STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff - Appellant , vs. JESSICA K. HILL , Defendant - Appell ee .
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 8-935 / 08-0657
Filed March 11, 2009
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
JESSICA K. HILL,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Boone County, David R. Danilson,
Judge.
The State seeks discretionary review of a district court ruling granting Hill’s
motion to suppress statements she made to police. AFFIRMED.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Mary Tabor, Kevin Cmelik, and Scott
Brown, Assistant Attorneys General, and Jim Robbins, County Attorney, for
appellant.
Meredith K.E. Mahoney and John D. Jordan of Jordan & Mahoney Law
Firm, P.C., Boone for appellee.
Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Eisenhauer and Potterfield, JJ.
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VAITHESWARAN, P.J.
The State seeks discretionary review of a district court ruling granting
Jessica Hill’s motion to suppress statements she made to police.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
The district court made detailed fact-findings, which are essentially
undisputed. To place the legal issue in context, we will summarize some of the
key findings.
Shane Hill was discovered dead of a gunshot wound in rural Boone
County. While investigating the shooting, Iowa Division of Criminal Investigation
agents learned that Shane Hill’s wife, Jessica, had an affair with Daniel Blair.
They interviewed Hill twice. At the time of those interviews, they had reason to
believe the affair occurred months or years earlier.
A day after the second interview, the Boone County sheriff learned that
Hill’s romantic relationship with Blair might be more recent. DCI agents decided
they needed to interview Hill a third time. An agent called Hill’s cell phone and
asked her to come to the Boone County Sheriff’s Office that afternoon.
His
pretext was that he needed to give her information she requested from Shane
Hill’s confiscated cell phones.
The agent did not tell her that he would be
interviewing her. He testified that he feared if she knew this, she would not come
to the office.
On receipt of the call, Hill responded that she was in another town. The
agent told her it was the end of the workday, he wanted to go home as soon as
possible, and the sooner she came, the better.
3
Hill drove herself to the sheriff’s office, parked directly in front, and
proceeded to the lobby. She was greeted by a DCI special agent, who asked her
if she would be willing to discuss some further questions. Hill agreed and was
taken to a room off the lobby for a video-taped interview. Hill was at the station
for seven hours and twenty-seven minutes.
The district court made the following findings with respect to the breaks
Hill was afforded:
After approximately one and one-half hours, Jessica Hill was
permitted a break and provided the freedom to use the restroom
and go outside of the Boone County Sheriff’s office to her vehicle.
While in her vehicle, she was able to smoke a cigarette and use a
cell phone and converse with her mother. She admitted that she
had the keys to her vehicle and could have driven away at that
time. A second break in the interrogation was taken about three
and one-half hours after the interrogation began. Jessica Hill was
offered to use the restroom but she declined. However, she did
request to have another cigarette but Agent Braafhart stated, “Why
don’t you wait for just a few minutes.” The second break in the
interrogation also occurred after Jessica Hill had been crying for
approximately twelve minutes . . . .
. . . [T]here was an approximate two-hour break. During the
second break, Jessica Hill is left alone in the interview room with
the door closed but unlocked. No guard was standing by the door,
however, she was apparently being monitored to some degree
through the monitoring window. During this break, Jessica Hill
makes comments regarding being tired, freezing, and starving. At
one point, an unknown man opens the door and hands Jessica Hill
a blanket.
The court found that, during the second break, the agents offered Hill a coffee or
pop so that she could wake up. The court further found that there were two
additional short breaks during which Hill remained in the interview room with the
door closed.
With respect to the manner of questioning, the district court found as
follows:
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The interview began that evening with Jessica Hill sitting in a
chair in a corner of the room, Agent Braafhart sitting in another
corner of the room and Agent Sauer sitting behind a desk. The
agents were several feet from Jessica Hill and were not blocking
the closed door. The interview began in a conversational tone in a
somewhat relaxed atmosphere with everyone sitting back in their
chairs. Agent Braafhart explains that he “just wanted to clarify a
few things, okay?” He began with some background information
questions and avoided leading or aggressive questioning . . . .
After the first break of approximately twenty minutes, Jessica
Hill returned to her chair in the corner but Agent Braafhart moved a
chair very near to Jessica Hill and leaned toward her with his hands
held above Jessica Hill’s legs.
Their faces appear to be
approximately two to three feet apart. On one occasion he touched
her leg. According to Agent Braafhart, he moved into close
proximity to Jessica Hill to gain her trust and comfort and develop
rapport with her.
Additionally, after the first break the agents asked leading
questions and the conversation was no longer general in nature or
informal. The agents repeatedly asked questions concerning
inconsistencies in the facts as told by Jessica Hill. She was also
asked questions calling for incriminating statements and questions
that implicated her in the crime. There were also appeals to her
family and to do the “right thing.”
Almost as soon as the questioning began after the first break, Agent
Braafhart asked Hill who she had talked to on her cell phone while on break and
shortly thereafter stated, “Well, obviously, the situation that we’re in right now is
that the investigation has taken a turn.”
The district court also discussed other events that occurred during the
interrogation:
Around 12:00 midnight, the agents asked Jessica Hill if she
would be willing to telephone Daniel Blair by use of her cell phone
with the conversation electronically recorded. She agreed and did
use her cell phone to call Daniel Blair while in the interview room.
The agents suggested comments she could make to Daniel Blair in
hopes of gaining incriminating statements from him.
Before the telephone call to Daniel Blair, Agent Braafhart
asked if they could move her vehicle so that Daniel Blair would not
be able to drive by the Boone County Sheriff’s office and see it
parked out front. Again, Jessica Hill agreed and someone other
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than Jessica Hill drove her vehicle inside a sally port at the Boone
County Sheriff’s office.
With respect to Hill’s ability to leave the interrogation room, the district
court cited a reference by Agent Braafhart to “leaving” and “you cannot leave
here.”
However, the court acknowledged the agents’ testimony at the
suppression hearing that Hill was not under arrest and was free to leave. Hill
disputed this testimony, stating she did not feel free to leave during the
interrogation. Hill left the station after 1:00 A.M. the following morning. By this
time, the agents had concluded the interrogation.
The State charged Hill with first-degree murder and conspiracy to commit
murder. Hill moved to suppress the statements she made in the third interview
on the ground that the interview was a custodial interrogation triggering a right to
Miranda1 warnings, which she was not given. Following a hearing, the district
court granted Hill’s motion to suppress all the statements she made following the
first break in her interview. The court denied the motion as it related to the
statements made prior to that break.
The State filed an application for discretionary review and a request for
immediate stay. The Iowa Supreme Court granted the application and stayed the
district court proceedings.
The sole issue on appeal is whether the district court properly determined
Hill was in custody following the second break. Our review of this issue is de
novo. State v. Heminover, 619 N.W.2d 353, 356 (Iowa 2000), abrogated on
other grounds by State v. Turner, 630 N.W.2d 601 (Iowa 2001).
1
“We give
See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 1612, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694,
706 (1966).
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deference to the district court’s fact findings due to its opportunity to assess the
credibility of witnesses, but we are not bound by those findings.” Turner, 630
N.W.2d at 606.
II. Analysis
Under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S Ct. 1602, 1612, 16 L.
Ed. 2d 694, 706 (1966), the prosecution may not use statements stemming from
a custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it follows procedural safeguards
to secure the privilege against self-incrimination. Specifically, suspects subjected
to “custodial interrogation” must first be warned that they have “a right to remain
silent, that any statement . . . used as evidence against [them], and that [they
have] a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed.”
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S. Ct. at 1612, 16 L. Ed. 2d at 706-07.
Custodial interrogation is “questioning initiated by law enforcement officers
after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom
of action in any significant way.” Id. at 444, 86 S. Ct. at 1612, 16 L. Ed. 2d at
706. The mere fact an individual is questioned at a law enforcement center does
not render the interview a custodial interrogation. See State v. Schwartz, 467
N.W.2d 240, 245 (Iowa 1991).
The custody determination depends on the objective circumstances of the
interrogation, not on subjective views harbored either by the officer or the person
being questioned. Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 323, 114 S. Ct. 1526,
1529, 128 L. Ed. 2d 293, 298 (1994).
The appropriate test is whether a
reasonable person in the defendant’s position would understand himself or
herself to be in custody.
State v. Countryman, 572 N.W.2d 553, 558 (Iowa
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1997).
We have adopted a four-factor test as guidance in making such a
determination.
These factors include: (1) the language used to summon the
individual; (2) the purpose, place, and manner of interrogation; (3)
the extent to which the defendant is confronted with evidence of her
guilt; and (4) whether the defendant is free to leave the place of
questioning.
Id.
As noted, the district court’s fact findings are not disputed and, on our de
novo review, we find them supported by the record. This brings us to the court’s
legal analysis. After examining each of the factors cited in Countryman, the court
stated the following:
Although there are facts which tend to mitigate against a
finding that Jessica Hill was in custody, considering the totality of
the circumstances, this Court concludes that more facts, and more
influential facts, support the conclusion that Jessica Hill was in
custody immediately after the first break of the interview. However,
initially the atmosphere was informal and conversational; the
questions were more general in nature-not accusatory; and Jessica
Hill was given freedom to use a restroom, go outside to her vehicle,
smoke a cigarette, and use her cell phone to call her mother.
In support of these conclusions, certainly the length of the
interrogation, the failure to inform Jessica Hill that she was free to
leave at any time and the ruse used to get her to appear at the
Boone County Sheriff’s Office for a pre-planned videotaped
interrogation are strong factors supporting the finding that Jessica
Hill was in custody. These circumstances are further buttressed by
additional factors or indicia of custody arising after the first break:
the very close proximity that Agent Braafhart sat by Jessica Hill;
Agent Braafhart’s comment that the investigation has taken a turn;
the denial of a cigarette break; constant monitoring of Jessica Hill;
closing the door to the small interview room every time the agents
exited; the fact that the agents knew she was tired and cold and her
mind was a “blur”; their effort to keep her awake by offering her
coffee or pop; the aggressive nature of the questioning, which
primarily focused on her participation in the alleged murder; Jessica
Hill’s physical reaction to the aggressive interrogation—crying; the
absence of any further contact with family or friends except the
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staged call to Daniel Blair; Agent Braafhart’s stern interrogation
disapproving of Jessica Hill’s use of her cell phone, and Agent
Sauer’s directions regarding the staged cell phone call that Jessica
Hill that “obviously, you can’t go see [Blair] right now.” These facts
support the conclusion that Jessica Hill was in custody after the first
break as a reasonable person in those circumstances would
understand that his or her freedom had been deprived and the
agents would not have heeded a request to depart at the person’s
own choosing.
On appeal, the State argues that the court placed too much weight on the
“deceptive strategy” used to get Hill to the sheriff’s office. It asserts “deceptive
stratagems as an indicator of custody seems inconsistent with precedent.”
We disagree. In United States v. Griffin, 922 F.2d 1343, 1351 (8th Cir.
1990), the federal Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals stated,
Police deployment of strong arm tactics or deceptive stratagems
during interrogation . . . is a practice widely condemned in
American law . . . . Because such strong arm tactics are more
generally associated with formal arrest than with an informal
encounter with police, the use of such tactics is identified as an
indicia of custody.
Our court cited this language with approval in State v. Mortley, 532 N.W.2d 498,
501 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995).
It is true that the Eighth Circuit has since exhorted courts not to follow the
Griffin factors “ritualistically” in every Miranda case. See State v. Czichray, 378
F.3d 822, 827 (8th Cir. 2004).
But it is also true that the district court
acknowledged this advice and followed it.2 Far from mechanically applying the
Griffin criteria, the court mentioned a host of factors in addition to the initial
deception to support its conclusion that the interrogation after the first break was
custodial. For this reason, we are not persuaded by the State’s argument.
2
The court cited Czichray and subsequent Eighth Circuit precedent. See United States
v. Ollie, 422 F.3d 1135, 1140 (8th Cir. 2006) (noting criteria are only “useful tools.”).
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The State next asserts that the district court erroneously differentiated the
post-break interrogation from the interview prior to the first break. The State
points out that Hill had just been allowed to leave, an indication that she was
there voluntarily.
The district court found this factor significant in its determination that the
first part of the interrogation was non-custodial. The court explained in detail,
however, that the entire atmosphere and tenor of questioning changed after the
break.
On our de novo review, we agree with the court’s finding. In addition to
the more aggressive questioning after the first break, the DVD of the
interrogation shows one of the agents leaning toward Hill for significant lengths of
time. Additionally, the second agent, at times, either leaned against the only exit
from the room or was situated immediately adjacent to it. And, while the door to
the interview room was unlocked, neither the agents nor other officers provided
any indication that Hill could leave during the interrogation or during subsequent
breaks.
This fact alone distinguishes Hill’s situation from the scenario in
Czichray, cited by the State. The court there stated:
We have observed that “[t]he most obvious and effective means of
demonstrating that a suspect has not been taken into custody . . . is
for the police to inform the suspect that an arrest is not being made
and that the suspect may terminate the interview at will.” United
States v. Griffin, 922 F.2d 1343, 1349 (8th Cir. 1990) (internal
quotation omitted). The FBI agents who interviewed Czichray
exercised this “obvious and effective” means of demonstration in
spades.
Czichray, 378 F.3d at 826; see also United States v. LeBrun, 363 F.3d 715,
722 (8th Cir. 2004) (“The agents told LeBrun before the interview commenced
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that he was free to leave. LeBrun testified that he understood that he was free to
terminate the interview and leave at any time.”).
The district court thoughtfully and thoroughly analyzed all the relevant
circumstances surrounding the agents’ third interview with Hill and came to a
measured conclusion that only the portion of the interrogation after the first break
was custodial. On our de novo review, we find no reason to quarrel with the
court’s conclusion that Hill’s “statements after the first break (beginning at p. 76,
line 14 of the Transcript) are hereby suppressed.”
AFFIRMED.
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