TROY BLACKFORD , Plaintiff - Appell ant , vs. PRAIRIE MEADOWS RACETRACK AND CASINO, INC. , Defendant - Appell ee .
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 8-932 / 08-0586
Filed March 26, 2009
TROY BLACKFORD,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
PRAIRIE MEADOWS RACETRACK
AND CASINO, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Robert B. Hanson
(summary judgment) and Eliza J. Ovrom (trial), Judges.
Troy Blackford appeals from an adverse jury verdict and judgment
dismissing his conversion claim against Prairie Meadows Racetrack and Casino,
Inc. to recover confiscated gambling winnings. REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Ryan T. Beattie of Beattie Law Firm, P.C., Des Moines, for appellant.
Dennis P. Ogden and Margaret C. Callahan of Belin Lamson McCormick
Zumbach Flynn, P.C., Des Moines, for appellee.
Heard by Sackett, C.J., Potterfield, J., and Huitink, S.J.*
*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 (2007).
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HUITINK, S.J.
Troy Blackford appeals from an adverse jury verdict and judgment
dismissing his conversion claim against Prairie Meadows Racetrack and Casino,
Inc. to recover confiscated gambling winnings.
I. Background Facts & Proceedings
The basic facts of this case indicate Blackford won $9783 while gambling
at Prairie Meadows on May 6, 2006. Prairie Meadows refused to pay Blackford
because its records indicated Blackford was involuntarily and permanently
banned from entering Prairie Meadows‟ facilities.
Blackford disputed Prairie
Meadows‟ version, claiming the ban had been lifted.
He also cited his
subsequently received invitations to gamble at Prairie Meadows and his
admission to Prairie Meadows‟ slot club. Because the casino‟s records indicated
Blackford‟s status remained unchanged, Blackford‟s winnings were confiscated
and donated to a charitable organization.
Blackford thereafter sued Prairie Meadows to recover damages based on
theories of conversion, libel, false imprisonment, and abuse of process. Prairie
Meadows denied liability under any theory.
Prairie Meadows affirmatively
alleged that any contract underlying Blackford‟s conversion claim was void or
unenforceable.
The trial court denied the parties‟ cross-motions for summary judgment on
Blackford‟s conversion claim, citing the factual questions concerning the status of
Blackford‟s involuntary ban from Prairie Meadows.
The trial court expressly
declined to resolve the legal question concerning Prairie Meadows‟ authority to
confiscate winnings from a patron involuntarily banned from its facilities. The trial
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court granted Prairie Meadows‟ motions for summary judgment, dismissing
Blackford‟s false imprisonment and abuse of process claims.
Blackford
voluntarily dismissed his libel claim, leaving only the conversion claim for trial.
In a subsequent ruling on pretrial motions, the trial court addressed the
legal issue left unresolved by the court‟s earlier ruling on the parties‟ crossmotions for summary judgment. The court‟s ruling states:
Under Section 99F.4(22), licensed gaming facilities are required to
have a process where people can voluntarily request that they be
excluded from the facility. If a voluntarily excluded person goes to
the facility and wins money, the money is required to be paid to a
gambling treatment fund and cannot be paid to the person. Iowa
Code § 99F.4(22). This code section is silent as to whether an
involuntarily-excluded person who nevertheless enters a facility and
gambles, is likewise barred from retaining any winnings and
whether the winnings must be donated to the gambling treatment
fund.
The court concludes that such winnings may not be retained
by the involuntarily-excluded person. The legislative and regulatory
scheme regulating gambling compels this result. The legislature
expressed a clear wish that persons who voluntarily ban
themselves from entering a gaming facility may not keep winnings if
they violate the ban and gamble. It is implicit that the legislature
would intend that involuntarily-banned persons who violate the ban
not be allowed to gamble or to keep any winnings. The Racing and
Gaming Commission regulates gambling in the State of Iowa. See
Iowa Code ch. 99F. Under the Commission‟s rules, a gaming
facility can eject or exclude any person from the premises. Iowa
Admin. Code r. 491-5.4(5)(d). Once a person is banned from a
facility, it is not within the rules for the person to be present or to
gamble at the facility. All promises, agreements, or contracts that
arise from wagers or bets are void, unless the wager is authorized
under chapter 99F (regulating gambling facilities in Iowa). Iowa
Code § 537A.4. A person who is excluded from a facility under the
rules of the Racing and Gaming Commission would not hold a
legally binding agreement with a gaming facility for payment of the
winnings. Therefore the facility would not be required to pay
winnings to such person.
Over Blackford‟s objections, the trial court submitted the following jury
instruction:
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In order for the winnings to be the property of Troy Blackford,
he must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the
trespass ban against him had been lifted by Prairie Meadows prior
to May 5, 2006.
You are further instructed that a casino licensed to do
business in our state is permitted to eject or exclude any person
from the premises of the casino‟s facility solely on the casino‟s own
decision, and without any reason or excuse given provided that the
ejection or exclusion is not founded on a constitutionally protected
ground, such as race, creed, color, disability, or national origin.
This is known as a “trespass.” If a person has been trespassed
from a casino‟s facility, but returns and gambles at the facility, the
trespassed person is not gambling according to the rules applicable
to that facility, and such activities do not give the trespassed person
any property right in the money or other valuable thing won during
such gambling.
Without conceding the merits of either the trial court‟s earlier-quoted ruling
or instruction No. 9, Blackford requested the following instructions:
INSTRUCTION NO.
Trespassers do not have an ownership or possessory right
in money or other valuable objects won during gambling. In order
for the winnings to be the property of Troy Blackford, he must prove
by a preponderance of the evidence that he was not a trespasser
upon the premise of Prairie Meadows on May 5, 2006.
INSTRUCTION NO.
Trespasser — Defined — A trespasser is one who is not
rightfully upon the land or property of another, but enters it without
consent, either express or implied, of the owner or occupier thereof.
Express consent arises when the owner or occupier of the
land informs one that they have permission to be upon the land.
Implied consent arises when one who has been invited to
enter upon the land either by the owner or occupier of the same by
some affirmative act done by such owner or occupant, or by
appearances which justify persons generally in believing that such
owner or occupant had given his consent to enter the premise and
act within the scope of that consent.
The trial court‟s ruling rejecting Blackford‟s proposed instructions states:
I am very uncomfortable giving an instruction on implied
consent to lift a trespass ban in the context of a gaming facility
that‟s so heavily regulated and the authority to exclude people
comes from that regulation.
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I think this is not just your run-of-the-mill trespass case. This
is a conversion case based on whether he had the right to be there
under the Racing and Gaming statutes so I am not going to include
the instruction on implied consent into the instructions.
Because the jury returned a verdict answering “No” to the question, “Had
Troy Blackford‟s trespass ban at the Prairie Meadows facility been lifted before
May 5, 2006?” the court entered judgment in favor of Prairie Meadows and
dismissed Blackford‟s conversion claims.
On appeal, Blackford raises the following issues:
I. Did the District Court Err in Ruling that Iowa Code Section
99F.4(22), Chapter 99 and other Code Sections provided
Defendant Casino Privilege to withhold Gambling Winnings of
Involuntary Trespassers and to Pay Said Winnings to the
Gamblers‟ Treatment Fund?
II. Did the District Court Err in Denying Plaintiff‟s Partial
Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff‟s conversion claim?
III. Did the District Court Err in Submitting Jury Instructions
Allowing Defendant Casino Privilege to Withhold Gambling
Winnings of Involuntarily Trespassed persons, in Requiring Plaintiff
to Prove that he was not a Trespasser rather Requiring Defendant
to Prove Plaintiff was a Trespasser, and in not Allowing Instructions
for a Trespass Ban to be Lifted by Means other than Express
Letter?
II. Standard of Review
This case was tried at law, and our review is for the correction of errors at
law. See Iowa R. App. P. 6.4. Findings of fact in a law action are binding upon
the appellate court if supported by substantial evidence.
Iowa R. App. P.
6.14(6)(a).
III. Conversion
A. The sole claim remaining at the time of trial was that of conversion.
Conversion is the wrongful control or dominion over another‟s property contrary
to that person‟s possessory right to the property.
Whalen v. Connelly, 621
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N.W.2d 681, 687 (Iowa 2000). “The wrongful control must amount to a serious
interference with the other person‟s right to control the property.” Condon Auto
Sales & Serv., Inc. v. Crick, 604 N.W.2d 587, 593 (Iowa 1999). We consider the
following factors to determine whether one person‟s interference with another
person‟s property right would give rise to a claim of conversion:
(a)
the extent and duration of the actor‟s exercise of dominion
and control;
(b)
the actor‟s intent to assert a right in fact inconsistent with the
other‟s right of control;
(c)
the actor‟s good faith;
(d)
the extent and duration of the resulting interference with the
other‟s right of control;
(e)
the harm done to the chattel; and
(f)
the inconvenience and expense caused to the other.
Larson v. Great West Cas. Co., 482 N.W.2d 170, 174 (Iowa Ct. App. 1992);
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 222A at 431 (1964).
There is no conversion where the exercise of control was not wrongful,
that is where the person taking control of the property does so rightfully. Larson,
482 at 173. In order to establish a claim of conversion, a plaintiff must establish
a possessory interest in the property. Kendall/Hunt Publ’g Co. v. Rowe, 424
N.W.2d 235, 247 (Iowa 1988); 18 Am. Jur. 2d. Conversion § 2, at 155 (2004).
Thus, in order to prove his claim of conversion, Blackford is required to show he
had a possessory interest in his winnings at Prairie Meadows on May 5, 2006.
B. The trial court first found that like a person voluntarily banned from a
casino, an involuntarily banned person like Blackford may not keep any winnings
from gambling. The trial court considered Iowa Code section 99F.4(22) (2005),
regarding voluntary trespassers, to determine Blackford‟s rights as an involuntary
trespasser. Section 99F.4(22) requires gambling facilities to “establish a process
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to allow a person to be voluntarily excluded for life from an excursion gambling
boat” and other licensed facilities.1 If a person violates the voluntary ban, no
money is paid to the person by the gambling facility, but any amounts won by the
person are deposited into a gambling treatment fund. Iowa Code § 99F.4(22).
Blackford correctly points out that he was not a voluntary trespasser under
section 99F.4(22), and that section does not apply to him. We determine the trial
court improperly relied upon section 994F.4(22) in determining whether Prairie
Meadows had a right to confiscate the winnings of a person who had been
involuntarily banned from the casino.
C. The other basis for the trial court‟s ruling was a finding that there was
no legally binding contract with Prairie Meadows for payment of winnings. It is
clear that a bet or wager with a casino creates a contract. See Romanski v.
Detroit Entertainment, L.L.C., 265 F. Supp. 2d 835, 845 (E.D. Mich. 2003) (noting
that when a person places money into a gambling game at a casino the parties
enter into an aleatory contract); Ledou v. Grand Casino-Coushatta, 954 So.2d
902, 907 (La. Ct. App. 2007) (finding the law of contracts was determinative in an
action by a patron against a casino for payment of a jackpot); Decker v. Bally’s
Grand Hotel Casino, 655 A.2d 73, 76 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994)
(“[P]laintiff‟s only contract with any defendant is the obligation of the defendants
to pay the posted machine jackpot to the plaintiff immediately after the plaintiff
has inserted the requisite coinage if the deposit of coinage registers a jackpot on
1
Iowa Code section 99D.7(22) contains a similar provision to establish a process to
allow a person to voluntarily request to be banned from facilities with pari-mutual
gambling. These provisions permit problem gamblers to voluntarily ask to be banned
from gambling facilities.
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the particular machine then in use.”); 38 C.J.S. Gaming § 3, at 97 (1996) (noting
a bet or wager generally operates like a contract). But see Logan v. Ameristar
Casino Council Bluffs, 185 F. Supp. 2d 1012, 1026 (S.D. Iowa 2002) (“[T]he
highly regulated nature of the gambling industry drastically reduces the parties‟
freedom to contract and thereby precludes the mutuality necessary to form a
„gambling contract.‟”).
On the other hand, the act of a patron placing a bet or wager at a casino
does not create a traditional contract. “While it is possible to conceive of the
relationship between patron and casino in contractual terms, it is a contract in
which the terms are not left to the parties, but rather are completely determined
by legislative enactment.”
Marcangelo v. Boardwalk Regency Corp. 847 F.
Supp. 1222, 1229 (D.N.J. 1994) (footnote omitted); see also Tose v. Greate Bay
Hotel & Casino, Inc., 819 F. Supp. 1312, 1316 n.8 (D.N.J. 1993) (“[B]ecause
every aspect of the relationship between the gambler and the casino is minutely
regulated and there is little freedom of contract in the usual sense, there seems
to be at least significant doubt that the New Jersey Supreme Court would
recognize obligations not specifically called for by statute or regulations.”).
In determining whether there was an enforceable contract, we look to the
legislative enactments in Iowa. See Marcangelo, 847 F. Supp. at 1229. Under
Iowa Code section 537A.4, in general, gambling contracts are “absolutely void
and of no effect.”
The statute creates exceptions for gambling occurring in
compliance with chapters 99B, 99D, 99F, and 99G. Iowa Code § 537A.4. The
applicable section in this case would be chapter 99F, “wagering under the
excursion boat gambling method of wagering . . . .” See id.
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The trial court found Blackford did not come within the exception found in
section 537A.4 for gambling in accordance with chapter 99F, because Blackford
had been banned from the casino. The court cited Iowa Administrative Code rule
491-5.4(5)(d), which provides as follows:
A licensee may eject or exclude any person, licensed or
unlicensed, from the premises or a part thereof of the licensee‟s
facility, solely of the licensee‟ own volition and without any reason
or excuse given, provided ejection or exclusion is not founded on
constitutionally protected grounds such as race, creed, color,
disability, or national origin.
....
The commission may exclude any person ejected by a
licensee from any and all pari-mutual facilities, gambling structures,
or excursion gambling boats controlled by any licensee upon a
finding that attendance of the person would be adverse to the
public interest.
While rule 491-5.4(5)(d) provides that a casino may eject and exclude a
patron from the premises, there is no provision for what happens to the patron‟s
winnings if the person fails to honor the ban and returns to the premises.
Furthermore, there is no provision in section 99F authorizing the casino to
confiscate the winnings of a patron who, although banned under rule 4915.4(5)(d), returns to the casino.2 Because the relative rights of the parties are
determined by legislative enactment, we determine that because there is no
statutory or regulatory provision authorizing Prairie Meadows to confiscate
Blackford‟s winnings, it could not legally do so.
We conclude the trial court erred in its pretrial legal ruling that Prairie
Meadows would not be required to pay winnings to a person involuntarily
2
Section 99F.4(22) permits only the confiscation of winnings from a voluntarily banned
person. As noted above, this provision does not apply to Blackford, who was
involuntarily banned from Prairie Meadows.
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excluded from the casino. We conclude Blackford has shown the first element of
his claim of conversion, that he had a possessory interest in the property.
IV. Partial Summary Judgment
Blackford asserts the trial court erred by denying his motion for partial
summary judgment on the ground that he had established a claim of conversion
as a matter of law. The Iowa Supreme Court has held “determinations made in
advance of trial concerning a genuine issue of material fact will not constitute
grounds for reversal where a full trial is subsequently held and sufficient evidence
is produced to sustain the claim.” Klooster v. N. Iowa State Bank, 404 N.W.2d
564, 567 (Iowa 1987). This is because “the denial of the motion for summary
judgment merges with the trial on the merits where the trier of fact reviewed the
exhibits and listened to the testimony of witnesses.”
Kiesau v. Bantz, 686
N.W.2d 164, 174 (Iowa 2004). After a trial on the merits of a case, a previous
court order denying a motion for summary judgment is not subject to appeal or
review. Id. We therefore decline to address Blackford‟s claims regarding the trial
court‟s denial of his motion for summary judgment.
V. Jury Instructions
Blackford claims the trial court erred in the submission of several jury
instructions because the instructions did not contain a correct statement of the
law. We have already determined that the trial court erred in its legal conclusions
in this case.
We have carefully considered all of the remaining issues raised by the
parties and find that they either without merit or controlled by the foregoing. We
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reverse the decision of the trial court and remand for further proceedings in
accordance with this decision.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Potterfield, J., concurs; Sackett, C.J., concurs specially without opinion.
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