
Although not bound by them, we agree that the district court’s conclusions
of law correctly set forth the applicable law as applied to the facts of this case. It
was Glasgow’s burden to show there was an agreement or policy to pay certain
wages. Iowa R. App. P. 6.14(6)(e). The district court concluded he:
failed to carry the burden of proof to show any agreement or policy
whereby Defendant car dealership owed Plaintiff employee a fifteen
percent commission on rebate funds paid to Defendant by the
national company over two months following Plaintiff employee’s
last date of employment, even though the national rebate was
based upon dealership activity during the period of Plaintiff’s
employment.
“We will not interfere on appeal unless we find the party carried his burden as a
matter of law.” Crookham v. Structural Contractors, Ltd., 466 N.W.2d 277, 278
(Iowa Ct. App. 1990). From our review of the evidence and applicable law, we
agree with the district court Glasgow failed to carry the burden of proof. The
district court correctly denied his petition. We affirm the decision of the district
court.
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Because we have affirmed the district court’s determination the dealership
did not owe Glasgow any unpaid wages, we need not address his arguments
concerning liquidated damages and attorney fees under Iowa Code section
91A.8.
AFFIRMED.
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