MARTIN SCHNOOR , Plaintiff - Appell ant , vs. ROBERT DESKIN and COUNTY OF WARREN , Defendant s - Appell ees .
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 8-933 / 08-0587
Filed March 26, 2009
MARTIN SCHNOOR,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
ROBERT DESKIN and
COUNTY OF WARREN,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Warren County, Peter A. Keller,
Judge.
Martin Schnoor appeals from the district court‟s ruling granting summary
judgment in favor of defendant Robert Deskin. AFFIRMED.
Jeffrey M. Lipman of Lipman Law Firm, Des Moines, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Mark Hunacek and John Lundquist,
Assistant Attorneys General, for appellees.
Heard by Sackett, C.J., and Potterfield and Mansfield, JJ.
2
POTTERFIELD, J.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
In March 2004, Iowa State Trooper Robert Deskin conducted a traffic stop
on Martin Schnoor and issued him a speeding ticket. Schnoor decided to contest
the ticket and to represent himself.
A friend, Craig Smith, advised him to
subpoena information about the trooper‟s radar logs and to serve the subpoena
on Trooper Deskin personally. On June 11, 2004, Schnoor called Deskin and
informed him that he needed to serve Deskin personally with a subpoena.
Deskin refused to arrange to meet Schnoor and told him to file the subpoena at
the highway patrol post.
The next day, Schnoor found Deskin‟s address in the phone book and
went to Deskin‟s home to serve the subpoena. Deskin was not home, but his
spouse came to the door. Mrs. Deskin told Schnoor she did not want to take the
papers and asked him to leave. Schnoor returned to his car and called Craig
Smith for advice. Smith told Schnoor he might be able to leave the subpoena
with Mrs. Deskin. Schnoor went back to the front door and asked Mrs. Deskin to
accept the papers. She told Schnoor to leave and said he was harassing her
and trespassing. Schnoor left.
Deskin notified his sergeant of this encounter.
The sergeant called
Schnoor and suggested that he could arrange with the sergeant‟s supervisor to
serve the papers at the post on the following Monday. On Monday, however, the
supervisor was not available, and Schnoor was unable to arrange to have the
papers personally served.
3
Schnoor‟s friend, Craig Smith, offered to serve the subpoena for Schnoor.
Schnoor drove Smith to Deskin‟s residence and waited in his vehicle while Smith
attempted to serve the subpoena. Deskin was irate and refused to accept the
subpoena.1 Smith returned to Schnoor‟s vehicle.
The next day, Deskin reported Schnoor‟s conduct to the Warren County
Attorney‟s office and demanded that Assistant County Attorney Jane Orlanes file
charges against Schnoor. After consulting with County Attorney Gary Kendell,
Orlanes filed a complaint and affidavit charging Schnoor with third-degree
harassment and trespass stating:
The defendant has called and approached the home of Trooper
Deskin on several occasions after being told the proper procedure
for service of a subpoena and in doing so has intimidated, annoyed,
harassed and/or alarmed Trooper Deskin and his family, even after
being specifically told not to, further the defendant has entered and
or remained on Trooper Deskin‟s property several times.
District Associate Judge Richard Clogg determined that probable cause
existed to issue an arrest warrant.
Schnoor surrendered himself and was
arrested. He pled not guilty and a Warren County jury acquitted him after trial.
Schnoor then brought an action against Deskin asserting a claim under 42
U.S.C. § 1983.2 On November 27, 2006, Deskin filed a motion for summary
judgment on the § 1983 claim. The court denied the motion, finding disputed
1
Needless to say, we do not condone Deskin‟s inappropriate reaction to service of
process.
2
Schnoor also brought actions against Warren County and Deputy Michael Morrison as
well as claims for false imprisonment and malicious prosecution. The claims against the
County and Deputy Morrison were dismissed on summary judgment based upon the
county‟s immunity. Schnoor dismissed the claims against Deskin for false imprisonment
and malicious prosecution after Deskin moved to dismiss alleging Schnoor‟s failure to
first file a state tort claim.
4
facts on the issues of whether Deskin acted under color of law, whether Deskin
acted maliciously, and whether Deskin acted on advice of the county attorney.
A year later, on November 21, 2007, Deskin filed a second motion for
summary judgment. The district court found that Schnoor‟s arrest and detention
were based upon a facially valid warrant, which established probable cause as a
matter of law, and that Schnoor had not alleged deliberate falsehoods or reckless
disregard for the truth by Deskin. Schnoor appeals, arguing the district court
erred in granting Deskin‟s motion for summary judgment.
II. Standard of Review
We review the district court‟s decision on summary judgment for errors at
law.
Stevens v. Iowa Newspapers, Inc., 728 N.W.2d 823, 827 (Iowa 2007).
Summary judgment is appropriate when the record demonstrates that there is no
genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. In re Estate of Renwanz, 561 N.W.2d 43, 44 (Iowa 1997). We
review the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id.
III. Section 1983
In order to prevail on his § 1983 claim, Schnoor must prove: (1) Deskin
deprived him of a right secured by the constitution and laws of the United States;
and (2) Deskin acted under color of state law. Christenson v. Ramaeker, 366
N.W.2d 905, 907 (Iowa 1985). The district court granted summary judgment on
the first point, finding that Schnoor could not show that his rights were violated
through false arrest and false imprisonment because he was detained under a
facially valid arrest warrant. We agree.
5
Schnoor asserts that Deskin‟s unlawful actions occurred before the
issuance of the warrant, and, therefore, Deskin cannot use the arrest warrant,
which did not exist at the time of the actions at issue, to shield him from liability.
This issue was addressed in Christenson, where the plaintiff alleged that a
criminal investigator for the State “negligently failed to conduct an adequate
investigation and was improperly motivated when he sought and obtained
issuance of the warrant for his arrest.” Id. at 906. Just as in Schnoor‟s case, the
actions at issue occurred before the issuance of the arrest warrant.
In
Christenson, the Iowa Supreme Court affirmed summary judgment, finding that
the plaintiff was properly arrested pursuant to a facially valid arrest warrant
issued by a judge and that there was no evidence the defendant had intentionally
or recklessly misstated facts.
Similarly, in Kurtz v. City of Shrewsbury, 245 F.3d 753 (8th Cir. 2001), a
neighbor advised police of complaints regarding plaintiff‟s suspicious behavior.
The plaintiff was subsequently arrested and alleged false arrest against the
neighbor. Kurtz, 245 F.3d at 756. The United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court‟s dismissal of plaintiff‟s claim because
there was “probable cause to arrest and prosecute [plaintiff].” Id. at 758. Thus,
Eighth Circuit case law establishes that a facially valid arrest warrant negates a
§ 1983 claim for false arrest or false imprisonment.
Schnoor asserts that Deskin should be liable for malicious prosecution
because he initiated the proceedings. See Bair v. Shoultz, 233 Iowa 980, 983, 7
N.W.2d 904, 905 (1943) (holding that in determining whether a defendant is an
instigator in a malicious prosecution case, “it is sufficient if his voluntary
6
participation in the prosecution starts the movement of the criminal machinery so
that an arrest would probably follow”). The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held
that a malicious prosecution claim does not establish a § 1983 cause of action
because it does not allege a constitutional injury.
Kurtz, 245 F.3d at 758.
However, the majority of circuits have found that malicious prosecution may be
actionable under § 1983 when “defendant‟s actions cause the plaintiff to be
unreasonably „seized‟ without probable cause, in violation of the Fourth
Amendment.” Pitt v. D.C., 491 F.3d 494, 511 (D.C. Cir. 2007). However, as
previously discussed, Judge Clogg signed the arrest warrant after determining
that probable cause existed.
Schnoor does not claim that Deskin deliberately or recklessly included
false information in his complaint to the county attorney. He does not provide
any basis for the court to look behind the warrant in this case. See Christenson,
366 N.W.2d at 909. Accordingly, he does not present a claim that is actionable
under § 1983.
AFFIRMED.
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.