BLUE JAY KALAR , Applicant - Appellant, vs. STATE OF IOWA, Respondent - Appellee.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 9-015 / 07-2159
Filed March 11, 2009
BLUE JAY KALAR,
Applicant-Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF IOWA,
Respondent-Appellee.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Wapello County, Daniel P. Wilson,
Judge.
Postconviction relief applicant appeals from the ruling of the district court
denying relief. AFFIRMED.
Michael O. Carpenter of Webber, Gaumer & Emanuel, P.C., Ottumwa, for
appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Bridget A. Chambers, Assistant
Attorney General, and Mark Tremmel, County Attorney, for appellee State.
Considered by Mahan, P.J., and Miller and Doyle, JJ.
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MAHAN, P.J.
Blue Jay Kalar was convicted of four counts of second-degree sexual
abuse for abusing his girlfriend’s six-year-old daughter. In this postconviction
relief action, Kalar contends trial counsel rendered prejudicial ineffective
assistance in failing to seek the aid of an expert.
Because a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel implicates
constitutional rights, our review of those claims is de novo. State v. Carter, 602
N.W.2d 818, 820 (Iowa 1999).
We review ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims de novo.
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a claimant must
demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence (1) his trial
counsel failed to perform an essential duty, and (2) this failure
resulted in prejudice. We may affirm the district court’s rejection of
an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim if either element is
lacking. To establish prejudice, a claimant must demonstrate there
is a reasonable probability that, but for the counsel’s unprofessional
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. The
probability of a different result must be sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome.
Anfinson v. State, 758 N.W.2d 496, 499 (Iowa 2008) (internal quotations and
citations omitted).
The petitioner must overcome a strong presumption of counsel’s
competence, and a postconviction applicant has the burden to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that counsel was ineffective. Osborn v. State,
573 N.W.2d 917, 922 (Iowa 1998). Absent evidence to the contrary, we assume
the attorney’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional
assistance.
State v. Hepperle, 530 N.W.2d 735, 739 (Iowa 1995).
It is not
enough for a postconviction applicant to assert that defense counsel should have
done a better job.
Dunbar v. State, 515 N.W.2d 12, 15 (Iowa 1994).
“The
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applicant must state the specific ways in which counsel’s performance was
inadequate and identify how competent representation probably would have
changed the outcome.” Id.
Kalar asserts defense counsel’s performance was deficient for failing to
seek the assistance of a child psychologist. He argues counsel should have
sought the assistance of a person with “expertise in the psychology and
development of children” who could “explain to the jury the potential pitfalls of
relying on the literal statements of a child.” Kalar does not, however, set forth
what he believes such an expert could have found, or how it would have differed
from the testimony presented by the State’s expert.
Kalar contends the case against him “turned on the accusatory
statements” of the victim and “only scant other evidence of guilt” was presented
by the State. To the contrary, in his prior appeal, this court found “overwhelming
evidence supporting defendant’s guilt.” State v. Kalar, No. 05-0298 (Iowa Ct.
App. May 10, 2006).
In any event, Kalar has not stated how the assistance of a defense expert
would have changed the outcome of the case. See Rivers v. State, 615 N.W.2d
688, 690 (Iowa 2000). He states that “if the expert returned only unfavorable
indications, Kalar would simply decline to have the expert testify.” An applicant
must “propose what an investigation would have revealed or how anything
discovered would have affected the result obtained below.” Dunbar, 515 N.W.2d
at 15. Kalar has not demonstrated there is a reasonable probability that had he
obtained the assistance of a child psychologist, the result of the proceeding
would have been different.
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The district court correctly rejected this claim of ineffective assistance. We
affirm the decision of the district court denying Kalar’s petition for postconviction
relief.
AFFIRMED.
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