STEVEN C. SHEEDER , Plaintiff - Appell ant , vs. BERN BOYETT E , Defendant - Appell ee . ______
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 8-899 / 08-1086
Filed February 19, 2009
STEVEN C. SHEEDER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
BERN BOYETTE,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Adams County, John D. Lloyd
(Order to Set Aside Default Judgment) and David Christensen (Judgment),
Judges.
A plaintiff appeals from the district court’s order setting aside a default
judgment entered against the defendant and from the district court’s order
entering offsetting judgments in favor of the plaintiff and defendant. REVERSED
AND REMANDED.
David Leitner, West Des Moines, for appellant.
Lyle Ditmars, Council Bluffs, and Richard Wilson, Lenox, for appellee.
Heard by Vogel, P.J., and Vaitheswaran and Eisenhauer, JJ.
2
VOGEL, P.J.
Steve Sheeder, the plaintiff in an action seeking damages for deprivation
of farm land, appeals from the district court’s ruling setting aside a default
judgment. Sheeder asserts that the district court abused its discretion in setting
aside the default judgment because the defendant lied to the court as to his
reason for not appearing for trial. We agree that “good cause” cannot be based
on an untruth.
Therefore, we reverse and remand for reinstatement of the
original judgment.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
On July 3, 2006, Sheeder filed an action for deprivation of farmland
naming Bern Boyette as the defendant. On September 17, 2006, Boyette was
served with notice of the suit. Subsequently, the district court set a scheduling
conference, but the conference was reset seven times because both parties
failed to appear. On January 19, 2007, Sheeder filed a notice of intent to file an
application for default.
On March 8, 2007, Boyette filed an answer and
counterclaim. On March 12, 2007, the district court scheduled trial for November
6, 2007.
Prior to trial, on August 6, 2007, Boyette’s attorney filed a motion to
withdraw. Boyette resisted his attorney’s motion by submitting a letter to the
court.
On August 27, 2007, following a hearing, the district court granted
Boyette’s attorney’s motion to withdraw.
On November 6, 2007, the case came on for trial and neither Boyette nor
counsel for Boyette appeared. The district court received evidence offered by
3
Sheeder to support the claims alleged in his petition.1 The district court then
entered a default judgment in the amount of $131,257.01 in favor of Sheeder and
dismissed with prejudice Boyette’s counterclaims.
On November 20, 2007, Boyette moved to have the default judgment set
aside. Following a hearing, the district court granted Boyette’s motion finding
that the default judgment should be set aside on the grounds of excusable
neglect. However, should Boyette be successful in any of his counterclaims, he
would only be allowed damages to the extent of any damages awarded to
Sheeder.
On June 10, 2008, following a trial, the district court found that
Sheeder was not entitled to notice of termination of the farm tenancy under Iowa
Code chapter 562 (2005).2 On other claims not at issue in this appeal, the
district court entered judgment in favor of each party in the amount of $902.14.
II. Default Judgment
Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.977 provides “[o]n motion and for good
cause . . . the court may set aside a default or the judgment thereon, for mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, excusable neglect or unavoidable casualty.” In ruling on
a motion to set aside a default judgment, the district court is vested with broad
discretion and will only be reversed if that discretion is abused. Brandenburg v.
Feterl Mfg. Co., 603 N.W.2d 580, 584 (Iowa 1999). We are bound by the district
court’s factual findings if supported by substantial evidence.
1
Id.
The
The record on appeal does not contain a transcript of the hearing nor any of the
evidence admitted.
2
Sheeder also appeals from the judgment asserting that the district court erred in
considering Iowa Code section 562.6 as it was not raised nor pled by the parties.
However, we do not reach this argument as we reverse and remand for entry of the
default judgment.
4
determination of whether a movant has established good cause is not a factual
finding; rather, it is a legal conclusion and is not binding on us. Id.
The burden is on the movant to plead and prove good cause. Id.; Cent.
Nat’l Ins. Co. of Omaha v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 513 N.W.2d 750, 754 (Iowa 1994).
Good cause is a “sound, effective, and truthful reason. It is something more than
an excuse, a plea, apology, extenuation, or some justification, for the resulting
effect.” Cent. Nat’l Ins. Co. of Omaha, 513 N.W.2d at 754 (emphasis added);
Hansman v. Gute, 215 N.W.2d 339, 342 (Iowa 1974). Rather, the reason for
default must rise to one of the grounds enumerated in the rule:
mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, excusable neglect or unavoidable casualty. Cent. Nat’l
Ins. Co. of Omaha, 513 N.W.2d at 754. Additionally, good cause requires at
least a claimed defense asserted in good faith. Id.
The underlying purpose of rule 1.977 is “to allow a determination of
controversies on their merits rather than on the basis of nonprejudicial
inadvertence or mistake.”
Brandenburg, 603 N.W.2d at 584. However, this
objective is qualified because it cannot be extended to the point where a default
judgment will be vacated when the movant has ignored the rules of procedure
with ample opportunity to abide by them. Haynes v. Ruhoff, 261 Iowa 1279,
1282, 157 N.W.2d 914, 916 (1968). “[W]e have never upheld such a grant where
the movant fails to show any effort to appear in response to a due and timely
notice.” Id.
The issue before us is whether Boyette met his burden to prove “good
cause.”
Boyette moved the district court to set aside the default judgment
asserting that he did not have notice of the trial date. A hearing was held, during
5
which Boyette claimed that he had difficulty in receiving his mail and thus did not
have notice of the trial date.
Skeptical of this claim, the district court noted
several notices and orders sent to Boyette by the clerk of court, none of which
were returned as undeliverable.
The court also discussed a series of
correspondence between Boyette and his former counsel, all indicating Boyette
was receiving his mail and aware of the progress of the litigation. The district
court specifically found that
[Boyette] was advised of the trial date of November 6, 2007 from a
copy of the scheduling order sent to him by his attorney, was
advised of the need for prompt attention to pre-trial issues in mid
summer, and was further reminded at least of the general time
frame of his trial in the letter of August 3, 2007.
However, Boyette did little to “obtain other counsel following the withdrawal of his
attorney until faced with the entry of judgment against him.
His denial of
knowledge of the trial date is not credible.” In spite of a finding that Boyette’s
asserted reason for not appearing at trial was false, the district court found that
the default judgment should be set aside on the ground of excusable neglect.
Upon the parties’ motions to amend or enlarge, the district court again concluded
“[Boyette] knew of the trial date.”
Sheeder asserts that the district court abused its discretion because
Boyette lied to the court in an effort to excuse his failure to appear at the
scheduled trial.
Therefore, Sheeder asserts Boyette did not establish good
cause to set aside the default judgment. We agree. Pursuant to rule 1.977, the
burden is on Boyette to establish good cause, which requires a “sound, effective,
and truthful reason” that rises to one of the grounds enumerated in the rule.
Cent. Nat’l Ins. Co. of Omaha, 513 N.W.2d at 754. Because the district court
6
found that Boyette’s asserted reason for defaulting was not credible and indeed
false, Boyette was unable to plead the prerequisite “truthful reason” and therefore
unable to prove any of the grounds enumerated in the rule. Thus, he was unable
to prove good cause.
Nonetheless, the district court set aside the default judgment on the
ground of excusable neglect, but not without some noted reluctance. The factors
to be considered when setting aside a default judgment on the ground of
excusable neglect are:
(1) whether the defaulting party actually intended to
defend; (2) whether the defaulting party asserted a claim or defense in good
faith; (3) whether the defaulting party willfully ignored or defied the rules of
procedure or was the default simply the result of the mistake; and (4) whether
relief is warranted should not depend on who made the mistake.
See
Brandenburg, 603 N.W.2d at 585 (citing Cent. Nat’l Ins. Co. of Omaha, 513
N.W.2d at 756).
The district court found factors one, two, and four presented little difficulty.
The record demonstrated that at some point Boyette intended to defend the suit
and asserted a good faith defense and counterclaim.
Approximately eight
months after the suit was filed, Boyette hired an attorney who filed an answer
denying the plaintiff’s allegations and asserted a counterclaim. When Boyette’s
attorney moved to withdraw, Boyette resisted that motion in a letter to the court
stating he intended to defend the suit and was frustrated with his attorney’s
actions. Finally, once the default judgment was entered and Boyette received
notice of this entry, he quickly moved to set aside the default judgment. See
Cent. Nat’l Ins. Co. of Omaha, 513 N.W.2d at 756 (stating that whether the party
7
moved promptly to set aside the default is significant in determining whether the
party actually intended to defend).
However, the third factor, whether the defaulting party willfully ignored or
defied the rules of procedure or whether the default was simply the result of the
mistake, caused the district court “some difficulty.”
The district court noted
Boyette “consistently failed to appear for trial scheduling conferences and failed
to file an answer until notice of [the first] intent to file for a default.” Following the
withdrawal of Boyette’s counsel, he did little to defend the suit, including
obtaining new counsel, until receiving notice of the default judgment. The district
court did not believe Boyette’s reason for not appearing for trial, but nonetheless
found his intent “to defend was inconsistent with a finding that he willfully ignored
and defied the rules of procedure.”
See Brandenburg, 603 N.W.2d at 585
(stating substantial evidence the default occurred as a result of a mistake is
inconsistent with conduct that one willfully ignores or defies the rules of civil
procedure).
Boyette offered no credible evidence his failure to appear was a mistake.
As found by the district court, his stated reason for failure to appear was false.
We disagree with the premise that one can lie to the court about the reason for
not appearing and then succeed on a motion to have the default set aside. A
movant cannot prove any of the grounds enumerated in the rule based upon an
untruth. See, e.g., Cent. Nat’l Ins. Co. of Omaha, 513 N.W.2d at 754 (stating
requisite good cause is a truthful reason); Hansman, 215 N.W.2d at 342 (same).
In spite of the fact that at times Boyette intended to defend the suit, he did not put
forth a credible reason for not attending the scheduled trial and defaulting. Thus,
8
there was no truthful evidence that Boyette’s asserted reason for defaulting was
a mistake, such that it could support the district court’s finding of excusable
neglect.
We conclude that because Boyette’s asserted reason for not appearing at
the scheduled trial was false, he was unable to establish good cause to set aside
the default judgment. Thus, we reverse and remand for reinstatement of the
November 6, 2007 default judgment.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
