SANDRA DORALE, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. RAY DORALE, Defendant-Appellant.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 8-931 / 08-0560
Filed May 6, 2009
SANDRA DORALE,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
RAY DORALE,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Monona County, Mary Jane
Sokolovske, Judge.
The defendant appeals a district court judgment quieting title to real estate
in the plaintiff. AFFIRMED.
Joseph Halbur, Carroll, for appellant.
Julie Schumacher, Denison, for appellee.
Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Mahan and Miller, JJ.
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MILLER, J.
Ray A. Dorale and Sandra K. Dorale, then husband and wife, on March 1,
1997, leased from Viola Dorale for ten years a legally described quarter section
of land located in Monona County, Iowa. The lease granted them an option to
purchase the real estate for $600 per acre on the landlord’s death, or earlier at
the landlord’s option. They later exercised the option. Although it is not clear
from the record, it appears the exercise of the option occurred after Viola
Dorale’s death.
In July 2005 Sandra sought and secured an order protecting her from
Ray’s domestic abuse.1 Two days after Sandra filed her petition for relief from
domestic abuse, Ray filed a petition for dissolution of marriage. An October 2006
decree dissolving their marriage awarded Ray “the west half of the Viola Dorale
property option,” and awarded Sandra “[t]he east half of the Viola Dorale option.”
The 160 acres had been appraised at $448,000 in September 2006. The East
and West halves were of equal value, so the eighty acres awarded to Sandra had
a September 2006 value of $224,000.
Ray wished to own the entire 160 acres, which he had farmed for years.
The existing protective order prohibited him from, among other things,
“communicat[ing] with [Sandra] in person or through any means including third
persons.” Ray nevertheless made efforts, by communicating through Sandra’s
father, to purchase Sandra’s interest in the eighty acres that had been awarded
to her.
1
The order prohibited Ray from having contact with Sandra, was later extended, and
according to the parties remained in effect in March 2007.
3
Raymond’s efforts culminated in events on March 12, 2007.
On that
evening he visited Sandra’s father’s home to talk to him. Unplanned, Sandra
also arrived to visit with her father. Discussions and arguments, contentious and
sometimes heated, ensued for approximately four hours.
At or near the
conclusion of the evening’s events Ray wrote, and Ray, Sandra, and Sandra’s
father signed, a paper that stated:
The divorce decree will not be changed. Ray Dorale will pay Sandy
Dorale $125,000 plus $48,000 for the East half “80 acres” of the
Viola Dorale farm. Sandy Dorale will give Ray the “Deed” to the
farm and get paid at the same time at the United Bank of Iowa in
Charter Oak Iowa.
3-12-07.
About a month later Ray again signed the paper, having his second
signature notarized. On May 14, 2007, Ray had the paper filed in the office of
the Monona County Recorder.
Sandra later received an offer to purchase her eighty acres.
The
purchaser’s attorney opined that the “interloping document” filed by Ray rendered
Sandra’s title unmerchantable. Sandra filed this action in equity seeking to have
title quieted in her.
petition.
Ray answered, denying material allegations of Sandra’s
He also asserted a counterclaim in equity, alleging the parties had
entered a binding contract for Sandra to sell her interest in the eighty acres to
him. Sandra answered the counterclaim, denying material allegations thereof.
Evidence at trial, including Ray’s testimony, shows that the value of the 160
acres had increased substantially during the six months between the September
2006 appraisal and the events of March 12, 2007.
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Following trial, the district court quieted title to the eighty acres to Sandra
and denied Ray’s petition for specific performance. In doing so it concluded that
Sandra’s signature on the document in question was the product of duress, the
purported contract was thus voidable, and the document was therefore
unenforceable as a contract for the sale of the property in question. The court
further concluded that the document in question did not constitute an enforceable
contract for the sale of land because it lacked essential terms of such a contract.
Ray appeals. He claims
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO ORDER
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE ON THE WRITTEN AGREEMENT
MADE BY THE APPELLANT AND APPELLEE FOR THE SALE OF
APPELLEE’S EIGHTY (80) ACRES TO THE APPELLANT.
Our review in these combined equity actions is de novo. Iowa R. App. P.
6.4; Krotz v. Sattler, 586 N.W.2d 336, 338 (Iowa 1998) (quiet title action);
Breitbach v. Christenson, 541 N.W.2d 840, 843 (Iowa 1995) (specific
performance). We give weight to the fact findings of the district court, especially
when considering the credibility of witnesses, but are not bound by them. Iowa
R. App. P. 6.14(6)(g).
The decision to grant specific performance is within our sound
discretion; it is not to be granted as a matter of right. It is to be
granted only in extraordinary, unusual cases in which irreparable
harm will result in its absence, not as a matter of grace. In
determining whether to grant a request for specific performance, we
must examine the particular facts of the situation and will generally
grant the request when it would subserve the ends of justice and
deny to do so where it would produce a hardship or injustice in
either party.
Breitbach, 541 N.W.2d at 843.
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While a court trying a case in which specific performance is sought has
considerable discretion in granting or withholding such a remedy, the discretion is
not absolute. Incorporated Town of Wahpeton v. Rocklin, 254 Iowa 948, 953,
119 N.W.2d 880, 883 (1963). Any inequitable conduct on the part of the party
seeking specific performance will justify its denial.
N.W.2d 813, 817 (Iowa 1980).
Youngblut v. Wilson, 294
“A greater degree of certainty of contract is
required for specific performance in equity than is necessary to establish a basis
of an action at law for damages.” Kelley v. Creston Buick Sales Co., 239 Iowa
1236, 1241, 34 N.W.2d 598, 601 (1948).
Ray claims the trial court erred in concluding Sandra signed the paper in
question under duress.
In so concluding the court quoted and relied on
Restatement (Second) of Contracts sections 175 and 176. Those provisions
state:
§ 175. When Duress By Threat Makes A Contract Voidable
1)
If a party’s manifestation of assent is induced by an improper
threat by the other party that leaves the victim no reasonable
alternative, the contract is voidable by the victim.
2)
If a party’s manifestation of assent is induced by one who is
not a party to the transaction, the contract is voidable by the victim
unless the other party to the transaction in good faith and without
reason to know of the duress either gives value or relies materially
on the transaction.
§ 176. When A Threat Is Improper
1)
A threat is improper if
a)
what is threatened is a crime or a tort, or the threat
itself would be a crime or a tort if it resulted in obtaining property,
b)
what is threatened is a criminal prosecution,
c)
what is threatened is the use of civil process and the
threat is made in bad faith, or
d)
the threat is a breach of the duty of good faith and fair
dealing under a contract with the recipient.
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2)
A threat is improper if the resulting exchange is not on fair
terms, and
a)
the threatened act would harm the recipient and
would not significantly benefit the party making the threat,
b)
the effectiveness of the threat in inducing the
manifestation of assent is significantly increased by prior unfair
dealing by the party making the threat, or
c)
what is threatened is otherwise a use of power for
illegitimate ends.
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 175, at 475-76; § 176, at 481-82
(1981).
In arguing the trial court erred, Ray focuses on the provisions of section
175(1), which concerns an improper threat by the other party to a contract, and
section 176, which describes when such a threat is “improper.” We, however,
read the trial court’s decision as finding the purported contract in this case to be
the result of duress under not only section 175(1), but also duress under section
175(2), which concerns a manifestation of assent induced by one not a party to
the contract, here Sandra’s father, Warren Thies. Our reading is based on the
fact that the court cited and quoted not only section 175(1) but also section
175(2), and the court’s conclusions that: “Mr. Theis [sic] testified that the parties
were arguing and he wanted the thing to end before someone got hurt. To that
end he repeatedly encouraged his daughter to settle with [Ray].”
Prior to the parties’ recent divorce Sandra had been the victim of domestic
abuse by Ray and she feared him. She testified that he had threatened her
physically concerning the land.
Ray’s post-divorce approaches to Sandra’s
father, Mr. Thies, to get Mr. Theis to convince Sandra to sell the eighty acres to
him, were in apparent violation of the protective order issued in the domestic
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abuse proceeding. When Sandra unexpectedly arrived at her father’s residence
while Ray was there, Ray did not leave. He instead seized the opportunity to
invoke Mr. Thies’s assistance, over a period of some three to four hours, to
convince Sandra to sell the eighty acres to him.
According to Sandra, her father was fearful and wanted Ray to leave. Mr.
Thies feared someone would get hurt.
Ray demonstrated anger and an
unwillingness to leave unless and until he got what he wanted. Sandra was
fearful and crying. Mr. Thies pressured Sandra to give Ray what he wanted in
order to end the situation and get him to leave. After lengthy pressure, including
a great deal of pressure from her own father, Sandra signed the paper purporting
to agree to sell to Ray for $173,000 her eighty acres. This land had six months
earlier appraised at $224,000, and according to the evidence had thereafter
increased substantially in value.
Upon our de novo review we find that Sandra’s manifestation of assent
was induced, in large part if not entirely, by her father, not a party to the
transaction, and that Ray was well aware of the pressure exerted on Sandra by
her father. We conclude Sandra’s manifestation of assent was the product of
duress, as described in Restatement (Second) of Contracts, section 175(2), and
is thus voidable and unenforceable. We need not and do not decide whether the
contract is also voidable pursuant to section 175(1). We have considered all
issues presented, and find any not expressly addressed herein either controlled
by the foregoing or unnecessary to resolution of the appeal. We agree with the
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trial court’s denial of Ray’s petition for specific performance and grant of a decree
quieting title in Sandra.
We affirm the judgment of the trial court. Costs on appeal are taxed to
Ray.
AFFIRMED.
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